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INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE OF *KOMMUNIKÁCIÓ, MÉDIA, GAZDASÁG*

Inspired by the life and work of Budapest native and renowned Communication and Media scholar Dr. George Gerbner (1919-2005), Dr. Jolán Róka of the Budapest College of Communication and Business, and Dr. Rebecca M. Chory, then a Fulbright Scholar teaching at the Budapest College of Communication and Business, established the George Gerbner Conference on Communication, Conflict and Aggression in 2009. The goal of the conference is to bring together individuals with a common interest in aggressive communication, antisocial behavior, and conflict so as to foster international relationships that lead to research collaboration and knowledge exchange.

Planning for the first conference began in the Spring of 2009, culminating in the May 2010 inaugural conference. This first Gerbner conference featured 30 scholars from seven countries and three continents. Since its inception, the George Gerbner Conference on Communication, Conflict and Aggression has been held in Budapest, Hungary four times and has featured presentations by scholars from over 15 countries, covering four continents.

The manuscripts featured in this Special Issue of *Kommunikáció, Média, Gazdaság* were first presented at the 2013 and 2014 George Gerbner Conferences on Communication, Conflict and Aggression. They speak to a variety of topics related to conflict, aggression, disagreement, society and culture, and the media. Specifically, the manuscripts describe new applications of Gerbner's cultivation theory in Kenya and Turkey; the news media's role in culture-related conflict (e.g., dowry negotiations in India); emerging forms of aggression involving social media; interpersonal conflict among college students working in groups, in families concerning media violence, and in recovery from alcoholism; disagreement, debate, and attitudes toward social issues (e.g., gun violence); and topics concerning national security, consumer sovereignty, and the criminal justice, legal, and media systems. The authors examine these issues from various theoretical perspectives and scholarly traditions,

using a diversity of methods. Consistent with George Gerbner's contention that communication and media research contribute to the good of society (Róka & Chory, 2014), the articles in this special issue add to the open discussion of topics of contemporary public concern and interest.

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Reference

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SECTION I:

NEW DIRECTIONS IN CULTIVATION AND STORYTELLING

RETESTING CULTIVATION THEORY ON THE ORIGINS, CAUSES, AND PREDICTORS OF AGGRESSION:
THE CASE OF PRE- AND POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA

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Introduction

The world over, television has become an "integral" part and parcel of every household. The importance of TV in every society is evident in the central position the television is given in most homes. Literally, in almost every home in major cities and towns, for example, furniture in the living room is arranged in relation to the spot the television has been given in each house. The arrangement is such that from every place one may sit, his/her television view is clear and uninterrupted. It therefore seems that the television is actually an essential "family" member whose place in the family is not only catered to but also guaranteed. This is not a new development at all. Already in 1972, George Gerbner and his colleague Lawrence Gross commented that "people watch television as though they

were attending church, except that they typically watch television more religiously" (West & Turner, 2010, p. 377).

Further, the duo made a causal argument about television. Namely, that television cultivates (causes) conceptions of social reality (ibid.). Cultivation theory argues that heavy television viewers develop an exaggerated belief in a mean and frightening world. That is, the violence they see on the screen can cultivate a social paranoia that counters notions of trustworthy people or safe surroundings. For example, there could be people or places one trusts but after heavy TV viewing the person may begin to develop doubts about the same. In a nutshell, the cultivation theory holds that television is a "message system" that "cultivates" or creates a worldview that, although possibly inaccurate, becomes reality because people believe it to be reality and base their judgments about their own everyday worlds on that "reality" (ibid.). This is corroborated by West and Turner (2010) who observed that television and other media play an important role in how people view their world; especially since most people get their information from mediated sources rather than through direct experience. Thus, the duo observe, "mediated sources can shape a person's sense of reality. This is especially the case with regard to violence. Heavy television viewing cultivates a sense of the world as a violent place, and heavy television viewers perceive that there is more violence in the world than there actually is or than lighter viewers perceive" (p. 379).

The average viewer watches television four hours a day while the heavy viewer watches even more (Severin & Tankard, 1997). And for heavy viewers, television virtually monopolizes and subsumes other sources of information, ideas and consciousness with the effect of this exposure being that heavy television viewers often give answers that are closer to the way the world is portrayed on television (ibid). They take the television world to be their world. Cultivation researchers note that the "differences between heavy and light television viewers show up even across a number of other important variables, including age, education, news reading, and gender" (ibid; p. 300).

From the above observations that mediated sources can shape a person's sense of reality, the reflections and findings of George Gerbner can thus be expanded beyond television to include other mediated means of communication. In this study, therefore, we seek to show Gerbner's theory as not only applicable to television, but also to other media, such as radio. Hence, we chose to re-test cultivation effects using radio. While

not stating that the theory is incorrect, we hold that its scope can be widened. This we shall seek to portray in the first part of the paper where we shall examine cultivation theory effects based on radio by examining pre- and post-Genocide Rwanda.

The second part of the paper will focus on a positive theme gaining momentum on Rwandan television. This is peace. While Gerbner's work was based on violent television programming and effects, our reflections on post-Genocide Rwanda demonstrate that exposure to positive messages over a period of time yields positive effects. This study thus illustrates that heavy television viewing of positive programs also impacts viewers in the very same way. With Rwanda's government having expanded the television network to reach most of the population, it is currently being used to promote peace. Therefore, we shall look closely at how Rwanda television is playing a role of peace building among her citizens through the creation and transmission of different types of peace messages; in a bid to manage and prevent aggression in post-Genocide Rwanda.

Situating the Research Country in Context

The World Bank report (2012) estimates the current Rwanda population at 11.46 million people. Rwanda is a small country located in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa. It is bordered to the West by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania to the East, Uganda to the North and Burundi to the South. According to the 2013 CIA World Fact Book, the major ethnic groups in Rwanda are Hutu (Bantu) 84%, Tutsi (Hamitic) 15%, and Twa (Pygmy) 1%. Literacy in Rwanda is at 71.1%. The law requires that every person should have at least a sixth grade education.

According to UHRC (2013), in 1994 during the Genocide, Rwanda's population was seven million people and composed of three ethnic groups: Hutu 85%, Tutsi 14% and Twa 1%. There were three major religious groups, namely Roman Catholic (60%), Protestants (20-30%), and Islam and Baha'I (about 10-20%). This means that at the time of the genocide, Rwanda's population was over 80% Christians. Rwanda has three official languages. These are Kinyarwanda, French, and English. Kiswahili is mostly used in trade centers. Rwanda is still largely dominated by Christians of different denominations. The largest denominations are Roman Catholics (56.5%), followed by Protestant

(26%), Adventist (11.1%), Muslims (4.6%) and the indigenous beliefs at 0.10% (CIA world fact book, 2013).

History of Aggression in Rwanda

Historically, as documented by Dauge-Roth (2010), between April 7th and mid-July, 1994, it is estimated that more than one million people were killed in what became the most ghastly mass-killing occurrence in Africa, the Rwandan Genocide. Tribe turned against tribe, with the Hutu inflicting heavy casualties on the Tutsis who were massacred mercilessly. The Hutus who refused to kill their fellow countrymen were also not spared. Death engulfed the land, with thousands being slaughtered each day by Hutu-led Rwanda Armed Forces and extremist militias known as *interahamwe*. To them, all Tutsis were traitors who deserved systematic elimination like "cockroaches," or "*inyenzi*." In order to accomplish this, a systematic form of communication had to be in play, and radio filled that position.

Longacre (2003) states that Rwanda's violence during the genocide did not just explode out of nowhere. There was strong underlying hatred between the Tutsis and the Hutus nurtured over scores of years. Around the 19th century, Tutsi kings (*Mwaamis*) ruled over the Tutsis, Hutus and Twa (pygmies) in a stratified feudal system where the Hutu majority were peasant farmers. Because of the anthropological myths introduced by the 19th century colonisers, such as John Hannington Speke, the cleavages that divided the people were cast in stone. For example, the Hamitic myth that the Tutsis were descendants of the biblical Ham was supposed to explain the arrival of civilization into Rwanda and legitimize the political and cultural superiority of the Tutsis who had lighter skin and held more intellectual and social qualities. Unfortunately, the Tutsis, while it served their purposes, believed in their own "natural superiority" and treated the Hutus with the harshness appropriate to a lower caste. In 1933, the Belgians institutionalised the split between the two groups, culminating in the issuance of an ethnic identity card to every Rwandan. Although Hutus resented their status and harsh treatment, considerable intermarriage took place between the two groups. Ironically, the identity cards introduced by the Belgians in 1933 to entrench Tutsi privileges and "ethnic distinctions" ended up being the very tool used by the Hutus to identify the Tutsis for elimination at killer road-blocks.

History of Rwanda's Radio Weapon

It is important to go back into Rwanda's history to understand the almost hypnotic control the radio had over the masses before and during the genocide. According to Dauge-Roth (2010), the propaganda directed at the population needed to reach a saturation point at which the population was "conditioned" to find killing "acceptable in the majority's eyes." It is not easy to explain how such massive mobilization and willing, or coerced, participation was possible. Kellow and Steeves (1998) suggest that African countries possess strong traditions of hierarchy and authoritarianism, which increases the likelihood of blind obedience. They indicate that these traditions are still remarkably strong in Rwanda. This is corroborated by Thomas Kamilindi, a Rwandan journalist, who notes that Radio Rwanda, the only radio station from 1961, "was the voice of authority, and authority is respected in Rwanda. People are raised and taught to take what they hear on radio as gospel truth" (2007, p. 136). Kamilindi resigned from the state-run radio just before the genocide erupted, citing the fact that he had been asked on several occasions to broadcast inaccurate and irresponsible news. He says, "I resigned from Radio Rwanda a few months before the genocide started… I had been asked to broadcast news that was repugnant to me" (ibid. p. 138).

Strategizing the Airwaves through Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM)

Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) strategised the airwaves for the Genocide. RTLM was established in 1993 by people close to or from the stronghold of President Habyarimana, who opposed the ongoing Arusha peace talks between President Juvenal Habyarimana and the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front. The station, which came to be known as the voice of genocide, initially reached out in a manner different from the state officials on Radio Rwanda, who delivered the government's official communication to a largely illiterate population in a dull way. As explained by Des Forges (2007), RTLM's goal was to woo the listeners. Therefore it used entertainment, such as the latest popular Congolese songs, as the initial bait. It also incorporated the voice of the common man into the airwaves through interactive programmes, preying upon the deep animosities and prejudices between the Hutu and Tutsi populations. This hateful rhetoric was placed alongside the sophisticated use of humour and music, while the presenters frequently referred to

Tutsis as "cockroaches." For example, the presenter would say: "You [Tutsis] are cockroaches! We will kill you!"

With more popularity came legitimacy. They still maintained official voices often enough to continue to enjoy the authoritativeness of a national radio and the added appeal of being the "station to speak for the people." RTLM soon won the hearts of the majority Hutu and quickly developed a faithful audience among youthful Rwandese, who later made up the bulk of the *Interahamwe* militia. Controlling the RTLM, the Hutu, with unmitigated impunity, whipped up long-standing sentiments of hostility and hatred for the Tutsis. At an RTLM fundraising meeting, Félicien Kabuga, who was allegedly heavily involved in the founding of RTLM, as well as the *Kangura* magazine, is alleged to have publicly defined the purpose of RTLM as the defense of Hutu power. Defending their actions through radio, the Hutus termed the genocide as an act of self-defense and a patriotic gesture. This became so ingrained in the minds of the majority Hutus that they firmly believed it was legal to kill a Tutsi.

Radio and Cultivation Theory

In 1994, Rwanda was the site of one of the most atrocious genocides in human history. Rwandan media played a central part in the tragedy. It is worth noting that Rwanda's public television began broadcasting in 1992. However, the impact of television as a form of media was very limited because only the upper-class elite had televisions at the time, and the middle-class had televisions that only played video cassettes. Radio, on the other hand, played a significant role in fuelling hatred in Rwanda and was used as a channel for anti-Tutsi propaganda. "Hate-radio" served as a voice of the anti-Tutsi campaign, inciting and instructing people whom and how to kill. Through radio, hate propaganda was responsible for fanning and coordinating the rapid wave of violence that was carried across the country.

Radio, therefore, formed the perfect tool to cultivate ideas of violence among the rural masses, and became a systematic weapon of choice during the genocide. According to Chretien, Dupaquier and Kabanda (1995) two tools were used to advance violence: the radio and the machete. The first was to give and receive orders while the second was to carry them out. Fisher-Murray (2004) concurs, asserting that RTLM acted as a direct organizing centre for the genocide, inciting and coordinating

the movements of "*genocidaires*," a French term for the mixture of militiamen, soldiers and ordinary citizens. Indeed, "media were used in Rwanda to spread hatred, to dehumanize people, and even to guide the *genocidaires* toward their victims" (Annan, 2007, p. ix)

In its verdict in the 'Media Trial' against the founders and executives of RTLM and *Kangura*, the judges at the International Crime Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) confirmed the undoubted role of Rwandan hate media in mobilising the population, whipping them into a frenzy of hatred and violence that was directed largely at the Tutsi ethnic group. The newspapers and the radio explicitly and repeatedly, in fact relentlessly, targeted the Tutsi population for destruction. Demonizing the Tutsi as having inherently evil qualities, equating the ethnic group with the enemy, and portraying its women as seductive enemy agents, the media called for the destruction of the Tutsi ethnic group (ICTR 2003, # 72).

The RTLM used its broadcasts to goad the killers during several months of conditioning the population. It was not a one-off incident because the element of repetition was present. This is consistent with Gerbner's cultivation theory which posits that there needs to be an extended period of population exposure to violent media content.

Radio and Content Type

Among the critiques of this theory are Potter and Chang (1990) who hold that Gerbner assumed the world presented on television is uniform across programmes and across time. They argue that it is possible for a person to watch television and see very little violence because of the large differences in levels of violence across the programmes. Concurring with the duo, Hawkins and Pingree (1981, as cited in Potter, 1990) measured television viewing in terms of different genres of programming and found dissimilar effects for the various types of programmes. In reference to these critiques, we see cultivation not only as a matter of continuous exposure for long periods, but also the degree or measure of whatever content is being aired. In Rwanda, the intensity of violence was further accentuated by graphic content through other forms of media such as newspapers. Nowrojee (1996) elaborates that "sexually graphic and offensive depictions" appeared in the pages of *Kangura* as an incitement to the "brutal sexual violence and rape that became the stock in trade of the killers" (p. 9).

Cultivation, radio and continuous exposure. Radio messages were thick with hate, incitement and utter antagonism by the Hutus against the Tutsis, with the RTLM radio *animateurs* deliberately sneering and scornful of the Tutsis in their broadcasts. According to Dauge-Roth (2010), the radio messages evoked negative historical memories of the colonial rule, transforming the Tutsis from exotic aristocrats to parasitic outsiders. The radio messages constantly reminded people of the numerical weakness of the Tutsi minority, which not only guaranteed their defeat but also absolved the Hutus of any blame, since an enemy resisting in the face of such odds had to be suicidal. The *animateurs* asked listeners every morning, "Have you started 'work' yet?" This "work" was a euphemism for killing Tutsis. Through a daily diet of informational updates, operational details, and encouraging monologues, they contributed to the framing of schedules and the rationalization of "work." RTLM broadcast regular "updates" that documented the dead and indicated to the killers the location of the remaining "cockroaches" so they could be killed. Hutu women who did not actively participate in the slaughter nevertheless heeded the station's entreaties to go out and pillage the belongings of those who had been killed.

According to Li (2004), the radio's power to propagate such levels of violence, and cause millions to respond, lay in the repetitive nature of its broadcasts. The broadcasts, which "reverberated in the thoughts and actions of millions of people, both participants and witnesses…did not rest solely in words… but…in the process of articulation and rearticulation by *animateurs* and listeners" (p. 105). Thus the cultivation principle in Gerbner's theory was addressed, in that, the continuous exposure to radio-mediated anti-Tutsi propaganda and hate-filled messages advocating violence served to incite people to extreme aggressive behaviour.

Causes/Contributors of the Rwandan Genocide

The causes of the genocide fall into three main categories, namely media (radio and print), social and political authority; and prior wars in Rwanda.

Media (radio and print media). As mentioned earlier, RTLM was basically used to relay instructions to the perpetrators about whom to attack and in what place. It actually legitimized the violence since it was the voice of those in authority (Des Forges, 2007). According to Melvern (2006), the daily order of operation of the RTML was as follows:

8:30 am - 12 noon:	Kinyarwanda programmes
5 pm - 8 pm:	Kinyarwanda programmes
8 pm - 10 pm:	Programmes in French

The Kinyarwanda broadcasts made between January and May 1994, were so different in tone from the French that they should have served as vital signs of what was to come (Dallaire, 2007).

In downplaying the story and dismissing it as ethnic clashes, the international media also contributed to the genocide by giving room for the hate propaganda to spread. Instead of the Rwandan genocide, the international focus shifted to other international events, such as the first post-apartheid elections in South Africa, the White House lawn handshake between Yitzak Rabin and Yasser Arafat (Dowden, 2007; Hilsum, 2007), the elections in Yugoslavia, and, ironically, the thousands pouring into Tanzania to escape the killings (Melvern, 2007). When the Rwandan government realized how instrumental and successful radio was in sowing hatred and spreading it among the very large and illiterate population, it bought radios for those who could not afford them (ibid).

Concerning print, *Kangura*, the extremist newspaper created by a former bus driver, Hassan Ngeze, was particularly known for its publication of the infamous Hutu Ten Commandments. The *Kangura* was funded by the government, military officers and members of a group known as the MRND (*Mouvement Révolutionaire pour le Développement*) Party. Between 1,500 and 3,000 copies were printed in Kinyarwanda and French and distributed twice a month. By then, Rwanda's literacy level was less than 30%. However, the journal had such sensational stories that everyone looked forward to reading them or hearing them read out during public gatherings, or the *interahamwe* rallies (Melvern, 2006). Some of the propaganda in the journal included claims that the Tutsis were manipulating the banking system since a disproportionate 70% of them were rich and had better jobs, and also that they would use their women to seduce the Hutus and overthrow them.

Social and political authority. After Rwanda's independence in 1962, explains Melvern (2006), the first president Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu, formed a government consisting of Hutus only and whose prime focus was the extermination of the perceived enemy—the Tutsis. Those Tutsis who had fled to the neighboring countries during the previous wars became refugees. Having been denied entry permits into Rwanda, a group

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of 15,000 refugees tried twice, without success, to oust Kayibanda. The government laid the blame squarely on the Tutsis inside Rwanda and made plans to eliminate them, starting with political opponents. The elimination of the Tutsis had been on the country's political leaders' agenda ever since they rose to power, and this fact had been repeatedly conveyed in official speeches (Dauge-Roth, 2010).

Many years later, the Prime Minister of Rwanda, Jean Kambada, is reported to have planned and perpetrated the 1994 genocide by ensuring that the local authorities had enough human resources for genocide, eliminating those unwilling to take part in the genocide, sanctioning violence and mass murder, and creating a climate of hatred and negative thinking. All manner of weapons were then used to kill the Tutsis and the mutilated bodies of the victims were unceremoniously dumped by the roadside. A statement by a military officer confirms how deeply those in authority hated the Tutsis and openly propagated the ideology of polarization: "[The] Tutsis never had a country of their own to make themselves into a people, they are people who came to Rwanda and were naturalized. They were given a home but with arrogance and pride they had imposed their supremacy on the Hutu of Rwanda" (Melvern, 2006, p. 3).

Prior wars in Rwanda. The previous wars in 1959, 1963, 1973 and 1992 made massive participation in the genocide in 1994 easier because of the climate of impunity they had progressively created. The 1959 outbreak of violence left about 2,000 people dead, while in 1963, about 14,000 were murdered (Dauge-Roth, 2010). In 1973, when the Tutsis in Burundi regained power and massacred 200,000 Hutus in revenge, President Jean Gregoire Kayibanda used the incident to spice up the anti-Tutsi campaign in Rwanda (Melvern, 2006).

Predictors of Aggression in the Rwandan Genocide

In 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel group composed mostly of Tutsi refugees, invaded northern Rwanda from Uganda in an attempt to defeat the Hutu-led government. Thus began the Rwandan Civil War between the Hutu regime, supported by Francophone Africa and France, and the RPF, supported by Uganda. This exacerbated ethnic tensions in the country. In response, many Hutus gravitated toward the Hutu power ideology. This was prompted by both the state-controlled and

the independent Rwandan media, which asserted that the Tutsis intended to enslave the Hutus and must be resisted at all costs.

The Role of the Media in the Build-up to the Violence (1990-1993)

Print media. Led by the infamous state-owned newspaper, *Kangura*, which is Kinyarwanda for "wake others up," the print media played a crucial role in initiating and promoting the genocide in Rwanda by spreading ethnic hatred and propaganda. Between 1990 and 1993, its upgraded version devoted columns to inter-ethnic hatred, which formed a vital part of the campaign geared toward the elimination of the Tutsis. These repetitive messages of anti-Tutsi hate speech became so systemic as to seem to be the norm (Melvern, 2006).

Dauge-Roth (2010) expounds that in December 1990, *Kangura* also published the infamous "Hutu Ten Commandments," which were a revision of the Bahutu Manifesto of March 1957. These rules, which regulated all dealings between Tutsis and Hutus, included instructions on how to break all intermarriages between the two tribes. It designated the Hutus and Tutsi as different races: the majority, indigenous, Hutu "native" and the "foreign" Tutsi invader, with tragic long-term consequences. It communicated the message that the RPF had a devious grand strategy against the Hutu (one feature article was titled "Tutsi colonization plan"). Women, too, were targets of the anti-Tutsi propaganda. The "Hutu commandments" included four which portrayed Tutsi women as sexual weapons and tools to be used by the Tutsis to weaken and ultimately destroy the Hutu men. The gender-based propaganda also included cartoons printed in newspapers, depicting Tutsi women as sex objects as well as derogatory statements calculated to incite war rape, such as "You Tutsi women think that you are too good for us," and "Let us see what a Tutsi woman tastes like." The newspaper's hate speech messaging against the Tutsis was later picked up by the radio. By 1992, *Kangura* routinely published leaflets with extremely violent content. One issue depicted a man holding a machete and asking, "What shall we do to complete the social revolution of 1959?" His was a reference to the Hutu revolt that overthrew the Tutsi monarchy.

Radio. Dauge-Roth (2010) provides details of the role of radio in the build up to the violence. Due to high rates of illiteracy at the time of the genocide, radio became an important way for the government to deliver messages to the public. Two radio stations that played a key role in

inciting violence before and during the genocide were Radio Rwanda and *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLM). Radio Rwanda was first used in March 1992, in directly promoting the killing of Tutsis in Bugesera, south of the national capital Kigali. It repeatedly broadcast a communiqué warning that the Hutu in Bugesera would be attacked by the Tutsis, a message used by local officials to convince the Hutus that they needed to attack first. Led by government soldiers, Hutu civilians and the *interahamwe* attacked and killed hundreds of Tutsi.

At the end of 1993, explains Dauge-Roth (2010), the RTLM's highly sensationalized reporting on the assassination of the Burundian president, a Hutu, was used to underline supposed Tutsi brutality. The RTLM falsely reported that the president had been tortured, and castrated (in pre-colonial times, some Tutsi kings used to castrate defeated enemy rulers). There were 50,000 civilian deaths in Burundi that year. Continuing strife resulted in the rebels' displacing large numbers of Hutus in the north, in addition to periodic localized Hutu killings of Tutsis in the south. International pressure on the Hutu-led government of Juvenal Habyarimana resulted in a ceasefire in 1993, during which he planned to implement the Arusha Accord.

From late October 1993, the RTLM repeatedly broadcast themes developed by the extremist written press, underlining the inherent differences between the Hutus and the Tutsis, the foreign origin of Tutsi, the disproportionate sharing of national wealth and power by the Tutsis, and the horrors of past Tutsi rule. The RTLM also repeatedly stressed the need to be alert to Tutsi plots and possible attacks. It warned the Hutus to prepare to "defend" themselves against the Tutsis.

On 6th April 1994, President Habyarimana's plane was shot down and this provided the Hutus with a legitimate opportunity to commence the elimination of the Tutsis. The authorities boldly used RTLM and Radio Rwanda to spur on and direct the killers, specifically in areas where the killings were initially resisted. The RTLM used terms "inyenzi" (cockroach in Kinyarwanda) and "Tutsi" interchangeably. In a veiled reference to the Tutsis, it warned that RPF combatants dressed in civilian clothes were mingling with the displaced people fleeing combat zones. These broadcasts gave the impression that all Tutsis were supporters of the RPF force fighting against the elected government and were therefore the enemy.

Re-Testing Cultivation Theory on Radio in the Case of Pre-Genocide Rwanda: Methodology Used

The study was conducted from January to July 2013. Identification of respondents for this study was a great challenge because the research was not only dealing with a sensitive area of investigation (Rwanda Genocide) but also identifying respondents (Rwandese) in Nairobi was in itself a challenge. Thus the most appropriate approach that we adopted was a combination of snowball and convenience sampling.

Convenience sampling is a non-probability sampling technique in which respondents are selected because of their convenient accessibility and proximity to the researcher (Robson, 2009). Convenience sampling was used to help identify respondents who were accessible and willing to participate in the study. Using this approach, we approached individual Rwandese we had access to, especially students and colleagues at workplaces. Then we explained to them our intention and asked them if they were willing to take part in the study.

Using the snowball sampling procedure as detailed by Robson (2009), we identified a few Rwandese individuals living in Kenya and who were willing to respond to the questionnaires, and after they responded, they were used as referrals to identify other willing members of the target population, who were then issued questionnaires to respond to. Further, we conducted in-depth interviews with willing respondents from the samples. Thus, triangulation has enabled collection of data in depth. The findings and data analysis are presented below.

Results

The findings of this study are being presented in two segments. The first part examines any documentation that seems to point to radio as having played a role in the Genocide. The second part presents findings from questionnaires and in-depth interviews conducted between January and July 2013.

Radio and Cultivation Theory: Results from Content Analysis

The study analysed content from various works since the Genocide – print as well as electronic – that points to radio as a contributor to the genocide. These findings indicate that radio, indeed, played an integral part in fuelling the hate messages and propaganda and subsequently, the brutal killings. According to Kinzer (2008), the incumbent President then, Habyarimana, had after agreeing to sign the Arusha Accord relegated a political insurgent group (CDR) to mere spectators, causing surmising. There was a nationwide call to protest.

> One of its most effective tools was a radio station, Radio-Television Libre De Mille Collines (RTLM), that broadcast a steady stream of racist venom and chilling threats…. Radio is ubiquitous in Rwanda, and as soon as RTLM made its debut in the summer of 1993, it became a central part of national life. (Kinzer, 2008, p. 109)

He goes on further to mention that radio offered a snappy mix of upbeat music, colorful patter, and ammunition. Dallaire (2007), a Canadian military commander appointed to head a UN peacekeeping unit in Rwanda, points out that one handicap that he faced was the refusal of the UN to allow him to operate a parallel radio station in Rwanda that he felt would be critical to counteract the venom that spilled from the fanatic RTLM.

Kinzer further narrates that during the first week of April 1994, the people listening to the "killer radio" RTLM began hearing cryptic warnings. These warnings were of a looming occurrence, predicted for days to come. He quotes an RTLM announcer saying, "...You will hear the sound of many bullets, you will hear grenades exploding"…addressing the Tutsi, he said, "Rwandans hate you in unison and to the bottom of their hearts. Begin thinking of how you are going to escape"…. (ibid. pp. 132-133).

This, he says, was repeated in various ways over the next few days. This showed the influence that the radio had and established the focus of reach, especially on the night of the plane crash that killed Habyarimana. During this period, the popular hate-radio station RTLM was instrumental in fuelling the violence. Listeners were urged to find the Tutsi's whose names were pinned at RTLM's premises, and kill them all.

Kinzer notes that radio fueled the frenzy with ceaseless calls to complete the genocide. Listeners were urged to kill Tutsi in their homes, their parents and children, not forgetting the unborn fetuses. It was war, and the announcers warned that if Tutsi rebels were allowed to win then all the Hutus would be killed and eaten. These were key factors showing how heavily the Radio waves were used before and during the Genocide.

In 1964, British philosopher Bertrand Russell, after witnessing the first Rwandan genocide in 1959 in which approximately 100,000 Tutsis were killed, described it as the most horrible and systematic human massacre witnessed since the extermination of the Jews by the Nazis (Melvern, 2000). Little did he know, and the world for that matter, that a graver fate awaited the Tutsis approximately three decades later where almost eight times the number of Tutsis lost their lives.

When looking at media effects in the Rwandan genocide, the focus is almost always on radio and aptly so as radio in Rwanda was and still is the most prominent channel of communication. The impact of hate media, and especially radio on the Rwandan genocide cannot be underplayed. It is almost impossible to mention radio when referring to the Rwandan genocide without citing Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTML). Of all the radio stations, RTML was the most notorious and bore most responsibility for the propagation of violence during the Rwandan genocide.

The evidence that media played a key role in the propagation of brutal violence during the Rwandan genocide is seen with the judgments brought forth by International Criminal Courts of Rwanda; most perpetrators found guilty of participating greatly in the genocide have been found to be journalists or anyone involved one way or the other in media. In 2003 the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) found two radio journalists and one print journalist guilty of inciting genocide. Prosecutors at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda argued that RTLM played a key role in the genocide during the trial of the radio's top executives Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Ferdinand Nahimana. Mr Barayagwiza boycotted the trial and was sentenced to 35 years. Mr Nahimana was given life in prison. Hassan Ngeze, who ran the notorious *Kangura* was also sentenced to life (Smith, BBC Article, 2003).

The ICTR found that by ordering people to kill and actually mentioning names in some instances of whom to kill, RTML had a direct hand in

convincing the Hutu to kill. The ICTR made its argument on the direct influence of radio by citing direct incitement via radio as a direct cause of violence. Both before and after April 6, 1994, RTLM did broadcast the names of Tutsi individuals and their families, as well as Hutu political opponents. In some cases, these people were subsequently killed, and the Chamber found that to varying degrees their deaths were causally linked to the broadcast of their names (Straus, 2007).

With these judgments and the penalty to the accused, we see the critical degree to which the court found radio to play in the genocide by directly inciting listeners to commit violence. According to Ally Mugenzi, a BBC journalist who worked in Rwanda during the genocide, RTML had a significant influence on the spread of violence in Rwanda. This is because RTLM acted as if it was giving instructions to the killers by giving directions on air as to where people were hiding (Smith's Online BBC Article, 2003).

Roméo Dallaire, a United Nations force commander in Rwanda at the time, writes about the impact and influence of radio in Rwanda in that it was "akin to the voice of God, if the radio called for violence, many Rwandans would respond, believing they were being sanctioned to commit these actions" (Dallaire & Beardsley, 2003, p. 272). Smith (2003) adds that "simply jamming [the] broadcasts and replacing them with messages of peace and reconciliation would have had a significant impact on the course of events" (Online BBC, 2003). This continues to show the impact radio had (negatively) or would have had if channeled positively.

Radio and Cultivation Theory: Results from Questionnaires

We sent out 80 questionnaires to Rwandese living in Kenya and only 51 were fully answered and returned. Some of the people who had earlier agreed to interviews and to answer questionnaires later changed their minds and refused to cooperate. In one particularly noteworthy incident, the older ladies in a group of about 30 changed their minds to participate in the study and convinced all the others to follow suit. One of them intimated that anyone who divulged information to "strangers" would be seen as "traitors" to the common pain the group had experienced in Rwanda as a result of the genocide. The other reason for the low response rate is due to marriage. The challenge with the married Rwandese, as we learned during the research, is that both had to agree to

the exercise. Thus some questionnaires were not returned when a husband forbade the wife from corresponding with the researchers or vice versa.

Our respondents varied in age from as low as 20 to over 50 years. The majority of the respondents were between the ages of 21 and 25 years, which translated 50.0%, while 12.5% were 20 and below. Those between the ages of 26 and 30 were 14.6%. This is also the critical segment of respondents who may have witnessed the actual genocide. Deducing from their age, they could have been between 7 and 11 years old during the genocide. Other respondents (22.9%) were between the ages of 31 to 50 years and older. This group was the least responsive, showing extreme reluctance to participate in the research. We attributed this to the fact that most of them must had been about 12 years of age and older during the genocide—certainly old enough to have been deeply affected by what they witnessed during the genocide.

Of the respondents, 59.9% were female and 43.1% male. Further, 71.4% were single, 25.0% married, and 3.6% were divorcees. Half (50%) of the respondents were business people, 46.4% were students, and 3.6% were religious leaders.

Almost all (98.0%) of the respondents identified the radio as the most prevalent form of media used to fuel tension and subsequently, the killings in Rwanda. In comparison, the respondents did not think that the newspaper was as effective in communicating hate and propaganda, and thus yielded only 2.0%. Apart from the fact that the majority were illiterate, most of the respondents attested to the power of radio to influence, cultivate and promote the violent attitudes that led to the brutal killings. This, findings show, is because respondents indicated that broadcasting was mainly in the local language, Kinyarwanda, which everyone understood. One did not have to be literate to listen to radio, and the portability of radio, as well as the possibility for one to listen to a neighbour's radio, even if unintentionally, contributed to the listenership, everywhere, all the time. From this, we are able to see that radio was the most influential medium of communication at the time.

This study also found out that 82.5% of the people were exposed to the hate messages and propaganda on the radio for 4 to 12 hours every day, with only 17.5% viewing TV for two hours and below per day. Some of the respondents commented that this could have polarized the community, and to a greater extent, fuelled the hatred, pillaging and destruction of property, and violence. Almost all (97.7%) of the respondents agreed that

the effect of exposure to the radio messages was increased tension and fear that degenerated into violence and the subsequent mass-killings, while only 2.3% felt otherwise. Almost half (46.8%) of the respondents were of the opinion that the various leaders were, to a large extent, contributors to the killings, 10.6% was contributed by hate messages constantly aired on the radio. In addition, 43.2% believed that hate, tribalism and the death of President Juvenal Habyarimana in a plane crash were important factors that further contributed to the atrocities.

When asked to form a link between the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya and the Rwandan genocide, more than half of the respondents (57.7%) held that ethnicity was a major contributor to the killings in both scenarios. However, 34.6% felt that the violence was politically instigated, while only 7.7% felt that the media played a significant role. The majority (64%) of the respondents considered radio to be a very powerful tool in the instigation and propagation of the violence, while 36% felt that radio had a considerable effect, through the constant broadcasting of hate and propaganda messages, during that period.

In a nutshell, the feedback from the questionnaires established that indeed there is a direct relationship between constant exposure to violent media content and aggressive behavior. Therefore, this study introduces a new dimension of radio playing the role that Gerbner had assigned television in his cultivation theory. That radio is powerful in spreading aggression cannot be underestimated.

Radio and Cultivation Theory: Results from In-Depth Interviews

In-depth interviews were also employed to collect data. This granted us the opportunity to cross-check the findings. We managed to interview 20 Rwandese who witnessed the genocide. Their ages ranged between 27 years and above 50. Of those interviewed, 13 were women and 7 men. Of the 20 respondents, 10 were married, five were formally employed, three were self-employed and five were university/college students. Their responses were coded according to emerging and recurrent themes, in line with the research question of this study. The findings are presented and discussed below.

Accessibility of the radio and the radio's role in the Rwandan Genocide. All the interviewees indicated that radio played a crucial role in the Genocide. They noted that people had started killing each other secretly, albeit with some fear. But when the radio began encouraging

them to continue with the killing, people were affirmed that what they were doing was right. One interviewee stated,

> "When radio presenters really persuaded people to go on with the killing, the killers really did it more and I think they felt right when they were doing it because the radio told them to do so. Therefore, the radio increased the problem."

Another respondent explained that at the time of the genocide, very few people in Rwanda owned radios. Even though they did not have radios, they used to listen to news about what was happening from their neighbours' radio. Another respondent added that people who listened to radios became other "radios" because they went around sharing with those who did not have radios. This generated multiplicity effect. Others were told by their friends what the radio had said, and they believed.

The interviewees further added that during the genocide there was no TV so people basically relied on radio for news and information. The in-depth interviews also established that there was only one radio station that was government-owned, the RTLM radio. Another respondent explained,

> "RTLM was telling people that what they were doing was good and they should do it and leave nothing to chance. So everyone had access to that radio station and almost everyone had a radio even if someone didn't have a radio, they could go to the neighbours or drinking joints or somewhere but everyone could have access to a radio."

Length of time that people were exposed to radio and its effect on the people. A number of respondents said they could not state how many hours per day they listened to radio, but it must have been many hours because they remember that everything came to a standstill and people were not going to work. Hence,

> "people were just idle and the most thing that was done is to listen to radio because people wanted to know how things were going. When people were advised to leave a place it had to be done through radio so people's lives were hanging around radio messages. So people were listening to the radio all the time; even the whole day and the whole night. The kind of messages from that specific radio was that people had to kill. People of one tribe were being encouraged to kill all people of another tribe."

However, some interviewees observed that listening to the radio occurred in the morning and in the evening. This is because, as the study shows, most of the Rwandan population were farmers and spent their time in the farms. So people used to listen to radios probably in the morning before going to their farms and in the evening when they came back from the farms.

The interviewees were of the opinion that the length of time people were exposed to the radio had a causal link to the genocide. They gave the reason that radio affirmed the people. For example,

> "after killing you come and listen to the radio and the radio tells you that you have done a good job but there is still a lot more to do. So the radio told people to go back and continue with the killing and they went. This is because the Hutus were feeling they had been given an assignment and someone (the radio) was monitoring and watching over you to see how well you are doing. So, continuously, it was like the radio the killers that they had not done enough. Thus people killed, came back, listened to the radio for evaluation, then they went back and killed again and returned to listen to the radio. It was a vicious cycle. So the radio really had an impact on the people because the more people listened, the more people got encouragement."

The interviewees also indicated that radio was most effective because majority of the Rwandans were illiterate so they just relayed on the radio. The radio described the enemy, directed people how to get those enemies and how to deal with the enemies. And that is what and how it happened.

Were the messages on radio reflected during the Genocide? From the in-depth interviewees, we gathered that the hate words used on radio were repeated when people went out to kill. Moreover, the killings were done in the very manner as the radio had instructed the listeners. For instance, one interviewee gave this example:

> "On radio the Tutsi ethnic group was being referred to as cockroaches. So when Hutu went out to kill, they used to say that they were going to kill cockroaches. And it came to a point they actually felt and believed that they were just killing cockroaches. You know you cannot feel any pain or remorse when you are killing a cockroach. So while killing over and over again, I think people came to that point where they believed they were killing not fellow human beings but cockroaches. People

could even repeat it out loud that they have to kill all these cockroaches. So I think those messages got to people's minds and they felt they were actually killing not human beings but cockroaches. In any case, no one likes to share a house, neighbourhood, or community with cockroaches. So that is one example that tells me that the radio messages really affected/influenced how people were looking at each other and also the feeling that people had after killing."

Other hate messages/phrases repeated from the radio were that the killers were encouraging each other to go out and kill, or to continue with the job, so that no one will survive from the enemy's (Tutsi) line. Words like *inyenzi* (cockroach), *tubatsembatsembe* (don't leave anyone, let's finish them) were repeated by the killers, just as they were being used on radio. Additionally, people could be heard discussing the direction they should take to find the remaining or more "cockroaches," the same directions as had been given on radio.

The interviewees held that the repetition of hate messages over the radio contributed to the degree of violence that occurred during the Rwandan genocide. They equate the radio (and radio messages of that time) to firewood being added on the already burning fire, to make sure that the fire does not die out. They discussed that the radio messages were adding both wood and energy to the fire that was already happening. It seemed that people who were killing were listening to the radio and were getting instructions and updated messages from the radio.

What effect did messages on radio have on the community around the respondents? The in-depth interviews established that the hate messages and instructions on the radio made people hate each other. This is because the messages could tell listeners that if they did not kill the "cockroaches," then the "cockroaches" would kill them, and the "cockroaches" would not give them opportunities to work or study. So hatred came along because the radio told listeners that these people (cockroaches),

"hate you anyway. So by killing them you are not doing anything wrong, because you are not hurting an innocent person, you are hurting someone who will hurt you if you don't hurt them first so people were encouraged to go act first." The effect of such messages to the community of people around each other made listeners believe that they were protecting themselves.

This is because if someone "keeps telling you that this person hates you, this person will hurt you, this person will kill you if you don't kill them first. Then you start hating them, you start hating your neighbour, you're thinking your neighbor is having plans to finish you, you feel if I don't do something now they will do something before me. So I think those messages really promoted hatred even in people who had been friends or neighbours to the point that people found killing justifiable, a protection of oneself before the enemy kills you. Listeners felt that by killing they were doing themselves well because they (enemy) would hurt you anyway."

Three other interviewees added that the radio messages created hatred in the people and the community around them. This is because even young children and youth who may have been too young to comprehend what was happening also participated in the killing by throwing stones and sticks at the enemy. Even if the children were too young to kill, they perceived who was an enemy and that is why they could also throw sticks or stones at the enemy. The young Hutus also quickly learned who the enemy was, and begun to avoid them because they (the children and youth) knew that those bad people ought to die. Furthermore, both the Hutu and Tutsi children who were too young to know about tribe, developed the tribal mind and have grown up knowing which tribe ought to die, and which ought to live. Thus the power of radio was so great that the young children heard and memorized most of the hate messages and words on the radio. Such words occasionally appear on the lips of Rwandan adults who were then young but old enough to listen to the radio and retain messages in their mind.

One respondent noted that probably what caused the killing was the historical hatred and lack of forgiveness between the Hutus and Tutsi. He gave a historical account of the various wars that have happened between the Hutus and Tutsi.

"In 1994 Hutus were killing Tutsis, in 1959 Tutsis chased away Hutus so they keep revenging. Even though this is the case of rotational fights between the Hutus and Tutsi whenever they get an opportunity to kill each other, radio messages in 1994 contributed to the massacre. If there were no radio messages they could have probably killed lesser people because they were killing each other before but with radio messages things went badly, directing Hutus to find the Tutsi even in the faraway

places where they were hiding and could not have been found, if it were not for the radio aiding them."

What role can Rwandan media (TV, radio, and print) play in promoting peace in Rwanda? The interviewees observed that media can promote peace in Rwanda by doing the same thing they did in demoting peace. This is because, the interviewees said, the more people hear messages over and over again and develop a belief in them, as was the case during the genocide, the more they act on those messages in the same manner. Thus media can focus on promoting more and more peaceful messages and these too will get into the minds and hearts of people. They also recommended media education, especially for the majority rural population who are still illiterate and hold that whatever radio says is gospel truth. Thus, the respondents hold that if the radio continually tells them that they should not kill they will be able to embrace that peace message just as they listened to and obeyed the radio in 1994 during the Genocide.

The interviewees also observed that a specific group to be targeted by these peace messages was opinion leaders. This is because even though people are getting educated, there are so many people in the rural areas involved in agricultural activities and they are the ones who are normally targeted by anyone who wants to bring about evil in society. These illiterate rural folk run very fast to act on radio messages as long as their opinion leaders have accepted the message. So, the interviewees held that while media can come up with peace messages, the opinion leaders must be targeted and be convinced so that they in return persuade their followers in the villages to shun violence and embrace peace. They insisted in Rwanda radio should be used most because TV is still a reserve of the urban rich.

Are there any links between the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and the 2007/2008 Post-Election violence in Kenya? The interviewees answered in the affirmative, stating that in both cases, it is clear that media, especially the radio, can be used to build or destroy; to kill or bring forth life; to brew violence or to promote peace. However, the respondents noted that they felt that the major difference is that there was something Kenyans were fighting against, the stolen victory due to incredible elections, but in Rwanda there was no real reason why people were fighting.

Summary. It is quite clear, from the in-depth interviews, that cultivation theory effects were present in Rwanda during the genocide, but through radio. One fundamental aspect of Gerbner's theory was that the reality portrayed by media was significantly different from the reality on the ground. This is what has come through from the interviewees. The images painted by the radio presenters varied significantly with the reality on the ground. For instance, the call for Hutus to kill Tutsi first before the latter could kill them was totally unfounded. Further, Gerbner (1969) portrayed mass communicators as "operating under pressure from various external power roles" such as political authorities (McQuail, 2005, p. 281). This is the very same scenario described by interviewees whereby presenters were under some external influence and direction. It is such interference that forced Kamilindi (2007) to resign. "As a journalist, I had been asked to broadcast news that was repugnant to me" (p. 138).

Management and Prevention of Aggression:
The Role of Radio and Film in Promoting Peace in Post-Genocide Rwanda

Gerbner's theory focuses on the role of television programming in promoting violent viewer behaviour, and it does not essentially show the effects television programming has on consumers when the messages portrayed are positive. Research focusing more directly on content which are specifically designed to promote or change social behavior has shown television to be effective in influencing [positive] attitudes in viewers (Condry, 1989). Since 1994, Rwanda's peace-building process has been successful in restoring trust in state institutions, engaging Rwandans in the reconstruction of sustainable reconciliation, and in overcoming ethnic divisions. A more positive theme of peace and reconciliation, using television, is gaining momentum in Rwanda. This is being done through the one major state-owned television station, Television Rwandaise (TVR).

After the horrors of the genocide, the Rwandan government, realizing the potent influence of the media, geared its efforts toward setting up control measures. An autonomous body, the Media High Council (MHC) (formerly known as the High Council of the Press (HCP), was established by Press law no. 18/2002 of 11th May 2002 (article 73). The Media High Council of the Press is responsible for, among other things, ensuring respect for the law and professional ethics in print and broadcast media as well as the internet; ensuring that the media serve as a catalyst to the

promotion of unity among Rwandese, and assisting journalists in instituting guidelines governing their conduct and the journalism profession in Rwanda.

The Role of Radio in Promoting Peace (The Waves of Peace)

Following the unfortunate role radio played as a weapon during the genocide, there is a wind of change blowing across the airwaves in Rwanda. The radio stations in Rwanda are now essentially devoted to entertainment and magazine programmes focused on social development or religious issues, and carry little but balanced political news (Karega, 2004). Contrary to the genocide period when radio messaging was highly political, Rwandan radio stations, at present, have shunned the producing of programmes that are political in nature, and instead produce those which call for peace in the country.

Rwanda's neighbours have also joined the fight to promote peace in Rwanda, with neighboring country Burundi establishing *Studio Ijambo* (Kirundi for "wise words"). The main objective of the studio is to produce a variety of programmes that could contribute toward peaceful transformation after the conflict. The station has provided a model for production of peace-oriented media content, not only for the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi, but throughout the African continent.

One of the most effective media projects from *Studio Ijambo* is "*Umubanyi Niwe Muryango*" ("*Our Neighbours, Ourselves*"), a soap opera that has grown and become the most widely-listened to radio programme (ibid.). Its main theme is overcoming daily conflict tribulations. The story revolves around the problems facing a Hutu and a Tutsi family, depicting the complexities of the relationships between these families due to the conflict tribulation. Another trademark of *Studio Ijambo* productions are the stories that focus on solutions and common people. The radio programme known as "Heroes" featured more than 150 episodes about people who risked their lives during a time of crisis to save the life of someone of another ethnic group (ibid.).

The Role of Film in Healing Rwanda

In Rwanda, one form of audio-visual communication that has shot to prominence is film. Film has grown tremendously, to become the most recognizable avenue to tell stories of Rwanda's progress, growth, reconciliation, forgiveness, healing, strength, unity and hope after the genocide period. Television and film especially, have been used to instill into the deeply traumatised population of survivors and perpetrators an attitude of reconciliation and hope. There are catchy phrases like; "We can define who we are but we can never, ever, ignore or brush off the past" (Eric Kabera, film pioneer in Rwanda) or "All Rwandese want to be reunited and reconciled; they want to see the children playing on the hills without thought of the past"(Marie-Clementine Dusabejambo, director of Lyiza).

Defining Rwandan identity through film is a phrase that best describes what the Rwandan television and film industry seek to attain through its productions. Several films based on the genocide have sought to recapture the distressing experience of the 1994 genocide, recreating the pain and loss that engulfed the state in its darkest period. While it is true that the genocide occurred, this is not all that Rwandan television and film seek to portray. Eric Kabera, a Rwandan film pioneer, founded Kwetu Film Institute, Rwanda's first film school. He is also the force behind the annual film festival in Rwanda known as Hillywood, where films are screened in villages across the country. Initiated in 2005, the festival that has been around for seven years now attracts filmmakers from all over the world, who compete for Rwanda's own form of the Oscars, a statue of a silverback gorilla. Some of the films and documentaries that have been produced and that depict the grisly accounts of the genocide include *Sometimes in April, Hotel Rwanda, Rwanda: Living Forgiveness*, and *Rwanda: Through Us, and Humanity*.

Eric Kabera expresses the utter essence of cultivating an identity apart from the genocide when he comments that the purpose of the festival is to inspire the rural majority in Rwanda to want to see themselves on screen, have the ability to express themselves and see their past and future in perspective. In an interview with CNN, Kabera (2011) maintains that many more stories are yet to be told in Rwanda, away from the theme of conflict and suffering. He maintains that he feels compelled to tell the Rwandan stories from within, using film, so that the world can care, and also because film has a uniquely powerful way of getting the message across. While Rwanda's film industry is still in its infancy, it has made

great strides over the past few years internationally, with some of its films being nominated for the highest accolade in the cinema world, the Oscars. Iconic movies such as the Oscar-nominated *Hotel Rwanda, Sometimes in April, Shake Hands with the Devil*, and *100 Days* are some of the films that have made a mark on the international scene.

Behind the Lens: Pursuing Peace

Rwanda's filmmakers are increasingly making a mark on the world stage and being recognized globally for their efforts aimed at healing the wounds of their country's past. In May 2011, New York's Tribeca Film Festival showcased several films by Rwandans. *Grey Matter*, by filmmaker Kivu Ruhorahoza, became one of the first feature-length films to be directed by a Rwandan who still resides in his homeland.

Perspective: Rwanda is a series of powerful short films by three young Rwandese directors examining the theme of reconciliation. The film series include *Saa-Ipo*, the story of a talented street musician who wants to make a life out of his passion for music. In an interview with CNN, the director, Jean Luc Fils Habyarimana, purposely choosing not to address the genocide issue head-on, but instead focusing on life after the war, commented, "We have other things to do, to show people we have other things to share."

The second film aired was "Lyiza," the tale of a young student who discovers that the parents of one of her classmates were responsible for the killing of her family. The director, Marie-Clementine Dusabejambo, stated that her aim was to show the world how Rwandans "managed to reconcile and solve their problems themselves without needing any help." She further highlighted the theme of forgiveness, adding, "It is forgiveness that transforms the moment, but does not erase the past." These sentiments are shared by almost all Rwandan filmmakers, who predominantly feature peace-related themes such as hope, restoration, and forgiveness in their film messages.

Another film, "Shema," portrayed a young man who was left crippled after losing a leg during the genocide. The director, Kayambi Musafiri, cast his own brother in the role. In an interview with CNN's Amanda Sealy on 8 June, 2011, he stated that his mission was to show the whole world that after calamity one has to "move forward and look for the better future, education, and having good times in your life."

The Case of Peace Journalism: The 2013 Kenyan General Elections

Peace Journalism is a phrase that was coined by one of the founders of Peace and Conflict Studies, Professor Johan Galtung, in the 1960s, and was developed from research indicating that often news about conflict has a value bias toward violence. It was later developed into what is now a well-established field by two BBC journalists, Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick. Peace Journalism refers to editors and reporters making choices about what stories to report and how to report them. That is what creates opportunities for societies at large to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005).

During the 2007/2008 post-election violence that wreaked emotional, physical and financial havoc in Kenya, the media missed an immense opportunity to play a pivotal role in regulating the violence. Unfortunately, the radio and television stations in urban centers became avenues to pit people of one tribe or political persuasion against another. Five years later, during the 2013 general elections, the atmosphere in Kenya was tense, with people anxious as to whether the violence would erupt again. The media, however, adopted a different approach. Peace messages were relayed repetitively on television and radio and in the newspapers. Mass rallies, where religious leaders and presidential aspirants were called upon to pledge peace and accept the outcome of the elections, were held in the capital's Uhuru Park, and broadcast live throughout Kenya. Four months after the elections, there is peace in the country. The Kenyan and Rwandan cases thus illustrate that the media's cultivation effect may be as well used for peace, reconciliation and reconstruction.

Conclusion

While Gerbner's theory shows that continuous exposure and heavy television viewing of violent programming results in aggression, we hold that it is not only applicable to television but also to other media such as radio, as seen in Rwanda. In this, we do not state that the theory is incorrect, but rather that its scope can be widened. With the knowledge gained about Gerbner's cultivation theory and through drawing comparisons in the African setting between Rwanda and Kenya, we may conclude that the media in Africa, and consequently the rest of the world, can be educated on its power. If employed correctly, media can foster growth, peace, development and prosperity, especially in times of

political or social unrest. But if channeled into negative consumption, they can lead to destruction. By using the effects of a mediated reality to a country's advantage, a government may be able to shift its citizens' focus towards unity as well as to peaceable means of resolving conflict.

One of the characteristics of an effective theory is its heuristic value (Littlejohn, 2002). Theories are considered successful if they provide openings in which further research may be conducted. By presenting an explanatory model, a strong theory generates questions or hypotheses. In practical terms, the achievement of a theory may rest on how readily other researchers may continue to do fruitful work in reaction or support. This explanation is true of George Gerbner's cultivation theory. This is because the current study has been able to confirm that indeed there is a direct causal relationship between constant exposure to violent media content and aggressive behavior. The new finding, however, is that the study introduces a new dimension to Gerbner's cultivation theory, namely that radio can cultivate violent behavior and attitude as television can, where television is not accessible. Thus, cultivation theory's scope has been widened to incorporate media other than just television.

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Rwanda. Through us, Humanity… is a 2006 documentary by Marie-France Collard.

Rwanda: Living Forgiveness, produced by Tom Sommer.

Sometimes in April, produced by Raoul Peck in 2005, is a historical drama television film about the Rwandan Genocide of 1994.

Appendix 1: Questionnaire

Retesting Cultivation Theory on the Origins, Causes, and Predictors of Aggression:
The Case of Pre- and Post-Genocide Rwanda

We, A.L. Lando PhD, Paul Odira, BA, Stella Nsubuga, BA, Linda Muthuri, BA, Everlyne Otieno, BA, Joan Wanja, BA, Martin Mwengah, BA, are carrying out a scientific study on the Cultivation Theory. The purpose of this study is to establish whether or not Radio can play a vital role in Aggression. Our case in reference is Rwanda and Kenya. The former is due to its Genocide History and Kenya for the 2007/2008 Post-Election Violence. We therefore request you to support us in achieving this objective by truthfully responding to the questions in this questionnaire. Your responses are confidential and your identity is not required.

SECTION A

Instructions

As appropriate, please tick inside the provided box or fill in the blank space.

Q1. What is your age bracket?

    1. 20 and below [ ]   2. 21-25 [ ]   3. 26-30 [ ]   4. 31-35 [ ]
    5. 36-40 [ ]   6. 41-45 [ ]   7. 46-50 [ ]   8. Over 50 [ ]

Q2. What is you gender?

    1. Male [ ]   2. Female [ ]

Q3. What is your marital status?

    1. Single [ ]   2. Married [ ]   3. Divorced [ ] 4. Widowed [ ]

Q4. What is your occupation?_____

Q5. In your opinion, which medium contributed the most to the widespread violence that took place during the genocide in Rwanda?

    1. Radio [ ]   2. Television [ ]   3. Newspapers [ ]
    4. Other (Specify) _____

Q6. Based on your answer in Question 5 above, how powerful was the medium?

    1. Powerful [ ]   2. Moderately Powerful [ ]
    3. Very Powerful [ ]   4. Not Powerful [ ]

Q7. How frequently were you exposed to that medium daily?

    1. 2 hours [ ]   2. 4 hours [ ]
    3. 8 hours [ ]   4. 12 or more hours [ ]

Q8. In your opinion, do you think radio contributed to the widespread violence that took place during the genocide?

    1. Yes [ ]   2. No [ ]
    3. Maybe [ ]   4. To some extent [ ]

Q9. How powerful do you think radio was in promoting violence in Rwanda genocide?

    1. Very powerful [ ]   2. Powerful [ ]
    3. A little powerful [ ]   4. Not powerful at all [ ]

Q10. How great an effect do you think the repetition of hate messages over the radio contributed to the degree of violence that occurred during the Rwandan genocide?

    1. A great effect [ ]   2. A considerable effect [ ]
    3. A moderate effect [ ]   4. No effect [ ]

SECTION B

Q11. What kind of messages do you remember being aired on radio? Kindly explain.

_____

_____

Q12. In your opinion, what effect did the messages on radio have on the community around you?

_____

_____

Q13. In your opinion, what factors led to the massive killing? Explain your answer.

_____

_____

Q14. How big a role do you think Rwandan media (TV, Radio, Print) can play in promoting peace in Rwanda?

_____

_____

Q15. What linkages can be drawn between the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and The Post-Election Violence (PEV) of 2007/2008 in Kenya?

_____

_____

Thanks for your time in responding to this questionnaire

END

Appendix 2 – In-Depth Interview- Moderator's Guide

Retesting Cultivation Theory on the Origins, Causes, and Predictors of Aggression:
The Case of Pre- and Post-Genocide Rwanda

We, A. L. Lando, PhD, Paul Odira, BA, Stella Nsubuga, BA, Linda Muthuri, BA, Everlyne Otieno, BA, Joan Wanja, BA, and Martin Mwengah, BA, are carrying out a scientific study on the Cultivation Theory. The purpose of this study is to establish whether or not Radio can play a vital role in Aggression. Our case in reference is Rwanda and Kenya. The former is due to its Genocide History and Kenya for the 2007/08 Post Election Violence. We therefore request you to support us in achieving this objective by truthfully responding to the questions in this interview. Your responses are confidential and your identity is not required.

Part one: Demographic Questions

1. Record interviewee's gender.
2. What is your marital status?
3. What is your occupation?
4. What is your age?

Part two: Retesting Cultivation Theory

5. Do you think that Radio contributed the most to the widespread violence that took place during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda? Please explain.
6. How available were the radios? Could everybody access a radio?
7. How many hours were people exposed to Radio daily? Please describe the nature of the messages on radio.
8. Do you think the duration that people were exposed to radio messages played a role in the genocide? Please explain.
9. Were the messages on radio reflected during the genocide? i.e. Same hate words used, killings as was described on radio?
10. Do you think that the repetition of hate messages over the radio contributed to the degree of violence that occurred during the Rwandan genocide? Explain.

11. What effect did messages on radio have on the community around you?
12. What factors do you think led to the massive killing? Explain your answer.
13. What role do you think Rwandan Media (TV, Radio, and Print) can play in promoting peace in Rwanda?
14. Are there any linkages that could be drawn between the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the 2007/2008 Post- Election Violence (PEV) of Kenya?

Thanks for your time in responding to our interview questionnaire

END

CULTIVATION THEORY: A NEW RESEARCH IN THE CASE OF ESKİŞEHIR, TURKEY

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Abstract

In this study, the cultivation role of television on people's perception of the world and their characterisation of social reality was investigated. Forrevealing/presenting the cultivation role of television, it has been utilized from the Cultivation Analysis component of the Cultural Indicators Project developed by George Gerbner and his colleagues. The aim of the study was to reveal the effect of viewing practices of people aged 60 and over on their perceptions of social reality. In this context, a survey that included cultivation questions was carried out with 120 adults (60 female and 60 male) aged 60 and over, who live in the Odunpazarı and Tepebaşı district of Eskişehir. As a result of the study, it has been identified that long term television viewing has a cultivation effect on the mean world syndrome and one's sense of insecurity.

Introduction

Television, a widespread means of mass communication, is a part of daily life and a fundamental element of individual and social experience and cultivation. Through positive and negative qualities that it imparts to individuals, with cultural gains that it provides, and as a leisure time activity, television is one of the important socialisation tools shaping culture at individual and social levels (Batmaz, 1995, pp. 1-3).

Being pervasive, available everywhere and every place with its recurrent messages, and not requiring literacy have given a clear superiority to television over other means of communication (Özer, 2004, p. 77). By entering all social places, it puts forth a certain worldview with the help of recurrent and common patterns. These patterns are organically compatible and interrelated. With the purpose of reaching the widest portion of viewers with minimalexpenses, television portrays what the majority favours. In this context, controversial topics and disparate opinions are balanced to make the presentations on television objective, moderate, or suitable for mass marketing. Television alters reality (Alemdar & Korkmaz, 2005, pp. 173-176).

Within this framework, a study on television's role in cultivating people's world perception and social reality conceptualisation has been put forward. Consequently, 120 participants, 60 women and 60 men, evenly distributed in Odunpazarı and Tepebaşı district of Eskişehir were surveyed. In the study Gerbner's Cultivation Theory is explained, television is mentioned in context and as the research has been done in the context of violence, violence is defined in terms of cultivation theory viewpoint.

Theoretical Framework: Cultural Indicators Project (Cultivation Theory)

The "Cultural Indicators Project," developed by Gerbner et al. in 1967-1968, is a research project launched for "The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence" and continued under various national institutions' sponsorships in the U.S.A. (Gerbner, 2000, p. 11). The Cultural Indicators Project is defined as both a database and a research project on the real world perceptions and behaviours of people exposed to the recurrent qualities of the television world for a long period (Gerbner et al., 1996, p. 2)

Starting in 1967, the Cultural Indicators Project began following the dramatic content of television, and starting from 1974 continued to research the results of growing up and living with television (Gerbner, 2000, p. 4). The first cultivation research was conducted on adults in a national scale survey in the early 1970s, sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health (Signorielli & Morgan, 1996, p. 113). As a result of many years of researches carried out to disclose the powerful long-term effects of television on viewers, it was concluded that "a strong causality relationship" could be established between the message and the viewers (Batmaz & Aksoy, 1995, p. 21).

In its early years, the project dealt with the nature of violence presented on television. In the following years, it focused on the role of television in the image of women/minorities, gender roles, occupations, political orientations, old age, health problems, etc. Also, in order to do comparative research on the content and role of television, the project was extended to various countries (Gerbner et al., 1996, p. 2).

The Cultural Indicators Project has a research strategy that involves three interrelated components: Institutional Process Analysis, Message System Analysis and Cultivation Analysis. These components provide "analysis of mass produced message system's production, presentation and reception forms" (Özer, 2004, p. 29). The first component, Institutional Process Analysis, is designed to find out how policies managing the intensity of media messages are formed (Gerbner, 2000, p. 5). Through this analysis, the relationship of mass communication with other institutions, how decisions are made, how message systems are formed, and how they operate in society are targeted to be revealed (Özer, 2005b, p. 2). According to Gerbner, mass communication policies reflect not only the structure of social relationships and a stage of industrial development but also the institutional and industrial powers and their oppressions. Therefore, Institutional Process Analysis is quite significant (Özer trans. 1973, 2005a, p. 130).

The other two components called Message System Analysis and Cultivation Analysis are closely related to studies and theories about the widespread effects of television (Gerbner, 2000, p. 5). The Cultural Indicators Project's second stage, Message System Analysis, is a flexible tool for observing programme contents systematically, reliably and cumulatively. It is a method used to identify various aspects of the television world and test its contribution to viewers' real world perception (Gerbner et al., 1996, p. 2). In Message System Analysis, which is the

source of questions laying the foundation of cultivation analysis, often recurrent, stable and "overstepping" examples are analysed (Özer, 2005b, p. 2). Message System Analysis "defines how public is formed through mass communication process and what the most commonly shared tendencies and hypotheses are" (Morgan, 1995: Özer trans. 107, 2005b, p. 2).

The third component of the Cultural Indicators Project, Cultivation Analysis, is created to question the hypothesis that assumes television has a cultivational effect on social phenomena, norms and values (Gerbner & Gross, 1979, p. 375). This method is used to explain how television contributes to the social reality of viewers. Cultivation Analysis is not concerned about the "effect" of a certain group of viewers, a television programme, genre or episode on viewers (Signorielli & Morgan, 1996, p. 112). Cultivation Analysis postulates that television is a message system to which society is exposed for a long time. Thus, it focuses on the continuous and mutual results of growing up and living with television (Signorielli & Morgan, 1996, pp. 111-112).

Cultivation Analysis examines the answers that individuals who are exposed to television at different levels give to the questions related to social reality. Hence, it tries to determine whether heavy viewers give "television answers" that reflect the television world compared with light viewers (Gerbner, 2000, p. 5; Shanahan & Morgan, 1999, p. 4). The cultivation differential is the difference in the percentage giving the television answer within comparable groups of light and heavy TV viewers (Gerbner & Gross, 1979, p. 386; Gerbner, 2000, p. 5).

The cultivation differential is important as it identifies the cultivational role of television on people within the same demographic sub-groups. Researches on the topic have revealed that heavy viewers are more likely to be suspicious and mistrusting of people compared with light viewers from all demographic sub-groups. Gerbner (2003, p. 345) argued that as heavy viewers do not have a selected viewing like light viewers do, it is hard for them to avoid violence on television.

Television and Violence in Terms of Cultivation Theory

Cultivation Theory dwells on the holistic role and cultural function of television. Gerbner claims that television, a mass producer, is the most widespread cultural institution and the central narrator of today (Özer, 2004, p. 30). Cultural symbols are spread by television the most and stories making up the culture are broadcast in a "package" (Özer, 2004, p. 30). Story and story-telling are the central concepts of Cultivation Theory. Gerbner claims human beings are unique from other species in that they live in a world that is created by the stories they tell (Signorielli & Morgan, 1996, p. 112).

Gerbner mentions three kinds of interrelated stories that construct the world in which we live. First, there are stories about how things work. The dynamics of human life are often hidden from view. Fictional stories (dramas, fairy tales, television programmes, movies, or novels) take us behind the scenes to reveal these dynamics and illuminate how the systems that govern the world work. Starting from infancy, they build a fantasy we call reality. Second, there are stories that confirm reality. They fill in the gaps in fantasies of the first kind with definitions, descriptions and events (Shanahan & Morgan, 1999, p. ix; Gerbner, 2001, p. 5). The third kind of stories tells us what we ought to do, according to Gerbner. These stories show us desired (or undesired) lifestyles and events, and what we should do to reach (or avoid) them. Today commercials are the main stories that tell us what we should do (Shanahan & Morgan, 1999, p. x; Gerbner, 2001, pp. 5-6).

That television is the modern narrator is one of the main hypotheses of the Cultural Indicators Project (Özer, 2004, p. 82). In the past, stories of a culture were transferred to next generations face-to-face by parents, teachers, priests, etc., whereas today "most stories are often told most people" by television (Signorielli & Morgan, 1996, p. 112). According to Gerbner, as an important socialisation tool, television shares the common cultural norms with all members of society, it explains them to the world (Özer, 2004, p. 84).

Being a source of broadly shared images and messages, television has become a tool that plays an important role in people's lives. As "an appliance, a piece of furniture, a story-teller, a member of the family," it has created a common and continuous learning environment. The symbolic environment created by television has told life, people, values, the strong and the weak to communities (Signorielli & Morgan, 1996, p.

114). According to Gerbner and his associates, television, a cultural arm of capitalist order, has both protected the authority and power of this order and legitimised it (Özer, 2004, p. 88).

Cultivation Theory postulates that heavy television viewers are more likely than light viewers to see the social world as resembling the world depicted on TV (Shanahan & Morgan, 1999, p. 3). Morgan suggests that television homogenises heavy viewers' beliefs with its content (Özer, trans. 1986, 2004, p. 19). This homogeneity is made through presenting fantasies as if they were real (Özer, 2004, p. 88). Thus, it is argued that being exposed to violence portrayed on television over a long period results in a mean world perception and sense of fear in individuals (Özer, 2004, p. 112).

Gerbner et al. focused on television and violence especially in the 1980s. In Gerbner and Gross's definition "violence is the overt expression of physical force, with or without a weapon, against self or others, compelling action against one's will on pain of being hurt or killed, or threatened to be so victimised as part of the plot" (Gerbner & Gross, Özer trans. 1976, 2004, p. 113). Cultivation theorists deal with violence as a show of strength, exhibition of power and a form of relationship having social functions. Therefore, "groundless threats, verbal harassment, unconvincing gestures" are not regarded as violence in cultivation studies (Taylan, 2011, p. 63).

Gerbner claims that the most common effect that television has on people is the "mean world syndrome." There is a significant correlation between violence scenes and victims on television and viewers' world perception. He argues viewers who consider their social groups under a greater threat compared with other social groups have a bigger sense of anxiety, insecurity, alienation and mean world perception than the others. According to Gerbner, people who do not feel secure could be prone to violence, dependant on authority, susceptible to strong, hard-line postures (Gerbner, 2003, p. 345).

The Cultural Indicators Project first focused on the number of violent scenes, their place in society, who did them to whom in television programmes (Taylan, 2011, p. 64). As a result of these studies, it was found that approximately 70% of the programmes on television included violent scenes; there are 5 violent scenes per hour, and 20 violent scenes per hour in programmes for children. It is calculated that children watch approximately 10,000 violent scenes each year, and 18,000 violence-

related deaths until they graduate from high school (Shanahan & Morgan, 1999, p. 43).

Another important concept that Gerbner introduced related to violence is "happy violence." Gerbner regards happy violence as "cool, swift, painless and even thrilling, but mostly sanitized." It always leads to a happy ending; it is designed to amuse, not to upset because "you have to deliver the audience to the next commercial in a receptive mood" (Gerbner, 2003, pp. 342-343).

Method

In this study, the role of television in cultivation was analysed using the cultivation analysis component of the Cultural Indicators Project. Due to the limitations of the study, institutional process analysis and message system analysis were not done. However, the studies of researchers who did message system analysis in Turkey are referred to in the study.

The purpose of the study is to determine the effects of viewing practices of individuals over the age of 60 on their social reality perceptions. In this context, a survey of cultivation questions was given to 120 adults (60 women, 60 men) living in Odunpazarı and Tepebaşı, Eskişehir. Participants were randomly chosen. With the presumption that they have been exposed to effects of television for a longer time and they prefer television most among other mass communication tools, the study is done on individuals aged 60 and over.

Cultivation theory requires participants not to be aware of the fact that value questions reflect the television world. Therefore, participants are asked to answer the questions on the front page of the survey first. After that, they see the questions on the back. In this study, it is presumed that the more people watch television, the more their values will be inclined to the holistic and ideological content of television. Consequently, the following hypothesis is tested:

The more time participants spend watching television's message system that has violent content, the more inclined their values will be to the "television world" shaped with the content provided with television.

For the Cultivation Analysis, a survey of nine questions was made. For the survey questions, Gerbner's six elements/components and newly developed elements/components are used. These components are:

A. Mean world syndrome:

      1. We live in a dangerous world.
      2. It is dangerous to walk alone at night.

Trust: People cannot be trusted.
Opportunism: Most people try to abuse you instead of being honest when they   have the opportunity.
Selfishness: People care about themselves instead of helping others.
Security: People do not feel secure.
Attack:

      1. People are attacked by people they do not know.
      2. People can be attacked at any moment.

Violence: There are acts of violence among lower class members.

Five-point Likert scales were used in the survey. Out of the five options ("strongly agree, agree, uncertain, disagree, strongly disagree"), "strongly agree" and "agree" are considered television answers because they reflect the television world. In the analysis stage, strongly agree and agree options were merged under "I agree;" and strongly disagree and disagree options were merged under "I disagree." One hundred and eighty and below viewing period is categorised as light, 181 and over as heavy.

Gerbner and his associates differentiate light and heavy viewers based on their viewing period. However, they do not give a time limit between heavy and light. On the contrary, they emphasise the difference between heavy and light viewing, and suggest a "division" between the two would be enough (Shanahan & Morgan, Özer trans. 1999, 2005a, p. 9). As a result, data was analysed with SPSS programme, and distribution of nine factors related with cultivation was examined. Results with $p < 0.05$ are considered meaningful.

Results

In this section, the studies of Ömer Özer and Veysel Batmaz who did message system analysis in Turkey are mentioned. Message system analysis findings of a Ph.D. dissertation by Özer (2004) entitled "Cultivation Theory: Analysing Cultural Functions of Television" and his studies "Analysing Cultivation Theory in the Context of Criticisms: A Research on the Resonance Effect of Television" published in 2005 and "The Content of Media Violence" published in 2007; and "Television and

Family in Turkey" by Batmaz (1995) are summarised, and then the field research results are given.

Information about Message System Analysis

In his Ph.D. dissertation on recognising television world through message system analysis, Ömer Özer studied ATV, Kanal D, Star and TRT1 evening news between 4 and 8 March, 2002 (Özer, 2004, p. 357). The channels broadcast a total of 138 news stories with violence element or direct violent action in five days. Total broadcast time of violence in the news was 459.17 minutes in total. The city with the most violent news stories was İstanbul. One hundred and seventeen of the news stories had serious content. Police were portrayed as both offender and victim of violence. Ninety-seven percent of the sides of violence did not know each other; and in 111 news stories it was found they belonged to lower classes (Özer, 2004, pp. 391-405). Relying on the research findings, Özer concluded that commercial television broadcasts violence intensively, and news stories are kneaded with violence and presented to the public (Özer, 2004, p. 405).

Özer carried out a field research in Çin Çin Bağları neighbourhood, Ankara in 2005 in order to find out whether mean world perceptions and feelings of personal insecurity f depended on living in violent neighbourhoods or television's role. In the message system analysis part of the study on defining the television world, evening news bulletins were analysed (Özer, 2005a, p. 127).

Özer conducted a violence analysis on evening news of ATV and Kanal D channels for five days between 14th and 18th April 2003. The findings of the study show that violent news stories take up nearly 20% of the news time. A total of 1,057 acts of violence were identified during that time. The number of people involved in violence was 123. People who did not know each other or people from lower classes resorted to violence. Acts of violence took place mostly in Iraq, followed by İstanbul. Axe, bomb, Molotov cocktail, stone, fist, anti-aircraft weapons were the equipment used in the acts. War images were the most shown images, and the reason for violence was murder. In addition to these, youngsters and men were involved in violence the most. Real violent acts made up the majority of the news stories (Özer, 2005a, pp. 153-157).

Another study that Özer did to uncover the violence presented in media and analyse the violence broadcast in evening news was "The Content of

Television Violence," also published in his book *Media Violence Society*. He worked on evening news stories of Show, Star and STV channels for five days between 31st July and 4th August 2006, and did 14 evening news stories analyses. Reaching the number of news stories for all three channels on a daily basis, Özer pointed out that the channels had different numbers of violent news stories on the same days, yet the figures were close to one another (Özer, 2007, pp. 221-226).

The study showed that there were not big differences among the three channels in terms of replaying and sustaining continuity of the news stories. There were many replays, but also continuity in scenes. It was concluded that all three channels had mostly serious news stories, and the locations of the events varied (Özer, 2007, pp. 227-230). When the types of events were analysed, Israeli attack, fights, domestic violence, rally, terror, and organised crime were the main topics; events were mostly coded as murder and injury on all three channels. The reasons for violence mentioned were arguments, conflicts and traffic accidents (Özer, 2007, pp. 230-236).

The analysis of gender's role in violence showed that in all three channels, compared with women, men had a higher rate of being involved in violence. In some news stories, however, the person or people using violence were not identified. What is more, women were exposed to violence more than men were. It was found that people resorting to or exposed to violence were not famous people mostly, and they did not know each other (Özer, 2007, pp. 237-244).

In the message system analysis part of his study entitled "Television and Family in Turkey," Veysel Batmaz looked at certain programmes of TRT1, TRT2, Kanal 6, Show TV, and Inter Star channels for 500 hours from December 1992 to December 1993 (Batmaz, 1995, p. 39-41). In his study, Batmaz sought to answer how television pictured family, and the world in a general sense; how subjects, characters, demographic variables were distributed on Turkish TV channels; what type of messages and contents were presented to the audience to "perceive" (Batmaz, 1995, p. 81).

According to the findings of the study, the total broadcast time of those five channels was 576 hours weekly. Family members watched television for an hour in every five hours. Programme genres from most aired to least aired were as follows: comedy, music and entertainment, sport, children's programmes and game shows (Batmaz, 1995, pp. 81-82).

Batmaz reached the following conclusions: The television world does not reflect the real world exactly. The real world is sometimes overrated on television (in issues such as violence, politics, etc.) and sometimes underrated (in issues such as education, health, family, etc.). Batmaz (1995, pp. 85-91) argues that television, which fills up one third of people's daily lives, distorts reality and conveys it with a certain emphasis and commentary.

Cultivation Analysis

Results of the surveys showed that participants allocated most of their time to television (68%) compared with other media. This proves that participants were appropriate for cultivation analysis. Besides, the average time when television was on was 8.3 hours. In their study "Growing up with Television: Cultivation Perspective," Gerbner et al. state that in a typical American home television is on an average of more than seven hours a day. The figure in this study is higher than the amount of time Gerbner and his associates mentioned.

Table 1. First Cultivation Test Results

			Q1			Total
			Disagree	Uncertain	Agree	
Viewing	Light	Count	9	0	27	36
		% within Viewing	25.0%	0.0%	75.0%	100.0%
	Heavy	Count	6	11	67	84
		% within Viewing	7.1%	13.1%	79.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	15	11	94	120
		% within Viewing	12.5%	9.2%	78.3%	100.0%

p = .004

1. Mean world syndrome was tested through asking *to what extent do you agree or disagree to the statement that says generally speaking we live in a mean world.* As shown in Table 1, there was a meaningful correlation between heavy television viewing and mean world

perception. Between heavy and light viewers, there was a 4.8% difference in the *I agree* option.

Table 2. Second Cultivation Test Results

			Q2			Total
			Disagree	Uncertain	Agree	
Viewing	Light	Count	10	7	19	36
		% within Viewing	27.8%	19.4%	52.8%	100.0%
	Heavy	Count	9	9	66	84
		% within Viewing	10.7%	10.7%	78.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	19	16	85	120
		% within Viewing	15.8%	13.3%	70.8%	100.0%

p = .02

2. A meaningful correlation between television viewing and trust was found as a result of the second cultivation test (Table 2) with the question that asked *to what extent do you agree or disagree to the statement that says generally speaking people cannot be trusted.* Between heavy and light viewers, a 25.8% of cultivation evidence was observed in terms of the *I agree* option.

Table 3. Third Cultivation Test Results

			Q3			Total
			Disagree	Uncertain	Agree	
Viewing	Light	Count	8	4	24	36
		% within Viewing	22.2%	11.1%	66.7%	100.0%
	Heavy	Count	5	12	67	84
		% within Viewing	6.0%	14.3%	79.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	13	16	91	120
		% within Viewing	10.8%	13.3%	75.8%	100.0%

p = .03

3. The results concerning the statement *generally speaking most people try to abuse you instead of being honest when they have the*

opportunity came out as meaningful and a 13.1% of cultivation evidence was obtained.

Table 4. Fourth Cultivation Test Results

			Q4			Total
			Disagree	Uncertain	Agree	
Viewing	Light	Count	9	4	23	36
		% within Viewing	25.0%	11.1%	63.9%	100.0%
	Heavy	Count	6	12	66	84
		% within Viewing	7.1%	14.3%	78.6%	100.0%
Total		Count	15	16	89	120
		% within Viewing	12.5%	13.3%	74.2%	100.0%

p = .03

4. The results regarding the statement *generally speaking people care about themselves instead of helping others* were meaningful and a 14.7% of cultivation evidence was obtained.

Table 5. Fifth Cultivation Test Results

			Q5			Total
			Disagree	Uncertain	Agree	
Viewing	Light	Count	4	5	27	36
		% within Viewing	11.1%	13.9%	75.0%	100.0%
	Heavy	Count	9	8	66	83
		% within Viewing	10.8%	9.6%	79.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	13	13	93	119
		% within Viewing	10.9%	10.9%	78.2%	100.0%

p = .80

5. The results concerning the statement *generally speaking walking alone at night is dangerous* were not meaningful.

Table 6. Sixth Cultivation Test Results

			Q6			Total
			Disagree	Uncertain	Agree	
Viewing	Light	Count	9	6	20	35
		% within Viewing	25.7%	17.1%	57.1%	100.0%
	Heavy	Count	7	18	58	83
		% within Viewing	8.4%	21.7%	69.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	16	24	78	118
		% within Viewing	13.6%	20.3%	66.1%	100.0%

p = .04

6. The results concerning the statement *generally speaking most people do not feel safe were meaningful* and a 12.8% of cultivation evidence was obtained.

Table 7. Seventh Cultivation Test Results

			Q7			Total
			Disagree	Uncertain	Agree	
Viewing	Light	Count	10	5	20	35
		% within Viewing	28.6%	14.3%	57.1%	100.0%
	Heavy	Count	10	14	60	84
		% within Viewing	11.9%	16.7%	71.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	20	19	80	119
		% within Viewing	16.8%	16.0%	67.2%	100.0%

p = .09

7. The results concerning the statement *generally speaking people could be attacked at any moment did* were not meaningful.

Table 8. Eight Cultivation Test Results

			Q8			Total
			Disagree	Uncertain	Agree	
Viewing	Light	Count	12	3	20	35
		% within Viewing	34.3%	8.6%	57.1%	100.0%
	Heavy	Count	31	17	36	84
		% within Viewing	36.9%	20.2%	42.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	43	20	56	119
		% within Viewing	36.1%	16.8%	47.1%	100.0%

p = .20

8. The results concerning the statement *generally speaking there are acts of violence among lower class members* were not meaningful.

Table 9. Ninth Cultivation Test Results

			Q9			Total
			Disagree	Uncertain	Agree	
Viewing	Light	Count	17	4	15	36
		% within Viewing	47.2%	11.1%	41,7%	100.0%
	Heavy	Count	30	23	31	84
		% within Viewing	35.7%	27.4%	36.9%	100.0%
Total		Count	47	27	46	120
		% within Viewing	39.2%	22.5%	38.3%	100.0%

p = .10

9. The results regarding the statement *generally speaking people are attacked by people they do not know* were not meaningful.

Conclusion and Evaluation

In this study, a field research was carried out and the role of television on cultivation was emphasised in the context of the "Cultural Indicators Project," developed by Gerbner and his associates. Other components of the Cultural Indicators Project, which are Institutional Process Analysis and Message System Analysis, were not conducted here due to research limitations. However, some resources on Message System Analysis were studied, and three researches done on the subject in Turkey were summarised.

As a result of the research, it was concluded that, for the participants, time spent with television surpassed time spent with other media, and they preferred television as the first source of information.

Five out of nine cultivation tests produced meaningful results. Participants think that "they live in a dangerous world, people cannot be trusted, people try to abuse you when they have the opportunity, people care about themselves instead of helping others" and they feel insecure. This reveals that television had a role of cultivation on the participants on the basis of these questions.

Results of one of Gerbner and his associates' key questions about living in a mean world came out meaningful, too. In this context, it is possible to say that television created a sense of mean world perception and personal insecurity in the participants. This result is important to counter argue the criticism that claims "mean world perception is not related to television, but to the immediate environment."

In terms of the other four test results that were not meaningful, we can make the following arguments: Participants may have not chosen *"I agree"* for the statements that said *"Generally speaking it's dangerous to walk alone at night"* and *"Generally speaking people could be attacked at any time"* because they think the place where they live is safe.

Tests concerning the statements *"Generally speaking there are acts of violence among lower class members"* and *"Generally speaking people are attacked by people they do not know"* did not come out meaningful either.

Since there are no questions in the survey to identify the socio-cultural class of the participants, whether there is a correlation between their *"I disagree"* answer and social class was not possible to determine. The

reason for choosing *"I disagree"* may be that they do not consider violence peculiar to lower classes and people they do not know, but they see it as an act that may come from any part of the society.

This study does not make generalisations. However, it has put forward the role of television in cultivation. It is possible to do new studies with the sample of this study or with new samples. Not only television, but also new media and social media, could be studied. Comparative analyses in which people with different demographic and socio-cultural characteristics take part would be useful for the field.

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A STUDY WİTH UNİVERSİTY STUDENTS REGARDING THE CULTİVATİON ROLE OF TELEVİSİON

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Introduction

The current study questions the role that violence broadcast on television plays in university students' perception of real life. For the purposes of the study, a survey was administered which included items obtained from cultivation analysis, which is the third phase of the "Cultural Indicators Project" developed by George Gerbner. The survey was applied to students attending the Anadolu University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences.

In the first section of the study, the researcher will provide information about the Cultural Indicators Project and cultivation analysis, which form the theoretical background of the study. Later, the administration process of the survey will be explained in detail, which will be followed by the conclusion section.

Cultural Indicators Research Project

The project was developed by George Gerbner for the "National Committee" established at the University of Pennsylvania in order to research the reasons for violence and the ways to prevent it (Erdoğan & Alemdar, 2005, p. 172). The main hypothesis of the project was that television is a centralized story teller (Gerbner et.al., 1994: cited by Özer, 2010, p. 324).

According to Gerbner, mass society theories have been more established and valid since the second half of the 20th century. The only tool to shape atomized individuals' perceptions of reality in today's mass societies is television since the messages conveyed via television are presented in

such a homogenous way that viewers are not given the opportunity to choose among different options. In other words, viewers are not free to be selective viewers (Batmaz & Aksoy, 1995, p. 24).

Having the power to reach the greatest number of people to tell the greatest number of stories as frequently as possible, television transforms the cultural process of storytelling in accordance with the dynamics of the market. This process is controlled by global commercial interest groups. The central, expansionist and homogenizing cultural mainstream is broadcast on television; "Television cultivates the concepts and sample behaviors that have the potential to be intense and to unite" (Özer, 2010, p. 325)

According to Gerbner, the effects of television do not involve sudden changes or similarities. There are some differences between rare viewers and frequent ones in terms of social reality conceptualization. It should be kept in mind that television is "the cultural dimension of industrial order" (Özer, 2010, p. 325).

The Cultural Indicators Project has three fields of research; namely institutional process analysis, message system analysis and cultivation analysis. Institutional process analysis is the first phase of the Cultural Indicators Project, which aims to identify power relationships behind the messages. In this context, the following issues are mainly dealt with: how decisions are made in mass communication institutions; how consumer demands are determined; and how the process of the determination of symbolic products is structured (Batmaz & Aksoy, 1995, p. 24).

The second phase of the Cultural Indicators Project, that is "message system analysis," deals with the messages produced by mass communication devices. "These messages involve point of views and hypotheses that might be comprehended by taking into consideration the social relationships and the contexts where they are produced (cited by Özer, 2010: 326 from Morgan, 1995, p. 104). According to Gerbner, messages should be considered as a system of messages rather than single messages (Özer, 2010, p. 326). Considering this point of view, message system analysis defines the most popular tendencies shared by public opinion and how public opinions are shaped accordingly (cited by Özer, 2010, p. 326 from Morgan, 1995, p. 107). In other words, message system analysis focuses on the following issues: the things presented by mass communication tools for the public opinion and their frequency; the point of views applied to prioritize the value judgments; and the logical

relationships among symbols and themes as well as the reasons for these relationships (cited by Batmaz & Aksoy, 1995, p. 25 from Gerbner, 1972).

Message system analysis is the main resource of the questions used in cultivation analysis reflected in the television content that is presented to viewers for a long period of time (cited by Özer, 2010, p. 326 from Gerbner, 1990, p. 253). Thus, this phase is a crucial step to determine the cultivation effect of television since a wrong analysis in this phase might result in inaccurate field study data (cited by Özer, 2010, p. 326 from Shanahan & Morgan, 1999).

The third phase of the Cultural Indicators Project, that is cultivation analysis, deals with the effects of watching television on social reality conceptualizations. In other words, cultivation analysis claims that the image of the "real world" in the minds of frequent viewers match with the one created on television. This claim is based on the assumption that frequent viewers tend to see the world as less safe and merciless compared to rare viewers (Mutlu, 2004, p. 315).

Cultivation analysis has often been a criticized topic[1]. Such criticism has led to the emergence of the concept of "mainstreaming," which refers to "creating a common point of view and bringing different individuals together by isolating the diverse opinions so as to create a homogenous community" (Özer, 2010, p. 328). In other words, the concept refers to the fact that television, which follows a mainstream policy to attract more viewers, homogenizes and assimilates individuals having different tendencies (Mutlu, 2004, p. 24). Accordingly, it can be concluded that frequent viewers have less diversity in real life due to the other factors and they perceive the television world independently from such differences. To be more concrete, when the replies given in surveys by different groups of viewers are considered– that is the differences harmonized with the social and political characteristics of these groups— we can see that such diversities are observed less or even are not available in the replies of frequent viewers (cited by Özer, 2010, p. 328 from Gerbner et al., 1986, p. 31)

The research method for the three phases of the Cultural Indicators Project, which are institutional process analysis, message system analysis

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[1] Özer (2010: 327) gives example of studies: Rubin, et al., 1988; Erdoğan, 1998; Shanahan & Morgan, 1999; Özer, 2004.

and cultivation analysis respectively, can be explained as follows: the focus of a study to be conducted in the first phase is the production processes of mass communication tools. The observations of the employees in the field of mass communication, as well as the available records, are examined to determine the factors related to the structure and functions of power roles and those leading to the emergence of power (Özer, 2012).

As for the purposes of message system analysis, content analysis is applied to television content. The aim of this analysis type is to identify the social and demographic choices in the world of television. "The distribution of the characters according to the programs, their occupations, behaviors and their value judgments are systematically classified and analyzed (Batmaz & Aksoy, 1995, p. 27).

Finally, cultivation analysis, which aims to determine the cultivation role of television, uses a survey administered to television viewers. This survey, developed by Gerbner, includes a number of statements assuming that television imposes the perception of a dangerous world in viewers' minds.

Violence in the Cultural Indicators Project

Violence conceptualizations suggested by Gerbner et al. are quite significant in understanding the intellectual structure of the Cultural Indicators Project. Gerbner and Gross (1976, p. 184; cited by Özer 2010, p. 328), in their early cultivation studies on violence, defined this term as follows and this definition was used in further studies as well: "Violence is the overt expression of physical force against self or other (with or without a weapon), compelling action against one's will on pain of being hurt or killed, or actually hurting or killing." As the definition suggests, the conceptualization of violence in the Cultural Indicators Project involves physical violence. However, since accidents and natural disasters are actions resulting in a considerable number of causalities, they are also considered "violence" (Gerbner 1980, pp. 11-12; cited by Özer 2010, p. 328).

The details of how the Cultural Indicators Project deals with violence can be summarized as follows:

- Violence, as a considerable social problem, is carried to the homes of people via television.
- The violence in television content controlled by governments tells people their places in society by categorizing them into two groups: those who victimize others and the victims.
- The violence on television, as part of the global market system, serves for the spread of television viewing all over the world (Özer, 2005, pp. 201-205; 2007, pp. 301-304; 2010, pp. 328-331).

Gerbner and Gross (1976, p. 192; cited by Özer, 2005, p. 205) answer the question "What can be gained through the broadcast of violence on television?" as follows: To increase the feeling of "Risk and Insecurity" (in different ways for different ruling forces) will increase the obedience and resignation to the existing authority. Later, this situation will legalize the use of power by the authority rather than the threats to social order by illegal forces.

Cultural products globally distributed represent common messages/codes in the content. The most important of these common messages are violence and sexuality. This global violent content is extremely low cost, compared to local production, this makes them attractive to the broadcasters who buy them. According to Gerbner, the main cause of violent content is that violence "is selling" (Gerbner, 2002, p. 298) because "violence is its cheapest and clearest symbolic expression" (Gerbner, 1994, p. 135).

Violence in its most reliably observable form is a physical show of force: It is making one do or submit to something against one's will on pain of being hurt or killed. It demonstrates who has the power to impose what on whom under what circumstances. It illuminates the ability to lash out, provoke, intimidate, and annihilate. It designates winners and losers, victimizers and victim, champions and wimps (Gerbner, 1994, p. 135).

The discussions mentioned above clearly show that television, from the point of view of the Cultural Indicators Project, goes beyond the cultural borders with the violent content it broadcasts. Therefore, it provides a sort of consensus in society, and determines the borders between those who commit violence and those who are exposed to violence and increases the nervousness of television viewers.

Method

In the current study, cultivation analysis was applied, which is the third phase of the Cultural Indicators Project. For the purposes of the analysis, the survey was administered to students attending Anadolu University's Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences. There are different categories of students in this faculty; those attending daytime education or evening education and receiving Turkish-medium education or English-medium education. The survey was given to 20% of the students attending daytime education and receiving Turkish-medium instruction. The nearly equal distribution of female and male students as participants in the study was also another issue considered while determining the sampling of the study. As a result, the survey was administered to a total of 297 students; 156 women and 141 men.

Gerbner et al. do not give a specific duration of television viewing for rare viewers and frequent viewers. They just state that it is enough to give a logical borderline to discriminate these two groups (Özer, 2007a, p.305). In this study, those who watch television less than one hour were grouped as "rare viewers" and more than one hour as "frequent viewers" according to survey data obtained. Values higher than $p > 0.05$ in significance tests were labeled as "not meaningful."

As the theoretical background suggests, the hypothesis of the study is that the value judgments presented by television content match the individual value judgments of frequent viewers more accurately than rare viewers.

This hypothesis raises the question "What are the value judgments presented by television?" and reminds us that message system analysis should be done to come up with some statements or questions for cultivation analysis. In the current study, message system analysis was not carried out; however, previous studies conducted in Turkey on television's violent content were referred to and survey items and the results were evaluated according to these studies[2].

The results of the study are presented below together with the items of the survey.

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[2] Some of these studies: Batmaz & Aksoy, 1995; Özer, 2005; 2007a; 2007b; 2010.

Cultivation Analysis Results and Evaluation

This section will present the tables of significance tests results for rare viewers and frequent viewers according to the survey items.

According to the cultivation questionnaire, 29 students watched television less than one hour; 193 students watched television more than one hour as daytime. Seventy-five students also said that they did not watch television. These students were not included in the analysis.

The questions of the questionnaire were developed by Ömer Özer, who has done a number of cultivation studies in Turkey, pursuant to Gerbner's cultivation questionnaires and cultivation studies in Turkey.

Table 1. Cultivation Test Results

			I do not agree	Undecided	I agree	Total
Viewing	Rare	Frequency	3	1	25	29
		Percentage	10.3%	3.4%	86.2%	100.0%
	Frequent	Frequency	15	9	169	193
		Percentage	7.8%	4.7%	87.6%	100.0%
Total		Frequency	18	10	194	222
		Percentage	8.1%	4.5%	87.4%	100.0%

$p = 0.90$

1) The analysis of the item "Generally speaking, we live in a dangerous world" revealed no meaningful result. According to the data presented in Table 1, the reason for this result might be that the distribution for the option "undecided" was very low.

Table 2. Cultivation Test Results

			I do not agree	Undecided	I agree	Total
Viewing	Rare	Frequency	5	6	18	29
		Percentage	17.2%	20.7%	62.1%	100.0%
	Frequent	Frequency	27	21	145	193
		Percentage	14.0%	10.9%	75.1%	100.0%
Total		Frequency	32	27	163	222
		Percentage	14.4%	12.2%	73.4%	100.0%

$p = 0.30$

2) The analysis of the item "Generally speaking, today people are untrustworthy" revealed no meaningful result. According to the data presented in Table 2, the reason for this result was the big gap between the number of rare viewers and frequent viewers.

Table 3. Cultivation Test Results

			I do not agree	Undecided	I agree	Total
Viewing	Rare	Frequency	3	3	23	29
		Percentage	10.3%	10.3%	79.3%	100.0%
	Frequent	Frequency	21	27	144	192
		Percentage	10.9%	14.1%	75.0%	100.0%
Total		Frequency	24	30	167	221
		Percentage	10.8%	13.6%	75.6%	100.0%

$p = 0.90$

3) The analysis of the item "Generally speaking, today people do not feel safe" revealed no meaningful result. According to the data presented in Table 3, there might be two reasons for this result. The first one is that the percentage of the options "I don't agree" and "undecided" was equal. Second, the difference between "frequent viewers" and "rare viewers" was very high for the option "I agree."

Table 4. Cultivation Test Results

			I do not agree	Undecided	I agree	Total
Viewing	Rare	Frequency	3	4	22	29
		Percentage	10.3%	13.8%	75.9%	100.0%
	Frequent	Frequency	22	20	150	192
		Percentage	11.5%	10.4%	78.1%	100.0%
Total		Frequency	25	24	172	221
		Percentage	11.3%	10.9%	77.8%	100.0%

$p = 0.90$

4) The analysis of the item "Generally speaking, today people are very likely to be assaulted anytime" revealed no meaningful result. According to the data presented in Table 4, the reason for this result was that the percentage of "frequent viewers" was very close to that of "frequent viewers."

Table 5. Cultivation Test Results

			I do not agree	Undecided	I agree	Total
Viewing	Rare	Frequency	13	4	12	29
		Percentage	44.8%	13.8%	41.4%	100.0%
	Frequent	Frequency	87	24	81	192
		Percentage	45.3%	12.5%	42.2%	100.0%
Total		Frequency	100	28	93	221
		Percentage	45.2%	12.7%	42.1%	100.0%

$p = 0.10$

5) The reason for the lack of meaningful results from the analysis of the item "Generally speaking, violence is observed among the lower-class members of the society" is the numerical data for the option "I do not agree" is higher than that of "I agree."

Table 6. Cultivation Test Results

			I do not agree	Undecided	I agree	Total
Viewing	Rare	Frequency	6	8	15	29
		Percentage	20.7%	27.6%	51.7%	100.0%
	Frequent	Frequency	53	46	94	193
		Percentage	27.5%	23.8%	48.7%	100.0%
Total		Frequency	59	54	109	222
		Percentage	26.6%	24.3%	49.1%	100.0%

$p = 0.70$

6) The analysis of the item "Generally speaking, people are assaulted by the people they don't know" revealed no meaningful result. The reason for this result is that the percentage of "rare viewers" is higher than that of "frequent viewers."

Table 7. Cultivation Test Results

			I do not agree	Undecided	I agree	Total
Viewing	Rare	Frequency	6	5	18	29
		Percentage	20.7%	17.2%	62.1%	100.0%
	Frequent	Frequency	46	23	124	193
		Percentage	23.8%	11.9%	64.2%	100.0%
Total		Frequency	52	28	142	222
		Percentage	23.4%	12.6%	64.0%	100.0%

$p = 0.70$

7) According to Table 7, the analysis of the item "Generally speaking, it is dangerous to spend time outside late at night" revealed no meaningful result.

Table 8. Cultivation Test Results

			I do not agree	Undecided	I agree	Total
Viewing	Rare	Frequency	3	2	24	29
		Percentage	10.3%	6.9%	82.8%	100.0%
	Frequent	Frequency	6	9	178	193
		Percentage	3.1%	4.7%	92.2%	100.0%
Total		Frequency	9	11	202	222
		Percentage	4.0%	5.0%	91.0%	100.0%

$p = 0.20$

8) According to Table 8, the analysis of the item "Generally speaking, today many women are exposed to violence" revealed no meaningful result.

Table 9. Cultivation Test Results

			I do not agree	Undecided	I agree	Total
Viewing	Rare	Frequency	14	5	10	29
		Percentage	48.3%	17.2%	34.5%	100.0%
	Frequent	Frequency	80	31	82	193
		Percentage	41.5%	16.1%	42.5%	100.0%
Total		Frequency	94	36	92	222
		Percentage	42.3%	16.2%	41.4%	100.0%

$p = 0.70$

9) The analysis of the item "Generally speaking, violence occurs among the males to a great extent" revealed no meaningful result. The reason for this result is that the number of participants who marked "I agree with you" and "I don't agree with you" are very close to each other.

Conclusion, Discussion and Suggestions

In this study, 20% of the students attending daytime education of Turkish-medium departments in the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences at Anadolu University (297 students) were given the cultivation survey. The third research component of the cultural indicators project, that is cultivation analysis, is based on the hypothesis that the world presented by television creates a perception of a "dangerous world" and this perception becomes stronger as people watch more television.

For cultivation analysis purposes, the participants were categorized under two groups; namely rare viewers (those who watch television less than one hour a day) and frequent viewers (those who watch television more than one hour a day). The significance tests applied to determine the relationships between these two groups revealed no meaningful result for any of the nine cultivation questions.

This result might suggest that the questions asked in cultivation analysis should be revised for further studies. First of all, the administration of the survey with university students might raise a new assumption that the television viewing habit has been replaced by internet use for this group of participants. A new question asking whether TV content watched on the Internet (such as TV series) might be added to the survey according to this new assumption. However, the addition of such questions based on

assumptions should be carefully discussed in academic contexts since the main starting point of the cultural indicators project with regards to television watching is that television does not allow viewers to have a lot of options to watch. Therefore, when the television viewing habit has been replaced by internet use, we may not confidently claim a similar cultivation theory for the Internet. In addition, it can be discussed how viewing television content on the Internet can be integrated into cultivation theory as well.

Another issue regarding university students is whether they live with their families or alone. Some students who stay at dormitories might be watching television less due to the fact that they can watch television only in common areas such as cafeterias or canteens since they do not have television sets in their rooms. In addition, there may be differences in their viewing habits when students live in flats without their families since they are more likely to participate in more social activities at nights rather than watching TV at home. Therefore, whether this question can be included in the survey or not should be discussed thoroughly.

As for the students who live together with their families, it can be said that television is considered a common communication tool in many families (Ergül, Gökalp & Cangöz, 2012). Is it possible that these students watch television more than those who live away from their families? Another question may arise regarding this issue: "Do the students who live with their families spend most of their time at home in their own rooms—therefore with their computers on the internet —or together with their parents?"

The questions discussed above can be piloted in a new study by including them in a survey to see whether they can provide insights for further studies.

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REMEDIATING AGGRESSION: HUMBABA, MYTHIC TRANSFORMATION, AND VIRTUALITY

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Abstract

This paper explores themes of aggression, destruction, and transformation in the ancient Epic of Gilgamesh, and the role of digital media in the remediation of the world's oldest written story. Within the context of a contemporary retelling, the monster Humbaba's position in the narrative as the antagonistic Other is evaluated. The project portrays how Humbaba, the divinely appointed protector of the Cedar forest, is seen to impede the desire of the foreign invaders for valuable natural resources, the Cedars of Lebanon. Seeking glory, the aggressors, led by the impulsive tyrant Gilgamesh and his companion Enkidu, invade the forest, kill Humbaba, and cut down the sacred cedars. In doing so, they set into motion unintended consequences, divine retribution, resulting in the death of Enkidu. The epic chronicles the transformation of Gilgamesh, as he changes from an arrogant ruler into an ethical one focused on serving the best interests of his people. The project aligned Humbaba's environmental consciousness with that of contemporary reforestation activist Wangari Maathai. The author explicates the process of blending an original spoken word performance and live action with 3D avatars in a virtual game engine environment. By employing repurposed Microsoft Kinect sensors with motion capture capabilities, the characters are controlled through Natural User Interface (NUI) by the motions of the actors. This research leads to an examination of the interrelationship between mythic portrayals of conflict and injustice, and the role that digital storytelling plays in creating a public dialogue about the history of human experience.

Introduction

It seems that as long as people have been telling stories, they have sought to understand matters of the heart, what it means to be human, and how to live a meaningful life. This is evidenced by the themes in the ancient Epic of Gilgamesh, an evocative tale in which a semi-divine hero is transformed after experiencing the loss of a beloved friend, and the resulting journey he undertakes to seek immortality. Graced with both god-like beauty and superior strength, he can be thought of as written literature's first superhero.

The purpose of this paper is to trace the development of a multimedia performance project based on the Epic of Gilgamesh created for an alternative format presentation as part of a storytelling session entitled *Stories From the Ancestors: Uncertainty and Resilience in a Vulnerable World* at the 13th International Congress of Ethnobiology (ICE), which took place in Montpellier, France in May, 2010. The intent of the project was to investigate how the latest advances in digital technology, specifically in the areas of virtual reality (VR) and motion capture, could be applied in a performance context to retell the world's oldest written story. It was envisioned as an act of creative expression, informed by an examination of the archival texts and the interrelationship of storytelling, movement, social memory, myth, and media.

Live actors controlling avatars in a virtual environment reenacted a shortened version of the epic through the use of a body-tracking motion sensor. Harking back to oral storytelling traditions, the performance was set to a spoken word piece, an original poetic retelling of the myth by the author. It was performed and videotaped in an immersive theater at Digital Worlds Institute of the University of Florida, which is equipped with five contiguous projection screens, as well as 5.1 surround sound capabilities. This new and inexpensive form of motion capture technology, a Microsoft Kinect RGB-D (Red-Green-Blue Depth) camera, offers the possibility of innovative storytelling that blends interactive live-action and virtual reality performance for multimodal narratives.

The resulting project benefited from the power and depth in the ancient Epic of Gilgamesh, and showed the epic could be told by harnessing technology to reinvigorate discourse about such issues as aggression, violence, deforestation, and other environmental concerns. In doing so, the "monster" Humbaba's position in the narrative as the antagonistic Other was evaluated and recast. The remediation portrayed how

Humbaba, the divinely appointed protector of the Cedar forest, is seen to impede the desire of the foreign invaders for valuable natural resources, the Cedars of Lebanon. It is significant that this act of aggression related to the recent war in Iraq, a country situated on the site of ancient Mesopotamia. However, since the project was not simply a recitation of the epic, but a contemporary reinterpretation, a parallel was drawn between the character of Humbaba and Nobel 2004 Peace Prize recipient and environmental activist, Wangari Maathai, a latter day protector of the forest. The Humbaba character was featured in an accompanying full color comic book, custom made as a handout for session attendees, designed as an illustrated story summary and to reinforce the project's message. It included an inner fold-out map of Mesopotamia and surrounding area.

Through this mediated recounting of the story of Gilgamesh, his friendship with the wild man Enkidu, their arrogance and act of aggression, and the resulting death of Humbaba, the ancient themes of unbridled ambition leading to tragedy, fear of mortality, and the hero's transformation are considered. The ancient story still entrances, both due to its quality of mythic timelessness and its timely wisdom. It conveys a comparison of value systems, inviting contemplation about the necessity of balance between the decisions made by humans and those that affect the protection of the environment. After surviving several fallen civilizations over millennia, the Epic of Gilgamesh still has much to teach those dwelling in the 21st century and beyond.

Literature Review

In a time long ago, almost 5,000 years into the distant past, a king by the name of Gilgamesh ruled over a Mesopotamian city of Uruk (Tigay, 1982, p.13). He governed what has been described as the first great city in the history of civilization, an urban center surrounded by a six-mile long wall (George, 1999, p.xxxi, p.8). Stories based on this historical figure were passed down orally through the generations for perhaps 700 years, until a new technology came along (Mitchell, 2004, p. 5). It was an invention called writing. Cuneiform script was created by incising wedge-shaped symbolic marks in clay tablets before firing in a kiln (Parry, 2011, p.17). The new encoding technology with its tablet-based media made it possible to save these early tales from being forgotten.

The first extant written story in history is that of the heroic figure, Gilgamesh. No longer a mere mortal, but two-thirds divine, he appears as Bilgamesh with the monster the Huwawa in five early Sumerian tales (Mitchell, 2004, p. 5; Fleming & Milstein, 2010, p. 5). The story cycle was recorded in Sumerian, and later in Akkadian, Hittite, and other languages of the ancient world (Tigay, 1982, p. 29). Coalesced into subsequent versions of the epic known as the Old Babylonian Version or by the title "Surpassing All Kings," the iteration may have been composed by one person, which scholars conjecture to have been an individual unnamed poet (George, 1999, p. xxi; Tigay, 1982, pp. 20-21).

Five more centuries passed before a poet-priest named Sîn-lēqi-unninni wrote his own version of the epic, refining and enhancing the older versions until he had crafted a poignant, poetic rendition (Mitchell, 2004, p. 6; George, 1999, p. xxv; Tigay, 1982, pp.12-13). The tablets of this version, known as "He Who Saw The Deep" or what scholars also refer to as the Standard Version, record the first written literary narrative to carry its author's name (Parry, 2011, p.17). The enhancements include a prelude added by the poet, as well as a speech by the only named female character, the priestess Shamhat. Copies of the tablets were in the King Ashurbanipal of Assyria's great library at Nineveh when it was destroyed by the Persians in 612 B.C.E., and were lost, not to be found again until 1849 by Layard, Rassam, and later, Smith (Ziolkowski, 2011, p. 8; Damrosch, 2006, p. 194). Excavations began after the discovery of the ruins of the library, and tablets were recovered from Nineveh and other sites. It took many more years to catalog and assemble the thousands of tablet pieces and to translate the 2,000 of perhaps 3,000 lines of the Standard Version that exist on twelve tablets in various museum collections today (Mitchell, 2004, p. 6; Fleming & Milstein, 2010, p. 2).

The tale of the discoveries and difficulties of translating the tablets is itself a saga, chronicled by David Damrosch in *The Buried Book: The Loss and Rediscovery of the Great Epic of Gilgamesh* (2006). It includes accounts of the first scholars to crack the cuneiform code, the intrepid Henry Rawlinson, whose first translation of a cuneiform text was published in 1860, and the brilliant working-class outsider George Smith, who was the first to discover and translate the Epic of Gilgamesh in 1872 (Damrosch, 2006, p. 20, p. 5). However, it was not until about 25 years later that the correct translation of the name Gilgamesh itself was made by the Assyriologist, Theophilis Pinches, Smith's successor at the British Museum (Damrosch, 2006, p. 29). Other background information on the

epic's various versions and translations include Fleming and Milstein's *The Buried Foundation of the Gilgamesh Epic: The Akkadian Huwawa Narrative* (2010)*,* and Tigay's *The Evolution of the Gilgamesh Epic* (1982).

Though many translations have followed the progressive discovery of the tablets, poet and scholar Stephen Mitchell produced his own version (not claiming it to be an exact translation), which was published in 2004, primarily based on Sîn-lēqi-unninni's Standard Version, one that also used artistic license in reworking the language of the original, and that used older texts to complete missing sections. He cites the work of Andrew George's translation of older versions of the Gilgamesh epic as an important reference while completing his version. It is Mitchell's graceful and lucid rendition that inspired the original poem produced for the project described in this paper. This original, found in the Appendix that follows, differs from Mitchell's in overall length, focus, and structure, as it was created in 5-line stanzas or iambic quintains instead of what Mitchell describes in his work as "a loose, noniambic, nonalliterative tetrameter" (2004, p. 66). Some 5-line stanzas were expanded with repeated final lines at certain points in the story for emphasis, somewhat like the repetitive poetic structures common in Sumerian and Akkadian variations of the Epic of Gilgamesh.

Scholars theorize that over its long evolution, versions of the Gilgamesh epic were performed orally in the bardic tradition, or possibly as part of sacred dramas staged before audiences (Ziolkowski, 2011, p. 169). Nevertheless, as Roger Parry points out in the title of his book *The Ascent of Media: From Gilgamesh to Google Via Gutenberg*, the story of Gilgamesh survives to this day because it was set down in text, mediated by the new writing technology of the day in ancient Mesopotamia, Babylon, and Assyria (2011, p. 17). How much has changed? Strikingly, 21st century technology is turning again to another form of tablet (made of silicon and plastic this time) with its own accompanying encoding. In addition, both computer users employ the term "scrolling" for accessing screen content, a term that originated from the ancient scrolls of papyrus and parchment that replaced the clay tablets in subsequent civilizations.

In the context of the Epic of Gilgamesh as a cultural artifact closely tied to social memory, works in the area of memory studies were reviewed. As a survey of memory-related projects and ideas, *Performing the Past: Memory, History, and Identity in Modern Europe*, edited by Tilmans, van Vree, and Winter (2010), proved to be especially relevant. In the journal

article "Memory Texts and Memory Work: Performances of Memory in and with Visual Media," Kuhn proposes the notion of a memory text being "a montage of vignettes, anecdotes, fragments, 'snapshots' and flashes that can generate a feeling of synchrony" (2010, p. 299). Furthermore, Kuhn argues that the structure of what she terms *memory texts*, or cinematic enactments of remembering the past, have an emphasis on metaphor, cyclic repetition, shifting points of view, and are image-focused, all attributes of performance linked to embodied cultural memory (2010, p. 299). These same attributes readily align with the capacities of digital media when applied to storytelling in an immersive theater: mythic otherworldliness, evocative use of sound, potential of replay or repetitive looping, the ability to assume other points of view through multiple avatars, often fragmentary, and image-heavy in focus.

These ideas centered around performance and memory relate to Howard's article "Expressions of Experience and Transformation: Performing Illness Narratives" (2013), as well as Lamberi's assessment in "Memory Between Old and New Media: Rethinking Storytelling as a Performative Practice to Process, Assess and Create Awareness of Change in the World" (2012), and Taylor's book *The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas* (2003).

Research on new media and performance must include defining important concepts and terminology. In *Visual Digital Culture: Surface Play and Spectacle in New Media Genres*, Andrew Darley, in providing a useful explication of what is meant by interactivity, describes it as "a distinctive mode of relating to audiovisual representations or fictions. The player is provided with a way of directly taking a leading role in what occurs, given the means to control- at least in part- what will unfold within the scene on the screen" (2000, p. 156). This proved useful in evaluating the project, which can therefore be seen as "interactive" even though the actors could not change the storyline.

Arnold and Eddy's book *Exploring Visual Storytelling: The Art of Turning Good Ideas into Compelling Stories* (2000), and Ryan's article "Beyond Myth and Metaphor: Narrative in Digital Media" (2002) yielded observations on storytelling in contemporary media involving such issues as character development, metaphor, and aspects of screen culture.

No matter the media, the Epic of Gilgamesh has retained its vitality, inspiring many to re-envision it as opera, anime, poetry, fiction, theater, music, film, puppetry, and recently sacred drama, as extensively

documented by Ziolkowski's *Gilgamesh Among Us: Modern Encounters with the Ancient Epic* (2011). To date there have been modern theatrical performances using technology, such as projected imagery, avatars, and digital sound, however after surveying the field, no other Gilgamesh projects were found to have employed motion sensor technology. One example of a current installation using similar motion sensor technology and associated animal avatars is called *Woodland Wiggle*, an installation in a play area at the Royal Children's Hospital (2013). It was designed as an interactive game for children and does not organize around a narrative, but is immersive and includes imagery and sound triggered by body movements.

Summary of Epic

The Epic of Gilgamesh begins with the semi-divine king of Uruk terrorizing his subjects. To achieve balance, the gods create the wild man Enkidu as a friend and cosmic twin to Gilgamesh. At the behest of the king, the wild man is tamed and brought into Uruk through the womanly wiles of a priestess of Ishtar and taught the ways of civilization. Gilgamesh and Enkidu meet, fight, and then form a deep bond of friendship. On a quest for everlasting glory, the pair travels to the Cedar Forest to conquer its divinely appointed protector, the giant Humbaba. Protected by veils or auras of power by the gods, Humbaba (whose name means "omen") was described as having a face like a moving sheep's intestines found in augury practices of the ancient world. Though the "monster" reasons with the men and begs them to reconsider their intentions, they kill it, cut down the sacred Cedars of Lebanon, and return to Uruk with the precious timber. This act of aggression brings about retribution by the gods, and the death of Enkidu. Grieving deeply for his friend and fearing his own death, Gilgamesh begins a search for the secret of immortality. He journeys to the underworld, meeting a survivor of the Great Flood, who tells him of a plant that offers immortality. Finding the plant underwater and then losing it to a serpent, he returns home to Uruk, a changed man, having realized the lasting value of his true purpose as king, rebuilding the city and aiding his people.

Methodology

The design of the project presented centered on a novel use of live performance blended with virtual reality, in that it offered the opportunity to demonstrate interaction design technology in an interactive storytelling application. Performers were tracked with motion sensors built into the Kinect system by Microsoft, which is designed to be an add-on device for the Xbox game system. It operates using multiple points of infrared light to map the parameters of a space and the objects within that space. The device links actors' movement to virtual 3D computer models, which can move within the virtual world of a game engine or game environment. In this project, the Xbox was not necessary, and the Kinect device was repurposed for real time interaction without the gaming structure.

The project included the design and production of avatars created by graduate students Michael Baksh and Cody Stewart of Digital Worlds Institute as part of their coursework. From character sketches provided by the author, the characters of Gilgamesh, Enkidu, and Humbaba were built using 3D imaging software. The author/designer created acrylic paintings as backgrounds in the virtual space after researching Uruk and Mesopotamian culture. The painting were digitally photographed and uploaded to the virtual game environment. Like a stage set, each change of scene required a digital image for the right side, left side, back, and floor. As dictated by the storyline, the scenes created included: an exterior of Uruk and the city wall, a palace interior, a forest, and variations such as the body of Humbaba lying on the forest floor.

Each Kinect unit can be linked to up to six characters through software, but only recognizes two players at a time, and can only simultaneously display two characters guided by them. This project incorporated a performance coordinated between multiple characters linked to one Kinect unit, but was set up to switch between seven scenes. In each scene, certain characters were available to the actors. Transitions from one scene to the next were achieved through simple keystrokes of programmed computer keys. When writing the spoken word script, designing the characters and virtual world backgrounds, and planning the performance, the design had to take into account that the actors directing the avatars cannot touch because it confuses the sensors and affects the quality of the images, though the 3D models of characters are still able to interact.

Microsoft Corporation, which includes the Kinect sensor among its products, has made the Software Tool Kit (STK) freely available for

download for those interested in development of Kinect-related projects. The STK was downloaded and the code adapted for use in this project by the development team members led by Dr. Angelos Barmpoutis, professor of computer science affiliated with the University of Florida's Digital Worlds Institute. He provided technical oversight for the work of his graduate students, Michael Baksh and Cody Stewart, while the author provided the concept, poetic, and design.

In keeping with the subject matter, short pieces of music from several tracks of an album by Janet Smith, entitled *Seven Modes for an Ancient Lyre* (2003), were used during the project performance, in combination with the spoken word piece narrating the action. The songs were composed and performed as an attempt to recreate music played on the ancient lyre of Ur, which had been reconstructed by a scholar in California. Smith used recordings of the reconstructed lyre, which were sampled then transferred to an electronic synthesizer, to compose these songs on a digital keyboard using ancient song structures, tuning modes and intervals.

Due to the difficulties of presenting a live performance in Montpellier, France, the performance took place on May 4, 2011 in the immersive REVE Theater of Digital Worlds Institute at the University of Florida and videotaped for presentation at the ICE conference. The actors involved were graduate students Michael Baksh and Alexa Henderson of Digital Worlds Institute, who interchanged character roles.

The use of kinesthetic sensors in performance has only recently emerged, and has demonstrated promising outcomes. The same technology can also be utilized for more prosaic functions, such as imaging and body scans for medical research applications (Barmpoutis, 2013). The significance of the research for this project is that it links live performance to body tracking technology of multiple Kinect devices to 3D computer models for use in the Natural User Interface (NUI). The use of the device cued to multiple actors as a performance piece is innovative. Others will be able to integrate the new knowledge made possible by this research when published.

Advances in Digital Media have yielded new modes of storytelling, while pioneering alternative distribution avenues for a story to find its audience. With the new possibilities of presentation, visual elements, including 3D virtual reality characters partnered with live actors, can be part of sharing an interactive storytelling experience at a global level. The intent of the

project is to foster greater awareness of the long-term consequences of environmental destruction. The comic book was designed as a way to reinforce the message, and to relate the ancient story to another contemporary medium.

Further iterations of the project are planned, as more development time would aid in the refinement of the characters' costumes, the addition of scenes, the animation of the falling cedar, and a wider variety of props and characters (Shamhat), with the goal of linking more than one Kinect sensor to the additional avatars. The process of programming the Kinect sensor and linking it to the avatars is time-consuming and requires technical knowledge of computer code to adapt Kinect's STK. The project also required digitally recording the voice over by the author, rehearsals for coordinating the actors' movements with the actions described in the poem, videotaping several takes of the performance, and the editing and production of the resulting video, which can be accessed for viewing at: http://sdrv.ms/Nsi15e. This iteration of the project was completed during the Spring 2012 semester at Digital Worlds Institute of the University of Florida.

Discussion

The tale begins with Sîn-lēqi-unninni's prelude, in which the narrator invites the reader to walk along the ramparts of the Uruk's famous wall and experience the vibrant life led by those who reside there. The description is written as an invitation to immerse oneself in the diegetic world of the poet's creation. By giving readers details about the verdant gardens and fountains, the clothing of the city dwellers, and the beauty of the women, the reader is able to create a picture of a world that has been nonexistent for eons. Moreover, the poet invites us to seek a box hidden there, open the lid, take out the tablets of lapis lazuli, and read the account of the story about Gilgamesh that follows.

The successful remediation of this epic in the 21st century still relies on our ability to be transported by a story. There is a direct parallel between the invitation, extended by the ancient poet to take part in the virtual reality of the mind's eye, and a digitally generated virtual world with its avatars. The project outlined invites a similar kind of participation through movement and interactive motion-sensing technology, thereby allowing actors to embody the story. Though the characters are provided as set electronic images and do not arise from the imagination of the

actors, the specificity of their beings, their clothing, build, and countenance aid the participant in entering the story world. As Cron observes in *Wired for Story*, "Story is visceral. We climb inside the protagonist's skin and become sensate, feeling what he feels. Otherwise we have no port of entry, no point of view through which to see, evaluate, and experience the world the author has plunked us into" (2012, p. 17). These details, whether textual, verbal, or visual, are necessary for achieving immersion in the narrative.

The actor's ability to switch between characters, which in this case are controlled through movement, aligns with the ability to change points-of-view within a narrative. However, there is something immediate and affecting about embodying the Other in several digital manifestations. Like story, performance is visceral. The actors taking part in this project moved within and between different bodies (avatars), changing identities from one character to another through keystrokes. "The computer avatar, a graphical stand-in for the human body within virtual worlds, links the notion of the double, the manipulable mannequin. The term *avatar* derives from Hindu scriptures, being the bodily incarnation of deities" (Dixson, p. 259). Thus, the project designers created an avatar for the embodiment of a mythical character, Gilgamesh, who was said to be two-thirds divine.

The use of the term *avatar*, is entirely appropriate in that digital media often adopts and appropriates elements from other disciplines and eras for use in digitally-born projects. In fact, Erl and Rigney believe that cultural memory "is closely linked up with the processes of *re*mediation. Cultural memory relies on what Bolter and Grusin [the theorists who coined the term "remediation"] would call 'repurposing,' that is, taking…from one medium and re-using it in another…memorial media borrow from, incorporate, absorb, critique and refashion earlier memorial media" (p. 5).

Through the motion sensing technology, this project combined performance with virtual reality. Those who use performance in their research understand its effectiveness. In her work with patients performing their own illness narratives, Howard maintains that, "[a]s a symbolic, embodied activity, performance encourages performers to sense the other by trying on unfamiliar experiences and can be a helpful, involved mode to make the concrete abstract and the abstract concrete" (pp. 134-135). She goes on to articulate that, "when seen as a praxis with transformative potential, performance becomes a type of *kinesis*...Performance as *kinesis* implies an urgent motivation to break and

remake social structures, norms, and beliefs that perpetuate the status quo" (pp. 134-135). Therefore, performance and innovative kinetic digital technology are a natural pairing, both with the potential for bringing about change, both in the private and the public realm.

Conclusion

At the beginning of the epic, Gilgamesh is described as having mistreated his subjects, so much so that the gods agree to intervene. Though the protagonist has been termed a "Kulturhero" by Ziolkowski and a "superman" by Mitchell, the hero is not very heroic initially (2011, p. 5; 2004, p. 2). Gilgamesh is portrayed as magnificent but uncaring.

The heart of the story in the Epic of Gilgamesh is found in Tablet 5, which describes the scene in the Cedar Forest and the death of Humbaba (Damrosch, pp. 60-61). The distant Cedar Forest is only approachable after days of journeying through unreal distances covered at a speed impossible for mortal men (Kuhn, 2012, pp. 196-197). As Kuhn asserts, "The Land of Cedars, haunt of Humbaba, is defined precisely by its otherness, its opposition as Nature to the world of Culture as embodied by the hero Gilgamesh and his sidekick, the former wildman and lately defender of shepherds (2012, p. 199). The outcome of this scene drives the rest of the storyline. It is the catalyst that brings about the tragic consequence of Enkidu's death. The text describes Humbaba's terrible visage, but contrasts it with the reasonable tone of the monster's words and its admirable sense of duty as the forest's protector. Gilgamesh and Enkidu arrive at the forest and proceed to cut down the sacred cedars immediately, knowing Humbaba is there to guard them. When the confrontation does take place, there is discussion and wavering about the decision, but together the pair decides to carry out their plan. The death of Humbaba is shown to result from the flaws in Gilgamesh's character, his impetuousness, arrogance, and lack of judgment, as well as Enkidu's inability to curb his friend's actions against his better judgment. Across thousands of years, the text portrays their foolishness and hubris.

The underlying power of the story comes from the realization Gilgamesh is forced to make, as the story traces the painful experiences that transform the hero. Like the wildman Enkidu, Gilgamesh becomes civilized in the process, turning away from acts of aggression and focusing his tremendous gifts on constructive pursuits—rebuilding city's wall. This arc illustrates Arnold and Eddy's observation that the greater

the change in the character over the course of a story, the more powerful the narrative (2007, p. 53). In the end, Gilgamesh has come a long way, his perilous journey to the underworld and back mirroring his emotional path, guided by his newly acquired moral compass.

In conclusion, the guiding principles of this project are encapsulated in Howard's statement that, "Collaborative storytellers have the opportunity to embody stories reflecting personal and social experience and to communicate in such a way that restores a richer understanding of those experiences, but they also situate performance as an act of transformation and a declaration of change" (2013, p. 133). The Epic of Gilgamesh was chosen for the basis of this collaborative performance project because it exemplifies those themes, and allowed Gilgamesh, Enkidu, and Humbaba to be brought to life in a new way.

Figure 1. The preliminary sketch of Humbaba in pencil (left) was created as digital vector-based drawing (right) with Adobe Illustrator and a Wacom graphics tablet. The digital drawings for the characters of Enkidu, Gilgamesh, and Humbaba were used as design templates for 3D character designs as well and appear in the digitally created comic book

Figure 2. Preliminary sketch of Gilgamesh in pencil (left) and as digital vector-based drawing (right) created by using Adobe Illustrator and a Wacom graphics tablet.


Figures 3 & 4. Testing body-tracking sensors using Kinect unit and test avatars in research lab

Figure 5. Development of Gilgamesh model as virtual 3D character

Figure 6. Creation of polygons for Gilgamesh model and adding textures (upper left in flat pieces)

Figure 7. Gilgamesh model from side angle in test of clothing styles before texturing

Figure 8. Humbaba avatar on screen being tested by off-screen actor guiding her movement

Figure 9. Front side of one page comic booklet prepared before printing and folding

Figure10. Students at Digital Worlds Institute demonstrate Gilgamesh models using Kinect unit.

Appendix

Gilgamesh

Inside the walls a palace stood,
That of a king surpassing all,
Beauteous, forceful, fearless, fine,
One part mortal, two divine,
Virile, tireless, wondrous strong!
He was a tyrant with no thought
Of any pleasure but his own,
Willful, selfish, and unwise,
What he desired, no one denied,
The people suffered and they prayed.
Their pleas for mercy reached the gods.
From clay was fashioned Enkidu,
A wild man, an untamed twin,
An innocent to be the friend,
The king had never had.
Enkidu learned human ways,
Came to Uruk to meet the king.
At first they fought, but then they saw
Each other for just what they were:
Two matching halves rejoined.
Enkidu pledged to serve the king,
Then they embraced as brothers do,
Two dear companions true of heart,
Between twin rivers, born apart,
Demigod and nature-child.
King Gilgamesh, with restless heart,
Craving glory, lasting fame,
Resolved that they would journey far,
To distant Lebanon to fell,
The Sacred Cedar Trees.
The gods had placed Humbaba there,
Enormous and with radiant powers,
To guard the fragrant forest spires.
With veils of terror, breathing fire,
Protecting them from men.
The two companions left Uruk,
Enkidu feared what might occur.
Marching many leagues a day,
Auspiciously, they made their way,
Dreading dreams of omens.
A thousand miles of doubts unwound,
The Cedar Mountain loomed ahead,
And on its graceful sloping flanks,
Stood ancient trees. Within their ranks,

The terrible Humbaba lived.
First one and then the other cried,
Lamented the fate that might befall,
But Gilgamesh felt rising hope,
And said, "Is not a three-ply rope
Stronger than one strand?
When they saw the towering grove,
They pushed all doubting from their minds,
With thoughts of cedar temple doors,
Of crafting beams for walls and floors,
They coveted the precious wood.
The mortal twin swung wide the axe,
Transgressed against the gods' decree
And when the trunk received the blow,
A groan resounded deep and low,
A hush, a grinding skreak, a thud.
An anguished roaring shook the earth,
The air grew hot, the greenwood quaked,
The two friends found her as they feared,
And cringing as Humbaba neared,
Gazed on her ever-changing face.
"Who dares to fell this sacred tree?"
Humbaba bellowed, charging in.
Out came the axe of bronze they brought,
They found their courage, stood and fought,
But Humbaba was too strong.
Then the intruders bowed and prayed,
From all directions came the winds,
Storm winds, whirlwinds, chill winds bound her.
Shamash, the sun god, did confound her,
Piercing through her veils of power.
When she found she could no longer move,
She spoke, begged them to spare her life.
With axe in hand, the king was still,
As he weighed his wish and will,
And listened to her plea:
"Trees and humans are as one,
A crown above and limbs below,
With blood or sap in branching veins (no pause)
To show the bond which still remains,
In trunks of nature's cunning."
"Enlil instructed me to guard
These fragrant Cedars for the gods.
Spare me, King, and I will serve,
To cut some trees, some to conserve,
Or I curse you all."
Angered, Enkidu stepped forth,
And spoke to Gilgamesh, his friend,
"Kill her now, do not debate-

She'll harm us if you hesitate!"
His urging hit its mark.
The axe came down upon her throat,
And slew Humbaba where she stood,
Blood flowed in rivers on the ground,
The headless body was a wound,
A misting rain came down.
A misting rain came down.
Rejoicing then, they felled the trees,
The slopes were cleared, and rafts were made.
The men returned with cedar beams,
By river, blinded by their dreams,
Of everlasting fame.
When the gods saw what had passed,
That Sacred Cedars were defiled,
That staunch Humbaba had been slain,
That mortal men had showed disdain
They vowed someone in turn must die.
Back in Uruk, the men were hailed,
At banquets and at festivals,
A joyous Gilgamesh took part,
With the companion of his heart,
Enkidu, his trusted friend.
One gray morning fate ensued,
As Enkidu became unwell,
He slowly faded, as his friend
Gilgamesh decried his end,
And with a sigh, he died.
And with a sigh, he died.
Gilgamesh was sick with grief,
With disbelief and sorrow,
He wailed aloud and tore his hair,
He begged the gods to hear his prayer,
He could not be consoled.
He could not be consoled.
The king, undone by fear of death,
Bereft and with a restless heart,
Left to seek eternal youth,
And through his journey learned the truth,
Then served his people well.
Thus the balance was restored,
The gods ordained what would occur,
Humbaba's ever-changing face
Becomes all those who take her place,
Within our hearts, her spirit lives.
Within our hearts, her spirit lives.

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SECTION II:

CULTURE, CONFLICT, AND THE NEWS MEDIA

INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION IN THE ROMA-HUNGARIAN CONFLICT: THE ROMA MURDERS

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Abstract

In a seven month period between 2008 and 2009, extreme nationalists carried out nine attacks on Roma/Gypsy houses in Hungarian villages using grenades, Molotov cocktails, and guns, all together firing 78 shots, injuring 55, and murdering six Roma individuals. In my essay, I answer two questions: "How do discourses after the 'Roma murders' reveal intractable conflict between liberals, extreme nationalists, and the Roma?" and "How does this conflict include the different communication styles?" I examine the intergroup and intragroup aspects of the "Roma murders" from the perspective of Hungarian liberals, extreme nationalists, and Roma through a comparative analysis of four articles. I apply the concept of intractable conflict, as articulated by Coleman (2006), as a distinguished category from manageable conflict. I argue that the Roma killings are a result of an intractable conflict among these parties, that communicational differences are part of this conflict, and that the killings represent a turning point in Roma communication.

Between 2008 and 2009, during a seven month killing spree, four men carried out nine attacks on Roma (Gypsy)[1] houses in various Hungarian villages using grenades, Molotov cocktails, and guns. They fired, all together, 78 shots, injured 55, and murdered six Roma individuals ("Hungarian gang jailed," 2013). Among the victims were a five-year-old boy and his father and a mother of four; the murderers shot them dead as they ran from their homes, which had been set on fire. Before the killings, right-wing politicians openly insulted the Roma population using racist language in everyday politics, and far-right paramilitary groups held power demonstrations to terrify Roma communities until the violence turned fatal, gaining international attention as "The Roma murders" (Verseck, 2013b).

In what follows, I examine the intergroup and intragroup aspects of the Roma murders from the perspectives of the three dominant groups—the Hungarian liberals, the extreme nationalists, and the Roma—with the analytical argument that the Roma killings are a result of an intractable conflict among these parties, that communicational differences are part of this conflict, and that the killings represent a turning point in Roma communication. I assert that the intractability of this conflict is rooted first in the idea of a separation that is a significant part of the leftist liberal and the extreme right nationalist political cultures as well as the various Roma groups' social-cultural identity; and second, in the differing communication styles of the Roma and the Hungarians. Regarding the former issue, I emphasize that as long as there is an intractable conflict between the two major Hungarian parties' political views, both Hungarian parties exclude the Roma from the concept of nation and the Hungarian public discourse. On the other hand, the Roma also separate themselves from the majorities to maintain their group identity. Concerning the latter, I highlight that Roma and Hungarians speak in different communication styles which is an "invisible" source of conflict. The communicational differences between the Roma and Hungarians have been not analyzed yet as part of the Hungarian-Roma conflict.

Analyzing Roma communication as culturally determined is a sensitive issue, since Roma civil rights leaders (such as Horváth, 2013 and Junghaus, 2014) want to get rid of the binary of "Europeans" and the "Oriental Other" that recalls the colonizer-colonized relationship they

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[1] In this writing I use both names with the same non-pejorative attempt. I differentiate between the two according to the word used in the original context.

experienced in the past. Furthermore, since researchers could not identify a so called "Roma culture" that could fit to all Roma/Gypsy groups, mentioning Roma cultural elements seems to be a step back, and to clash with the Roma effort to build a new Roma identity that, indeed, does not emphasize differences but underlines that Roma and non-Roma are "equal" human beings (Junghaus, 2014). Though, I think we should not throw out the baby with the bath water and disregard the existence of culturally determined speaking styles when they make intergroup communication problematic, and when the conceptualization of these differences can lead to problem solving.

I propose that intractability cannot be altered to tractability only by changing the frame and behavior of the groups in conflict, as Peter T. Coleman (2014) suggested, if the conflicting groups communicate in dissimilar communication styles. The Roma's example shows that even after Roma leaders rebuked the "primitive" and "criminal" Roma image that the Hungarian majority assigned for them, and even after they changed their isolationist attitude, recognized their intersectional position and expressed their willingness to participate in the Hungarian public discourse (Kóczé, 2009), the Roma leaders often had to decide whether they talk to the Roma (and then not communicate with Hungarians) or they talk to the non-Roma (and then lose credibility among the Roma), since it seemed to be impossible to talk with both at once (Horváth, 2013). I propose that conflicting groups also need to bridge the gap caused by their different communication styles. After the Roma murders, we can observe this attempt in the Roma civil rights leaders' "code switching" between two different styles that Ellis and Maroz's (2002) described as *musayra* and *dugri* communication to reach both Roma and Hungarians. The longer they practice code switching, the more successful they are in mediation.

At the end of this analysis, I conclude that there is a transition from intractability to tractability in the existing conflict with the mediation of the Roma, who operate with a new Roma image as "equal human beings," who change their separationist attitude, and who started code switching between two different communication styles– the Roma and the Hungarian –to speak with the Roma and non-Roma across political and cultural boundaries. This conclusion contradicts the Eurocentric view that the Roma are supposedly "unfit" for westernized societies and who, therefore, should not participate in the national public discourse. Though, my goal is to call attention to the Roma's changing role in the present

conflict that is, although politically and socially exigent, fully unrecognized. I also want to highlight the importance of the communicational aspects when analyzing conflict.

According to the examined articles, liberals and extreme nationalists speak in-group with their peers and do not communicate with others who disagree with them. Contrary to these, the Roma leaders started an energetic crisis management in their communities and a dynamic intergroup communication addressing the Hungarian society at large with the aim to end racial discrimination, segregation, and miscommunication, and to mediate among the conflicting groups (Daróczi, 2012, 2013).

The data for this analysis is taken from four articles. I have chosen Miklós Gáspár Tamás (2013), a long-time leftist liberal opposition leader's article because this was the first reaction to the murders in the name of the Hungarians. The second article was published by an extreme nationalist blogger, Maroz (2013), whom I consider the rightist equivalent to Tamás because the popular blog is a direct answer to Tamas' article. Although I could have selected Jeno Setet's (2013) speech in the Milla protest that Daróczi in her Facebook page praises as "worthy to teach, beautiful creed," or Aladár Horváth's (2013) Roma Pride Day speech, which are examples of *musayra* style, I chose Ágnes Daróczi (2012, 2013), a Roma civil rights leader's two articles. I chose Daróczi because she is the most widely accepted among the Roma and non-Roma, and she has communicated since the beginning of the international Romani movement with both Roma and non-Roma (Guy, 2001). I will exemplify the two different communication styles as Daróczi uses them for in-group and intergroup communication. All of the articles were published around the time of the 2013 verdict of the murders. As far as I know, to date, Roma hate crimes and their aftermath have not been analyzed from the aspect of conflict.

My goal is to call attention to the Roma's changing role in the present conflict that is politically and socially exigent. I seek to answer two questions: "How do the post-murder discourses reveal intractable conflict between liberals, extreme nationalists, and the Roma?" and "How does this conflict involve the different groups' diverse communication styles?" In the next part of this study, I clarify the characteristics of the Hungarian-Roma conflict and describe their different communication styles.

Roma in Hungary

As my analysis will highlight, Hungary's conflict around the Roma is an intractable conflict that, based on the exclusion of Roma in Europe spanning more than 100 years, has appeared to take on a life of its own before the Roma Murders.

Roma are the largest European ethnic and linguistic minority; out of approximately 10-12 million European Roma, five to six percent live in Hungary (Ringold, Orenstein & Wilkens, 2005, p. xiv). As former nomadic people who arrived in Europe in the 14th century from Eastern India, Gypsies were discriminated against in Western European countries based on their different lifestyle. Regarding the general treatment of Gypsies, out of the three basic approaches that Marushiakova and Popov (2001) identified as still existing models in Eastern and Central Europe (the Ottoman, the Russian, and the Austro-Hungarian), the Austria-Hungarian Empire's praxis was the strictest. In it, the state decided the Gypsies' "best interest" was to "civilize" them, forcing them to assimilate. Starting in the 18th century, Austria-Hungarian Empress Maria Theresa banned the name "gypsy" and forced the use of "new peasants" and "new Hungarians," prohibited Gypsy marriages, and took Gypsy children away from their families to raise them as non-Gypsies. Later, her son Joseph II banned the use of Gypsy languages as well (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). These *Romungros* were forcefully assimilated. Others who arrived later from Romania became an isolated group, seen as second-order citizens; they became extremely marginalized even after the 19th century when, as a result of forced acculturation, most of the Roma became sedentary or semi-sedentary and primarily spoke Hungarian (Marushiakova & Popov, 2005).

Even today, segregation, illiteracy, and chronic joblessness keep many Roma in extreme poverty and ghetto-like conditions, and since they have many children, their poverty drastically grows. According to the *Romani World Web*, the generation of individuals born in Hungary during 2006 shows a division of about 30% Roma and 70% non-Roma. One fourth of all children reaching elementary school age in Hungary are Roma. The drastically growing Roma population adds xenophobia to the racial hatred and intolerance experienced by the Gypsies.

Roma represent many different sub-groups with various levels of social consciousness.

Many Roma are aware only of their immediate communities and do not identify with a broader racial or cultural community. Yet others who have an ethnic identity, struggle to determine their cultural rights and demands since they do not have a homogenous culture they could call "Roma culture" or a territory they can refer to as a nation of origin. These hinder the loosely organized Roma communities and the Roma elite to represent themselves in the Hungarian public discourse while they live in constant clashes with Hungarians. Hungarians are, themselves, deeply divided into extreme right nationalists and left liberals; both have different ideas about how to handle the increasing Roma presence (Verseck, 2013b).

On the other hand, Guy (2001) asserted that "Roma are not just ethnically distinct from other groups but [are] in a special category of their own. This is mirrored by the Romani view of all non-Roma as *gadje*." a pejorative word used to refer to non-Roma (p. 4). Also Dumont (1966/1970) calls attention to the need to understand the Roma, who see themselves as different and who distinguish themselves from the non-Roma. Accordingly, the tension between the Roma and the Hungarians has developed throughout history into an intractable conflict. I examine the communicational aspects of the Roma-Hungarian discourse as part of the intractability issue.

Rationale

As I previously suggested, I consider the different groups' diverse communication styles as constituents of the conflict between liberals, extreme nationalists, and the Roma. I assert that the discrepancy between the Hungarian and Roma communication styles is part of the intractability; consequently, changes in these communication styles reveal ongoing transformations and bring along further alterations in the intractability of the conflict. In relation to this, I argue that dynamic in-group communication strengthens group identity and can deepen separation and intractability. However, when it is accompanied with positive imagery of a peaceful future, the dynamic in-group communication can affect a group's relation to the others involved in the conflict. As part of this shift, it can alter the relationship with the other's diverse communication style and can lead to code switching. Accordingly, the ways the different groups understand the events of the Roma murders will reveal the nature of this conflict. Though, it is not only the ways they comprehend these events but also the ways they communicate them that is significant.

I recognize Roma intragroup communication as a way of speaking that Ellis and Maoz (2002) described as *musayra* style, and Hungarian in-group communication as *dugri* style.

Musayra is a repetitive, indirect, expressive, and affective way of speaking, not argument-oriented, but based on forestalling, "closely bound up with politeness, 'saving face' and other related pragmatic phenomena … [to] advocate a given stance and make no direct concessions to an adversary" (pp. 183, 185). *Musayra* is a living practice in Arabic, Indian, and Pakistani cultures and, until recently, was connected to "poetry reading." Kamran (2012) analyzed different forms of *mushairas*, comparing the Arabic *musa'ara* and its Persian and South Asian variants (p. 11), which are the cultural roots of the Gypsy speaking style. The Urdu version of *mushaira* is connected to the Gypsy "deep song" or "slow song" that Leblon (2003), in accordance with Hungarian musicologists, described as the "stanzas do not constitute a logical sequence with regards to meaning" but emotions (pp. 57, 60). *Musayra* resembles the high-context speaking style that Hall (1977/1989) identified as indirect and non-specific (p. 105).

On the other hand, Ellis and Maoz (2002) characterized *dugri* as straight talk, explicit and clear, which bases arguments on assertions and elaboration. *Dugri* speak is compatible with Hall's (1977/1989) low-context speaking that is direct and specific (p. 102). Ellis, Maoz and Hall connected this style with western cultures that identifies Hungarian communication as *dugri* style.

The difference between the Hungarian *dugri* and the Roma *musayra* communication styles is part of the intractability, plays a significant role in the isolation of the Roma, and leads to failed intergroup communication among the conflicting parties. Coleman (2006) suggested, "In many intractable conflicts, the relation between the parties develops in settings where exclusive social structures limit intergroup contact and isolate the in-group … and community domains" (p. 538). While different speaking styles are a part of the groups' identities, they can limit intergroup contact. Accordingly, changes in speaking styles affect intergroup relationships.

I suggest that the Roma leaders' conscious or unconscious switch between *musayra* and *dugri* speaking styles helps them to become active agents in changing intractable conflict to tractable. Additionally, code switching, paired with a positive attitude in problem solving, brings changes in

group identity and opens further new perspectives in conflict resolution. The racial murder spree motivated Roma leaders to speak out for themselves as Roma, and to participate in the wider public discourse, breaking with their historic absence in the political public sphere.

The significance of this study is that it adds the importance of communication styles to Coleman's (2014) theory of conflict resolution. While Coleman (2014) suggested that mediation between the conflicting groups is possible either by altering the behavior of the group in conflict, or by changing the frame of the conflict, I accentuate that code switching between the different groups' communication styles is a significant element of the conflict solving.

Next, I explicate how imagining a peaceful future, as in Coleman's (2006) theory of conflict resolution and as Boulding's (1988) focused social imagining—in which participants identify a vision of how to solve a social problem in an idealized future—suggest, is connected to the practice of code switching. As part of these, I review and synthesize conflict resolution literature. Then I critically examine four representative publications that exemplify the intragroup and intergroup communication of the liberals, the extreme nationalists, and the Roma, and their imagined common life in the future.

Theoretical Foundation

As the first task in my theoretical foundation, I explain the concept of intractable conflict derived from Coleman's (2006) understanding, as a distinguishable category from that of manageable conflict. Coleman (2006) suggested,

> [I]ntractable conflicts are complex, mercurial, exhausting and rife with misery…. It is the complex interaction of many … factors across different levels of the conflict … over long periods of time that brings them to an extreme state of hopelessness and intransigence. (p. 541)

Tractable conflict, on the other hand, "involve resolvable problems that can be integrated, divided, or otherwise to the relative satisfaction of a majority of the parties" (p. 718). The conflict between the Roma and Hungarian society fits into this concept of intractable conflict. Moreover, since liberalism and extreme nationalism clash in their different nation-building concepts in Hungary, as well as clashing with respect to the

Roma's role in nation-building, communication between liberals, nationalists, and the Roma present further conflict in the Hungarian-Roma relationship. The issue of Roma inclusion or exclusion in the nation and cultural differences are therefore at the center of almost all of Hungary's national conflicts. As Kaway (2009) has suggested, the construction of nation and nationalism is fundamentally an issue of communicating about the construction of a shared space. Yet, as Martin, Nakayama, and Carbauch (2012) pointed out, diverse communication codes for various cultures often lead "to misunderstanding, disadvantage, [and] injustice" (p. 24). From this perspective, the diverse communication styles are all part of the recent conflict.

Existing intergroup dynamics have disadvantaged Roma in Hungary. Roma communication has been set in terms of power interests, historical contextualization, economic conditions, race, ethnicity, and social positions. As Martin et al. (2012) reasoned, "critical scholars emphasize that human behavior is always constrained by societal ideological superstructures and material conditions that privilege some and disadvantage others" (p. 28). As a result, the focus on Roma discourse exists within a recognition that Roma/Hungarian culture is a site of struggle (Martin et al., 2012).

The critical lens in the Roma case directs the spotlight onto neoliberalism as an influential ideology that impacts nationalism and, as Kaway (2009) highlighted, affects "the meaning and discursive practices of national culture and relations with the culture of the other" (p. 18). Based on the phenomenon that numerous communication meanings are disputable (and disputed) within social hierarchies, diverse communicational practices often become a source of conflict. In the next section, I review previous literature on the topic, I follow the immediate antecedents, and I study communication practices that deepen the existing conflict and practices that can become the source of conflict resolution.

Background and Context

Recent studies have shown the Roma issue as an urgent topic because with the spread of neoliberalism, extreme nationalism grows, which considers Roma their number one nemesis.

Previous researches have primarily focused on identity, ethnic, and racial crises (Acton & Klimeva-Alexander, 2001; Bakker, 2001; Bárány, 2002; Fosztó, 2009; Guy, 2001; Horva´th, 2005; Ja´roka,2012; Kovai, 2010;

Ladányi & Szelényi, 2001 Liégeois, 2007; Matras, 2004; Morris, 2000). These tensions fit into the category analyzed as enduring rivalry (Goertz & Diehl, 1993). Other studies have analyzed the conflict between Roma's ethnic and European identities and the tension represented in these two identities (Herakova, 2009; Marsh & Strand, 2006; Marushiakova, 2005; Ringold, Orenstein & Wilkens, 2005). This type of conflict has been studied as a protracted social conflict (Azar, 1990). Bornemisza-Habasi (2008, 2011, 2012) studied racial hate-speech in Hungary. Many Roma theorists have emphasized the Roma's exclusion from the Hungarian concept of nation (Baker, 2011; Bárány, 2002; Horváth, 2011). Horváth (2011) observed, "We consider ourselves part of those (majority) nations and we see ourselves with their own eyes, although the latter do not believe that we are also they" ("From bad to worse," p.1). Theorists discuss this conflict as part of the struggle for power and self-determination (Burgess & Burgess, 1996). Right now, there are two opposing trends in Roma discourse: one that Plaut (2012) defined as a Roma struggle "to emancipate themselves from both their pariah image and their disadvantaged position" (p. 63) and the other that Rövid (2009) described as overwhelming racial discrimination that sets boundaries on the emancipation for which Roma strive. Rövid (2009) pointed out,

> The Hungarian public sphere is flooded with articles discussing crimes committed by or against Roma. The former refers to Gypsy criminality, whereas the latter drives our attention to the increasing pervasiveness of racist discourses and a series of crimes committed against Romani people. (p.1)

The Roma murders and its aftermath confirm that the Roma conflict has become an urgent issue in Hungary.

With the spread of neoliberal ideology, the Hungarian government stopped securing the national job market and taking responsibility for citizens' well-being. The results of the two latest elections[2] show that many Hungarians want to see a strong national leadership; and since only the extreme nationalist agenda comprises the nationalist rhetoric, growing numbers of people have adopted far-right ideologies. As a key obstacle to economic prosperity, nationalists identify Roma as a national burden, as "primitives" and "criminals" who cannot fit into Westernized societies.

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[2] On the 2010 election, "Jobbik," Hungary's far-right party was the third, on the 2014 election they were the second most popular party. They also won three seats in the European Union Parliament in both elections.

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For instance, Bilefsky (2013) cited a French defense team for Roma who had been accused of stealing; where rather than focusing on Roma poverty and discrimination, the lawyers claimed that Gypsies "were simply following age-old Roma traditions and [that they] generally operate outside the norms of society in 'the style of the Middle Ages'" (p. 1). In Hungary the Roma killings started in a similar state where extreme nationalists felt they have to save their nation from the epidemics of Gypsy "barbarism" and "criminality."

Texts and Approach to Analysis

International media, among them an article in *Spiegel* by Keno Verseck (2013b), critiqued the Hungarian government and public, noting that Hungary received the verdict of the murders with indifference; the public, the political parties, the government, and even the media paid minimal attention and never expressed sympathy for the Roma victims (p. 1). As an answer to this allegation, Miklós Gáspár Tamás, a leader of the Hungarian leftist liberal elite, published an article on the 25th of July, 2013, titled "If This Is Not a National Mourning, then This Is Not a Real Nation" in a popular economic journal's online edition (Tamás, 2013, p. 1)[3]. The very same day, an extreme nationalist blogger, Maroz, answered Tamás' article in a blog post titled, "Fake Nation in a Fake Country" (Maroz, 2013, p. 1)[4]. As a representation of a Roma perspective, I also analyzed two articles from Roma leader Ágnes Daróczi: "For the Day of the Roma Pride" was published for the first Hungarian Roma Pride Day shortly after the verdict (Daróczi, 2013, p. 1)[5], and "We Could be the Balance" was published in a popular daily newspaper, *Népszava*, on November 5, 2012 (Daróczi, 2012)[6]. I conducted a close text analysis of these articles. As part of my study, I collected and analyzed online versions of Hungarian newspapers and journals, such as *HVG* and

[3] Everything I am quoting from Tamás' (2013) article is on page 1. I no longer put parenthetical page references in my writing regarding the article.
[4] Everything I am quoting from Maroz's (2013) blog comment in the "kakukkfeszek" blog entry is on page 1. The message's title is Álnemzet egy álorszagban [Fake nation in a fake country]." I no longer put parenthetical page references in my writing regarding the blog.
[5] Everything I am quoting from Daróczi's (2013) For the Roma Pride Day article is on page 1. I no longer put parenthetical page references in my writing regarding the article.
[6] Everything I am quoting from Daróczi (2012), "A mérleg nyelve lehetnénk" [We could be the balance], is on page 1. I no longer put parenthetical page references in my writing regarding the article.

Népszava, and American newspapers, such as the *Huffington Post* and *The New York Times*. From European international news, I examined articles of *Spiegel Online, BBC News UK*, and *Euronews*. Additionally, I looked at different blogs, the most significant of which was the far-right *Kakukkfeszek.hu*, the UK-based Roma *Community.eu* and Nóra Ritók's *Nyomor széle [The edge of the misery]* blogs. I critically compared, contrasted, and analyzed the historical and social determinations of the texts, the way their primary audience understands them, and their effect on the "Other."

Analysis

In the following section, I describe and outline the liberal, the extreme nationalist, and the Roma response to the anti-Roma hate crimes. However, after I discuss the liberal and extreme nationalist standpoints, I do not immediately address the Roma response but, instead, I compare and contrast the liberal and extreme nationalist frames.

The Liberal Reaction to the Roma Murders

As an answer to the hate crimes, after a two-and-half year silence, Tamás (2013) apologized to the victims' families in the name of Hungarian white liberals; he called for national mourning. Tamás spoke in the name of the whites who consider Roma as "brethren," "brothers," and "sisters," and who grieve over their death. He admitted that only a small fragment of Hungarian society believe, "[one] has no right to murder other, innocent people … just because they belong to a group which the former deems less appealing from the fated order." Tamás described the story of the killings, using the words, "Terrorism has appeared in the country." Yet, "we cannot expect natural grief, shock, and anger" because "racism is so strong and widespread" that even serial killers might expect some sympathy. Tamás offered a solution to the problem:

> [O]nly the following can help: justified pangs of conscience, repentance, and unobjectional and unconditional love towards our insulted, humiliated, and terrified Roma brethren, our Roma brothers and sisters. And grief…. This is our grief collectively. If not, then this is not a real country, not a real nation.

For the liberals, the Roma murders were a sign of the falling of the nation. Tamás (2013) titled his message: "If This Is Not National Mourning, then

This Is Not a Real Nation." Mourning would clear the Hungarians from the guilt of murder. With these sentences, Tamás acknowledged multiple problems that had divided the nation before the killings. Tamás said,

> Innocent fellow countrymen were butchered … simply because of who they are, because their skin color is darker, because they bear the burden from centuries of exclusion and anathematization …. [T]his is our grief collectively.

Those who know history can easily associate the birth of Nazism in the twentieth century with these premises. Tamás made the same association between the present-day sociopolitical atmosphere and spoke out for the forgotten Hungarian victims of Nazism: the Jews and the Gypsies. Yet, the reader can interpret his lament as mourning for the failing Hungarian nation that makes the same mistakes over and over again without showing regret or acknowledging those mistakes as faults. Tamás suggested that, if racial killing of innocent people remains so unrecognized in a nation as the "Roma killings" were in Hungary, then it means that citizens either do not consider killing wrong, or they do not consider Roma as human beings. In this case, the conflict has arisen between the liberals and extreme nationalists.

For Tamás, grief interrupts the past and the present. Yet, forgotten grievances lead to suppressed public memories. Tamás emphasized that, today, nobody remembers the results of earlier racism: One "episode," the death of the Roma father and son, led Tamás to another "episode," that of Nazism, which, similar to today's killings, remained without public remorse and/or apology. Arguing in *dugri* style, Tamás switched the attention from the Roma victims to all victims of the Holocaust and to the falling Hungarian nation. I will analyze a rightist blogger, Maroz, as Tamás' counterpart, since the blogger addresses the very same issues as a direct answer to Tamás.

Anti-Roma Sentiments and Extreme Nationalists

The extreme nationalist blogger, Maroz, responded the same day to Tamás' article, rebuking its arguments. Maroz asserted that the argument of "love your brethren" is weak in the given situation, where "a person might have at first only respectfully asked to perhaps not love the gypsy who robbed him/her in bright daylight." Maroz stated that brotherly and sisterly relationships are very much dependent on whom one sees as a brother or sister:

[W]hy should we not also love our non-Roma brethren, non-Roma brothers and sisters, who think … that there is a problem with this gypsy-thing, that perhaps there is a need for some kind of solution?

In a nation where leaders betray citizens and leave them to themselves, there is no safety for those citizens: they have to take issues into their own hands, in Maroz's words, "to find some kind of solution." Maroz spoke in the name of a counter-culture that sees the purpose of life as something more than solving moral dilemmas. Maroz tried to persuade the reader to take practical actions against the Roma problem. Here we can see a new narrative of the self-made heroes who arise from everyday people to fight against a "corrupt" world and regime. The blog entry rejected the Hungarian liberal elite's plan for saving the nation. Maroz commented,

TGM [Tamás Gáspár Miklós] as some kind of overdue Christ, commands us, with the command of love; … of whom one can just as well say fake philosopher, fake public-thinker, fake intellectual, just as he calls us a fake nation and a fake country, and of course, it would be just as dumb to do so, as it was for him.

Maroz diverted the attention from the Roma victims to a new moral and social order. Maroz echoed the populist far-right, Leitmotiv that the alleged "Roma criminality" is so high that Hungarians cannot feel at home in their country and this they must change. Still, the "real" Hungarians are judged negatively, as if Roma hatred were racist (Bayer, 2014). Maroz stated,

The problem is nothing else but this division and exclusion: whoever doesn't love our Gypsy brothers and sisters on command is the reason why we can neither be a country, nor a nation, and it is not difficult to find the logical conclusion to what those guilty of being the reason deserve. They need to be excluded. They need to be called Nazis, collectively. They need to be pointed at, that he/she is the Evil, and we are the Good.

With this perspective-switch, we can understand the nature of tension within the Hungarian society. On the one hand, they have to identify with values rooted in European Judeo-Christianity, where the moral command is "do not hate!" and "do not kill!" On the other hand, the growing racial hatred and the supposed interest of the nation have led Hungarians to a far-right political agenda that does not see Roma as fellow human beings.

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Regarding speaking style I conclude that the extreme nationalist Maroz's argument follows the *dugri* argumentative style where the warrant is that "real" Hungarians can never live in peace with Roma who have proven during centuries that they are "essentially" unfit in Western societies.

As we see, the war between the self-righteous racists and humanists is so deeply rooted in European history that it developed into an intractable conflict between the two. Accordingly, there are not only differences between the leftist liberals and extreme nationalists based on their ideology, but also similarities regarding their argument construction.

Similarities and Differences in the Liberal and Extreme Nationalist Framing

There are not only differences between the leftist liberals and extreme nationalists based on their ideology, but also similarities regarding their argument construction. First, both Tamás and Maroz see the Hungarian nation as one repeatedly stricken by ill fate throughout history. In both versions, Roma have the fate of being the victim. Yet, while Maroz addresses Tamás and his followers, Tamás chose to avoid conflict by stating,

> We do not argue with those who do not consider the Roma as people…. [We] talk only to those who agree with us, who we believe are many, even if they are in silence.

At everyday levels, justified silence becomes the uneven counterpart of racism. A confrontational racist rhetoric, on the one side, and silence, on the other side of a divided Hungarian society together make the Roma a perfect prey.

Second, in both cases, the framing of issues and personhood is a significant tool. Butler (2009) asserted that framing violence as non-violence can transform the sense of what it means to be human and the value of human lives into numbers and the meanings of targets (p. x). Butler's (2009) proposal means that frames have epistemological characteristics because they are connected to the question "*What is a life?*" (p. x). Yet, for the extreme nationalists and liberals, in the "Roma killings," Roma life was justified in two different ways. For the extreme nationalists, the loss of Roma lives was a victory, i.e., the high numbers of the casualties equated to a positive step in the direction of a "problem being solved." For the Liberals, loss of Roma lives was an addition to the

nation's tragedies. Next, I will discuss the Roma intragroup and intergroup arguments and style.

Roma Intragroup Communication

In this part I will identify Roma civil rights leader, Daróczi's article (2013) entitled For the Roma Pride Day, as an excellent example of what Ellis and Maoz calls (2002) *musayra* communication style (p. 182). Daróczi's article was published shortly after the victims' funerals. From Daróczi's web-based article, it becomes clear that, indeed, the Roma are a proud people. Daróczi (2013) wrote,

> I am proud of my father and mother, my grandfathers and grandmothers, because they were victorious and taught their children to win…. I am proud to belong to a people that never wanted to enslave, subjugate, reject or rob other people. . . . I am proud of the prisoners of the Gypsy lager in Auschwitz…. I am proud of my people, because, throughout history, they were always able to make themselves useful…. We brought peace against the attacks of fleeing passions. (p. 1)

Daróczi's (2013) words illustrate a repetitive, indirect, expressive, and affective way of speaking. Logically, none of these statements is timely. In the eyes of the liberals and the extreme nationalists, Roma people seem to not be in the winning position; they seem to be criminals. There is nothing to be proud of connected with being in the Auschwitz Gypsy lager, and Roma are not valued by others, even today. Roma seem to create trouble, not peace. Daróczi was not argument-oriented, but "advocate[d] a given stance and [made] no direct concessions to an adversary," in accordance with Ellis and Maoz's (2002) observation of the *musayra* style (p. 183). Daróczi based her arguments on delimiters that Ellis and Maoz (2002) put in three categories: "frames, forestall/secure, and forestall/remove" (p. 185).

Indeed, the second part of Daróczi's statement revealed a unique argument based on emotions and beliefs, where the goal was to identify with the other while maintaining positive face rather than satisfying logic. As Daróczi emphasized, hundreds of other nations and nationalities have vanished in the storms of history or through the rage of nature, but not the Roma people. Roma did not start a war against others driven by self-interest, evilness, jealousy, or hatred. Roma made themselves useful for their environment with their knowledge of metals, trees, plants, animals,

and industrial trades, and their understanding of human nature. Because they spoke many languages, they could understand everyone. The Roma leader worked with a different collective memory than Maroz. Daróczi (2013) also remembers the Auschwitz Lager differently than did Tamás. According to Daróczi, Roma have never been weak victims; despite the tremendous superiority of Nazi forces, on May 16th of 1944, the Gypsies rose up in an armed rebellion against their Nazi capturers. Roma do not identify with the image of a frail, unfit, and vanishing culture. They remain proud in the midst of a coordinated racial attack against them as a new form of extreme nationalism appears. As part of the *musayra* speaking, Daróczi (2013) expressed Roma people's hope that "more and more of us will be able to conjure up: smile, warmth, hope, and peace," fulfilling Boulding's (1988) concept of positive social imagining. With this, Daróczi changed the liberal and extreme nationalist frames and placed the Roma in the spotlight as valuable and equal human beings.

Roma Intergroup Communication

Roma communication, however, becomes problematic when they have to reach out of their group. To their different communication style, their different life-world adds further complications. Roma have their well-distinguished, separate world wherever they live, which makes their daily self-representation in non-Gypsy communities difficult. Their miscommunication is based first on skills they often miss in everyday life based on their widespread illiteracy[7], poverty and segregation; second, as I mentioned regarding their in intragroup communication, on their culturally determined communicational differences. Ritók (2011), in her blog entry, summarized these experiences,

> The office, the administrator, the doctor, the receptionist, the policeman, the teacher all expect them to act as if they understand the foreign words, know the directions, are able to ask for an appointment by phone … using the correct words and tone … but it doesn't work. There is not enough "knowledge," acquired behavior-models for real communication.

Additionally, for Roma people, the non-Romani world is counter-cultural, therefore they basically relay on intragroup communication. Guy (2001) asserted, "Roma are not just ethnically distinct from other groups but [are]

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[7] About 50% to 80% of the Roma are illiterate.

in a special category of their own. This is mirrored by the Romani view of all non-Roma as *gadje*" (p. 4.), a pejorative word used to refer to non-Roma. To show the significance of "inner talk," Daróczi speaks differently with her people than with non-Roma. As long as she is with her cultural peers, she uses *musayra* speech, for example in her Roma Pride article (Daróczi, 2013). On the other hand, with outsiders, she argues in *dugri* style, for instance in her article titled, "We Could Be the Balance" (Daróczi, 2012). Although, the shift might be subconscious, this style-switching is significant from a communication point of view.

Suspicion of the outside world causes the Roma leader to realize that there are many lies concerning history and the place of the Roma in that history. According to these, the Roma murders are a direct consequence of the Hungarian attempt to counterfeit historical and social events. Daróczi (2012) recalled,

> According to certain sources 58,000 Gypsies were deported from Hungary to Auschwitz. According to Camille Woods, another source who traveled to different Roma settlements in Hungary during the war, there were about 50,000 Roma victims. In recent publications, however, the numbers are 5,000. After falsifying events of the Nazi genocide, anything can happen to the Roma today.

Indeed, Daróczi (2012) has a similar argument to the extreme nationalist blogger, Maroz, in evaluating the country as a "fake democracy." Daróczi (2012) reasoned, "In this country, we don't have a real democracy because people do not think that every single citizen has the same rights." As an answer to the Roma murders, Daróczi (2012) said, since the Roma are not politically conscious, liberals, churches, and the government must take responsibility to save them against far-right atrocities. Her vision of disaster has a concrete meaning: neo-*Nazism*. Daróczi (2012) noted,

> Today, the largest risk is the country's shift to the far-right. All democrats should unify against it. Poverty, and at the same time the declaration of a minority as a black lamb, leads to social disaster, one that we've seen already.

The danger is not as idealistic as Tamás' lamentation of an upcoming tragedy of the weak nation. Daróczi (2012) even has a plan to stop this nearing disaster. As a solution, she recommends,

> In such a situation, the democratic parties have no other choice than to co-operate and unite against extremism. And for this you need to seize every tool.

Unexpectedly, Daróczi (2012) provided the most radical political advice among the three writers when she suggested,

> Roma must select an independent politician and character who can mobilize others, who can counter-prove that all parties are wrong when they believe that Gypsies do not vote.

Daróczi (2012) emphasizes that Gypsies must take responsibility in electing their leaders. It is everybody's fundamental right to be able to vote and to be able to be voted for. Meanwhile, for her, a collective memory is a significant source of power. In the present Hungarian society, the "correct" remembering or not remembering of historical events makes a great difference. Roma want to remember the "Roma killings" as a source of moral strength to stand up and organize themselves politically, socially, and culturally. After the Roma murders, the Roma leadership became visibly empowered and started imagining a positive role for themselves in Hungarian society. Similar to Elise Boulding's (1988) "focused social imagining," in which participants identify a vision of how to solve a social problem in an idealized future, Roma leaders have started to disregard current realities in order to imagine a new, more positive "Gypsy face" to identify with in the future. Daróczi (2013) stated, "We hope to endure the world: by healing the soul and reading the future." They set a vision of a non-violent future where Roma will live in harmony with their natural and social environment. The Roma leader's positive imaginary have led her to the code switching, with which she solves previous communicational problems to reach out of their group. To summarize these changes I review the most important exigencies and main elements of my theory building.

Conclusion

In this study, I analyzed the Roma situation in Hungary, as illustrated through the Roma murders, as a complex, severe and enduring conflict, and described the Roma murders as being the result of intractable conflict in Hungary. First, I assert that left liberal and extreme right nationalist political cultures involve the idea of a division that leads back to intractable conflict between majorities and minorities, sedentary and nomadic or semi-sedentary cultures, whites and non-whites, and supposed modern and primitive communities.

The liberal elite, Tamás, called for unifying in nation-wide mourning. For him, the nation is fatally wounded and divided into racists and humanists, and these conditions will be very difficult to change. Tamás manipulated the concept of a weak and failing nation that carries much collective guilt because of past and present racist crimes in Hungarian society. For Tamás, the Roma murders are a sign of the fall of the nation, as a whole, where the Roma is the "disappearing weak, and noble savage;" he addressed the victims by expressing a high level of brotherly love, a love he had not previously addressed to living Gypsies (Wolfe, p. 23). Therefore national mourning is not an effective appeal in Tamás' argument.

Second, I argue that, as a counter movement to the extending power of the neoliberal European Union, far-right ideology became extremely influential in Hungary, developing intractable conflict between left liberals and far-right extreme nationalists. Tamás reported that, as a result of the fast-spreading extreme nationalism, the current level of racism in Hungarian society is so high that liberals are silent. I identify both the growing extreme nationalism and silence on behalf of the Hungarian humanists as key constituents of the existing intractable conflict. I concluded that the conflict is hard to solve between the far-right and the liberals, at least in part because Tamás openly turns away from his opponents and speaks only with those who agree with him.

In contrast, the extreme nationalist blogger, Maroz, while arguing aggressively, wants to interact neither with liberals nor with Roma. Maroz imagines a strong nation that takes responsibility and keeps order without a "hypocritical" reference to Good or Evil, and refuted the idea of a collective guilt. Maroz upheld the right for picking and choosing the people with whom Hungarians want to live in their country. Cleansing the country of strangers, beginning with the Roma, would be the first step to

solving the present difficulties. In this position, the extreme nationalist blogger is in intractable conflict with the Roma as well. For Maroz, the Roma murders are a virtue, a sign of the birth of a new leadership that takes the fate of the nation into its hands and solves the Roma issue instead of waiting for the actions of an "impotent" government. As Maroz argued, Hungarians have to feel sympathy not for the Roma victims but for the Hungarian people who suffer from the supposed "barbarism of Roma criminals."

The third topic I discussed is an additional dimension, the intractable conflict that exists in the different communication styles between the Roma *musayra*, indirect and high context intragroup communication, and the Hungarian *dugri*, direct and low context communication style. Roma, in their isolation, communicate only in their cultural group. Historically, Roma communities were unsuccessful in intergroup communication; therefore, they often became the proverbial black sheep. Contrary to these postings and all cultural differences, after the killings, the Roma leaders changed their attitudes and conflict resolution styles. They started dynamic crisis management in their communities with a *mushaira* style intragroup communication, and switched to a *dugri* style when communicating with the non-Roma world. Roma leaders expressed their people's willingness and ability to fit in the 21st-century Hungarian society; they imagined a new "Gypsy face" free from stigma. They framed the Roma murders as violence and human loss, as opposed to the frame extreme nationalists used of casualties in a "righteous war" to save the nation from Roma criminality. After the killings, the Roma came out of their isolation and declared that they want harmony in their social and natural surroundings. Roma leaders realized that, through selecting Roma and Hungarian leaders carefully, hate crimes can be avoided. The Roma leadership thinks that memories of a collective guilt have to warn the nation to avoid new tragedies.

Roma leaders, among them Daróczi (2012), critiqued the existing "fake" democracy. With this, Roma front-runners located themselves on a common platform with the extreme nationalist critic of the pretentious Hungarian political sphere. Instead of remaining an isolated group, they reached out to allies with all democratic political and social institutions and started persuading Roma and non-Roma that only a unified nation can build a "real" democracy, as opposed to a counterfeit one. Daróczi (2012) realized that the Roma are a multitude who can represent political power and can become the deciders in the upcoming elections.

Although intractable conflict is complex and multi-dimensional, it is also mercurial. They can be reversed and changed with different behavioral attitudes and with changing the frame, as Coleman (2014) suggested (p. 541). Though, as this study shows, dynamic in-group communication not only strengthens group identity but also alters the relationship toward the other's diverse communication style. I noted that the Roma *musayra* is accompanied with positive imagery of a nonviolent future, which, in turn, have lead the Roma leader to the practice of code switching between two different communication styles. These together alter the relationship between the conflicting groups and fulfill a significant role in conflict resolution.

Ultimately, I conclude that, in the aftermath of the "Roma killing," as the analyzed articles show, Roma have worked to resolve the "Roma issue." With altering the framing of the Roma murders from tragic Hungarian fate and from nationalistic duty to loss of human lives; with changing the isolationist Roma attitude to reach the non-Roma world; and with switching between *musayra* and *dugri* speaking styles to gain broader understanding, the Roma leadership have shown their ability to mediate between conflicting groups and to change intractable conflict to tractable.

This study suggests that mediation among the conflicting groups can be a naturally occurring turn as a result of a shockingly tragic event. I understand that the code switching between *musayra* and *dugri* communication styles as parts of the Roma's answer to the tragedies. Moreover, I conclude that similar ideas that are represented in Boulding's (1988) focused social imagining theory can arise spontaneously as a survival strategy in a group, and they imagine a nonviolent future as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Yet, I recognize a third important element in transforming intractable conflict to tractable: the role of timing when starting a dynamic intercultural communication in the midst of the growing racial discrimination and exclusion. The time period after the Roma Murders was a safe time for the Roma to come out with a new identity–with the image of the victorious Roma versus the Roma as victim–and with a new speaking style, because of the international attention that followed the Roma murders.

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DEMOCRACY VS. OPPORTUNITY: REVEALING THE NATURE OF CONFLICT COMMUNICATION DURING THE "ARAB SPRING"

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Abstract

The world received information about the period known as the "Arab Spring" movement through both traditional and nontraditional mass media. Most news consumers, however, continue to rely on traditional mass media to learn about and understand these major international conflicts. This understanding may be heavily influenced by how the conflict is communicated—communication involving the selection of words, phrases and even in what issues are reported. This study examines how leading Western newspapers covered issues in the Arab Spring and contrasts them with issues found in regional public opinion polling throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Framing, agenda-setting and agenda-building theories of mass communication research are used as a foundation for understanding the possible influence of traditional news coverage of these conflicts on public opinion.

On December 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi was reported to have set fire to himself to protest a police confiscation of the fruit and vegetables he was selling in Tunisia, sparking a movement that would later be known as the "Arab Spring." As the movement spread through other counties in the region, the United States government emphasized that the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt revealed that citizens of these countries were striving for democracy. By February 2012, uprisings had spread to Yemen's capital and Mubarak had stepped down as the leader of Egypt. Violent protests continued in Egypt, Bahrain and Tunisia, and Libya's protests turned to an insurgent action leading to the killing of Gaddafi. Major

upheavals continued throughout the year in Syria and other parts of the region.

The reporting of these and other incidents by international news media preceded major foreign policy actions of world powers, such as the deployment of NATO forces in Libya and the ouster or killing of major political figures, such as the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Such reporting has consequences—Christie (2006) found that some issues related to forming a rationale for military intervention in a conflict may set public policy agendas for governments, and other issues may not. In the case of the Arab Spring, a possible rationale for military intervention could be to help repressed citizens striving for democracy.

While many citizens of the Middle East/North African region received their news and information through a variety of media channels, including social media, Western nations primarily relied on more traditional news media for their information and understanding of the issues. This study examines the coverage of major Western sources of news as it seeks to reveal how these conflicts were reported to the Western world. The agenda-setting and agenda-building traditions of mass communication research are used as a lens to view how these issues were communicated through major traditional sources of international news media as world powers debated possible intervention in these conflicts.

Literature Review

The decisions to engage forces in combat is one of the most difficult and consequential choices a nation makes, and for centuries, warfare has required sustained support from the public. As the public receives most of its information on war from mass media, it becomes essential to understand the role mass media play in this process (Kull, Ramsay & Lewis, 2004). Support for recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was strong at the start of the conflict, and media reports were mostly favorable. The "rally around the flag" syndrome outlined by Mueller (1973) explains this initial support. Mueller (1973) also noted a phenomenon of increased public support during times of national crisis.

There is an obstacle preventing a nation from receiving full public support for war, and that is the linkage between casualties and public support of combat operations. John Mueller's research on 20th century American warfare suggested that public support drops off "sequentially from the war's support as casualties mount" (Mueller, 1973, p. 62). Therefore, it is

no surprise that nations preparing for war desire to present a clear rationale for the conflict to prepare for and achieve favorable public opinion (Christie, 2007). In addition to providing rationale, nations want to provide visual images that are consistent with their national objectives. During the Gulf war, video images released by the military public affairs offices were even screened—relaying the image of war as being high-tech and without loss of innocent life or casualties (Gerbner, 1992).

News media do not always relay the themes suggested by government during war. However, Christie (2007) noted that the political framing of issues at the onset of the war in Iraq was initially found heavily covered in mass media. This framing of issues in the Iraq war, found heavily covered in leading news media, established the rationale for conducting the war, including the threat resulting from Iraq having weapons of mass destruction, the need to respond to terrorism, and the presence of an international coalition united with the United States, supporting this cause (Christie, 2006).

Theoretical Considerations of Agenda-Setting, Framing and Media Influences

A rationale for conflict can be viewed through the lenses of the "agenda-setting" and "framing" traditions in mass media research, used to study the emergence of new issues or events. The guidance provided by news media (assigning importance to issues and events) has been found to be important for new issues. This guidance is especially important for issues not discussed with others. as well as for issues not personally experienced (Graber, 2005). This would largely be the case for most of the world whose populations are not located in the Middle East or North Africa region.

Understanding linkages of public opinion, public policy, and mass media can also be seen through the application of agenda-setting and agenda-building approaches. These approaches examine the role of public opinion in the government's public policy decisions. Agendas were defined as "issues or events that are viewed at a point in time as ranked in a hierarchy of importance" (Rogers & Dearing, 1987, p. 555). One of two related research traditions is "agenda-setting," a process through which the mass media communicate an agenda of issues and events to the public. Agenda setting has been practically defined as "the idea that the news media, by their display of news, come to determine the issues the

public thinks about and talks about" (Severin & Tankard, 1988, p. 164). An expansion of agenda setting is "agenda-building," a process through which policy agendas of political elites become influenced (Rogers & Dearing, 1987). The agenda-building model has three main variables: media, public, and policy agendas. These variables interact among themselves while being influenced by other variables (Rogers & Dearing, 1987).

The 1972 McCombs and Shaw study led researchers to look upon agenda setting as a process (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). The agenda-building tradition eventually examined how public issues got placed on public policy agendas. Crenson (1971) examined how a single issue—air pollution—became a policy agenda item in a city government.

The theory of agenda setting is not generally seen to reveal a heavily persuasive process at work. However, framing theory suggests that media coverage may move beyond what issues we think about to influencing how we think about the issue (Craft & Wanta, 2004). Tankard defines framing as an "idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration" (Sparks, 2006, p. 177). Therefore, it may be assumed that government policy makers preparing for combat would desire to present issues by emphasizing selected issues or attributes of the issues. Policy makers may frame an issue by emphasizing "facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution" (Entman, 2004, p. 5).

Therefore, framing goes beyond agenda-setting in examining how the public considers or evaluates issues, and framing can be used to evaluate the media's potential influence in making issues more salient. Various definitions have been used to explain media framing. Entman's (1993) definition states that, "To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (p. 52, original emphasis). Gitlin (1980) noted that frames were applied as "principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens and what matters" (p.7). Gamson and Modigliani (1987) defined a frame as a "central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events" (p. 143).

Shoemaker and Reese (1996) provide a more applied way for us to view influences on mass media content, using a model to note a hierarchy of influence on what is reported in news media. According to the model, the content of news stories is least affected at the individual level (this level consists of reporters' background, attitudes, values and beliefs). However, the model shows the most persuasion occurring at the ideological level, meaning "a symbolic mechanism that serves as a cohesive and integrating force in society" (p. 183). This ideological influence may also be interpreted as a "worldview," seen in areas such as the belief in private ownership capitalism or in Marxism.

Given the review of literature based on the agenda-setting/agenda-building processes and the potential effects resulting from emphasizing selected attributes of media issues, it stands to reason that issues or attributes of these issues would emerge in Western newspapers largely grounded in a Western ideological view—issues that are consistent with government policy and rationale for support of the conflict. Therefore, three related research questions guided this study:

1. What key issues or attributes of issues of the Arab Spring movement received coverage by three major Western newspapers?

2a. How does the hierarchical ranking of these news media issues compare with the importance given to issues noted by public opinion polling in the region?

2b. Were there differences in the amount of media coverage of traditional democratic issues (democracy, fight against terror, human rights, freedom, free speech, women/women's rights) versus 'opportunity' issues more important to the region (economics, corruption, health, education and Islamic law)?

3. How do the newspapers examined differ in their coverage of these issues?

Method

The methodology of the study used a computer-assisted content analysis beginning with the coverage of the violent Tunisian incident in December 17, 2010. It continues until the one-year anniversary of the ousting of the Tunisian leader on Jan 14, 2012. This period covers a timeline established by the Reuters news organization outlining the major events of the Arab Spring (Timeline, 2012). It examines media coverage throughout this time

period and identifies key issues. The study then compares the key issues in media coverage to those issues revealed by public opinion polling throughout the Middle East and North Africa.

Media content from three leading national/international newspapers from this time frame was examined using a computer-assisted search for the content analysis. Daily front-page stories in *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post,* and *The Daily Telegraph* were selected as the sources of Arab Spring issue information. These front-page articles were examined only if they mentioned either the Arab Spring or a regional search term in the lead of the news article. The regional search terms included Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen and Egypt – these countries were taken from an Associated Press status report of countries most affected by the Arab Spring (Arab Spring Countries' Statuses, 2012).

The selection of front-page stories in leading national newspapers for agenda-setting studies has been well established (Winter & Eyal, 1981; Wanta, 1993). Wanta (1993) noted that large national circulation newspapers such as the *New York Times* may also have an agenda-setting effect on other media. Key search terms were then found using the "VB Pro" text-base searching program. Compared to human coding procedures, precise reliability is realized with such a computer search (Krippendorff, 2004), eliminating the need to include tests for intercoder reliability.

Search terms for issue information were all obtained from a combination of a major speech by U.S. President Barack Obama and a public opinion poll noting major political concerns among residents in the "Arab Spring" region. These two sources were assessed to have the potential to show cultural or ideological "worldview" differences in these political issues. President Obama, in a major speech to the nation on May 19, 2011 (approximately five months into the movement) addressed the Arab Spring movement and defined it in a strongly Western democratic context. In this speech, the U.S. President talked about the forces driving the political changes as he stressed freedom and democracy, human rights, free elections, and terrorism (Remarks by the President, 2011). These were search terms used in the study to represent the democratic issues.

The issues stressed by the U.S. President were not the same as those issues found to be important to the region. Nine months into the Arab

Spring timeline, Pollster John Zogby found that employment issues (rather than democratic ideals) were the top concern in every country surveyed in the Middle East and North Africa. The problem of corruption was also a major concern in four of the seven countries surveyed. Other issues, such as political reform and democracy, were not as prominent as the "opportunity'' issues of jobs/economy, education, and health care (Zogby, 2011).

Other issues important to the region and thus used in this methodology were derived from a public opinion poll by the Pew Center for People and the Press, called the "Pew Research Global Attitudes Project"(Most Muslims, 2012). The poll noted the difference in the Western "democracy" rationale for the Arab Spring and the attitudes of the public in the region in support of Islam, including the integration of Sharia law, to have a "prominent place in the government" (Most Muslims, 2012, p. 1). A separate Pew study of worldwide views of Muslims found that majorities of Muslim populations surveyed, including those in the Middle East and North Africa, wanted Sharia to be the law of the land, including 74% of the respondents in Egypt (The World's Muslims, 2013).

Pew noted that, "…the economy is a top concern. And if they had to choose, most Jordanians, Tunisians and Pakistanis would rather have a strong economy than a good democracy" (Most Muslims, 2012, p. 1). Less than half of men surveyed in Jordan favored equal rights for men and women, and support for extremist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah was relatively strong in much of the region (Most Muslims, 2012).

The issues noted in the speech and polls were used as the basis for the issue search terms used in this study. Variants of most search terms (i.e., for the issue of the economy, "economic" and "economics") were added to ensure most references to the basic issues were captured in the content analysis.

A context search was used to ensure validity. This search showed the equivalent of one or two paragraphs surrounding the search terms. By randomly checking the context of sentences close to the terms, this procedure ensured the term accurately represented the issue intended. Identical search strategies for search terms were repeated for each day for newspaper front-page articles during the timeline.

Results

The units of analyses for the three media sources used in this study were published front-page articles referencing the Arab Spring or region taken from the *Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, and *The Daily Telegraph* from Dec. 17, 2010 to Jan. 14, 2012, A total of 291 articles including at least one reference to either the Arab Spring or the regional search terms were published in *The New York Times* during this time frame, and 134 articles referencing the these issues or terms were found in *The Washington Post*. Seventy-three front-page articles covering the issue in the lead were published on page one of *The Daily Telegraph* during this time frame.

Results reveal similarities and some differences in the nature of coverage of *The Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, and *The Daily Telegraph*. Table 1 shows the frequency and ranking of individual articles mentioning the Arab Spring search terms in newspapers (research questions 1 and 2). These results are shown in order of their total counts, with the most frequently mentioned issues listed first. Of these terms, articles about democracy related to the Arab Spring appeared most frequently in *The New York Times* (166 references), *The Washington Post* (70 references) and *The Daily Telegraph* (9 references). Multiple search terms may appear within the same article, and some articles are counted more than once.

Articles about economics and terrorism were the second-most covered stories related to Arab Spring protests, followed by stories mentioning human rights, freedom and corruption. *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* were similar in their front-page coverage of these issues – each had a related prioritized order of stories, beginning with 'democracy' as the leading issue and ending with Sharia law (research question 3).

To respond to research question 2a, two combined variables were constructed. The "democracy" variable (taken from issues stressed in U.S. President Obama's speech) included issues of democracy, terrorism, human rights, freedom, free speech and women's rights. The "opportunity" variable (taken from regional public opinion polling) included the issues of economics, corruption, health, education and Islamic (Sharia) law. Since the reform variable was observed to be equally stressed by both sources, it was omitted from the construction (as was "Arab Spring").

Table 1. Number of front page stories mentioning key Arab Spring issues from President Obama's 2011 Speech and Middle East/North Africa Polling Sources (Dec. 17, 2010 – Jan. 14, 2012)

Arab Spring Issue	*New York Times*	*Washington Post*	*Daily Telegraph*
Democracy	166	70	9
Economics	110	39	1
Terrorism	92	46	7
Human rights	86	32	5
Freedom	75	29	2
Corruption	50	21	1
Speech (freedom)	48	17	4
Women/Women's rights	48	20	0
Reform	44	21	5
Arab Spring	39	15	3
Health	27	10	2
Education	19	5	0
Sharia	1	2	0

Figure 1 shows a time-series plot of the number of combined mentions of opportunity and democratic search terms found in all newspaper coverage examined in this study. The plot shows mentions of the democracy search terms spiking five major times during the campaign period. The spikes are not as apparent for the combined opportunity search terms, nor are they as prominent. The chart reveals a noticeable difference in the coverage of democratic versus opportunity issues. It also shows some possible correlation (not tested) between the coverage of the two combined variables.

Figure 1. All newspaper references to combined "democracy" and "opportunity" themes

Referencing research question 2a, a paired sample t-test revealed a mean of 2.94 mentions of the democratic terms found among the combined news articles, compared to only .98 average mentions of the opportunity terms among the three newspapers. The test revealed a statistically significant difference (t = -9.25, p < .001). These results are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Average number of combined mentions of democracy and opportunity issues in front-page articles in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Daily Telegraph

Issue	*n*	Mean	S.D.	*t*	*p*-value
Democracy	498	2.94	4.39	9.25	*p* < .001
Opportunity	498	.98	2.29		

Discussion

This study reveals how the Arab Spring was covered in thee leading national/international newspapers throughout the first year of conflicts and major political changes in the region. The study uncovered a major distinction in how leading Western newspapers covered this movement, emphasizing democratic over opportunity issues.

Since the Western world largely learned of the Arab Spring through traditional news media sources, one could assume that the news media had a major role in forming public opinion. In public opinion polls conducted in early 2011 (CBS News, USAToday/Gallup), half of Americans surveyed expressed the opinion that democracy would take hold in Egypt and other countries in the Middle East (Polling Report, 2011). At the end of 2011, BBC global polling (conducted by GlobeScan) found a favorable majority opinion about the Arab Spring movement, and heavy support among Germans and French populations (Global poll reveals, 2011).

The effect of the media portrayal of these issues of the Arab Spring found in this study is that these issues (and attributes of the issues) become more salient to the public and may have promoted the evaluation of the movement according to these terms. These attributes could result in reader's processing the movement based on a "central organizing idea" noted by Gamson and Modigliana (1987, p. 143). Thus, this coverage of the movement may have indicated how the public viewed the larger issue of democracy/opportunity in the past and how they will view the issue in the future. Also, consistent with research on framing, if the current trends in media coverage continue, it is likely that the public will evaluate the issue in terms of the attributes covered by the leading newspapers.

Looking at the study in terms of influences on what the news media reported about the Arab Spring, it is apparent that, given the issues examined, the issues categorized under "democracy" were covered more than the "opportunity" issues by a 3-1 ratio. This suggests that the application of the Shoemaker-Reese (1996) model of media influences reveals a strong effect on news media coverage of this conflict. The influence of the Western ideological worldview is a plausible explanation for the relatively large proportion of media coverage given to issues defined as "democracy." This news media coverage was also consistent with White House themes revealed in U.S. President Obama's 2011 address to the nation. Such models are often difficult to test empirically.

Thus, a major contribution of this study is a validation of the Shoemaker-Reese model using the ideological-level issue categorization and testing method.

This study suggests that, in order to present a more balanced approach to reporting news about such events, more care should be taken to accurately communicate the true nature of the conflict—one that does not define democracy in the same terms as those accepted in the Western worldview. These findings point to limitations and future research needed in this area. A major limitation of this study is the use of a computer-based content analysis. While the analysis is effective at precisely finding key search terms, the exact meaning of the term is not fully revealed—the method used in this study, while more reliable than human coding, impedes uncovering a more complex context of this issue.

Also, a methodology to reveal the emphasis on the search terms in public policy statements, such as the U.S. President's address, is needed. The exact linkage between this reporting and public opinion is also not tested.

Conclusion

Communication during conflicts such as the Arab Spring is critically important to society. Major public policy decisions, including those involving the commitment of combat forces, depend on an accurate portrayal of issues involved in the region. The study has revealed the stark contrast between the communication of "democratic" media issues defining the Arab Spring conflict (based largely on Western worldview) and "opportunity" issues defined by public opinion polling in the region (such as expanding economic opportunity and ending political corruption). As a result of this imbalance in media reporting (much less communication of the "opportunity" issues), Western news consumers received a distorted view of the nature of the conflict—one largely influenced by Western ideology. News media seeking to communicate a more balanced view of these conflicts should take into account that definitions of democracy and other basic rights in this region of the world differ considerably from those in another worldview.

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VIOLENCE, AGGRESSION, AND DOWRY CONFLICT IN INDIA:
TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA RESEARCH

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Abstract

The dowry practice of securing marriage agreements has been formally illegal in India since 1961. Despite this fact, such practices are still quite common in certain regions and communities of India, as well as other south Asian countries, as they used to be throughout much of the world at one time or another. Dowry payments can be framed and understood as negotiations within complex familial and social systems that cement and secure particular "deals" between families and married couples--the marriage and fair treatment of a daughter, for example (Shenk, 2007).

Many such marriage "deals" are, however, rarely fixed or final in their negotiations as we might expect them to be at marriage—at which point we might assume is the closure of negotiations (Bloch & Rao, 2002; Srinivasa & Lee, 2004; Van Willigen, 1991). In fact, they are frequently subject to the continued and often aggressive negotiations and renegotiations (additional demands) of the groom and his family who can, and sometimes do, assume the power to "change the deal" even after the deal is supposedly "done" at marriage. One common storyline, for example, is that the groom's family comes back for more dowry payments (concessions), which the bride's family is often unable to pay. The bride is reduced to being viewed as a "means to an end"—the end being more payments or goods (for example, cash for something they desire or goods such as a motorcycle). The families are thrown into vivid conflict and enmity which organizes subsequent interactions around their dramatically unequal power relationship. The bride is then subject to the threat or actuality of violence and other mistreatment, including abuse at the hands of her husband and members of his family. The violence or

threat of violence, and sometimes more subtle emotional pressure and abuses, are used to leverage, extort, and/or punish, discipline and shame the woman and her family. This sometimes occurs in socially public displays, and sometimes in hidden in private family spaces (note that as many as two thirds of such cases are estimated to go unreported). This paper is about these fascinating, sometimes macabre, and often tragic post-wedding negotiations and renegotiations, their portrayal in news media, and the role of various media in enabling the expansion of narratives and related courses of action available to women and also to the men they marry.

We reframe dowry violence as the manifestation of aggressive/dominant negotiation strategies typical in such relationships of dramatically unequal power, when the demands for more payments by the groom's side from the bride's side continue, and often intensify after marriage. Aggressive communication and behavior such as threat-based leverage, extortive revisions of agreements, and violent displays of punishment and discipline/shame for non-compliance with extortion--and more subtle emotional abuse, can easily fracture the fragile often "negative peace" of marriage agreements and lead to violent conflicts. Violent conflict often leads to vicious attacks on the bride, and sometimes even end in her death. These events are often played out publicly through media coverage, which has an impact on public understanding of the issues, and perhaps on social action surrounding the issues, and the creation of alternative ways of negotiating marriage "deals" that can be cultivated culturally over the long term.

To ground this theoretical reframing, this paper explores three interrelated dimensions of dowry negotiation and violence. First, we explore the communicative structure of dowry as tactical negotiations within a framework of the unequally gendered power of families connected by marriage. Second, we explore some of the key archetypes in traditional print media coverage of dowry violence. Third, we explore how new media--online and social media-- play a role in sharing stories and their interpretations and, perhaps, cultivating wider and more empowered narrative choices, and even stimulating communication and social change.

Each of these three brief interrelated explorations generated many more questions than we answered in this paper. We make these further questions explicit, and build them and their thematic interrelationship into a framework for suggesting further exploration of dowry violence and its relationship to communication, and media portrayal and

representation. The implications are examined for how media coverage of dowry violence cases help cultivate and reify, as well as challenge and call for changes to, the cultural assumptions around the use of aggressive and violent (gendered) negotiations.

Dowry Negotiations--Narrative Archetypes

According to the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) in 2005, approximately 7,000 women were reported murdered, and the bureau suggests that the real numbers (reported plus unreported) may be as much as 25,000 per year—indicating a dowry death every 77 minutes in India. In 2011 The NCRB reported 8,618 dowry harassment deaths in India and reiterated that the real numbers may be triple this number annually. This increase is supported by research that also suggests that cases are on the rise even now (Srinivasan & Bedi, 2007). These statistics are of course for deaths related to dowry violence. Statistics on more everyday micro aggressions and human indignities are much harder to come by or estimate. However, if the violence cases are the tip of the proverbial iceberg, then aggression, violence, and mistreatment are enormous problems lurking in the murky unknown beneath our view. As such, there is a critical need to understand these negotiations, and how they result in such numbingly large numbers of abuses.

In this section, based on reported accounts of dowry negotiations, we outline what we know about the structure and dynamics of the aggressive negotiations for clues to the form they take. We want to use this structural analysis to explicate and understand how aggression and violence fit into the process of dowry negotiations, within particular cultural contexts. Of course, personal accounts of dowry negotiations, like any conflicts are strategic, slanted, and incomplete. We cannot easily know everything that happened, particularly when we typically only have one side of the conflict represented narratively (Kellett, 2001, 2007). With this in mind, we also want to be able to raise questions about what is and is not reported, and the narrative glosses and framing that are used to rhetorically justify the aggression and violence.

Cultural Context and Framing of Negotiations

It is a deep and dark cultural irony that Sheba Rakesh in a 2011 interview for Pravda.RU points to when she says that dowry payments that are supposed to secure a woman's welfare has become the biggest killer of women in India. She argues that the meaning of dowry has shifted from pre-mortem inheritance for girls to take wealth with them into marriages, to signifying love of the daughter, to a contemporary cultural meaning as a sort of consumer greed based on the ethos of—what can we get from them as a captive audience (the bride's family often feels the pressure to comply—wanting a highly qualified husband which may be perceived as a scarce resource).

She goes on to say that dowry negotiations can best be viewed as a rational business negotiation—maximizing demands and minimizing concessions and engaging in threats or punishment to secure compliance. As she elegantly put it, "Since these business negotiations like everything else have a shelf life, the exhaustion of dowry rings the trouble bell for the woman in question." This understanding of the cultural frame and meaning of dowry negotiations suggests that we might explore them at least to some degree as quite rational decision-making processes—albeit within a particular cultural context where certain actions and reactions/responses have specific meanings.

So, the very cultural meaning and framing of the negotiations presupposes aggression and competitive demands, given that the two parties are of dramatically unequal power—the woman is often in a sense a hostage (Bloch & Rao, 2002)—and the demands can be extraordinarily high from the groom's family side. This, coupled with a low value placed on women, and historically on justice relating to mistreatment of women in Indian culture (low fear of consequences for aggression), creates a recipe for aggressive and violent conflicts—directed at the bride.

Typical Structures of Dowry Negotiation Interactions

Dowry negotiations have a back and forth of concessions and demands as any negotiation does—albeit here in an extremely unequal power relationship which has a significant impact on the sequence of things. This back and forth has been examined theoretically to some extent (Bloch & Rao, 2002; Shenk, 2007). At the same time, much of the fine fabric of how negotiations are done, and to what degree they can be

captured within a rational negotiation model of decision-making—somewhere between a business and a hostage negotiation in which the hostage taker has a lot of power—remains a mystery worth exploring. As a note here, we ought to also recognize that the form of the negotiations is likely to be quite different from the normal back and forth within what we know as the negotiating room between negotiators. Many dowry negotiations are likely to be truncated and blunt sequences of a demand and a response with not much of a communication "process" as such. This is, itself, an issue worth exploring in relation to the power dynamics of the situation.

Sometime close to the wedding—usually soon after it, additional demands are made for either more payments or specific goods. To appear reasonable, these are often aligned in the minds of the groom's family with specific needs such as a motorcycle for transportation. Whether reasonable or not, a demand is made. Quite how these demands are made is not always clear in terms of the specific context, or wording, or supporting rationale if one is given. The bride's family can comply and hope the demands cease. Often they do this but then often more demands come. When these are not met, the aggressive and violent tactics often occur as follows.

Micro Aggressions on Human Dignity

If the groom's family that the bride joins are not satisfied with dowry concessions (and when more concessions are not forthcoming from the bride's family) she may be subject to some or all of the following demeaning tactics:

Being shunned or not being accepted into the family. These tactics focus on their exclusion and poor support, relative to the level of unacceptability of the dowry. Lack of dowry acceptability is met with behavioral expression of not accepting the bride.

Being subordinated within the family. In particular, being ranked relative to other daughters-in-law and their dowries can occur. Relative ranking and related treatment of the daughters-in-law symbolically represents the relative levels of acceptability of the dowry they brought into the family.

Being exploited for domestic work. Particularly if a dowry is unacceptable, or if it is not added to after marriage in response to

additional demands, then the bride can be punished or made to prove her worth through domestic servitude to the groom and his family.

Abandonment: Sometimes brides are essentially abandoned by their husbands. In extreme cases he may remarry while she is still in the household. In some cases she is left to fend for herself despite her low ability to earn outside the home, and often her lack of connectedness after marriage to her own parental family. The lack of close relationships weighs heavily on Indian women who are socially conditioned to think of themselves and their worth in relational rather than individual terms.

We can assume that her position and treatment may be revised if she comes up with more dowry, otherwise there would be no rational incentive to try to secure more dowry. Some cases may well be simply long-term forms of abuse based on the knowledge that she is unable to secure more dowry. This aspect of negotiations is important to explore further.

Macro-Aggression and Violent Tactics

If high demands are not met, and there is a low risk of accountability for the male family and desire or cultural proclivity towards violence to women, then the bride may be subject to the following more explicitly aggressive and violent tactics which escalate the interaction or even may end the relationship:

Harassment and threats for more payments. The bride may receive direct threats, or she may endure a family culture of fear of reprisals and fear for her life. Threats may be made to her directly or to her family members in order to extract more payments. Essentially this form of interaction may be similar to a hostage negotiation. The back and forth around harassment and threats, particularly when framed as a hostage negotiation, would be fascinating to explore further. We do know that female in-laws (mother-in-law and sisters-in-law) are frequently the perpetrators of harassment and punishment (Rew, Gangoli, & Gill, 2013).

Murder and disfigurement. Presumably this tactic—essentially ending the negotiations is a tactic of last resort—but this is only an assumption. We often do not know what sequence of communication, if any, the families have been through before this happens. These are the tactics most likely to catch media attention because of their macabre cruelty and resulting newsworthiness. Endings may involve being set on fire (which can

sometimes be disguised as a kitchen accident, given that kerosene is used for both cooking and the murder of the bride), injected with poison (which may elude shoddy or absent post mortem examination), or forced suicide (for which she can be blamed for not fitting in to the family). So, these tactics have more to do with disguising agency and thus avoiding blame and legal accountability than the symbolic tit-for-tat as we saw in micro-aggressions (see Lavin, 2006).

It is important to note that here are also some regional differences in the form that attacks typically take. For example, in Bangladesh the common form became acid attacks in which acid is thrown on the woman—especially her face. In Delhi the most common approach was kerosene burnings. In other places, such as south India, strangulation or beating to death are more common.

Bride's Family Negotiation Responses

The bride's family will at some point respond to the demands or actions of the groom's side. These communicative options include the following, but there are probably many more options and combination of options in everyday practice.

Complicity/accommodation. The bride's family can and often do try to comply with the demands of the groom's family. Bigger dowry from a bride usually means better treatment, fewer domestic duties, and more autonomy for her has been negotiated within the family. But it is a precarious place, as a big dowry may make a woman vulnerable to further extortions. The concession of complicity is complex and related to a set of factors such as the likelihood that the concession will end the demands versus lead to more, the financial stability and level of greed of the groom's family, the ability of the bride's family to meet this and potentially additional demands, the contextual needs of the bride's side such as their need to avoid public shame that might affect marriage prospects of other daughters, and other factors. The groom's side may or may not have access to some of this information and strategize accordingly.

Silence. There is a great deal of truth to the adage that silence is the biggest killer in dowry negotiations, and yet it is a common passive tactic. The bride's family sometimes does not speak up for fear of more reprisals, or fear of ruining their other daughters' chances of marriage (if, for example, the eldest daughter's marriage fails), and they therefore

endure the potential reprisals on their daughter if they do not meet demands. This is, of course, a high risk but low concession negotiation response and may be a rational choice when the bride's family does not expect violence, or when they simply cannot comply. It is high risk if the groom's family is prone to violence or is likely to be serious about making increased or additional demands.

Rescue/legal action. Increasingly, as discussed below, brides and their families are filing complaints using both the anti-dowry laws of 1961, as well as more recent domestic violence laws that were made much more robust in 2005. This is a counter attack of sorts and may be most rational when the bride's family fears extreme danger, has legal resources, and when the potential loss of face is a lower priority for them than seeking justice.

These are some of the main tactics used in the relationship between demands and concessions of dowry negotiations, and yet there is much still to know about exactly how and why the sequences of demands and concessions take the form that they do. Of course, negotiations are likely to go through more than just a simple sequence of demands and responses but I do not have access to this fine detail of these communications. Suffice to say, at least for our purposes here, that the framing and content of these negotiations tends towards aggression and violence.

Questions for Further Examining Dowry Negotiations, Aggression, Violence and Communication

Here are some useful questions to guide additional research on dowry negotiations and the communication that comprise such interactions:

- To what extent and in what ways can a cultural (Indian context) decision-making model (business or hostage) of negotiation tactics and dynamics help account for communication in dowry negotiations?
- How are dowry negotiations connected to broader issues of power and gender and the differing value of boys and girls/men and women in Indian culture?
- How are dowry negotiations connected to broader cultural assumptions and practices of dispute resolution/conflict management in Indian culture?

- What is the decision-making and communication process by which dowry deals are reopened and renegotiated by the groom's side (how do they come up with a plan and a rationale for extortion)?
- In practice, how are aggression and violence accounted for, rhetorically justified, even blamed on the woman in dowry violence cases?
- How do narrative accounts of women and men (brides and grooms or unmarried young people) differ in how they represent the practice of dowry and their negotiations?
- How are actions and reactions, moves and counter moves, demands and concessions, interrelated in the fine fabric of actual dowry negotiations (how do they actually happen in practice)?
- Much is made of *threats* in dowry negotiations, but how does the corollary of *promises* work, and how are they revised to make new demands (for example, what promises does the groom's family use to gain compliance)?
- Much emphasis in media coverage is placed on stories that have dramatically violent endings, but how are peaceful and long lasting dowry/marriage deals made? What factors contribute to the differences between the two, and how could this understanding be useful in avoiding violence?

Media Coverage of Dowry Negotiation and Violence

Although traditional cultivation theory has focused on the cumulative effects of television violence on American publics (Gerbner, 1998; Morgan, 2002), there are some interesting parallels with the case of dowry violence and Indian media coverage—albeit with a couple of fascinating twists. Primary among these twists is the fact that in Indian media coverage we are more concerned with the cumulative impact of the *absence* rather than the presence of coverage that captures the magnitude and causes of dowry violence. Second, on a related issue, of note in Indian media (film and music for example) is the presence of the hyper-romantic representation of everyday life, and the cumulative effects of how such coverage cultivates world views that may marginalize "problems" such as dowry violence. Third, newspaper, radio, and only more recently television coverage, unlike in the US, are the central media of mass communication in India. Given these twists, it is important to recognize that much of what we are discussing here does relate back to

some of the fundamental assumptions of cultivation theory—that long term coverage or lack of coverage of violence does have an important impact on the public and their perception of dowry violence as a pervasive or rare, important or minor problem in everyday Indian life.

Traditional Indian media coverage of dowry violence over the last 15 to 20 years or so can be characterized by a curious dialectical combination of *banality* and the *sensational*. Borah (2008) explores the framing of dowry violence events, and the habituation of coverage in several thousand newspaper cases over several years (specifically 1999-2006). Borah does an excellent, comprehensive job of explicating the habitual form of reporting dowry conflicts. In particular, Borah found that dowry disputes were typically reported in the "crime story" category—minimally the news portrayal involves the brief description or naming of the crime, clarification and naming of suspect/perpetrators, victims, and the outcome—typically in the form of an arrest. Much of the time this is the extent of detail in the news coverage. More recently, through analysis of two recent cases, Gurjar (2011) shows the news format of "who was killed, how, by whom, why (goods/payment), and who arrested" is still very much the norm. Usually the story is routinely told in a quite matter-of-fact way through narrative voice of the police. The cumulative effects of such reporting habits in cultivating audiences' understanding of dowry violence as a social problem are worth exploring further.

In accord with the above researchers, we found very little on the "social evil" of dowry in mainstream print media over the same period and up to the present time. Rather, coverage was episodic, event driven, and presented cases as individualized events—a brief story around a relatively isolated incident that may or may not have been "solved" as a crime. Stories were also covered in material terms (including the often bizarre facts of what was demanded and why) rather than in social terms (why the phenomena exists and what needs to change). Very few additional details were covered unless the case was newsworthy in some way—sensational because it was particularly macabre, or involving an official or having a connection to a famous person.

Interestingly, they also found that news coverage peaked around and after two major cases, the Suhaib Ilyasi case in 2000, and the Nisha Sharma case in 2003. In the Iliyasi case, the wife of a well-known crime TV series (India's Most Wanted) producer, Iliyasi, was mysteriously stabbed to death—allegedly over her refusal to bend to harassment for more dowry payments from him and his family. Equally interestingly he fought back,

claiming that he was being abused by the anti-dowry law and by his in-laws for custody of their children (498A).

In the Sharma case, the bride called off the wedding in the moments just before the ceremony because of a last minute demand (extortion attempt) by the groom's side. They attempted to demand $25,000 while the large wedding party gathered—a rational if cynical negotiation move on their part. At her request Sharma's parents refused, and violence erupted between the families. The groom and his mother were arrested. Through these cases, the news categories formed earlier in the 1990's of "dowry death" and bride burning" became more prominently reported and ingrained into news coverage, as did women's empowerment in resisting dowry and blowing the whistle on illegal extortion, as in the Sharma case. This begs further exploration of the impact of famous cases and the social/community impact of the new category/name.

The tendency of news coverage towards underreporting dowry violence and focusing on extreme cases is essentially about "market" considerations—as one editor interviewed puts it: "The (news) market needs feel good lies. Dowry deaths are the ugly truth." The ugly truth of the Ilyasi and Sharma cases was trumped by their sensational news appeal. Ilyasi, was a well-known producer of a crime show, now a prime suspect. The Sharma case was one of the first reported cases of the woman invoking the law as protection in a very public display of empowerment. Hers was also a dramatic "close call" given how different things could have worked out if she had married him and then had to deal with their almost inevitable onslaught of additional demands. So in sum, despite the occasional sensational case, as might be expected, journalistic routines around newsworthiness and the habits governing coverage have much to do with how dowry disputes and violence are reported in mainstream print news media (Joseph & Sharma 1994).

This inherently conservative bent of media coverage of dowry violence has come under critical scrutiny. Amanda Hitchcock (2001), on the World Socialist Website, puts it very aptly:

"One cannot help but be struck by the offhand way in which a young woman's life and death is summed up, matter of factly without undue cause for alarm or probing of causes. It is much as one would report a traffic accident or the death of a cancer patient—tragic certainly—but such things are to be expected."

In sifting through news reports I was also struck by this banality—sensational dialectic of coverage. There is a focus on the dramatic and macabre cases involving death and disfigurement somewhat at the cost of reporting the finer fabric of misuse—the daily loss of human dignity for example—which is certainly less dramatic and visual and yet so critical to understanding the problem. I completely understand and agree with Hitchcock's sentiment, but, perhaps holding mainstream media accountable for portraying a deep social crisis, when that is not typically what they do, seems unfair. Portraying a local event as being part of a deeper social evil among the very people who purchase a news product is also, perhaps, a little unrealistic. Audiences are easily offended and can be quickly lost. We also need to explore how other forms of media coverage—social media, online news media, Twitter, and so on—have played, and might play, an important role in critically engaging people with the issues; drawing public attention to the issues and cases; providing victims with an understanding of alternatives; putting pressure on local, regional, and federal governments; and helping to connect the dots that each case represents in a broader systemic treatment of this gendered long-term social crisis. What follows are some questions based on mainstream media coverage that add to our framework for examining dowry negotiations and related violence.

Questions for Further Examining Media Coverage of Dowry Negotiations and Violence

Questions to guide additional research on media coverage of dowry violence include the following:

- What role does the typical coverage in the "crime story" category have on public understanding and attitudes towards dowry violence issues in the last 15 to 20 years?
- What role in shaping media coverage, and social reality, did the prominent cases in 2000 and 2003 and others play in India?
- How did certain forms of abuse and killing (burning with kerosene, for example) become normalized through media naming ("bride burning" for example) and reporting of dowry violence in particular regions? Did this normalization spur increases in "copy-cat" incident rates?
- How does television coverage differ from, or mirror, print media coverage of dowry negotiations and violence?

- What role does coverage in new media, social media and online news sources for example, have in representing the lived reality and social meaning of dowry violence?
- What role do such non-print media have in creating the necessary pressure for change, and important support for victims?

Media and the "Cultivation" of Alternative and Counter Narratives

"My message to all you young girls is, 'Don't give them a penny'" (Nisha Sharma, 2003)

As much as news coverage may have helped to cultivate the normalcy of accepting violence as just "to be expected" in dowry cases, perhaps it can also play a central role in cultivating alternative and counter narratives and relational realities. The Sharma case for example, beginning in 2003, was pivotal in publicly demonstrating alternatives to complicity and powerlessness in dowry negotiations for women. Sharma's clarion call of "…Don't give them a penny" provided a catch phrase that captured an alternate stance on marriage and dowry—probably connecting deeply with the pathos and thoughts of many people, she is saying, do not submit to pressure to make it about money. The myth that a large gift or dowry would protect the woman was brought into vivid question by the case and surrounding discussion, and I think many families since this case, and others like it, now question the mythology of viewing dowry as an investment in the bride's protection and welfare. It is unclear, however, how deeply or directly the case impacted behavior and custom in practice. Srinivasan and Lee (2004) warn us that behavior can be much slower to change than shifts in approval and disapproval ratings might suggest. But the point is, this highly publicized case galvanized and gave voice to many of the concerns and fears of the female public (and brides' families). It was a significant case in cultivating voice and change around dowry issues and injustices.

Interestingly this counter narrative—essentially a feminist standpoint—is not without its own oppositional counter narratives. Some men, Ilyasi at the forefront in 2000 for example, and including some from the legal community in India, argue that the abuses of the anti-dowry law by women are significant in number, and that they are underreported by a biased news media. The counter argument is often that women who are unhappy with their new husbands will use the hot button "dowry violence" issue and claim dowry harassment in order to get them arrested

and at the very least publicly humiliated. Sometimes, allegedly, the bride and her family will use the threat of that law to extort money and goods from them. A culture of extortion breeds a back and forth of counter extortion perhaps? There are probably a few cases that fuel the argument, but it is hard to believe that such cases are anywhere near as numerous as those representing the thousands of micro and macro violent actions against women annually around this issue. Nevertheless, the story is definitely out there and has its believers and passionate narrators and advocates. Iliyasi himself produced a film to capture his and others' experiences on the other side of the dowry law. This thickening of the plot in this conflicted discursive back-and-forth around these counter and oppositional narratives is well worth deeper examination.

Subsequent to the Sharma case ten years ago, online/new media outlets have provided a forum for cases that personify an empowered standpoint for women and an alternative to the typifications of print media reporting discussed above. Cases also often highlight the need for legal and financial support during the process of litigation for women, and the success of women who follow through the legal process and get free from their domestically abusive husbands.

One such recent case—Shehnaz Bano—(outlined in www.unwomen.org 2012/12) illustrates this form of (new) media representation well, and the communicative structure of the "negotiation." When Shehnaz married in 2009 she never suspected her life would be defined by dowry violence, although the warning signs were probably there from the start. Her in-laws were never satisfied with the dowry her family produced. Her family tried appeasement as a negotiation tactic—producing as large a dowry as they could at the time of the wedding. Soon, however, there was pressure for more. Demands increased until they were quickly unable to meet them. As is quite typical, this is when more explicitly abusive behavior began. She became essentially a domestic slave. She was forced to do all of the domestic work in her husband's household. She catered full-time to the demands of the eight people who lived there. Because of her low dowry production she was punished with being provided with no personal money and very little food on which to live. When she became ill from the physical brutality she would have to ask her own family to take her to the hospital. She would return to find that she was locked out. Her in-laws would only let her back in the house after intervention from police or neighbors. She was locked into this domestic nightmare because of the social stigma associated with leaving, and her lack of funds to support

herself if she did. When her sister-in-law attacked her with a knife she knew she had to get out, whatever it took. The Lawyers Collective—a women's rights initiative (www.lawyerscollective.org/) in accord with the 2005 Protection of Women from Dowry Violence Act, provided essential support and legal help for her to escape and to prosecute. Today she personifies success—she is living independently and is enjoying a violence free life. She is a "shero" of sorts (Kellett, 2007). This and other such cases reported in online news and sometimes picked up in more mainstream media, have an impact on the cultivation of perceptions and behavior. Quite how, and to what extent, requires further research.

The role and impact of new media advocacy organizations such as the Communication Initiative Network (www.comminit.org) and others such as Stop Violence Against Women (www.Stopvaw.org) who are committed to promoting the intersection between communication, media, and social and economic development and social justice is a fascinating area of research to be developed. They promote awareness of cases within a broader social justice framework, as well as advocating for communication in the form of sharing and interactive discussion/blogging of issues such as dowry and domestic violence more generally.

Recently, progressive community developments such as creating all female police stations, now in several Indian cities, and a dramatic rise in violence survivor (support) groups, have enabled the sharing of narrative experiences that would have been extraordinarily difficult just a decade or so ago for women in many parts of India. All female police stations eliminate the fear of being (twice) victimized by police rape and/or harassment/harsh disbelief, and enable women to safely report their experiences and file complaints. Support groups legitimize personal narratives of abuse, and foster supportive communication between people with similar experiences. There are also legal funds and paralegal advocacy organizations that have sprung up to support women as they move forward with complaints (The Lawyers Collective, for example). Some are also pushing for broader changes to institutions and practices that connect to the social problem of dowry. For example, gender neutral inheritance laws are seen by some as one way to reduce the perceived need for dowries (Van Willigen, 1991). These are all positive "cultural indicators" that the narrative and behavioral possibilities are broadening for women.

Central to any real progress is the educational promotion of awareness that alternative ways of constructing self and relationships are possible for

both men and women, and that the power to make those choices is available and safe, though hopefully within a familial and cultural context that supports them (Katzenstein, 1989). As Sheba Rakesh states in an interview with Pravda: "We need women to appreciate the value of independence as much as they appreciate the value of relationships in life and most importantly we need more men to be aware of the delicate issue…" (2011). Such thick and difficult cultural changes require cultivation through strategic communication. New media in particular are, and will continue to play a vital role, although, as Palkar (2003) rightly cautioned us ten years ago, there is a long way to go—and there still is a long way to go today. The robust presence and interconnection of personal narratives, opinions, comments, virtual discussions and related communication through Twitter and to a lesser extent Facebook, as well as new media forums and sights, is encouraging in suggesting that changes are being cultivated at grassroots levels among interested publics.

Questions for Further Examining Alternative and Counter Narratives for Dowry Negotiations

Here are some questions to frame some possible fruitful avenues of research on new media and social media roles in changing attitudes and behavior associated with dowry practices in India.

- How has the reporting of alternate and empowered women's narratives, particularly in new media and social media, impacted attitudes and behavior relating to dowry?
- How has new media reporting impacted traditional media reporting of dowry issues, if at all?
- How have progressive changes such as legal-aid organizations and the creation of all women's constabularies changed communication and behavior around dowry violence and dowry practices more generally?
- What might further qualitative and ethnographic studies of all women's constabularies and victim support groups and virtual chat in its various forms reveal about the communicative construction of dowry violence and related experiences?
- What is the discursive relationship between counter narratives (anti-dowry) and their own counter narratives (anti-dowry law) and how do they mirror the gendered conflict of the dowry discourse more generally?

- How does/will various media play a pivotal role in helping to create needed, social justice driven change?

Conclusion: Toward a Communication and Media Framework

This paper has focused on the idea that the dynamics of how dowry negotiations are conducted, their representation in media as a gauge and a cultivator of cultural awareness and understanding, and the creation of alternative ways of negotiating marriage agreements are interrelated parts of a whole. As such we have attempted to synthesize these connected concerns into a unified framework to be explored through subsequent research.

This framework, grounded in cultivation theory, integrates a deeper analysis and understanding of both the rational and cultural dimensions that account for how dowries are negotiated and the decision-making and communication processes that go into their negotiation and re-negotiation. Central to understanding how negotiations occur is a deeper understanding of their representation in media and popular culture—particularly print news, but some television. And finally, it is important to understand how new media and social media can be important communicative tools in advocating for alternative ways of engaging relationships and negotiating marriages without aggression and violence implied by their construction as something akin to a business or hostage negotiation. Understanding how communication and media work in accord with legal and other cultural shifts to propagate and cultivate changes to dowry practices is a crucial and timely undertaking. The many questions raised here are a good starting point to suggest future directions for communication and media research.

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SECTION III:

PORTRAYALS AND PERCEPTIONS OF VIOLENCE SURROUNDING SOCIAL ISSUES

TARGETING THE WRONG VILLAIN IN THE GLOBAL WARMING DEBATE

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Abstract

This article explores the rhetoric of political discourse, scientific evidence, and spiritual myths used within the current dialogue on global warming. It is apparent that social, political, and economic forces have failed to produce any significant halt to the warming of this planet earth. To investigate the logic of denial we employ a form of cultural criticism based on the influence of myth, specifically: identity, eschatological, societal, and cosmological. Myths often represent the substance of culture. The rhetoric of three prominent global warming deniers is analyzed. Through an analysis of the discourse used by these three political and spiritual figures, we link their articulations of global warming denial to modern Western conceptions of "apocalypse" where it is associated with catastrophic end, or near-end, of the human race. Ultimately, we argue that myths shape (more than scientific evidence) many political and spiritual viewpoints regarding the validity of the implications of global warming.

1. Introduction

Imagine if you will, walking by the seashore. It is rather a warm day and sweat sticks to your skin like honey. A few clouds are in the sky and the heat presses down. An oblong shape catches your eye. It is a sea turtle that appears very dead. There is a long black smudge underneath his throat. You recognize it as oil. In fact, gobs of oil are scattered in lumps along the Gulf water shoreline. One or two lonely dying birds covered in oil are not even moving at all: another result of this planet's thirst for oil. The burning of fossil fuels goes on unabated. And there are consequences: many species of frogs are declining. One such frog is the spring peeper known throughout most of North America. Studies show that a thinner ozone layer (caused by an increase of carbon dioxide emissions) raises havoc with their eggs. This is just another sign of global warming -- according to a piece from the *New York Times* newspaper.

In the act of deception the truth is either camouflaged or forgotten. This loss has consequences. The wrong person gets killed. You become deprived of a benefit that could have been yours. In the political spectrum the stakes are even higher. Whole groups of people may be wiped out by the start of a war. Laws are enacted that affect large segments of the population. Money gets allocated for programs or materials that will aid many communities.

In this age, another crisis of faith and reason is emerging. There appears to be much deceit, manipulation of data, and controversy over a topic that has consequences for all of us: global warming. Should governments, societies, religious groups, peace organizations, politicians, world leaders, and citizens everywhere be concerned over findings by the scientific community in regard to the warming of the earth? What might be revealed or learned? What do our actions, inactions, and rhetorical arguments say about culture and civilization's relationship to nature? Actually, quite a lot. The controversy over global warming reflects attitudes, beliefs, prejudices, and understandings of our place within nature and of the discourse concerning our activity affecting Mother Nature. Robert P. Harrison (1996) is associate professor of French and Italian literature at Stanford University. In an essay entitled, "Towards a Philosophy of Nature" he noted:

> The cultivation of nature gives rise to culture, to be sure, yet culture is not an epiphenomenon of nature. It is the modes by which human beings organize their relation to nature. The

modes vary and change. What does not change is that religion, art, ideas, institutions, and science through which a culture expresses itself are ultimately reflections of the ways it relates to nature. (p. 426)

This essay is an attempt to explore the relationship the United States society has with nature by listening to the rhetoric on the issue of global warming. What does it mean when scientific findings are denied their appropriate place in the reasoning of thoughtful men and women? What myths are brought to bear on this issue? How do institutions like Congress affect our ability to act? How might Christianity reflect the way that we relate to nature? Finally, what reflection do we see in that looking glass that mirrors dying nature before our eyes?

In the early years of leaded gasoline, warning flags were raised by many in the scientific community. However, this war of words and actions was won by and through the leverage of big oil corporations. The message was repeated and ultimately accepted: there is no harm in using leaded gasoline. For close to forty years the public used gasoline with lead. Finally, the situation became dire and could no longer be ignored. Those who worked with leaded gasoline or were around substances with high levels of lead were getting sick. Legislation was enacted to reduce carbon emissions by introducing catalytic converters on automobiles. Today, the controversy rages over the effects of global warming, who is responsible, and what is the actual threat. A struggle is on as to whose narrative will prevail or dominate.

The current situation appears to be one of gridlock. Part of the reason is that a significant number of people in the USA do not accept or perceive a clear and present danger. Brin (2012) states: "For the core Denier narrative is that "every *single young atmospheric scientist is a corrupt or gelded coward.* Not a few, or some, or even most... but every last one of them. Only that can explain why none of them have "come out" (p. 2); this sentiment illustrates an easy dismissal of experts who publish volumes of information arguing for doing something about global warming. Indeed, quite a few skeptics maintain that those who advocate doing something about global warming have it all wrong. This is the story that we get after reading through many discourses against the notion of global warming. Furthermore, state the skeptics, our society should see the dangers of carbon dioxide or toxic substances in our air and water as a challenge (not a cause for alarm) for what our scientists are capable of

doing. Ultimately, technology will find a cure for disturbing trends in the global atmosphere.

Secondary concerns should not be allowed to get in the way of progress. Buell wrote many books mapping out the industrial revolution, the effects of the Renaissance, and the weight of capitalism, and this is how he sums up the current situation:

> In essence, the dialectic went as follows. Humanity's heroic era of mastery of nature (thesis) was opposed by the belated, but powerful appearance or environmental apocalypse (antithesis); the new, boundless possibilities of society, just now being revealed as incorporating both the ideology of mastery and the logic of environmental crisis were the triumphant synthesis (2010, p. 23).

This implies that the answer to our dilemma of the warming of the earth could easily be solved by technology. The notion that we, as masters of nature, may avert any environmental crisis coming our way is a good position to take. In fact, this crisis will prove our superiority and mastery of nature. It is yet another step down the road leading towards progress. This is just one way where the myth of eternal progress for our society is perceived to be the dominant one.

Equipped with new power and knowledge, are current civilizations, nations, and tribes destined to realize humanity's potential and become masters of the universe? Environmental concerns upset the faith in technological advances and there are many who set their course or goal as being an economic one. Quite often politicians and world leaders state that a healthy economy should be of primary concern. The reality is setting in. Douglas (2010) notes that those concerned with the predictions and forecasts of environmental scientists need to take an additional step forward in their arguments rather than one of warning. He writes, "Society will not decisively change its economic course until its governing paradigm is rejected; this will not happen until there is a replacement paradigm ready, one which points out the flaws in the current paradigm and solves them..." (p. 214). How can a reasonable man or woman be expected to move forward and accept a new paradigm unless and until the current one is perceived to be lacking?

2. Introduction of Data

There are those among us who refuse to accept valid scientific data and observations from many notable scientists that our paradigm is no longer sufficient. In light of this refusal to acknowledge valid scientific data and observations by prominent scientists, two research questions are proposed. How is it that so many people persistently cling to the notion that A) nothing should be done about global warming evidence or fears, and B) global warming is a hoax? To find the answer to these questions the discourse or perceptions of three key political and spiritual figures within the United States of America are critically analyzed. The first figure is the current governor of the state of Texas. He has been governor since the year 2000, making him the longest governor to hold office in the history of Texas. He has consistently and adamantly opposed any need for concern in the ongoing debate on global warming.

Our next political figure is Senator Inhofe of Oklahoma. "Jim" Inhofe, born November 17, 1934, is the senior United States senator from Oklahoma and a member of the Republican Party. First elected to the Senate in 1994, he is the ranking member of the United States Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and was its chairperson from 2003 to 2007. Inhofe served eight years as the United States representative for Oklahoma's 1st congressional district before his election to the Senate in 1994 and also previously served as both an Oklahoma state representative and senator (Source, Wikipedia).

The last figure is a spiritual figure: Dr. E. Calvin Beisner. Dr. E. Calvin Beisner is associate professor of social ethics at Knox Theological Seminary and a member of the Cornwall Alliance's advisory board. This Alliance consistently repudiates any cause for alarm over global warming issues as presented by the majority of the world's environmental scientists. This individual speaks for a wide assortment of people varying from scientists, pastors, and college professors to a strong following within the Evangelical community.

3. Overview of Analysis

A combination of fantasy theme theory, cultural criticism, and empirical analysis is used to arrive at an understanding of the deep rooted origins, beliefs, and values which fuel the current debate on global warming.

In culture, myth holds a significant place. Myths are passed down from generation to generation. Some are passed down orally while others are transmitted by print. Either way, they explain our place in the world. Myths are divided into four distinct categories: cosmological, societal, identity and eschatological (Hart & Daughton, 2005, p. 243) An *eschatological* myth helps a people know where they are going, what lies in store for them in the short run (full employment, an end to nuclear war) as well as in the long run (heavenly reward, the transmigration of souls). An *identity* myth explains what makes one cultural grouping different from another. For example, the notion that the United States of America is a freedom-loving nation or that it leads the world in innovation and discovery are identity myths. A *societal myth* teaches us the proper way to live (Hart & Daughton, 2005, p. 242). For example, there is the mythic legend of the Alamo. The Alamo is a fort in Texas that held out to the last man during the fight for independence from Mexico in the 17th century. This narrative teaches us to fight against all odds for what is right. Finally, *cosmological* myths reach deep into origins. These myths offer explanations of our roots, both in origin and ancestry. There are American Indian myths that explain where we come from and how we got here, just as there are in the European and Asian civilizations. As Hart and Daughton point out, "We hear myths like these at an early age from our parents…textbooks (how the Declaration of Independence came to be), churches (what Moses heard in the burning bush)" (p. 242). In examining the rhetorical articulations of three leaders in the political and spiritual realms, we seek to identify myths and metaphors that aid in the process of denial. We turn now to our first unit of analysis.

A primary metaphor used consistently in the discourse of global warming is the trope of "earth as God's creation" metaphor. Nature is ultimately God's creation and is here for our use and dominion. This notion is explored further by Mills (1982). The view that this earth belongs to God denies the agency of human beings in being the cause of environmental collapse. Only God can destroy and make whole. Genesis is the story of the beginning and the book of Revelation is the story of the end. We argue that this understanding is deceptive in nature. It creates the illusion that the battle is over. All is moving along as it should. This attitude lulls

many human beings in to a state of complacency or inaction. It is far better to question the notion of apocalypse by seeking the best way to live our lives during this time of waiting and survival.

A final form of rhetorical criticism that we employ is fantasy theme theory. This theoretical approach, made popular by Bormann (1985), is not about something made up, nor is it grounded in reality. Rather, it is "the creative and imaginative interpretation of events, and a *fantasy theme* is the means through which the interpretation is accomplished in communication (Foss, p. 110). These could be words, statements, and positions held on issues such as global warming. Global warming is currently out of the actual space or time occupied by most individuals or groups. What we mean is that the effects are not readily felt by a large majority of the population. However, the nature of global warming is constructed in a certain way. These themes tell a narrative. As Foss observes, "Fantasy themes tell a story about a group's experience that constitutes a constructed reality for the participants" (p. 111). This theme must be dramatic in the sense that it comes about through an experience all have shared before, or one that is anticipated in the future (such as global warming). If enough people believe in a rhetorical vision, their actions are affected, and they work to make this fantasy come true. Bormann (1985) notes,

> "They will cheer references to the heroic personae in their rhetorical vision. They will respond with antipathy to allusions to the villains. They will have agreed upon procedures for problem solving communication. They will share the same vision of what counts as evidence, how to build a case, and how to refute an argument." (p. 115)

We argue that global warming deniers occupy such a world. Their vision is a shared one that responds in the same ways to challenges issued by the public, science, or government panels. In this essay we seek to occupy the reality that the denier of global warming inhabits. Their world is, in many ways, chilling but revealing. What is it that their story tells us about our world? How shall those of us not in denial respond? What is the best way to respond critically in the face of denial?

3.1. Governor Rick Perry

Governor Rick Perry is currently the governor of Texas. During his bid for the Presidential office in the election of 2012, Governor Perry made many striking claims. In his book "Fed Up" he calls global warming, "a contrived phony mess that is falling apart under its own weight" (Reston, 2011, p. 1). Goodall, writing for *Rolling Stone* magazine, noted that Rick Perry bashed the Environmental Protection Agency as "killing jobs all across America" (p. 1). Institutions then, that have a job of protecting the environment are characterized as monsters that prey on the economic health of this country. The implication is that we have no further need of government supervision even in areas as vital as water, air, and earth. Human conceptual inventions and technological interventions will do the job. The myth perpetuated here is the superiority of humankind over nature. There is a dialectical struggle here that depicts choices. The inference is that if you make the choice that creates more jobs, thus more money, more goods, and more to consume, then the citizen can never go wrong.

When the Governor of Texas witnessed extreme drought conditions in his state, he prayed to Almighty God. Of course, this alone is neither bad nor good. It is consistent with the metaphor of a God who will intervene when things get bad. The myth inferred is that we are all in God's hands. It is a reliance on fate that nobody can avoid—the fate that is given to all at birth. The Cornwall Alliance for the Stewardship of Creation consists of a vast array of politicians, religious figures, college professors, and scientists who have declared the irrelevance of global warming concerns. On its website this principle is declared:

> We believe Earth and its ecosystems—created by God's intelligent design and infinite power and sustained by His faithful providence—are robust, resilient, self-regulating, and self-correcting, admirably suited for human flourishing, and displayed His glory. Earth's climate system is no exception. Recent global warming is one of many natural cycles of warming and cooling in geologic history. (Stenger, 2011, p. 2)

In one sense this statement becomes a historical truth. The state may now appeal to a higher authority to justify its actions and decisions. This declaration is highly political because "no government can succeed unless it can link its preferred policies to historical truth" (Hart & Daughton, 2005, p. 243). So, when Governor Perry prays directly to God, he is

invoking an authority that is beyond dispute. The dominant cosmological myth is perpetuated. The dialectical struggle between good and evil is implicitly enforced.

Former Vice-President of the USA Al Gore is a proponent of the view that something drastic is happening to our environment and adamantly declares that we need to do something about it. He lays his views and findings out in a documentary video entitled, "An Inconvenient Truth." Governor Rick Perry has this to say concerning Al Gore's views and findings: "I certainly got Religion, Perry said in 2007…I think he's gone to hell." (Goodell, p. 2). What Perry means by "religion" can only be guessed at. Either way, through the act of global warming denial the metaphor is further strengthened that the earth is a book written by God. As such, we cannot tamper with it.

To figure out how the earth may end or even that we can alter the course of the planet earth is arrogant. Peter Manly Scott in his essay, "Are we there yet? Coming to the end of the Line-A Post natural Enquiry," claims that, "…the apocalyptic discourse is fundamentally and primarily a discourse on *judging*. It is an effort to judge what the true basis of action is" (p. 268). We agree with this view. Human beings involved in a call for action concerning global warming are subjected to a murky logic of judgment based on various myths. The argument is foremost one of justice. When what one nation does may affect the welfare of another nation there are issues of responsibility to answer. Not only is this of concern for surrounding neighbor nations, but the fourth and fifth generations of humankind as well.

A powerful image may be found in the Biblical text of the book of Revelation chapter 8. In this chapter the seas of the world turn into blood and the earth as we know it burns up. The end of times is revealed for those who have eyes to see. This way of envisioning a beginning and an end strengthens the fantasy theme of the linear progression towards the end or telos. As children of God we are inevitably marching towards our own end. There is nothing we can do to stop it. The appropriate response towards global warming is laid out for many in the United States of America by powerful people. We turn now to another such politician of considerable influence.

3.2 James Inhofe

On October 26, 2006 James Inhofe, a senator from Oklahoma, released a speech given by him entitled, "Hot and Cold Media Spin Cycle: A Challenge to Journalists who Cover Global Warming." This report is from his website: Press Room. In this speech he appeals to journalists to practice good judgment in determining what may be presented to the public. He uses the term "American People" quite often and implies that they will not be fooled. This appeal coincides with the 'identity myth" described earlier: We are one nation under God. Of course, this God is defined by those in power as well as multiple exhortations of just what it is that God wants us to do.

Intelligence is a virtue that is much sought after. Nobody wants to appear dumb or ignorant. This myth of an intelligent America is used extensively to support all manner of arguments. It is powerful and appealing. James Inhofe has given multiple speeches on the environment and global warming concerns. Much of the nature of his rhetoric may be seen in the previously mentioned speech. In this speech he claims that, "…many major organs of the media dismiss any pretense of balance and objectivity on climate change coverage"…and that, "The American people know when their intelligence is being insulted. They know when they are being used and when they are being duped by the hysterical left" (2006, p. 8). The implicit argument is to insist that the rejection of global warming science and hypothesis is a sign of intelligence. The heroic persona here is characterized as the American people. As Foss states concerning fantasy theme theory, "They will cheer references to the heroic persona in their rhetorical vision. They will respond with antipathy to the villains" (p. 113). The villains here are all those misled scientists, politicians, and laywomen and men who propose that global warming presents a threat to the American People. However, the real fiber of the American People will be shown as they become the true heroes in this game of deception and illusion.

This stance also reinforces the identity myth that the American people possess the truth. It is, after all, the destiny of the American people to spread their form of democracy to all ends of the earth. The dialectical base of the rhetoric over global warming is thus framed and reproduced. It is immersed in the vision of the Apocalypse as the end of the end. As Stefan Skrimshire noted in his article "Eternal Return of Apocalypse," "For a language of climate crisis that looks only to the definitive 'event' in the future, that seals either salvation or damnation for the humanity or

the earth, would seem to borrow more from Christian eschatology" (p. 229). This is the main finding of our analysis. All three global warming deniers appealed to Christian dogma or doctrine to justify their denial. A perspective is anticipated by global warming deniers which says that there is nothing to expect. All is moving as it should according to God's plan. This is not a message of fear but rather one of resignation. Skrmishire goes on to argue that environmentalists would do better if they blended their message of impending doom with one that sees this crisis as revealing "…the current ecological crisis as a necessary part in some higher destiny or culmination of world history" (p. 229). In other words, a new paradigm or fantasy that all may join in could be created. The possibility of ecological ruin and disaster may be seen as a calling that will result in an appropriate response by and for the human race. In this way our potential to be in the world and of the world will be realized.

Senator James Inhofe pushes further. He makes an appeal to the straight forward path of progress and indicates that global warming issues act as an impediment for this great nation. The refusal of Senator James Inhofe, and whoever else he can convince to believe with him, is elevated to noble denial. Skepticism is good, claims Inhofe, because many scientists can be wrong. He makes a vague claim about astronomical calculations. He notes that there are no longer nine planets in our solar system because Pluto has been demoted.

> Above all, the media must roll back this mantra that there is scientific "consensus" of impending climatic doom as an excuse to ignore recent science. After all, there was a so-called scientific 'consensus" that there were nine planets in our solar system until Pluto was recently demoted. (p. 8)

This is a false analogy. The means by which planets are discovered and defined is rather different from how conclusions are reached concerning the earth's atmosphere. Furthermore, this statement is a red herring fallacy in the sense that the findings of most scientists are ignored for a lesser, more trivial reason. Some findings of scientists have been wrong in the past, therefore, this one is as well. Of course, that scientists were correct more often than not is not of major concern. That the scientific findings on global warming are a falsehood is accepted as an irrevocable doctrine by James Inhofe. The result is that American society will be rewarded for acting and believing as they should. For, writes James Inhofe, "I firmly believe that when the history of our era is written, future generations will look back with puzzlement and wonder why we spent so

much time and effort on global warming fears and pointless solutions like the Kyoto Protocol" (p. 8).

To further seal the argument, James Inhofe opens the pages of the Bible and states, "Well, actually the Genesis 8:22 that I use in there is that, "as long as the earth remains there will be springtime and harvest, cold and heat, winter and summer, day and night…my point is, God's still up there. The arrogance of people to think that we, human beings, could be able to change what He is doing in the climate is to me outrageous" (Johnson, 2012). Whatever is happening to our world in terms of climate change is beyond our control. To intervene becomes a mark of pride and stupidity. In this way our sense of continuity is heightened. There is no break with the future or the past. Furthermore, who can argue with the authority of God's word? This is apocalyptic discourse in its traditional form. The cosmological myth of the battle between the forces of light and darkness blend in with the eschatological myth of knowing our place in the world. The tenor of global warming is here seen through the vehicle of Divine Revelation. The environmentalists are creating a new religion that is contrary to what we know to be true. They do not share the same fantasy as the rest of us. This is the dramatizing message delivered by global warming deniers. We (the few stalwart global warming deniers) must all agree on a united front to present when engaging with those scientists who warn us of dire consequences.

The next controversial figure is the high prophet of global warming denial: Dr. E. Calvin Beisner.

3.3. Dr. E. Calvin Beisner.

This struggle between those who accept scientific data to indicate a crisis is occurring vs. those who do not believe that scientific data supports any kind of immediate action is being played out in a dialectical struggle between good and evil. A decision of this kind heightens the sense of urgency and clarifies the alternatives (Hart & Daughton, 2005, p. 244). It may be seen as a struggle of truth versus falsehood. A cosmological myth is being played out that demonstrates who we are and where we came from; even where we are going. For many, the ultimate source of truth is the Bible. It is the source of all of our logic and ultimately decides the truth or fallacy of all things, ideas, and events.

Dr. E. Calvin Beisner is a major proponent of the view that environmental concerns over global warming and man-made fossil fuel emissions are

having a harmful effect on the rest of us. He is one of the founders of the Cornwall Alliance for the Stewardship of Creation, a Christian-based interpretation of global warming (http://www.cornwallalliance.org/). He has a PhD in Scottish History and is author and lecturer on the application of Christian world view, theology, and ethics on the environment. He was interviewed in May of 2011 by Lee Duigon. This interview is rather revealing in that it sums up the core values and reasoning of the rhetoric which stands up to "environmentalism." In the shared fantasy where environmentalism is perceived as a threat, fear is cultivated. A common method of resolving this controversy must be adopted by all of those people who share the effort to combat the threat that environmentalism poses. Foss points out concerning fantasy theme theory, "They share common symbolic ground and respond to messages in ways that are in tune with the rhetorical vision" (p. 113). To do this, terms must be defined and interpreted in the same way by everyone ascribing to their beliefs.

"Environmentalism has a history, begins Dr. Beisner, "that shows it's a world view and religion, complete with substitutes for God, creation, the universe, humanity, sin, and salvation" (p. 2). Just what he means by the word "substitutes" he never makes clear. The implication is that global warming science itself may be seen as a form of idol worship. It does indicate though, that Dr. Beisner has the real thing, while many of us may not. The debate or dialogue on global warming then takes an oppositional turn. Environmentalism as religion competes with the genuine religion: Christianity.

A stance of this sort makes a claim to authority. Hart and Daughton (2005) point out, "Such stories are not presented for the sake of mere diversion but to justify data-claim movement" (p. 243). Environmentalism is fraught with danger, and therefore, we must be sensitive to a whole slew of false gods and/or universes. To further this notion of an apocalyptic monster waiting to devour the faithful, Dr. Beisner refers to environmentalism as the Green Dragon. "It's bad enough that science has been corrupted by a love of money and political power. The Cornwall Alliance is also concerned about the Green Dragon's seduction of the church" (p. 3). A statement of this kind further supports the aforementioned identity myth that the American People possess the truth. Stories of the "real" American who refuses to be seduced by a Green Dragon gives a noble identity of sorts to all those willing to join in.

Dr. Beisner further points out the advance of environmental concerns as being antithetical to all that a Christian holds sacred. He writes

> Religion is the root of any culture, and environmentalism has become a full-fledged religion in its own right. It is the most comprehensive substitute in the world today for Christianity so far as world view, theology, ethics, politics, economics, and science are concerned, and you need to understand it in order to counter it effectively, from presuppositions to policies, from classroom to Movie Theater, from evening network news to Internet and local newspaper. (in The Cornwall Alliance)

Another reason that the myth of the Green Dragon may pose a real threat is the notion that there *should* be no limits to human growth when it is about harvesting the natural resources that this earth has to offer. Douglass (2010) states that there exist two core values of the environmental movement: naturally imposed limits on human consumption and our ethical obligation to the non-human world (p. 200). The former value clashes implicitly with the Christian notion that the earth was put here for our use. Are human beings an intrinsic part of this planet and all its ecosystems? The answer is: not really. There does not appear to be many limits placed on humans when it comes to an earth that is given to us, for our benefit, by a Supreme Being. In other words, there is no limit to the growth of human endeavor. Are there any limits then to human ingenuity and exploration? For example, torturing animals in laboratories or polluting the planet for the sake of more energy sources is perceived by many as unacceptable methods of using earthly resources. The fantasy of human supremacy and dominance reigns supreme. The myth of environmentalism as false religion seeks to thwart a shift towards a greater global awareness and consciousness—that could result in constructive action finally being taken.

4. Pragmatic Observations

A core principle of economic theory states that there is no such thing as a free lunch. For instance, some corporations or individuals are taking advantage of the fact that there are no strict regulations in place to limit carbon dioxide emissions. Oil and gasoline products are still being made and distributed at breakneck speed. Eventually, future generations will have to pay for the climate change effects of more greenhouse gases and extreme weather conditions.

These warnings and findings have little meaning when large amounts of money are used to sell your product. As we demonstrate, often politicians receive large contributions from oil and energy corporations. This infusion of money acts as an incentive to distort and manipulate key facts and figures.

In the previous analysis of the rhetoric emanating from James Inhofe, Calvin Beisner, and Rick Perry, we noted the distortion of key components to the ongoing discourse on global warming. The urgency of this situation, however, calls for immediate action of some sort. How the realities of scientific findings are used versus the misinterpretations of some national leaders does not change the real facts, and sooner or later, humanity will have to face serious environmental problems.

Since there are many tradeoffs, it is important to find the balance between the benefit of having a clean environment and the cost of maintaining pollution free environments. Many people have argued that the price of fuel will increase when more regulations are put in place regarding the production, manufacture, and sale of oil and gas. However, if there are no regulations, and companies are lowering their total cost by not being responsible in shouldering some of the burden of the cost of cleanup, future generations suffer dramatically from the irresponsible actions of some nations. President Obama has recently commented on a possible approach for being more responsible: "The only way to really break this cycle of spiking gas prices, the only way to break that cycle for good, is to shift our cars entirely—our and trucks—off oil. It's not just about saving money. It's also about saving the environment. But it's also about our national security" (Broder, 2013, p. A12).

Dr. Wilcoxen, a well-known environmental economist, demonstrated in his research that the Kyoto Protocol has resulted in little or no effect on the global warming trend (p. 1). Still, governments have not taken full responsibility for these results. Many oil corporations still enjoy liberty to manufacture as they please.

This is the classical dilemma. What is the role of government in regulating the oil industry? To what extent should government become involved in the manufacture and use of oil, coal, and gas deposits? The consequences of delay, inaction, and years of debate have serious consequences. Politicians and leaders like Inhofe, Perry, and Beisner should be made to assume some of the responsibility for their messages of denial. The chief function or aim of political and religious leaders ought

to be the long-term health and welfare of societies. Countless hours, months, and years spent in interminable rhetorical duels serve no purpose.

This does not mean that we adhere to the notion that governments should have full control of the manufacture or use of oil, gas, and coal. Rather, we are arguing for a balanced approach that benefits corporations and the public. The optimal choice is one which does the most while harming the least (in terms of jobs and quality of life). This is called in economics the Pareto efficiency.

Unfortunately, many nations are ignoring global warming signs. The result is that, for the short term, behemoth energy companies make significant profits where most is distributed into the pockets of wealthy top management personnel. It may be that the current generation will escape relatively unscathed. However, the consequences for future generations are enormous. Droughts, accessibility to clean water, and drastic weather patterns will result in misery and suffering. That this is unethical behavior is undeniable. That the inaction of this generation is a crime against humanity might very well be the judgment of future generations.

The politicians mentioned earlier received thousands of dollars in contributions from oil and energy companies. In return, they voted against any sort of bill that might tighten the regulations on toxic emissions. For example, according to the analysis that was conducted by the Center for Responsive Politics, entitled "Oil Change International and Public Campaign Action Fund," the senators that voted against the Close Big Oil Tax Loopholes Act received $297,519 each, on average.

Unfortunately, these statistics are not reported often by the mass media. It may even be that many in the political world are aware of the accuracy of environmental studies. However, they choose to ignore these signs in order to maintain the status quo. Environmental concerns are sacrificed on the altar of consumerism and profit. It is unethical and inappropriate to receive monetary donations for being in favor of oil and energy companies.

As the national campaigns director for the Public Campaign Action Fund, David Donnelly, commented, "Giving profitable, price-hiking Big Oil companies billions in taxpayer subsidies is plain wrong, … the Senators who voted to prevent consideration of this bill today have made it clear— they stand with their big oil donors over their constituents struggling to fill their tank" (Kretzmann, 2011, p. 1). Six hundred and thirty-three

lobbyists received over $39 million during the first quarter of 2011 from oil and gasoline companies. In addition, senators that opposed legislations for more regulations on oil and gasoline companies received a total of $17,791,875 in campaign contributions from oil and gasoline companies (Kretzmann, 2011, p. 1).

James Inhofe was rated five percent by the League of Conservation Voters, which indicates the anti-environmental stance of James Inhofe. Inhofe is anti-environment. Our analysis of the voting on environmental-related bills and an analysis that was conducted by www.ontheissues.org show that Inhofe is consistently opposed to any measure that may replace coal and oil with alternatives. As may be expected, Senator Inhofe raised $6,858,383 from his campaigns between 2007 and 2012 to further the cause of denial. Other top four contributors were Koch Industries (multinational group of energy and petroleum companies), Murray Energy Corporation (producing over 30 million annual tons of bituminous coals), Devon Energy, and OGE Energy.

Rick Perry is quick to emulate James Inhofe and other conservative groups. He voted on the bills 66% (i.e., six out of nine times) "strongly opposed" and three times voted "neutral." According to data collected by senior researcher, Douglas Weber, at the Center of Responsive Politics, Perry raised $1.2 million from the energy sector, while Romney and Obama raised $532,000 and $395,300, respectively. He also raised $648,400 from the oil and gasoline industry, whereas Romney and Obama raised $274,70 and $84,000, respectively.

Empirical facts speak for themselves. The motivations of big oil and energy companies remain clear. Money does not appear to be a factor when it comes to halting any motion forward to regulate emissions. The aim is to halt or weaken any proposed regulation that will result in substantially lowering carbon emissions. It is important to remember that there is never such a thing as a free lunch.

Many economists, such as Dr. Jorgenson from Harvard University, submitted testimonials to the "SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS" to show that global change does indeed present a significant environmental risk. He suggested methods to reduce greenhouse emissions to no avail. Over 2,500 economists, including eight Nobel Prize winners, endorsed this testimonial that was presented on July 10, 1997 to the members of the Committee on Environment and Public Works. However, from 1997 to

the present moment, no significant improvement in the way that energy and oil companies produce their product is noted. The findings, suggestions, and proposed regulations to counter the effect of global warming have fallen largely on deaf ears. A rising awareness among the people who occupy this planet will result in a growing awareness of the corruption inherent within the so-called debate on global warming.

5. Conclusion

Environmental concerns appear to rip away the illusion that we are progressing ever forward towards some vast, gallant, infinite future. This contradiction between reality and progress calls for a new paradigm shift. Paradigm shifts can be fraught with anxiety. Perhaps this is what the deniers of global warming sense, but cannot articulate well—namely the notion that the roots of our world would be torn apart if we begin to take the warnings and predictions of the environmentalists to heart. A real attempt at constructing a global village would be required. Everything is sacrificed on the altar of progress. The current vision of a linear advance through the ages is shattered. It is possible to repeat mistakes that have occurred many ages ago. It could be that steps are taken backward as easily as we can move forward.

We have attempted to show in this paper the influence of myths upon human action. Not much has been written about the belief systems that produce global warming denial. Rather, the emphasis appears to be a political and economic one. Balance of power, responsibility, effect on jobs, and cost of doing something, all are highlighted. We wanted to enter this discourse by taking a harder look at some prominent people who deny that this dialogue should even be taking place. Myths, whether we are aware of them or not, play a huge role in shaping our response to this crucial issue. We have touched on a few.

A positive response could indeed be more apocalyptic discourse, not less. This perspective leads to an imaginative response that may well be beyond current political discourse or economic concerns. It hints at a new paradigm of meaning that involves eternal cycles of transformation, chaos, and resurrection. What is needed within the current discourse on global warming is recognition of the myths which influence us. An apocalyptic vision, states Skrimshire (2008), is inherent in the interpretation of the word apocalypse where: "apocalypse' is derived from the Greek word for revelation, or the unveiling of divine truth to mortal

man. To many people apocalyptic literature […] represented the imaginative attempt to portray the corruption of the present in order to inspire radical social transformation.[…] Perhaps what is needed, therefore, is more, not less, of the imaginative apocalyptic. This may be achieved by taking a closer look at the "corruption" that this debate is steeped in. This imaginative vision then will result in a new shared myth (or fantasy) where we may grapple with the challenge of global warming in a meaningful and constructive way. Myths may be re-interpreted in a new light that illuminates the real pros and cons of responsibility concerning environmental degradation. It could be the one event that heralds the dawn of a New Age.

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THE RHETORIC OF GUN VIOLENCE: BLURRING THE FOCUS, BLAMING THE LENS

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"So why is the idea of a gun good when it's used to protect our President or our country or our police, but bad when it's used to protect our children in their schools?"

"When you let bad people go home they do bad things"

-NRA Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre

In 1999 two male students of Columbine High School, 17 and 18 years old, went on a rampage killing 13, wounding 28, and, in their final act, taking their own lives. The citizenry of the United States mourned and debated the issue of gun control. Should we seek to place constraints on access to, and ownership of, guns? Or is the problem, as the National Rifle Association (NRA) contends, the people who use guns inappropriately, rather than access to guns? Eventually, the debate lost its urgency. In 2007, a 23 year-old male student at Virginia Tech University killed 32 and wounded 17 before killing himself. Again the nation mourned and public dialogue about gun control reignited again, but as time passed, the gun control debate faded away. In December 2012, a 20 year-old male, after having killed his mother at home, walked into Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut, killing 20 children, 6 teachers, and then taking his own life. This latest tragedy reinvigorated the gun control debate.

According to William Brown's Rhetoric of Social Intervention (RSI) model, each senseless act of violence was a catalyst that created social disorder, thus propelling the State to assert its "monopoly on violence;" in this case, by promoting further restrictions on access to and ownership of guns. As a result, increased awareness of the incompleteness of this solution among "social arbiters" should prompt social interventions to revise the ideological system by providing other interpretations for our experiences. In particular, the NRA has proposed the new naming pattern of *people-kill-people* (under which, consequently, restricting gun ownership is seen as an unnecessary violation of Second Amendment rights) as an alternative to *guns-kill-people* (so we must have more laws to keep guns away from people). In Brown's model, either the revision of the ideological system, or its reification, avoids a vicious cycle and restores social order.

However, as a result of the above incidents of violence, the ideological system has not changed; neither has there been greater gun regulation. The authors posit two potential reasons: 1) the social disorder created by these acts of violence was insufficient in both duration and magnitude for the ideological system to become truly deviance amplifying; therefore, 2) the anomaly-featuring and anomaly-masking communication of the NRA (social intervener) was ineffective to enact its intended attention shift. In this paper, we examine the rhetoric of Wayne LaPierre (Executive Vice President and CEO of the NRA since 1991), public opinion polls regarding gun control, and federal gun legislation passed between 1999 and the present. We provide an analysis of the attempted attention intervention of the NRA, as they encourage the adaptation of a *people-kill-people ideology,* which would, perhaps, shift the public debate on violence away from guns and toward culture, specifically, the treatment of mental health.

Background of NRA Intervention

Violence and public opinion pre-intervention. In 1992, Dr. Antonia Novello, the U.S. Surgeon General, reported that homicide had become the 10th leading cause of death in the United States, with suicide the eighth, thus prompting her to declare violence a "public health emergency" (p. 3007). According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or FBI (1998), the reported number of murders and non-negligent manslaughters in the U.S., per 100,000 inhabitants, declined by 21.3% between 1989 and 1998. In 1991 (a peak year), 24,700 offenses were

reported, whereas in 1998, 16,910 offenses were reported. The rate per 100,000 inhabitants went from 9.8 in 1991 to 6.3 in 1998. For offenses in which the circumstances of the offense were known, between 1993 and 1997, a firearm was used in 67-70% of the offenses. In 1998, the use of a firearm in murder and non-negligent manslaughters offenses declined to 64.9%.

The use of firearms to commit violence has generated public discussion regarding the regulation, ownership, sale, and use of guns. Since 1960, the Gallup organization has conducted public opinion polls measuring attitudes towards gun legislation and gun ownership. According to poll results, gun ownership reached a peak in 1993, with 51% of respondents reporting they had a gun in their home, but declined in 1999 (34%). Additionally, in a poll conducted in February 1999, 60% of respondents reported that "laws covering the sale of firearms should be made more strict" and only 9% of respondents felt the laws should be "less strict." Yet, the majority (64%) did not feel that the possession of a handgun, except by police or other authorized persons, should be banned, although 83% felt background checks should be required at gun shows. Overall, attitudes towards the NRA were mixed, with 25% of respondents reporting that the NRA *always* or *most of the time* reflected their views about guns, 36% said *some of the time* and 31% reporting *never*. The remainder of respondents, 8%, had *no opinion* about the NRA.

National Rifle Association. The NRA was formed in 1871 to "promote and encourage rifle shooting on a scientific basis" (National Rifle Association, 2013, ¶ 1). In 1903, the NRA began to promote "shooting sports among America's youth" and today "more than one million youth" participate in "NRA shooting sports events and affiliated programs" (¶ 5). The "Legislative Affairs Division" was formed in 1934, as a "response to repeated attacks on Second Amendment rights," (¶ 7) but did not officially register as a political lobby until 1975. In 1960, they introduced the NRA Police Firearms Instructor Certification Program and, as a result, today there are "more than 10,000 NRA-certified police and security firearms instructors" (¶ 11). Additionally, certified instructors provide firearms education to "over 750,000 gun owners a year" (¶ 12). According to their website, the NRA is "widely recognized…as a major political force and as America's foremost defender of Second Amendment rights" (¶ 14). *A Brief History of the NRA* ends with a quote from George Stephanopoulos, President Clinton's White House Communication Director, "Let me make one small vote for the NRA.

They're good citizens. They call their congressman. They write. They vote. They contribute. And they get what they want over time" (¶ 14). In 1998, the NRA had 2.8 million members and a negative net worth of $46.5 million (Nuckols, 1999).

Wayne LaPierre joined the NRA in 1978 as the "lobbyist responsible for 10 Northeastern states" (Nuckols, 1999, A1). He became executive director of "all NRA lobbying activities" in 1986 (A1). In 1991, LaPierre was appointed to be the association's executive director, a job that paid $190,000 in 1997 (Nuckols). In a 1995 fundraising letter[1], LaPierre called federal law enforcement agents "jack-booted thugs" and further suggested, "in Clinton's administration, if you have a badge, you have the government's go-ahead to harass, intimidate, even murder law-abiding citizens" (Keil, 1995). As an act of protest, former President George H.W. Bush cancelled his membership in the NRA, and LaPierre was forced to apologize for his words (Nuckols, Keil). Attorney General Janet Reno said of the NRA, "they like to call names rather than to pursue matters in a thoughtful constructive way" (Keil).

Gun Control Legislation. The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution, frequently invoked in gun control discourse, states, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed." According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) issue brief (1999), proponents of gun control legislation argue, (1) the amendment is obsolete in the context of modern circumstances (2) was intended to guard against any attempts by the central government to suppress state militias and (3) does not guarantee an absolute right free from reasonable regulation. Opponents argue that the intent of the Second Amendment is to guarantee the right of citizens to "keep arms as a defense against potential government tyranny" and point to examples of governments that used "firearm restrictions to curb dissent and secure government power" (p. CRS-2).

Federal regulation has been considered the only effective means of controlling access to and ownership of firearms because state regulation would allow guns to travel illegally from states with few restrictions to restrictive states. Two federal statutes "regulate the commerce in firearms, or their ownership: the National Firearms Act [NFA] of 1934…and the

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[1] The letter became public after Timothy McVeigh, a NRA member, bombed a federal building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people.

Gun Control Act [GCA] of 1968" (CRS, 1999, p. CRS-5). The NFA was intended to "make it difficult to obtain types of firearms perceived to be especially lethal…most notably machine guns and short-barreled long guns" (p. CRS-5), and taxes the manufacture and distribution of such firearms. The GCA required all persons in the business of manufacturing, importing or selling firearms to be federally licensed; however, this excluded private transactions among individuals and collectors. Additionally, licensed sellers were required to maintain records of all commercial gun sales.

According to the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence (BCPGV), the exemption of private transactions enabled the buying and selling of guns at gun shows to be exempt from licensing and record keeping requirements as *collectors* were not limited by the quantity of guns sold if they were not selling guns for the "principle objective of livelihood and profit" (2006, p. 8). A gun show is a temporary (one to two days) exhibition of materials related to firearms, including guns. More than 4,000 gun shows are held annually and are "largely unregulated arms bazaars…where the public is able to purchase firearms from both licensed and unlicensed sellers" (BCPGV, 2006, p. 8).

As of 1999, the GCA had been amended seven times: (1) to further define "engaged in the business," (2) prohibit the manufacture and importation of certain types of ammunition, (3) prohibiting plastic firearms (those that cannot be detected by security devices), (4) prohibiting the possession of a firearm on school grounds, (5) prohibiting the sale of handguns to minors (under 18 years of age) and "persons under court orders related to domestic abuse," and the manufacture and importation of semiautomatic assault weapons, (6) requiring background checks for prospective purchasers of firearms (The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act) , and (7) prohibiting persons convicted of "a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing guns and ammunition" (CRS, 1999, p. CRS-6).

The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act was meant to close a void in the GCA. "Although the Gun Control Act prohibited gun sales to felons, the mentally ill and children, it had no mechanism for a background check to determine if a buyer was prohibited under the law from buying firearms" (BCPGV, 2006, p. 12). Initially, the Brady Act gave law enforcement up to five days to conduct a background check with the proviso that the federal government would work to create a national database to permit "instant" background checks. The FBI's National

Instant Criminal Background Check (NICS) was implemented in 1998. The instant check system reduced the waiting period from five days to three days.

Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the Columbine High School shooters, were under the age of 18 when the guns they used were obtained. They recruited an 18 year-old friend to purchase guns at a gun show on their behalf. No background check was conducted; further, the buyer had no prior history that would have prevented the purchase. However, according to the BCPGV (2006), she said "I would not have bought a gun for Eric or Dylan if I had had to give any personal information or submit to any kind of check at all" (p. 11). Cho Seung-Hui, the Virginia Tech shooter, purchased his weapons legally from a licensed gun dealer, despite the fact that in 2005, a court had "ordered Seung-Hui to undergo psychiatric counseling because it was believed he was a danger to himself" (Brubaker, 2007). As Seung-Hui was not committed to a mental hospital, the court order was not entered into the federal database (NICS). Adam Lanza, the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooter, and also reportedly suffering from mental illness, used his mother's guns. She had taught him to shoot at the firing range. All four shooters committed suicide at the scene.

The Rhetoric of Social Intervention (RSI) Model

All communication involves potential for intervention. An intervention can be seen as any "act to promote or prevent change" (Opt & Gring, 2009, p. 5). Importantly, this act is a singular (though often multifaceted) attempt located within a complex system of potential change endeavors. Social systems imply that there will be multiple interveners, or change agents, as "the creation and communication of ideology proceed together" (Brown, 1978, p. 123). Brown defines ideology as "any symbolic construction of the world in whose superordinate 'name' human beings can comprehensively order their experience and subsume their specific activities" (p. 124). Since human beings have an innate need to organize, categorize, and name experience, "ideology-as-process will endure as long as interacting beings are human," (p. 123) in order for humans to make sense of their lives. William R. Brown (1978, 1982, 1986, 1987) created the Rhetoric of Social Intervention, or RSI, model from this basic assumption. According to Brown (1978), "through the recursiveness of relational categorizing, the result can be a superordinate symbolic construction of 'reality' with 'order,' coherence,' and 'system,' altogether

giving the participant in the ideology the sense of power accruing from any comprehensive explanation of experience" (p. 126). In other words, through strategic language choices, social interveners are able to rhetorically create, maintain, and change the way society thinks about specific events and experiences.

We must remember that at least in the United States, communication, above all, professional communication, is strategic. Thus, while everyone within a social system is involved in the constant "social negotiation of ideologies," (Brown, 1978, p. 128) this practice is never power-neutral. Instead, interveners choose each communicative act consciously, with a clear purpose and end in mind. "Ideologies flourish when the communication system compensates for vicious circles that otherwise exacerbate gaps in human beings' construed social words. Ideologies decline when the communication system fails so to compensate" (p. 133). Hence, interveners deliberately foreground and background particular experiences in their attempt to shape society's interpretation of reality to the one they expressly desire. This reality is socially constructed; hence, "ideological communities find ways to meet the possibility that an outgroup or an innovator will recategorize experience and call attention to a heretofore unconceived, and therefore worrisome, gap in doctrine" (p. 134). These gaps, or *anomalies*, are then key to any ideological change, particularly during times of social disorder.

> Attention to anomalies is decreased while a paradigm promises a comprehensive fit…. Or more precisely, anomalies are noted but not regarded as being crucial to continued acceptance of the dominant paradigm. Attention to anomalies increases when the promise of comprehensive fit decreases. By such a switching of attention, potentially deadly symbolic gaps …. Are accounted for, and the ideology…. Is maintained. (p. 138)

Hence, through the use of tactical anomaly-featuring and anomaly-masking communication, interveners are able to utilize these deviance-compensating and deviance-amplifying moments within the communication system to either maintain or subvert accepted ideologies.

Current Study Method

Each act of violence was covered extensively by the news media. A key word search, utilizing the NewsBank InfoWeb database, of "gun control" and "Wayne LaPierre" was conducted of news items dated April-June, 1999, April-June, 2007 and December-January, 2012-2013, in view of the fact that most coverage occurred within the first 60 days after the event. NewsBank InfoWeb "is a web-based collection of primary source information from regional, national, and international newspapers, newswires, government and international documents, regional business journals and periodicals" (Florida State University Library, 2013). Reported quotations and speech transcripts of Wayne LaPierre were extracted for the analysis, as a direct quotation is less likely to be distorted by reporter bias and interpretation. The excerpts were reviewed for emergent themes and, consequently coded for thematic categories. The background data on crime statistics, legislative action, and public opinion was gathered, as cited, to contextualize Wayne LaPierre's actions within the social system.

The Social System: Interveners and Audiences

The primary intervener for this intervention is Wayne LaPierre, NRA Executive Vice President and chief political strategist. We believe he directed his intervention attempt toward various audiences, although the American public remained the primary target audience throughout. In addition, during this intervention, the media served as both a target audience and the primary vehicle of message delivery. LaPierre attempted to gain favorable and timely coverage through the media, while simultaneously viewing most media as hostile to his position.

"Rather than face their own moral failings, the media demonize lawful gun owners, amplify their cries for more laws and fill the national debate with misinformation and dishonest thinking that only delay meaningful action and all but guarantee that the next atrocity is only a news cycle away" (LaPierre, 2012). Rounding out the pro-gun lobby is NRA President, Charlton Heston, who is also frequently quoted alongside LaPierre, and the gun industry itself, often represented in the media through groups such as the American Shooting Sports Council and the National Shooting Sports Foundation, "the trade association for the firearms industry" (National Shooting Sports Foundation, 2013). LaPierre repeatedly emphasizes these central coalitions. Persistently he is proactive

in underscoring that "the solidarity between us is stronger than ever before," even when these groups made statements that could possibly be interpreted as contradictory to LaPierre's agenda. Alternatively, anti-gun lobby groups, such as the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence and Handgun Control Inc., appeared as clear interveners to thwart LaPierre's desired name shift. In addition, many elements of the social system were poised as potential interveners for either side: Congress (with the typical Republican/Democrat divide), the Attorney General/Justice Department, the Surgeon General, the American Medical Association (AMA), the President (Clinton, Bush, and Obama respectively), as well as the entertainment industry.

Shifting the Rhetoric of Gun Violence: The Attempted Attention Intervention

According to Brown (1982), "the rhetorical attention-shift is to the social system what the dropped stone is to the surface of quiet water…. The attention-switch clearly assumes strategic importance as a difference that relates to many differences" (p. 21). As such, LaPierre's attention intervention has been an attempt to encourage the identified social system – especially the American people – to rename the epidemic of violence from *guns-kill-people* to *people-kill-people*. This effort involves shifting the public debate on violence *away from guns* and *toward* the greater *culture of violence*. In essence, LaPierre tries to foreground anomalies in the currently held ideology of *guns-kill-people* in order to highlight the incompleteness of this naming pattern, because as long as the American public could make sense of the anomalies, they would hinder ideological change. Simultaneously, LaPierre must background anomalies in the proposed *people-kill-people* template, so that it more consistently fits lived experience. In essence, all attention shifts to restructure ideology are accomplished through these anomaly-masking or anomaly-featuring maneuvers (Brown, 1982).

Introducing alternative ways of valuing, being, and knowing that will contest the completeness of the old naming pattern actualizes the attention shift. First, LaPierre attempts to promote a shift in *knowing* by providing new information about legal issues. He stresses *2nd amendment rights* and the *protection of private transactions*, chiefly the right of a private individual to sell a gun to a friend or neighbor. In addition, he provides information on cultural issues, directing attention to trends in *youth violence*, as well as supplying statistics backing the *lack of enforcement* of

current gun laws. His rhetoric expressly stresses the legitimacy of his information as stark contrast to what the public has previously been lead to believe: "Instead of doing their homework and giving the American people the real facts about guns and crime, the national media has simply repeated the lies put forth by the gun-ban lobby" (1999). Particularly, LaPierre wants the public to know that he can provide solutions: "The NRA is going to bring all of its knowledge, dedication and resources to develop a model National School Shield Emergency Response Program for every school that wants it. From armed security to building design and access control to information technology to student and teacher training, this multi-faceted program will be developed by the very best experts in their fields" (2012).

At the same time, LaPierre promotes a shift in *being* – to naming the NRA as being the *same as* the general American public. He accomplishes this by stressing that at the end of the day, they – the NRA and American public – want the same things: *greater enforcement* of laws and *protection* from violence. "The National Rifle Association has a core, fundamental interest in eliminating any violence or crime with firearms" (1999). To further demonstrate their unity with the American people, LaPierre astutely centers on the NRA's *shared sympathy for victims of violence:* "Our spirits must endure this terrible suffering together, and so must the freedoms that bring us together. We must stand in somber but unshakable unity, even in this time of anguish" (1999). Finally, LaPierre promotes a shift in valuing to allow the public to appreciate the contributions that that the NRA makes to society. LaPierre's rhetoric encourages the public to see the NRA *as problem solver*: "Our message is the one that will make people safe" (1999). Especially after Sandy Hook, this *defense against a dangerous world* rhetoric takes over. Basically, we need good guys with guns to protect citizens/family from bad guys with guns and the NRA is "ready, willing and uniquely qualified to help" (2012). LaPierre clearly embeds the NRA's call for armed officers in schools in this message (while backgrounding that Columbine had an armed officer and this was inadequate to stop the violence). Again, this is most evident in LaPierre's post-Sandy Hook press conference:

> Now, we must speak ... for the safety of our nation's children. Because for all the noise and anger directed at us over the past week, no one -- nobody -- has addressed the most important, pressing and immediate question we face: How do we protect our children right now, starting today, in a way that we know

works? The only way to answer that question is to face up to the truth. Politicians pass laws for Gun-Free School Zones. They issue press releases bragging about them. They post signs advertising them. And in so doing, they tell every insane killer in America that schools are their safest place to inflict maximum mayhem with minimum risk. How have our nation's priorities gotten so far out of order? Think about it. We care about our money, so we protect our banks with armed guards. American airports, office buildings, power plants, courthouses -- even sports stadiums -- are all protected by armed security. We care about the President, so we protect him with armed Secret Service agents. Members of Congress work in offices surrounded by armed Capitol Police officers. Yet when it comes to the most beloved, innocent and vulnerable members of the American family -- our children -- we as a society leave them utterly defenseless, and the monsters and predators of this world know it and exploit it. That must change now!

Strategies, Tactics, and Rhetorical Maneuvers: Expectancy Violations

In the attempt to shift the naming pattern from *guns-kill-people* to *people-kill-people,* LaPierre's rhetoric during this time evolved from "reduce access to violent juveniles" to "prosecute juveniles" and "better enforcement of existing laws." To amplify the "host of factors" that lead to gun violence, LaPierre's challenge involved highlighting *failed/overreaching government*, primarily focusing on *lack of prosecutions* and *lack of enforcement* of existing laws. In addition, he contests the current naming pattern by pointing out incomplete and unfulfilled expectations related to gun legislation, naming it instead *as political maneuvering*. However, we believe LaPierre missed crucial opportunities to further shift focus *away from guns* in order to *blame the perpetrator.* More strategic rhetorical highlighting of anomalies related to cultural influences, such as *declining morals, media/entertainment industry influence,* and need for *treatment for mental illness*, would have strengthened the attempted intervention, and may have succeeded in shifting ideology by now.

Awareness of deviance. Public debate appears to call for a "comprehensive approach to juvenile violence" – and this would mean a convergence of both *cultural* and *legal* issues. So why does the immediate

response to episodes of violence always key in on *gun control*? LaPierre appears to notice this anomaly and makes numerous attempts to highlight it. "Passing new gun-control laws has become a perverse form of new entertainment" (1999). LaPierre accuses Washington of politicizing each of the mass shootings. Through statements such as "some have tried to exploit tragedy for political gain," (2012) LaPierre attempts to foreground the issue as *political maneuvering*. Specifically, LaPierre attempts to showcase how national focus on gun-control laws merely serves as *distraction* from the incompleteness of the current naming pattern. "We can't lose precious time debating legislation that won't work. We mustn't allow politics or personal prejudice to divide us" (2012).

LaPierre's rhetoric also accentuates *failed/overreaching government*, pointing out anomalies in the administration's plan. He repeatedly purports the remedy for gun violence as tougher enforcement of existing laws that make it a federal crime for a felon to possess a gun. "Gun control doesn't do anything to really get the criminals off the streets of America. It's tough enforcement of the existing gun laws. Every cop on the street knows it" (1999). During his press conference after Sandy Hook, he makes a big deal about crime increasing. At the time of writing this paper, only the first six months of 2012 crime data is available, although data on weapons usage is not; the FBI notes a 1.9% increase in violent crime[2], however, the reported occurrences of murder decreased by 1.7%. LaPierre also cites NRA backed nationwide enforcement programs, like Project Exile, as working answers to the problem, while underlining current government solutions as failures: "People in the know already know that no one is going to be prosecuted. All that counts in the end is criminals all over this country with guns are walking free. In Columbine, those two murders broke 18 laws on the books. You could pass 50, but the problem is, bad people still do bad things." LaPierre incessantly brings up government negligence, for example, repeatedly stating that in 1997-1999, there were only 13 prosecutions of handgun violation laws in schools. To his clear advantage, LaPierre is simultaneously backgrounding the fact that most juvenile gun violations are prosecuted at the state and local levels, and overall gun violence has dropped nearly 30% from 1992-1998. In addition, we believe LaPierre mainly backgrounds crime statistics (except immediately following Sandy Hook)

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[2] Violent crime includes four categories of offenses: (1) murder; (2) non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault; (3) the property crimes of burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft; and (4) arson.

because firearms are consistently used in 67-68% of murders. This is of course the main argument of gun control advocates; that a gun is much more deadly than other weapons. So in a violent situation (and suicide is included in this argument), death will more likely be the result; you can kill someone with a knife, but you have to be closer to the victim and work harder at it. Furthermore, if LaPierre discusses crime going down, that puts his "dangerous world" argument in jeopardy. Who needs protection if murder is decreasing?

Finally, by emphasizing overreaching government, LaPierre is concurrently subverting the notion of *dangerous guns* through the use of *dangerous youth*: if guns are dangerous, we must control them; if instead, youth are dangerous, guns may have nothing to do with it. "In Littleton, those two horrible kids, homicidal maniacs, they broke 20 federal and state gun laws. You could have put another 50 laws on the books and they would have broken those, too. In the search about those who should be held responsible, how about blaming the people who pull the trigger, set off the bombs and do the killings" (1999)? This rhetoric deliberately foregrounds how none of the (proposed) laws would have prevented the crime at hand, and, that the focus clearly needs to move from guns to the people who use the guns. Additionally, this implies that the NRA is not against laws on some unfounded principle, but rather the NRA is against laws because they don't work. To underscore this point, he advocates, "We've always supported instant background checks" (1999). Again, this shifts the focus to identifying *dangerous people*. Overall, LaPierre attempts to demonstrate deviance within the expectations of the current naming pattern of *guns-kill-people* by bringing attention to the idea that more gun laws only hurt law abiders, and do nothing to stop people who use guns to commit crimes.

Openness to new interpretation of lived experience. In order for the American public to be open to the *people-kill-people* template as an explanation for violence, LaPierre needs to further advocate for new attributes that fit this new ideology. The intensity and repetition of this particular rhetoric in the post-Sandy Hook press conference suggests that, moving forward, the intervention will foreground the *violence of entertainment industry* as the reason for declining morals in our culture in order to shift from blaming the gun to *blame the perpetrator*. Immediately following Columbine and President Clinton's call to investigate youth violence, the AMA replied that they already had plenty of information about children and violence, and clearly identified media exposure, video

games, and need for treatment of mental illness, especially depression, as the main culprits. However, other than brief mentions of "bad people," LaPierre did not seem to fully capitalize on the implications of this until his post-Sandy Hook press conference. There, LaPierre finally unleashes his blame explicitly: "There exists in this country a callous, corrupt and corrupting shadow industry that sells, and sows, violence against its own people…. [The media] portray life as a joke and murder as a way of life. And then they have the nerve to call it 'entertainment'" (2012). This already popular debate is a valuable opportunity to take the focus off the gun and put it back on the person using the gun. "In a race to the bottom, media conglomerates compete with one another to shock, violate and offend every standard of civilized society by bringing an ever-more-toxic mix of reckless behavior and criminal cruelty into our homes" (2012). If the American people can at long last be convinced that the media/entertainment industry encourages a culture of violence for financial gain, perhaps public outcry will finally provide sufficient catalyst for the ideological system to become truly deviance amplifying, and change.

Need and Power Side Effects

The RSI model is holographic, where each subsystem – attention, power, and need – encourages shifts in the other two. According to Brown (2010, p. 3):

> Rhetorical interventions conceptualized as shifts of attention from one life-world organizing gestalt to another subsume *both* need and power (1) insofar as applying a new paradigm enables community members to attribute new needs and qualities to themselves and to be more or less active in advocating them to others, (2) insofar as such patterning entails the relative opening of closing of attention towards members of an in-group and or outgroup, and (3) to the extent that such a switched patterning of experience constitutes intergroup relationships as being either competitive or cooperative, or one *and* the other.

Luhmann (1979, p.110) views power as a "symbolically generalized communication medium. In keeping with the RSI model, power then "becomes a process not of creating but of selecting" (Brown, 1986, p.182). This became especially clear during LaPierre's attention-intervention. Specifically, we have been reminded that the American

public gains power through selected government officials. However, a great disconnect appears to exist between the people and their elected representatives, and there has been little change in social hierarchy even as Congress shifts from Democratic to Republican (and vice versa) control. Elected officials seem to have little motivation to cooperate with the American public, and the relationship between government and its people has come to be increasingly *competitive*. In contrast, moneyed lobby groups continue to exert powerful influence on legislative outcome, and the relationship between these entities continues to be a *cooperative* one. For instance, Hollywood executives, producers, and actors were strategically excluded from Clinton's (1999) White House Summit on Youth Violence. LaPierre highlights the implications of this collaboration: "too many in our national media... their corporate owners ... and their stockholders... act as silent enablers, if not complicit co-conspirators" (2012). Of course, LaPierre is also complicit in the political power system. For example, his rhetoric post-Virginia Tech was substantially less than following the other two incidents, indicating he doesn't seem to feel that the Virginia Tech incident poses much of a threat. This could be because the perpetrator obtained the guns legally, even though he had a previous court appearance for mental instability, demonstrating a failure of legislation, specifically the background checks (although since Columbine the background check system had been reduced from a waiting period to "instant checks" that the NRA had lobbied for). Or it could be that during this time, LaPierre had friends in the White House (George W. Bush).

At the same time that LaPierre was promoting an attention switch, he was also indirectly advocating the *need for awareness* of cultural issues, specifically mental illness, in this country. He is consistent in using words like "maniac," "insane killer," and "genuine monster" to describe the assailants, purposefully separating "them" from "us" – us being normal, law abiding citizens. "The truth is that our society is populated by an unknown number of genuine monsters -- people so deranged, so evil, so possessed by voices and driven by demons that no sane person can possibly ever comprehend them. They walk among us every day" (2012). Media coverage following the attacks demonstrates the lack of serious public debate about mental illness in this country. Interestingly, the 2008 Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act[3] got nowhere near the

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[3] Promoted by Patrick Kennedy, who suffers from bipolar disorder and addiction, the act "requires group health plans and health insurance issuers to ensure that financial

media coverage that the GCA got, and Sandy Hook did not seem to get linked to this political issue, although there were some articles recounting the difficulties parents face in getting treatment for their mentally ill children. While several congresspersons have attempted to use Sandy Hook to generate concern about the Act and mental illness, the media (and hence the American public), have yet to answer the call.

The Vicious Cycle Continues

Public Health. Since 2007, homicide and suicide were no longer one of the top 10 leading causes[4] of all deaths in the United States (National Center for Health Statistics, 2011); however, mental health continues to be a public policy concern. "In their lifetimes, about one-half of Americans will have a serious mental health condition…[and] fewer than one-half of people with serious mental illness receive treatment," (National Center for Health Statistics, 2011, p. 19). The U.S. Census Bureau (May 18, 2013) estimates the current U.S. population at over 315 million; therefore, approximately 157.5 million people will experience a serious mental health condition. Former U.S. Congressman Patrick Kennedy has been an advocate for those suffering with mental illness and argues, "the current absence of mental health parity costs our society economically in many important ways, as research shows that better mental health care results in lower physical health care costs and savings to businesses," (8).

Violence and Public Opinion. In the years following the Columbine High School shootings, reported occurrences of murder and nonnegligent offenses have continued to decline; however, the use of firearms to commit the offense remains consistent with years preceding the Columbine tragedy (see Table 1).

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requirements (such as co-pays, deductibles) and treatment limitations (such as visit limits) applicable to mental health or substance use disorder (MH/SUD) benefits are no more restrictive than the predominant requirements or limitations applied to substantially all medical/surgical benefits" (U.S. Department of Labor). Today, Kennedy continues promoting the Act because insurance companies are still working toward compliance.

[4] For Whites, suicide was the 10th leading cause of death. For African-Americans, homicide is 6th and suicide is not a top cause. When the data is analyzed by gender, homicide and suicide are more prevalent among males, with homicide being the 4th leading cause of death of African-American males and suicide being the 7th leading cause for White males.

Table 1. Murder and Nonnegligent Offenses in the United States, 1999-2011

Year	Reported Occurrences	Rate per 100,000	% committed by a firearm
1999	15,522	5.7	65.2
2000	15,517	5.5	65.5
2001[1]	16,037	5.6	63.2
2002	16,204	5.6	66.8
2003	16,528	5.7	66.8
2004	16,137	5.5	66.0
2005	16,692	5.6	67.9
2006	17,034	5.7	67.8
2007	16,929	5.6	67.9
2008	16,272	5.4	67.0
2009	15,241	5.0	67.1
2010	12,996	4.8	67.5
2011	12,664	4.7	67.7

[1] According to the FBI report, "The murder and nonnegligent homicides that occurred as a result of the events of September 11, 2001, are not included.

In 2012, public opinion about the NRA was generally positive (Gallup, 2013). The majority of Americans held a favorable view of the NRA and felt that, at least some of the time, the NRA represented their views on guns. More Americans favored requiring background checks at gun shows; the Gallup poll data is summarized in Table 2.

Table 2. Summary of 1999-2012 Gallup poll survey results on guns

	February 1999	December 2012[1]
NRA reflects my views about guns		
Always/most of the time	25%	35%
Only sometimes	36%	32%
Never	31%	29%
No opinion	8%	4%
My view of the NRA is:[2]		
Very/mostly favorable		54%
Mostly/very unfavorable		38%
No opinion		7%
I have a gun in my home	34%	43%
Favor background checks at gun shows	83%	92%
Favor ban on possession of handguns	36%	24%
Gun laws should be:		
More strict	60%	58%
Less strict	9%	6%

[1] Data was collected between December 19 and 22, after the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting.

[2] Data for 1999 was not available on the Gallup website.

Gallup asked an additional question in the 2012 poll; respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of possible solutions to prevent mass shootings. Results are pictured in Table 3.

Table 3. Effectiveness of possible solutions to prevent mass shootings.

	Very effective
Increased police presence at schools	53%
Increased spending on mental health	50%
Reducing the depiction of violence in entertainment media (TV, movies, video games)	47%
Banning the sale of assault and semi-automatic weapons	42%
Have at least one school official carry a gun	34%
Insisting the news media refuse to print or read the names of persons responsible for mass shootings	27%

Guns. The number of "firearms available for sale or were possessed by civilians" increased from 242 million in 1996 to approximately 259 million firearms in 2000 (CRS, 2006, p. CRS-4). "Through calendar year 2003, nearly 41 million background checks for firearm transfer applications occurred under the Brady Act. Of this number, nearly 790,000 background checks, or about 1.9%, resulted in firearm transfers being denied" (CRS, p. CRS-10). More than half of denials, 57%, "occurred because the applicant was a felon, or was under felony indictment" (p. CRS-10). The second most common reason was a domestic violence misdemeanor conviction.

During the intervening years, 1999-2013, new gun legislation was introduced but little changed at the federal level. In 2005, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act was signed into law. The act "prohibits certain types of lawsuits against firearm manufacturers and dealers to recover damages related to the criminal or unlawful use of their products (firearms or ammunition) by other persons" (CRS, 2006, p. CRS-17). Additionally, the act bans "armor piercing ammunition" and requires a child safety lock be "provided with newly transferred handguns" (CRS-

18). A provision in the 2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act prohibits the collection of a fee for background checks made through the NICS system. In response to the Sandy Hook Elementary School tragedy, legislators once again attempted to expand the scope of background checks to include transactions between private sellers and buyers at gun shows and all Internet sales. However, while the majority of senators voted for the amendment, 54 to 46 (Barrett and Cohen, 2013), it failed to gain the 60 Senate votes required for passage.

The American gun debate continues. Some residents of Newtown, the home of Sandy Hook Elementary, continue to view guns favorably, despite living closest to the tragedy:

> I wish that at that school somebody was armed. If a security guard or a teacher or a principal had been armed, somebody could have taken the [killer] out before his lethal rampage.

> Kuthair Habboush, a software engineer. (Bengali, 2012)

> To me, a firearm — 99% of the time, when it's unloaded — it's a beautiful work of art. It's not meant to kill people. It's meant to protect people and help you provide for your family. But you have to keep them out of the hands of the loonies.

> Dave Chapdelaine, 40-year resident of Newtown. (Bengali, 2012)

> You can change this gun law and that gun law, and it's not going to change things like [the school shooting] from happening.

> Gary Bennett, former hunting club president. (Bengali, 2012)

Conclusion

In this paper, we used the RSI model to highlight LaPierre's attention intervention to break the American public out of the vicious cycle of naming youth violence as *guns-kill-people*. Instead, LaPierre offers the alternative naming pattern of *people-kill-people*. He attempts to shift the ideological system by *blaming the perpetrator* (bad people do bad things), asserting the *failure of government* (government fails to enforce existing laws and, consequently, fails to protect the "most beloved, innocent, and vulnerable among us") and insisting every American's right, under the *2nd Amendment*, to protect and defend oneself against a dangerous world, is at

risk. However, as 92% of Americans favor expanded background checks (an increase from 1999) and 58% believe gun laws should be more strict (only a slight decrease from 1999), indicating a consensus of public opinion that guns are dangerous and should be regulated in some form, LaPierre has failed to shift the public discourse to solutions for controlling bad people, as only half of Americans believe that increased spending on treatment for mental illness is a possible solution. The failed amendment to expand background checks demonstrated a legislative success rather than a shift in the ideological system.

These mass shootings appear to create a climate more favorable for a serious debate about issues related to youth violence. However, "easy access" to guns dominates the media rhetoric of quick scapegoat solutions. Even if these mass shootings are seen as a wake-up call, they are apparently still not enough. If history repeats itself, as images of the Sandy Hook shooting fade from public memory, and other attention-demanding incidents such as the Boston Marathon bombing grab public attention, the debate on gun control will once again fade to the background, leaving the ideological system unchanged and no clear solution to prevent another mentally ill person from committing suicide in a mass killing event, until the next event occurs to reinvigorate the debate.

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SHOOTING DEATHS AND OFFICERS OF THE LAW: THE INFLUENCE OF NEO-LIBERAL LOGIC ON THE PLACEMENT OF GUILT AND INNOCENCE

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Abstract

Studies in ideological criticism have found that dominant ideologies shape and maintain our perspective on the world. Since ideologies influence our attitudes and values, it is important to identify the current dominant ideology: neoliberalism. I examine the shootings of civilians by uniformed officers to determine the effects of ideology on assigning blame and responsibility. The result indicates clearly that the hegemonic ideology accords privilege to people in uniform when violence occurs. Unfortunately, neoliberal policies use various rhetorical strategies in reinforcing the values of the dominant ideology. I explore how this ideology implicitly shapes judgments and perspectives about the use of guns by those in law enforcement. I conclude by discussing why neo-liberal ideology plays such a strong role in the ways that the public assign guilt or innocence. I probe the implications of these findings for cultivation theory, ideological criticism, and indicate how these findings contribute to our overall knowledge of cultivation theory and cultural analysis.

It is always important in understanding a culture that the dominant discourse or ideology be recognized. The ideology of a society tells us much of how phenomena is interpreted and understood. What a society is composed of will reveal its dominant ideology. Sonya Foss (2004) notes that, "An ideology is a pattern of beliefs that determines a group's interpretations of some aspect(s) of the world. It is a system of beliefs that

reflects a group's 'fundamental, social, economic, and political interests" (p. 239). The conservative right today in the USA is embedded within a larger ideology of neo-liberalism that it helped to create. By the conservative right I mean an assembled group of politicians, lawyers, citizens, and corporate officials, who often call themselves Republicans. Their key focus is to shape public policy and bring into being government laws that uphold the neo-liberal focus. As Marlia Banning (2013) writes about neoliberalism,"…it uses the apparatus to deploy keywords and discourses, incite cultural politics, and generate public opinion and sentiments that reshape the boundaries of public life in the form of private interests" (p. 4). One such sentiment is the view or perception of the police by the public. A key discourse that is prominent in neo-liberal rhetoric is the sanctioning of force by the police. There are plenty of people out there who deserve to be disciplined. Some of these are: welfare cheats, murderers, the insane, drug addicts, the homeless, and anybody else labeled as an enemy of the state.

Recently, I have been witness to multiple news briefs inviting the public to participate in parades commemorating the memory of the "fallen heroes," police officers who have died in the line of duty. Their picture was displayed and an American flag waved in the background as decorated veterans of the police department marched by, a powerful image of the role that police play in our lives. A cultural view of the police officers and their roles within our lives is encouraged. He or she is the guardian of our society or way of life. As Ian Loader (1997) writes, "Rather, the iconography of policing—the handcuffs, fingerprints, cop shows, uniforms, photofits, picture postcards, memoirs, cars, sirens, helicopters, riot shields, and so forth—connect with and re-articulate dispositions towards, and fantasies of, policing that already pertain within the wider culture (p. 4). A ritual of honor and tradition is enacted, thereby further cultivating the shining heroism of the police officer. He or she is dedicated to crime control. The eradication of those people who are violent or pose any kind of threat to our civilization will be dealt with by the police force. In this way public sentiment and opinion is reinforced.

It is my purpose in this essay to probe and discover the opinions, sentiments, and beliefs surrounding police violence in the USA today. Who is perceived as bearing the burden of guilt or blame when a shooting occurs? Is there an oppressive relationship between the public and the police force? To what extent does the symbolic representation of the

police force affect our perception of the job that they do? Finally, what may be done to ease an oppressive relationship if it is actually there?

Neoliberalism and its Effect

A prominent activity of neo-liberalism is to safeguard individual (especially commercial) liberty, as well as strong private property rights (cf. especially Mises, 1962; Nozick, 1974; Hayek, 1979). The emphasis is on the rights of the individual. So, the individual in a neo-liberal society seeks to make as many decisions as possible unhampered from or by the dictates of government. Yet, when the rights of the individual are transgressed, an arm of government is called upon to help and aid. This is the police force and Homeland Security. The power and reach of these two institutions within the USA is gradually on the rise and culminates in the power of the judiciary. This emphasis on the judiciary to make the correct judgments and/or decisions is becoming a root practice. Thorsen and Lie (n.d.) in their treatise on neo-liberalism note:

> The primary goal of this ideology then becomes one of ceding power from the state to free markets and individual people. In this broad view of the state, neoliberalism becomes, "a loose set of ideas of how the relationship between state and its external environment ought to be organized. The practical implementation of neoliberal policies will, therefore, lead to a relocation of power from political to economic processes, from the state to markets and individuals, and finally from the legislature and executives authorities to the judiciary (p. 15).

This attitude may be seen in the latest developments within the Supreme Court where corporations are ruled as being individuals with corresponding rights. We can see this stance in the "Wall Street" rage of millionaires and billionaires in the effort of the government to regulate the financial market. President Obama has been called "fascist" and likened to Hitler by state legislatures (Celock, 2013). Finally, the Patriot Act passed after the terrorist act of 9/11, gave vast power to the judicial branch in arresting and convicting citizens; often without the right of habeas corpus (Chomsky, 2012). The focus of these views appears to diminish state and federal influence and emphasize individual rights.

In the USA many argue that neo-liberalism is the dominant ideology that affects much of the decision-making and government operations within the USA. This ideology of neo-liberalism is spreading over much of the

western world, and, perhaps, we are living in an age of neoliberalism (Munck, 2005). Public opinion and sentiments seem to echo the main concepts of individual liberty, less government, and free market economy. There is evidence that corporate controlled mass media filter information and magnify the public confusion surrounding crucial issues like global warming and gun control.

A fundamental value seen emerging then, is that individuals are seen as being solely responsible for the consequences of their choices and actions. This belief generates a form of hyper individuality. The ability of the public or social assembly to move forward and resolve issues, create new laws, or solve conflict is belittled. Forms of conspiracy theory and plain contempt for reasoned discourse is constantly being generated in and through various forms of mass media and radio talk shows. Two examples of these are Fox news and the Rush Limbaugh talk show. A hesitancy in asking questions concerning social inequality or economic inequity is cultivated. Why bother if the government is corrupt or social welfare programs are seen as primarily a tool of control? The supremacy of the individual is highlighted over concerns of the collective.

Positions and Group Relationships

Neo-liberalism may be seen then as a political philosophy which advocates/ supports economic liberalizations, free trade and open markets, privatization, deregulation, and enhancing the role of the private sector in modern society. As such, it opposes left leaning ideologies. It also supports social stratification where the rich have more rights than the poor.

Wealthy corporations own much of the news media in the USA. In 1983, some 50 corporations controlled the majority of the mass media. Today, that number is down to six (Snyder, 2010). The social and political empowerment that this allows is significant. This fact has implications for the free distribution of information. What stories are told and where are the results of TV and newspaper editors or managers telling their writers what to produce. Information should not be allowed to be disseminated without some censor. The implicit assumption is that the richer you are, the more right you have to information. Free access to reliable information is becoming increasingly difficult. The freedom of information act is now classified information according to Jerome Halligan reporting for the Blog website. What information is revealed and

what is concealed is never completely known. This becomes evident in the description of three police shootings. Only bare details are revealed and no comment is given by the journalists involved other than that it was a "tragedy."

Three Instances of Police Shootings

Andy Lopez

On October 22, 2013 a sheriff was making his usual rounds in a neighborhood in Santa Rosa, California. He had another deputy with him in his car and the day was a gorgeous one. For 13 year old Andy Lopez, it was going to be his last day alive. He was on his way to a friend's house carrying a replica of an AK-47 gun on his back. Upon seeing Andy Lopez, as he was cruising by, Deputy Gelhaus slammed on his brakes. He ordered the young boy to drop the "weapon." As Andy Lopez was taking the BB gun off of his back, Deputy Gelhaus shot seven bullets: one of which went through the young boy's heart. As Andy Lopez lie dying on the ground, Deputy Gelhaus put handcuffs on his hands. His assistant later claimed that he never even had a chance to get out of his car (Freedman, 2014).

As of this date, no charges have been filed and Deputy Gelhaus is now returned to duty, although on a desk job. There is a strong community feeling that this boy was shot down in cold blood. Every day since the shooting a memorial is tended at the site where he was gunned down. However, the people who were not there think that this incident should be put to rest. Feelings run both ways. One outside resident remarked, "I think they're just a bunch of vigilantes. They weren't there. I wasn't there and I believe that no sheriff or policeman wants to try to kill somebody," said a resident (In *North Bay News*). In another blog a reader commented, "Use deadly force only after being fired at? What happens when the first shot kills the cop? Oh, I guess that doesn't really matter...." Another wrote, "Because the proliferation of toy guns is the issue we need to address and NOT the irresponsible use of force and lack of judgment on the part of law enforcement—the police need to be policed" (in Steinmetz, 2013). The reactions were wide and diverse. What did become clear is that the further removed from the place of the shootings, the more citizens were inclined to speak for the police officer or blame it on the toy gun manufacturer.

Noel Polanco

Detective Hassan Hamdy shot and killed an unarmed driver of a vehicle. The driver's name was Noel Polanco, 22 who, witnesses say had both hands on the wheel of the car. He had been driving erratically, switching lanes, and speeding. The police officers finally convinced him to pull over. After instructing everyone to "show their hands" the detective shot Noel Polanco once in the stomach. This is the testimony of an off duty police officer who was in the back seat: Dianne Deferrari. He died later in a hospital. No weapons were found inside the car, and a witness testified that Polanco's hands were on the driving wheel for the duration of the time before he got shot (Ruderman & Goodman, 2012). Police officials would not give a reason for the shooting.

The detective did go to trial but the grand jury acquitted him of all charges. He is under investigation currently by his police department for not following proper "procedure." The maximum that could happen to him is the loss of his job.

Ramarley Graham

Ramarley Graham was outside talking with his friends. Police approached the scene and decided to check some people out. Ramarley had a bag of marijuana on him and began to run for home. The police followed and burst into this home. Officer Haste followed the boy into his bedroom and yelled at him to show his hands. He did not come out of the bedroom, therefore Officer Haste shot him once, killing him. No weapon was found, although a bag of marijuana was discovered in the room. Graham's family maintain that he was shot as his grandmother and six year old brother looked on (Barakat & Leonard, 2012).

On Wednesday, May 15, manslaughter charges against NYPD officer Haste were dropped. Officer Haste's attorney said that "the whole defense against Officer Haste is, what his state of mind was prior to discharging his weapon one time," said Stuart London, Haste's attorney. Evidently that is sufficient criteria to have a charge of murder dismissed (Barakat & Leonard, 2012; Kiraly, 2013). These three stories never made it to national news. All three were rather brief with barely any commentary or reaction as to who was right and who was wrong. All three stories mentioned some worthy act of accomplishment that the officers in question had done. Details of the victim's lives were skimpy, if mentioned at all.

Interactional Strategies

It is important to note that an ideology can be promoted by the clothing, hierarchal position, and narratives of the people involved. The way that the public and law enforcement officials interact with one another can play a role in how the situation is perceived and judged.

In these instances of shooting by a uniformed officer, the individuals involved were wearing a uniform and carrying a gun. This automatically gives a degree of authority and power that the public does not have. In all three instances that I write about, these officers had a distinguished role within their respective police departments. In the case of Officer Gelhaus, he was an instructor for sheriff's deputies. He also worked as an instructor in a firearms training school.

Officer Hamdy was a 14-year veteran. He had received numerous awards for rescuing people. Also, he had served four years in the Marine Corps. The countering narrative was swift and openly in disagreement. Michael Palladino, president of the Detectives' Endowment Association and the union that represents Detective Hamdy, stated openly, "This story is absurd." It was absurd, noted Michael Palladino, because a seasoned veteran of the police force would never shoot an innocent citizen. Noel Polanco must have made some kind of threatening move to deserve his death

In the case of Erick Gelhaus, when city leaders called for a full investigation of the events leading to the shooting, then Santa Rosa school board member Laura Gonzales commented, "I'm really disappointed in our so-called leaders who did a lot of fear-mongering." (Bliss, 2013, p. 3). She was alluding to the ongoing investigation of Erick Gelhaus. For Laura Gonzales there was nothing that Erik Gelhaus did that deserved any blame. He had done the right thing because he felt that his life was in danger.

Officer Haste was also noted for being a member of the Marine Corps. Eighteen months after an indictment by the local police department, charges against him were dropped. Officer Haste was noted for being discharged honorably from the Marine Corps. When, he showed up for his trial many of his police officer associates were there. They cheered him when the verdict of not guilty was handed down. A grand jury decided against bringing charges. The jurors said that the policeman had reason to believe that the young teenager was pulling out a gun. That was

enough, in their minds to acquit him. In the report written by Kristen Kiraly (2013) concerning this incident, it was further noted that police officers communicating with Officer Haste had told him that the boy was armed. This appeared to be sufficient reason for Officer Haste to act in the manner that he did. Again, the briefness of the messages surrounding these shootings is striking. The stories were not well-represented in national headline news nor was there any analysis done except for the blogger comments.

Cultivation Analysis

This theory is one that attempts to explain the relationship between mass media, government institutions, and the public. What becomes important is the environment that is created by the interaction of mass media messages. This environment breeds a sort of relaxed acceptance of whatever messages are coming through. George Gerbner (1998) writes:

> The historic nexus of state and church is replaced by the new symbiotic relationship of state and television. The 'state' itself is the twin institution of elected public government and selected private corporate government, ruling in economic domains. Media, its cultural arm is dominated by the private establishment, despite use of the public airways. (p. 176)

In this view, the role that police play can indeed be cultivated by the description of police actions given through and by mass media. Journalists often use police as prime sources of information. There is an "aura" of credibility in what police spokespeople have to say. What they have to say about crime and crime prevention is well-circulated almost every day in the mass media. As Ian Loader (1997) writes, "It has long been recognized that police occupy a privileged place in constructing representations of crime events…" (p. 10). What contributes to the impact of their messages is the fact that in all 50 states the killings are investigated by the local police department and district attorney. They have a vested interest in maintaining the integrity of their colleagues. For, after all, the actions and power of the police are symbolic of the legitimate use of violence as opposed to the illegitimate use of violence.

Often police officers remind the public of how dangerous or mean the world really is. Their shining example and attention towards rounding up the criminals make them an outstanding defender of the faith. They can do no wrong. The police officer puts his/her life on the line every day to

protect the innocent, famous, and reputable people of this culture. Frequent violence is seen as a fact of life and the police are there to take care of it. The symbolism of the police force allows them to maintain their reason for being. Television and mass media do much to keep this image in the forefront. George Gerbner (1998) writes how television "…tends to cultivate the image of a relatively mean and dangerous world" (p. 15). This observation is corroborated by the words of Deputy Erik Gelhaus as he instructs his fellow police officers, "Today is the day you may need to kill someone in order to go home. If you cannot turn on the 'mean gene' for yourself, who will? If you find yourself in an ambush, in the kill zone, you need to turn on that mean gene" (Kay, p. 1). In this scenario, shoot first and ask questions later-- appears to be good advice.

The mass media cultivate the notion that we should be anxious about safety in our neighborhood (Gerbner, 1998, p. 190). The work of a police officer becomes crucial for our well-being. Violence is a fact of life and we do well to support those who keep it under control. Police officers are the main line of defense against the criminal elements of this world. Manning and Singh (1997) point out that, "Hyperviolence refers to the representation of violence through language in discourse that negates the reality and consequences of interpersonal violence" (p. 349). The personal violence that an officer of the law might do is then downplayed. To dare to imagine otherwise makes you a traitor.

There are individuals, however, who do attempt to seek justice for those killed. Four weeks ago, one state did enact legislation calling for an independent investigation when officers of the law kill a civilian. Wisconsin was the first state to enact such a law (Bernd, 2024). Michael Bell, a retired lieutenant colonel in the Air Force was instrumental in bringing this about.

Opposing the Rule of Law

As previously mentioned in my introduction, neoliberalism plays a role in framing the issue of police violence. The rule of law is privileged over the knowledge that the public possesses. In the three cases noted, there existed considerable public outcry. In the case of Andy Lopez witnesses testified that he had not pointed the weapon at the police officer. Forensic science also demonstrated how it would have been impossible for Andy Lopez to be pointing the toy gun at the police officer. However, in this instance, and the other two mentioned, nothing of significance was

accomplished. The police officers who did the shootings were never formally convicted of any wrongdoing.

Publics, according to George Gerbner (1998) are the "formation of individual and group identities in the new urban environment, as the different classes and regional, religious, and ethnic groups who try to maintain some sense of distinct integrity and also to live in cooperation with other groups" (p. 177). I mention this observation by George Gerbner to note how easily the public can be swayed towards your point of view. In the case of police shootings, the public, often uncritically, accept the narrative of the police officer involved.

In 2004, Michael Bell, a son of a retired Lieutenant colonel in the Air Force was shot to death in front of his mother and sister. As Michael Bell, the father stated, "I have a blond, blue-eyed son who was shot in the head while his hands were behind his back in handcuffs, being held down by another police officer and there were five eyewitnesses…and I was ignored and vilified" (Kiraly, 2013, p. 2). He describes how people often suggested that he was not being patriotic by seeking to bring the policeman who shot his son to justice. The notion that a police officer could do wrong caused cognitive dissonance in those who became aware of the facts. They just could not believe that an armed officer of the law could or would do such a crime. Michael Bell goes on to describe how it took many years before his petition could be heard and after four years it was. He banded together with other parents who had suffered the loss of a member of their family due to police action. Wisconsin became the only state in the union to demand an independent investigation when a police officer became responsible for the death of one of its citizens.

In some cases, those individuals directly affected by the violence of the police become aware of the contradiction. This poses a dilemma for society. The knowledge that these few possess oppose the institutional logic of the rule of law. P.K. Manning, and expert in criminal law, and Singh (1997) wrote that, "…knowledge that opposes the conventional wisdom of progress, science and the rule of Law, will undermine the blindness institutional loyalty produces. The "blindness" is a result of accepting the violence society uses to maintain its vertical and horizontal order" (p. 341). There are some who try to expose the blind acceptance of violence perpetuated by the police against its own citizens.

Michael Bell commented that, "We researched the state of Wisconsin and we could not find an 'unjustified' ruling of a police involved shooting in

129 years since the police and fire departments were first formed in 1885, and we knew that was an impossible record of perfection" (Bernd, 2004, p. 2). As Michael Bell pursued his case, letters started to pour in accusing him of being "unpatriotic." The notion that a police officer should or could be questioned disturbed many. Dave Lindorf, writing in *WhoWhatWhy*, observed, "public indifference to 'civilian' causalities in police actions highlights a disconnect: The public perceives rampant crime while the actual crime rate suggests nothing of the sort" (p. 4). The narrative that emerges from this view is that the fear of becoming a victim trumps the few instances of the abuse of power by police officers. Many of us look the other way.

That there exists a blind acceptance of the violence that the police force often use became evident in my public speaking class at SUNY Oswego. The majority of my students claimed that the police officer should not be held responsible. It was, actually, the fault of the toy gun manufacturer for making the guns so "realistic looking." I was shocked. When I noted that a human life was terminated and that a due process of law should be followed, the reaction was still the same. The police are under pressure and any perceived threat to their rule of law should be dealt with swiftly. Therefore, the shooting, although regrettable, was still justified.

Culture Studies

Culture is an ambiguous word. It is most often interpreted as those customs, beliefs, values, and ways of speaking that characterize a group of people. The dominant culture appears after a series of competing ideologies played out their struggle. Scholars spend a considerable amount of time and discourse to understand the influence of culture. How we survive in it and what we can do to change or better the culture within where we live is the subject of culture studies. Littlejohn and Foss write, "These scholars want to see changes in Western society, and they view their scholarship as an instrument of socialist cultural struggle" (p. 324). We should identify contradictions and/or error within our culture. If this is achieved, most people in our society would be in a better place to understand oppression and how it works. Once a problem is seen or brought into the public domain, there is a greater chance that it will be solved. For various reasons getting a clear notion of a problem becomes more and more difficult. Marlia Banning (2013), a rhetorical critic, notes:

Whenever the space of appearance is diminished, as by the spectacular inversion of information's substance and appearance, or by the subjugation of scientific and technical discourses to political or religious dogma, the capacity for public deliberation on complex matters, and thus public life and reality itself all are diminished (p. 160).

What this means is that how a police officer appears is the substance of mass media messages, ads, and public formats such as fairs and 4th of July celebrations. Political notions of the police force are constantly being reinforced by messages constructed within neoliberal frames of thought. The space or areas where one can go to obtain redress from a wrong perpetuated by a police officer is few.

Furthermore, write Littlejohn and Foss, "the study of mass communication is central to this work, for the media is perceived as powerful tools of dominant ideologies" (p. 324). We have already seen the weight that George Gerbner puts on television as being a force that shapes our thinking and attitudes. However, this area of mass communication (TV) exists within the domain of an even higher set of values. The neo-liberal ideology is being preserved and strengthened by the use of this important tool. As Banning (2013) points out, "Via free market government policy and infrastructure, the telecom industry laid the foundations that undergirds the neoliberal apparatus" (p. 93). The role that violence plays in our lives is reinforced and strengthened by how violence is displayed in the press and media. This violence is often referred to as "spectacular violence" (Manning & Singh, 1997, p. 344).

This type of violence is one that is celebrated and condoned. It is a remnant of the days when the Coliseum in Rome was the scene of sanctioned violence between not only humans but human and beast. A celebratory mood is created that often obscures the domestic violence which occurs every day within the USA. We see this in football games, hockey games, and the violence of cyber reality. Many of us have a difficult time distinguishing between real and fake violence. Manning and Singh (1997) remark on this spectacular violence:

Spectacular violence flourishes in a society in which interactions are mediated, or patterned, by the media rather than direct and interpersonal; where rapid communication extends ones senses; where news, politics, entertainment, and sport become conflated

by mass media; and where 'virtual' violence in cyberspace becomes as politically sensitive as domestic assault (p. 344).

What becomes evident is the impact mass media plays in shaping our views of what is appropriate violence versus non-appropriate. The broadcast images of uniformed officers in hundreds of police television series doing admirable feats of daring inform us of their achievements and value. These images of sanctioned violence are shared by strangers on the TV or even on the internet. These television shows often start by informing us that they are based on real life situations. The distinctions between the real and non-real become blurred. What remains is a certain blindness to the fact that sometimes even police officers go beyond the scope of the law that he or she are sworn to uphold.

Conflicting Messages of the Police Force

Police officers occupy a special place within society. Their place is one of cultural performance. Many people within this society see police as being the solution to a host of problems. These may range from family disputes, theft, protection of property and, ultimately, murder. Police men and women literally hold life and death powers. They perform a symbolic function that demonstrates the power of the regime. There exists a monopoly on violence enacted by the gun. Of all the people who have guns within the USA, the military and the police force have the most right to use them. If there is brutal or uncalled for violence perpetuated by these two arms of the government, they are normalized or depoliticized. The use of force is an intricate mechanism of the police and military. Rarely are instances of violence performed by the police force attributed to human weakness or error. When police departments do conduct investigations it further strengthens their credibility and resolve to maintain their creed of "protect and serve."

Furthermore, the victims are often seen as being the dispossessed of society. Teenagers, drunks, and drug addicts are unwanted members of this social group. What happens, though, when such power is abused? Linneman et al. (2014) remark:

Which is to say, the reproduction of police and state power occurs through the "legitimate" violence most often exercised against those dispossessed and "socially dead" others…

The ever constant need for security ensures that the power of the police force is ever strengthened and justified. It is shaped often by and through images of police as the heroes of our society. The power of the officer to kill becomes a central component of the power that the police officer holds. Michel Foucault (1984), a noted philosopher, noted that an ultimate stamp of government power is the ability to hold life and death over its citizens. When a shooting occurs that is damning in its execution, the narrative changes. The individuals who get shot are cast as uncooperative and threatening; whereas the accomplishments of the police officers are highlighted. Narratives in the news and on television appear to focus on the fear of crime and perceptions of disorder as a way to justify the occasional lapses of reason.

Foucault (1984) wrote about how truth is often portrayed, "Truth is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements (p. 74). Therefore, we see and hear the distribution of police remarks, the statements of district attorneys, and general rationalization of police action distributed through the media. Just what is released and where is decided by those in power. Often, police and military will have public relations offices. Statements are not to be made by individuals who work within these institutions unless they are cleared for it. I know because I was a member of the military for 20 years. At no time were we allowed to make public statements without the consent and knowledge of the public affairs office.

Conclusion

The influence of media in shaping our perceptions of the role of the police force in our society is vast. Media images are circulated and watched by millions; they are a visual representation of chaos and order. Shows such as *Criminal Intent, Criminal Minds, Special Victims, L.A.P.D.* and *Disappearing Men and Women*, are just a few examples of television shows promoting the hero image of those dedicated to maintain law and order. Sue Turnbull (2010) writing in *Media and Cinema Studies*, on crime drama series, comments that crime shows, "…is one of the most enduring and successful of television's entertainment genres… (p. 821). Some of the most watched and enduring shows throughout the world are crime drama shows which depict law enforcement officials in daring and violent captures.

This is one way in which the function and role of the police force is magnified and celebrated. As such, it obscures the real essence of violence in everyday life. Manning and Singh (1997) write of such violence, "…symbolic violence is the representation of violence to unknown others by unknown others for the consumption of the massified other" (p. 344) and, "It is the passive, vicarious violence seen in society's sporting events witnessed by millions, in some cases by television and satellite: crude and vulgar superhero movies; and the televised spectacle called the Gulf War, edited, taped, and selectively replayed by the military and broadcast repeatedly throughout the world" (p. 344). In this way the image and role of violence is carefully cultivated by and through spectacle representations. Violence is perceived to be a viable solution for a host of problems. Guns and our fascination with them resonate within our culture. What is cultivated is the role of violence as spectacle. The spaces where violence is played out provide not only entertainment, but become an opportunity for the normalization of violent confrontation. Constant reconstructions of crime events and plenty of docudramas on television, newspapers, and even video games, further the image of spectacular violence.

Neo-liberal ideology does nothing to halt the stream of violent images nor does it seek justice for those wrongfully exploited by those in uniform. There exists a theatre of cruelty where the shooting of a 13 year old becomes an unfortunate but necessary routine. Demonstrations of solidarity by the relatives and others of the three victims whom I have described meet with failure. Their resistance is undermined by the disdain for the public good that is one of the core values of the neo-liberal logic. True, Andy Lopez had violated the rules of carrying a BB gun, however, he needed to be disciplined. The spectacle carries the day while we observe sovereign powers reestablish their power to kill any member of its community. On the altar of security concerns human life is often sacrificed.

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FRAMING EFFECTS ON ATTITUDES TOWARD TORTURE

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Abstract

The purpose of the present research is to focus on one facet of media portrayals of torture, namely how different approaches to framing the use of torture influence readers' attitudes toward torture. Experiment 1 examined the influence of effectiveness framing on attitudes toward torture, and Experiment 2 examined framing in terms of in-group/out-group biases. Findings from Experiment 1 demonstrated that participants had more favorable attitudes toward torture when torture was portrayed to be effective than when portrayed to be ineffective. Findings from Experiment 2 showed that when interrogators were framed as out-group members and detainees as in-group members, respondents showed less favorable attitudes toward torture than when the in-group/out-group designations of interrogators and detainees were reversed. Implications of these findings with regard to the General Aggression Model (Anderson & Bushman, 2002) and mass media influences on attitudes toward torture are examined.

Most contemporary research on torture has concentrated on the psychological effects of torture on its victims (e.g., Biderman & Zimmer, 1961; Melamad, Melamad, & Bouhoustos, 1990; Engdahl & Eberly, 1990) and its perpetrators (e.g., Fanon, 1961; Milgram, 1974), as well as the factors that facilitate its practice (e.g., Haritos-Fatouros, 2003; Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, & Zimbardo, 2002). Although such work is clearly important, it is crucial to bear in mind that the practice of torture does not occur in a vacuum. Rather, the extent to which torture is facilitated or suppressed depends upon the extent to which the social context allows for its use (see, e.g., Benjamin, 2006). A portion of that social context includes how torture is presented in the mass media (see, e.g., Benjamin, 2008).

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the issue of torture has received considerable attention in various mass media outlets (see, e.g., McCoy, 2006), from articles and editorials found on newspapers and websites, to televised news coverage (e.g., Abu Ghraib scandal, the interrogations leading to the location of Osama bin Laden), and in television series and film portrayals (e.g., *24*, *Zero Dark Thirty*, *Homeland*). Although to a casual observer it would be sensible to conclude that these media portrayals would influence readers' and viewers' perceptions of torture, depending on how torture is framed, relatively little research on framing effects on attitudes toward torture has been conducted to date.

One theoretical model for understanding how attitudes toward torture might be influenced is the General Aggression Model (GAM; Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Anderson & Carnagey, 2004). According to the GAM, numerous antecedent variables can influence both appraisal processes (the focus of the current series of experiments) and behavioral outcomes. Of particular interest for the purposes of the present experiments, the GAM specifies that situational stimuli, such as violent media serve as primes for three routes to aggression (cognitive, affective, and arousal) which then influence how events are appraised (e.g., Anderson & Bushman, 2002). In discussing media coverage of torture specifically, Benjamin (2008) noted that efforts in the media to frame torture in a favorable light have the potential to enhance public support of its use, hence facilitating the likelihood of its occurrence by interrogators. Conversely, media portraying torture negatively should serve to diminish public support of its use, thus potentially inhibiting its likelihood of occurrence.

In terms of current attitudes toward torture, recent research indicates that Americans are generally ambivalent about the use of torture (see, e.g.,

Gronke, Rejali, Drenguis, Hicks, Miller, & Nakamura, 2010). However, recent social psychological research suggests that attitudes toward torture may be changed in a more or less favorable direction, depending upon how torture is framed (e.g., Crandall, Eidelman, Skitka, & Newman, 2009). In an experiment by Crandall et al. (2009) participants were randomly assigned to read a passage describing interrogation methods used by US military personnel that have been classified as torture under the *Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Punishment or Treatment* (United Nations, 1985). Each passage framed torture either as part of the status quo or as a novel development tied to the recent War on Terror. When torture was framed as part of the status quo, participants showed more favorable attitudes towards its use than when torture was framed as novel. The results suggest that when torture is presented as "business as usual" otherwise ambivalent American readers will show increased support for its use (Crandall et al., 2009). The two experiments reported herein will expand upon the previous research on framing effects and attitudes toward torture, by examining manipulations of the perceived effectiveness of torture, as well as manipulations of the in-group and out-group status of the interrogators involved in torture and their detainees.

Experiment 1

As noted earlier, Gronke, et al. (2010) recently published an article showing that although most Americans during the previous decade were ambivalent about torture, they showed some willingness to support its use if it they believed that by doing so, future terrorist attacks would be thwarted. Taken together with the research of Crandall et al. (2009) on framing effects, Americans should show more favorable attitudes toward torture if they are exposed to media portrayals of torture in which its use is effective than if they are exposed to media portrayals of torture as ineffective. The primary hypothesis of Experiment 1 is that when participants are exposed to a written message in which torture leads to the achievement of a national security objective, such as the location of Osama bin Laden (in other words, when torture is framed as effective), participants will show more favorable attitudes towards its use. On the other hand, if torture is framed as ineffective, participants will show less favorable attitudes towards its use.

Method

Participants

The sample consisted of 81 students (54 women, 26 men, and 1 who declined to specify) recruited from sections of an introductory psychology course at University of Arkansas-Fort Smith. Participants ranged in age from 18-54, with an average age of 21.37.

Materials

The Attitudes toward Torture Questionnaire (Crandall et al., 2009) consisted of seven items assessing individuals' opinions about the use of the interrogation techniques described in the stimulus materials (e.g., "These methods are an effective way of getting information."). All items were scored on a seven-point Likert scale, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicated more favorable attitudes toward torture. As in the original Crandall et al. (2009) experiment, the questionnaire showed high internal consistency, with a Cronbach's alpha of .84.

Procedure

After reading and signing an informed consent statement, participants were randomly assigned to read one of two brief statements describing the effectiveness of enhanced interrogation techniques performed by US forces (effectiveness frame manipulation). The description of torture was adapted from several news sources covering the operation that led to the successful location of Osama bin Laden. The Effective Frame version read:

In recent news, the heroic raid by US forces that led to the location and death of terrorist Osama Bin Laden was reported. In order to gather this information, specially trained US forces used enhanced interrogation methods that were deemed necessary for the successful location of the wanted terrorist. These methods included actions such as strapping detainees to a board and dunking them underwater, stuffing detainees face-first into a sleeping bag, and long periods of hanging detainees by ropes in painful positions. In addition, years later, these same detainees were conventionally interrogated (using rapport-building and routine questioning). However, it was under conditions of enhanced interrogation

that the needed information was obtained for the mission to be successfully carried out. In other words, it appears that the enhanced interrogation methods were effective in obtaining the information necessary to locate Osama bin Laden.

The passage used in the Ineffective Frame condition was similar to the original passage except in terms of its emphasis of the use of traditional interrogation methods:

In recent news, the heroic raid by US forces that led to the location and death of terrorist Osama Bin Laden was reported. In order to gather this information, specially trained US forces used enhanced interrogation methods that were deemed necessary for the successful location of the wanted terrorist. These methods included actions such as strapping detainees to a board and dunking them underwater, stuffing detainees face-first into a sleeping bag, and long periods of hanging detainees by ropes in painful positions. Although these enhanced interrogation methods were used, it was not until years later when these same detainees were conventionally interrogated (using building rapport and routine questioning) that the needed information was obtained and the mission was successfully carried out. In other words, it appears that the enhanced interrogation methods were not effective in obtaining the information necessary to locate Osama bin Laden.

Once participants had finished reading the passage, they responded to the items on the Attitudes toward Torture Questionnaire (Crandall et al., 2009), and then completed some background demographic information. Upon completion, participants were debriefed and thanked. Total participation time was less than ten minutes.

Results and Discussion

A simple one-way analysis of variance showed a significant effect for type of interrogator, $F (1, 79) = 28.71$, $p < .0001$. Participants showed significantly lower favorability toward torture when torture was framed as ineffective ($M = 3.33$, $SD = 1.25$) than when torture was framed as effective ($M = 4.79, SD = 1.20$).

The findings of Experiment 1 confirmed the hypothesis. It does appear that when torture is framed as effective, participants will have more favorable (albeit ambivalent) attitudes towards it than when it is framed as ineffective. These findings are consistent with previous political science

research (Gronke et al., 2010) and with previous social psychological research on framing effects on attitudes toward torture (Crandall et al, 2009).

Experiment 2

Research on Social Identity Theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979) suggests that individuals are motivated to respond positively to members of their in-groups and negatively to out-group members. One potential consequence of this in-group favorability bias is the motivation to harm members of out-groups, including showing a willingness to behave aggressively toward out-group members (e.g., Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Left unanswered is the question of what happens when out-group members engage in the same aggressive activities against in-group members.

To answer the question, a variation of the original Crandall et al. (2009) experiment was conducted to test how attitudes toward torture are influenced by variations of the in-group/out-group status of interrogators and detainees. In the original Crandall et al. (2009) experiment, interrogators in each scenario were portrayed as in-group members (US forces) and detainees were described as out-group members (Middle Eastern military prisoners). The present experiment will test the hypothesis that when the interrogators are portrayed as out-group members (i.e., Middle Eastern forces) and the detainees are portrayed as in-group members (US military prisoners) attitudes will be less favorable than when interrogators are portrayed as in-group members (US forces) and detainees are portrayed as out-group members (Middle Eastern military prisoners).

Method

Participants

The sample consisted of 98 students (54 women and 44 men) recruited from sections of an introductory psychology course at University of Arkansas-Fort Smith. Participants ranged in age from 18-45, with an average age of 21.12.

Materials

The Attitudes toward Torture Questionnaire consisted of seven items, modified from Crandall et al. (2009). One item in the questionnaire was modified from "I consider these techniques to be un-American" to "I consider these techniques to be inappropriate" in order to better fit the context of the stimulus materials used in the experiment. As in Experiment 1, all items were scored on a seven-point Likert scale, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), with higher scores indicating more favorable attitudes toward torture. Consistent with Experiment 1, the questionnaire showed high internal consistency, with a Cronbach's alpha of .85.

Procedure

After reading and signing an informed consent statement, participants were randomly assigned to read a brief statement describing enhanced interrogation techniques performed by either American troops against Middle Eastern prisoners (In-Group Interrogator condition) or Middle Eastern troops against American prisoners (Out-Group Interrogator condition). The passage used in the In-Group Interrogator condition was identical to the Status Quo passage used by Crandall et al. (2009). The passage used in the Out-Group Interrogator condition differed only in terms of the characterization of the interrogators and prisoners. Participants subsequently responded to the items on the revised Attitudes toward Torture Questionnaire, and then completed some background demographic information. Upon completion, participants were debriefed and thanked. Total participation time was less than ten minutes.

Results and Discussion

A simple one-way analysis of variance showed a significant effect for type of interrogator, $F (1, 96) = 4.50$, $p < .04$. Participants showed significantly lower favorability toward torture when the interrogators were members of an out-group ($M = 3.23$, $SD = 1.08$) than when interrogators were members of an in-group ($M = 3.79$, $SD = 1.51$).

As expected, varying the in-group/out-group status of torturers and detainees influenced individuals' attitudes toward torture. Although consistent with the work of Gronke et al. (2010), participants were generally ambivalent about the use of torture when it used by members of

their own in-groups against out-group members, when torture was portrayed as used by out-group members against members of their own in-group, participants' attitudes toward torture trended in a significantly negative direction.

General Discussion

To summarize, in both experiments, the main hypothesis was confirmed. How torture is framed influences readers' attitudes towards its use. When torture is framed as effective, individuals will have more favorable attitudes towards it than when torture is framed as ineffective. When torture is framed as involving out-group members as interrogators and in-group members as detainees, attitudes towards its use become significantly more negative. The above findings are consistent with previous political science research on attitudes toward torture (Gronke, et al., 2010) as well as the recent research on framing effects and attitudes toward torture by Crandall et al., (2009).

One implication of the above experiments is that the way torture is portrayed in the mass media will have a potentially profound impact on how readers and viewers perceive its desirability, which is of both theoretical and practical importance. The findings from the two experiments are consistent with various theories of aggression, such as the GAM (Anderson & Bushman, 2002), which would predict that the way media violence is presented will influence appraisal processes, such as attitudes. The findings from Experiment 2 are consistent with Terror Management Theory with regard to in-group favoritism effects (see, e.g., Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Rosenblatt, Veeder, Kirkland, & Lyon, 1990). In the present research, readers' already ambivalent attitudes toward torture became more negative when presented with a scenario in which out-group members, with which the US was at war at the time, used torture on in-group members. It is quite conceivable that individuals can hold somewhat contradictory attitudes regarding torture depending upon the in-group/out-group status of those utilizing such methods, with minimal cognitive dissonance.

In practical terms, the findings suggest that at least on a very short-term basis, the way information regarding torture's use is framed to an audience will shape that audience's appraisals of the issue of torture. Hence, it is important for audiences to be aware of the editorial slant of various news outlets when consuming news information in which torture

is reported. Furthermore, as Benjamin (2008) contended, the extent to which torture is framed as a desirable practice has the potential to enhance its use in the name of national security, a possibility alluded to by Carnagey and Anderson (2007) in their discussion of increases in favorability of attitudes toward war and violent treatment of penal offenders that occurred in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.

The samples utilized in both experiments were relatively small compared to the sample available to Crandall et al. (2009), and was composed of students enrolled in introductory psychology courses. Although research based upon such samples is sometimes criticized in terms of its generalizability (see, e.g., Sears, 1986, though see also Anderson & Bushman, 1997, for a rejoinder), in the case of the present experiments, the findings appear consistent with similar research utilizing a larger, randomly selected sample (Crandall et al., 2009).

The present experiments were based upon coverage compiled from news articles, and hence the stimuli themselves were intended to mimic the sorts of frames one would encounter in print media. It would be beneficial to examine the extent to which the use of these same frames in televised and film media (in which the portrayal of torture is often more realistic and graphic) influence individuals' attitudes toward torture's use. In addition, the present research focused strictly on short-term framing effects. In everyday life, individuals are exposed to the same framing effects examined in the two experiments reported herein over a much longer period of time. Longitudinal research on media violence shows that such exposure can lead to biases in appraisal, such as an increased perception of the world as a dangerous place (e.g., Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signiorelli, 1980). Furthermore, the effects of long-term exposure can linger for decades (Huesmann, 1998). In the case of torture, based on the work of Huesmann (1998) on media violence, long-term exposure to the use of torture in various media could lead to the storage of violent behavioral scripts in long-term memory, which, with repeated rehearsal will become increasingly automatic, increasing various hostile appraisal biases, and strengthening and enhancing favorable attitudes toward torture. Second, exposure to media violence serves to desensitize individuals to violence (e.g., Fanti, Vanman, Henrick, & Avraamides, 2009; Thomas, Horton, Lippincott, & Drabman, 1977), which has a number of consequences (e.g., Bartholow, Bushman, & Sestir, 2006) including inhibiting helping behaviors (e.g., Bushman & Anderson,

2009). In the case of torture, prolonged exposure to its use in mass media could leave individuals less likely to notice its occurrence, along with human rights violations in general, and influence individuals to be less likely to intervene (e.g., in the form of protest, advocacy, etc.) when instances of its use are brought to light (Benjamin, 2008).

Finally, the present research was not designed to examine the potential interactive effects of any of a number of individual difference variables with framing effects on attitudes toward torture. According to the GAM (Anderson & Bushman, 2002), any of a number of individual difference variables might have an influence on attitudes toward torture. Of particular interest would be variables related to ideology, such as authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and racial and ethnic resentment (see, e.g., Altemeyer, 1996; Larsson, Björklund, & Bäckström, 2012). Furthermore, given how attitudes formed through direct experience tend to be more resistant to persuasive appeals (e.g., Wu & Shaffer, 1987), it would be useful to examine how individual variations in direct experience in combat situations where torture has been known to occur influence attitudes toward torture. Although Gronke et al. (2010) noticed that combat veterans from Afghanistan and Iraq tended to have more negative attitudes toward torture than the general public, it would be of interest to determine if such veterans are similarly affected by how torture is framed as nonveterans, or if veterans are more immune to attitude change when exposed to the sorts of framing effects examined in Experiments 1 and 2 and in the experiment reported in Crandall et al. (2009).

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SECTION IV:

STRATEGIC (AND SOMETIMES ANTISOCIAL) COMMUNICATION IN INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND SECURITY POLICY – TOWARDS A COMMUNICATIVE CENTRUM GRAVITATIS?

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Ultimately, war cannot be explained. Communication of war is paradoxical because it seems to be necessary, but – as our everyday experience shows – eventually becomes impossible. Wherein is this impossibility grounded? Which challenges or necessary conditions, respectively, do communication managers have to consider? And why has communication come to the forefront of organizational – also military – strategic planning? This paper wants to shed light on these questions by explaining how the centre of gravity shifted from the military to the communicative and what this means for strategic planning in a military context.

1. Strategic Organizational Communication in a Military Context: Shifting the Center

The political necessity that any security policy position, war, and war decisions need to be communicated despite all impossibilities can be derived from Clausewitz's famous dictum about war as "continuation of policy by other means" (Clausewitz 1873: bk. 1, ch. 1, sec. 24). Acting on the assumption of a political determination of aims, two political tasks can be distinguished: apart from the so-called decision-making policy, there is need for a suitable representation policy (Sarcinelli, 2005, p. 113) where the latter conveys the decisions or introduces them by way of communicative support, respectively. The relationship between policy making and representation is to be understood as symbiotic; thus, communication becomes an integral part of any organization and any organizational decision-making. Typically, communication is portrayed as a mere instrument (Cooren 2000) in order to reach the form, business

activities, identity, and evolution of an organization and, at the same time, as a consequence of the very same four dimensions. Other researchers go as far as stating that organizations and organizational actions are congruent with communication (Mumby, 1988, p. 95). Others argue that an organization has no objective reality, but is "in a relentless pursuit of itself" (Cooper, 2007, p. 1,547) and is continuously created and, respectively, made visible by its members' and stakeholders' communication (Evered, 1983, p. 126). In any case, communication and organizational action and being are inextricably interwoven. The center of action has shifted from the factual to the representational.

For some time, organizational research has been discussing approaches that stray from the premises of classical organizational science such as Max Weber's bureaucratic model (Weber, 1978) and taylorism (Taylor, 1903; 1911) where communication was seen as a one-way output-optimizing mechanism. Concepts such as autopoesis (Luhmann, 1984; 2005) and sensemaking (Weick, 1995; 2001) assume a central role of communication in constituting an organization. The critical terminus here is ascription. Communication needs to be understood as a process where – against the flow of sequential events of message releases – pieces of information are ascribed to the sender on the part of the recipient; the recipient determines the content of the sender's message. Each actor or acting organization only functions as point of ascription of content, not as creator. By way of this retro-active ascription of content to the sender's position, the whole communication process gains an emergent quality: it is no longer the organizational actor who decides about its intentions by doing or non-doing, but the situation. Therefore, an organization is nothing more than a mere social artifact that is founded in processes of attribution and thus in (strategically managed) communication.

Turning this argument around, it can be claimed that communication has become key factor to organizational success. Organizations are business companies, institutions such as the military, but also every single mission engagement with different coalition partners. At the core, all organizations are very much alike. Each organization is, by the same token, social structure, defining patterns of action and behavior. It organizes interdependent action of individual actors constituting the organization. Thus, findings from theory and praxis of strategic communication – so far mainly derived from a business communication context – can also be applied to military organizations.

All organizations communicate, internally and externally. The stories they tell define what the organization is, explains and legitimizes its existence and future being. Since this process of definition always happens, an organization communicates even if it does NOT proactively communicate: either, the organization legitimizes and describes itself, or the field of interpretation is being passed on to others implicitly.

For this reason, the relevance of communication management has grown over the past decades. Communicative differentiation is considered to imply immense competitive advantages in the struggle for resources: employees / soldiers, capital / parliamentary alimentation, customer loyalty / acceptance of a mission. Thus, communication management does not only mean the organized and planned packaging of decision making. Far beyond that: the effects of applied as well as neglected communication are critical of any – military – strategy's development and, thus, need to be considered EX ANTE as factors of subsequent success. Taking this into account, communication needs to be understood as a core element of strategic organizational leadership, including mission engagements' strategy.

Therefore, there are two pillars that turn communication into a strategic military matter: Communication is a representation of the facts created by politico-military means; at the same time, communication is a constituent factor of any policy making, i.e., communication is part of creating politico-socio-military situations. What does this mean?

From a political point of view, it is absolutely necessary to explain war and war conflict decision-making. One could also say that military organizations and their actions are congruent with communication. One could even argue that a military organization – and a mission engagement – does not have an objective reality of its own. Without communication, it does not exist, since it only consists in communicative actions. Therefore, a shooting or a bomb might be understood as an extreme method of symbolic communication; however, interpreting this (real?) bomb and the (real?) shooting are much more important than the acts in and of themselves. Thus, the centrum gravitatis has shifted; goals and aims of a conflict are now being evaluated according to communicative, not military parameters.

2. The Impossibility and Necessity of Strategic Communication

Based on the difficult relationship between policy making (being) and representation (visible image) outlined above, which holds especially true for security policy and (transparent?) communication of war and violence, this chapter will shed light on security policy's core questions – various aspects of the dichotomy of impossibility versus necessity of communication – and offer the strategic narrative as one possible solution scenario (Zowislo/Schulz 2011: 39f.).

The Media's Logic

According to Eisenegger and Imhof, the impossibility of communication can be generally demonstrated by looking at the "tension zone" between mass media's communication logic and governmental institutions' interests (Eisenegger/Imhof 2004: 247ff). Here, social, factual, time-related, and socio-territorial perspectives are to be mentioned.

In social respect, political parties, as well as the government and its bureaucracy, have to fight with media's selective reporting, which in turn influences political decision-making or even is its very reason, respectively; direct mediation of their ideas towards the "target groups" of voters and citizens plays a less and less critical role – if any at all (Eisenegger/Imhof 2004: 247). Political representation, thus, (partly) becomes a trigger for policy making.

In factual respect, politics has to subordinate more and more to media's logic as concerns production processes, as well as selection and interpretation patterns. Such a "primacy" of the media demands the professionalization of both external and internal communication and a systematic issue management. Also, personnel decisions relevant to communication matters will be assessed by looking at the criterion of "media capability" (Eisenegger/Imhof, 2004, p. 247). Strategic planning of political representation (sometimes) becomes the core of policy making.

Subsequently, the time-related perspective makes it clear that "reaction pressure" and reactive politics aggravate constitutional democratic processes. Since even companies with clearly hierarchical leadership structures are pressured by the need for up-to-dateness and speed, the challenge for politics is even bigger; democratic processes, as well as the separation of political and bureaucratic processes, make fast and decisive processes of coordination and planning almost impossible

(Eisenegger/Imhof, 2004, p. 247). Political representation, however, is committed at least to being isochronic with policy making. And eventually: in territorial respect, media and political fields are no longer congruent (Eisenegger/Imhof, 2004, 247f.). The mass media audience has been internationalized; thus, under the aforementioned aggravated conditions it is even harder for political actors to develop topics or issues that can be strategically managed and integrated into overall planning.

Paradox: Authenticity versus Consistency

Reality and truth seem to be categories of credible communication in a democratic society, especially when a military context is concerned. Whenever authenticity is talked about, a difference is traditionally made between true being and mere image. For human beings, this differentiation does not lose evidence despite the (ontological) difficulties involved and becomes an issue of public debate on a regular basis. The benchmark for authenticity, however, can no longer be a mutually exclusive relationship of natural being (truth) and communicative representation. It has been replaced by reality ascription as described above, depending on subjective ascriptions of meaning for which Blumenberg (1964) emphasizes the criterion of consistency.

The criterion of consistency also qualifies controversial frames of reference such as illusory worlds and recipients' bedazzlement as Gerhard Schulze points out about the event society and event-oriented consumption. There, the notion of lie and truth are useless since manipulation and desired psycho-physical processes happen by mutual consent of producers and consumers (Schulze, 1993, p. 10).

By no means does consistency mean that communication needs to be free of contradictions. Interpreting the term authenticity as impressiveness of communication, one automatically comes across the paradox as rhetorical category which destabilises established thought and language habits in a way that astonish, amaze (Plett, 2002), or even fascinate the recipient. This alteration between being spellbound and destroyed is a mode of reception which holds especially true for the communication of war and has always given impulses to literature and the arts.

Ernst Cassirer's *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (Cassirer, 1973) offers a theoretical frame to turn the haut gout that human beings can only experience reality in a mediated way into something positive. He describes the analytical narrowness of human cognitive faculties as a

positive characteristic or even a unique capability of giving meaning to the world by symbolic interpretation (p. 239).

Connectable versus Un-connectable Communication

A further challenge of organizational communication is concerned with the aspect of communication's connectability. Here, the idea of network-based operations can be transferred to the communication of war with the goal of forming and maintaining communicative networks with stakeholders. Connectability is the necessary "unity of communication" (Luhmann, 1984, p. 204). The aspect of connectability emphasized by Luhmann turns out not to be authentic whenever an act of communication is inappropriate for a communicative situation, i.e. whenever such an act does not allow for further linkages and disregards expectations of stakeholders and publics.

The mass media purport this principle by being geared to connectability. They normally generate a sequence of expectable unexpected stories and thus develop issue careers. The mass media are interested in stories, not in isolated units of communication. Last but not least, online communication owes its allure to a connectable world without borders. Communities and other communication fora pursue the goal of sustaining connectabilities in the long-term.

Contradicting an understanding of communication based on action theory which distinguishes between successful and unsuccessful transmission, the criterion of connectability emphasizes the ability of communication to build up structural complexity. Redundancy is created as communication generates a memory that can be utilised by many in a multitude of ways (Luhmann, 2005, p. 117). So, expectations are pre-set through the communication system's context, which in turn are fulfilled by suitable acts of communication.

To tell a consistent and connectable, yet not by any means unambiguous story which puts security policy positions and war acting in a broader context of goals, consequences, risks, and dangers – explainable to recipients: to voters, but also to the soldiers as well as other stakeholders – could be the aim of a communication strategy; i.e., the call for a "vision" giving a meaningful frame to a single unit of action and assertable even in individual cases of failure.

To communicate in an authentic way in the sense of transparent and real – which is in any case impossible as elaborated on above – would then be a

rightly unachievable stipulation. In fact, consistency – also in the eye of the recipient – would significantly contribute to being able to classify events without degrading communication or even damning it for prettifying things.

3. Centrum Gravitatis – Elements of Managing Strategic Communication

Despite the conflict between the impossible and the necessary as concerns communication, the core question that needs to be answered is: What is the critical factor for military engagements when the goal is not any longer to render the opponent defenseless? The answer is: The communicative center needs to be determined properly, as far as content (issues), stakeholders (dialogue partners) and the methods (media) are concerned.

Stakeholder Management

Communication must be holistic. Thus, it is in any organization's own interest to consider its own actions' effects for all internal and external stakeholder groups in a strategic way. Stakeholder management aims at fostering a (symmetric) dialogue with those groups to serve the stakeholders' and its own interests. Starting with identifying, categorizing, and analyzing their potential of influencing the organization's success, suitable communication tools and methods must be derived. This is also valid for national and multinational stakeholder groups of a mission engagement such as soldiers, their families, and allied military organizations, departments of state, bureaucracy, parliaments, politicians, parties, interest groups, business companies, the media and others from all parts of a functionally differentiated global society.

Issue Management (proactive) and Crisis Communication Management (reactive)

Another element of strategic communication management is content management towards which stakeholder management can be oriented. Communication never happens without context; thus, individual issue worlds can be defined. Issues can either determine the course of action; in case of crisis, the organization can merely react to issues pushed by others. Or the military organization itself pushes issues with positive potential.

Integrated Communication (operative level)

Due to the plurality of different communication instruments on the one hand and the manifold perceptions by internal and external stakeholder groups on the other, an integrated management of all communicative acts is necessary in order to convey a credible and understandable picture and, thus, legitimacy. Stakeholders, last but not least soldiers, lose trust.

Successful, integrated communication management interlinks all communicative activities and integrates them formally as well as content-wise. Part of this integrative effort is taking the stakeholders' perspectives into account according to their relevance. Also, clear and precise communication strategy and purposes need to be formulated. In a nutshell: integrated communication management relies on intra-organizational leadership.

Narratives (strategic level)

These three dimensions lead to the notion of network-based communication which arises emergent, but in any case, parallel to the "real" events of a war. Thus, the definition of a communicative core becomes necessary that turns this complex network consisting of stakeholders, communicative instruments and issue-related worlds into a manageable net – instead of a confused cacophony.

The lack of a meaningful communication strategy is a problem. Robert H. Scales explains the idea of culture-centric warfare from experiences with asymmetric conflicts (Scales, 2004). This approach qualifies military-technological options and emphasizes "soft" factors such as motivation, intention, method, and culture of "weaker" opponents as far as their mere numbers and weapons are concerned. According to Michel de Certeau (1988), this approach can be named the tactics of fourth generation warfare. In order to avoid unwelcome surprises, war must be explained in a very different way to the public as well as to soldiers themselves. That the more convincing story might be critical for military success has become common understanding:

> "A grand counter-terrorism strategy would benefit from a comprehensive consideration of the stories terrorists tell; understanding the narratives which influence the genesis, growth, maturation, and transformation of terrorists organizations will enable us to better fashion a strategy for

understanding the efficacy of those narratives so as to deter, disrupt and defeat terrorist groups." (Casebeer et al., 2005, p. 3)

What does this mean for communication in a mission engagement? Communication moves to the core. The goal is to create trust and support for the mission by way of integrated, goal-oriented, context-sensitive strategic communication, including all stakeholder groups. This network character of communication management and the determination of a communicative center of gravity, however, lead to the paradox that they contradict the very idea of strategic planning. Communication understood as a core factor of any conflict has become too fast and too unpredictable within network contexts as to pre-arrange settings. What can be drafted is a pattern that describes the framework without claiming exclusiveness. However, what is this pattern?

This pattern can be defined as a strategic narrative. One does not start a war, says Clausewitz (1873), without explaining what one wants to achieve with and within this war. Military communication is necessary in order to create legitimacy and, thus, the maintenance of motivation. "Hard" material goals of military considerations are replaced by (strategic) narratives. They give sense and point beyond rational offers of meaning; they are symbolic. They provide for the motivating and legitimizing pattern of interpretation for extra- and intra-organizational actors. By the same token, they aim at undermining the opponents' strategic core motives and the publics influenced by this very opponent. It would be desirable to have a strategic core motive, a consistent and connectable story, which puts security policy decisions and military actions within a broader context of purposes, consequences, risk, and danger.

4. Narrative Challenges

Risk versus security? – The Observer's Perspective

From a communicative point of view, it might indeed make sense to talk about security policy since it is thereby concealed that any decision is in principle insecure; security is by no means created by not deciding either. However, this commonplace generates difficulties just from an everyday practical perspective. According to Luhmann (1991), security experts are "first order observers." They believe in facts. Disagreement mainly results from different interpretation of these very facts or from a different degree of availability of information (p. 30).

The problem with this perspective is that it automatically entails the reproof of a lack of explanation, which is to be avoided. The actual problem of communication, however, can be realized only from a second order observer perspective where one does not differentiate between risk and security, but between risk and danger.

Risk in Luhmann's (1991) systems theory means that a potential damage is seen as a consequence of a decision. Danger means that the potential damage is regarded as being externally induced and thus is independent of one's own decision (30f.). For him, risks are self-attributions of decision makers, whereas the danger one has to face without any decision-making power is always attributed to the environment (attribution by others).

Also the arguments made by organizations in business and politics point to the dichotomy of risk and danger. Since it is not possible for all human beings to be part of every decision, it is unavoidable that decision-makers and persons concerned oppose each other. It is communication's main task to establish suitable patterns of interpretation for military organizations. The communicators' skills are critical for switching between the role of the concerned party and the role of decision-maker at the right point in time if necessary.

Taking this into account, terror attacks might, for instance be perceived differently. Depending on the kind of ascription, these are either problems of confidence in inner security, and thus a danger, or these attacks must be seen as problems of trust when interpreted as a consequence of security personnel's risky behavior. This is relevant for further interpretation patterns. Depending on the interpretation, the world outside is very different, is one which must or can be fought against with different means or in which one can basically feel safe. Security as the differentiation between risk and danger is not a mathematical value but a problem of communication.

Explaining the Purposes of Bellicose Disputes

The characteristic of modern conduct of war can be seen in the fact that these are not classical conquering expeditions any longer, but actions are interpreted as defensive measures and sometimes labeled surgical intrusions. Is it questionable which purpose is really being followed and how it can be portrayed or is taken up and represented by mass media. Clausewitz (1873) distinguishes originally between purpose and goal:

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"No war is commenced, or, at least, no war should be commenced, if people acted wisely, without saying to themselves, what is to be attained by and in the same; the first is the final object; the other is the intermediate aim." (bk. 8, ch. 2)

Recalling Clausewitz's (1873) dictum on the relationship between politics and war, the purpose must be a political one. One has to keep in mind that Clausewitz was a contemporary of Napoleon and learned that it was not enough to be successful militarily whenever the political purpose lacked or was lost along the way. The resignation of his foreign minister Talleyrand was symptomatic of Napoleon's failure because he eventually did not succeed in assigning a political perspective to his military successes. Even though Clausewitz has been talked about by strategists for decades, military victory and political success are still mixed up as one could lately clearly see with the examples Iraq and Afghanistan. Interestingly enough, the USA's and their allies' opponents first and foremost pursue political goals and always see military successes as an expression of a supreme political will.

Rawe and Schulz (2009, p. 91) illustrate the context as follows: Communication can be described as concurrence of three typical decision-making roles. The homo psychologicus determines individual motives, which in the role of homo economicus are substantiated with good reasons for the public and are powerfully deployed in the role of homo politicus. The skillful interaction of all three roles is critical for communication. Individual motives alone are often times non-communicable and/or not suitable for legitimizing decisions. Wars can be initiated for economic, religious, psychological, familial or other reasons, yet for external communication good reasons need to be found. The more legitimate the decision's logical reasoning seems to be, i.e., the better communicable and conveyable through mass media it is, the smaller the demand for the power role. The more power the decision-maker in turn has, the less he or she has to rely on the legitimacy of his or her decisions. Rawe and Schulz label the skillful combination of all three roles as "micro-political skill."

In the face of massive loss of trust as concerns democratically legitimized politicians, the fundamental credibility of rational legitimizations has been questioned. Eventually, this means that the power perspective and the motivation of decision-makers either in favor of or against war cannot be hidden behind attempts to rationally legitimize decisions

communicated to the public via mass media; in fact, the former perspectives come to the fore due to the loss of credibility.

Consequences and Relevance

One facet of "new wars" is that bellicose disputes nowadays are without any consequence for national sovereignty. With a foreign intervention's failure, one's own country's loss need not be feared. For Clausewitz (1873), however, military defeat still had this consequence:

> "If the military force is destroyed, that is completely defeated, rendered incapable of further resistance, then the loss of the territory follows of itself." (bk. 6, ch. 27)

However in the second part of the quote, Clausewitz discusses the fact that the abandonment of territory can also be a strategic decision of the opponent in order to defend or more easily reconquer territory, wherefore military deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq can be mentioned as examples.

> "[...] but on the other hand, the destruction of the military force by no means follows from the conquest of the country, because that force may of its own accord evacuate the territory, in order afterwards to reconquer it the more easily." (bk. 6, ch. 27)

We – i.e., the civilian population – find ourselves in a strange contradictory state: being at war; pretending that peace is not threatened; and knowing that our individual peace is indeed not touched upon.

The leading role becomes all the more clear: that political representation could or had to take over, namely to illustrate complex contexts within an interwoven global security policy theatre so that each individual citizen can understand the consequences even if those cannot be tagged with conventional categories of personal or national threat scenarios. The communication content as concerns new or differently proceeding consequences, however, is not widely known. It would be a primary task of communication to formulate the enlarged notion of security, to tailor it to individual demands, and thus to explain after all what consequences state-run security and military policy might still have.

Communication of and about war is necessary in order to create legitimacy for political decision-making and thus organizational sustenance. At the same time, transparent communication is impossible as concerns strategic advantages as well as the facts of transparency and

authenticity per se. Additionally, the implementation of the common understanding of what communication management in the area of security and military policy could be is in fact impossible, since it would mean that violence and war were understood as legitimate strategic-communicative issues and in constant danger of being prettified by public relations. This is particularly true since the relevant moments of necessary communication can for the most part only be determined ex post in any case – after or during a crisis situation.

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LITIGATION AS AGGRESSION: THE USE AND ABUSE OF THE COURTS AND MEDIA FOR BULLYING, NOT JUSTICE-SEEKING

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I. Introduction

Clausewitz is credited as stating that war is politics by other means.[1] In modern America, celebrities, and the very wealthy, sometimes appear to use lawsuits for purposes other than seeking justice within the law. Rather, for them litigation can become "war by other means." In legal terms, such lawsuits may be either wholly or in part without merit (frivolous) or brought in bad faith for improper purposes, such as to harass (abusive). Possible examples of this phenomenon seem to appear more frequently, at least as reported with great enthusiasm by the news media. These include the developer/TV host Donald Trump's suit against comedian Bill Maher over Trump's human paternity; Fox News' suit against then writer/comedian, now Senator Al Franken over the subtitle of one of his satirical books; Tour de France champion Lance Armstrong's suits against various associates, friends, newspapers, and the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency over allegations of his use of performance-enhancing drugs; and the Church of Scientology's suits against former members, critics, and the Internal Revenue Service and its employees over disagreements about church policy or interpretations of the tax code.

This paper will examine these developments in light of the origin and purposes of the legal system, the rules of court and how they are designed to operate, the mechanisms available to judges and the state bars to address possible abuses of the system, and how well these mechanisms curb abuses and promote justice. In addition, the paper will address the

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[1] The precise quotation has been translated as "War is a mere continuation of policy by other means." Carl von Clausewitz, On War (1874), Project Gutenberg, February 2006, Book I, Ch. 1, Sec. 23, www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h.html

modern-day cult of celebrity and specific examples of possibly abusive litigation by celebrities by focusing on certain lawsuits and responses to them, including the possible motivation of the plaintiffs and how the litigation has been concluded. Finally, the paper will attempt to explain the meaning of possible celebrity abusive litigation for the entire legal system and society, and most importantly, what can and should be done to address potential misuse of the legal system.

II. The Legal System: History and Purpose

The fundamental purpose of any legal system is to definitively resolve disputes in a court based upon rules of law, rather than other means, most importantly, violence. Of course, the state's power is ultimately backed by force, though rarely is that required. It has been said that courtroom trial and juries replaced trial by physical combat.[2] Numerous legal principles are fundamental to the United States legal system, such as the right to due process (notice and an opportunity to be heard), the right to a neutral tribunal, the right to counsel in certain criminal cases, and the right to a jury trial in most civil and criminal cases.[3]

In civil suits the fundamental purpose of the civil legal system is to encourage meritorious litigation to be definitively adjudicated. Non-meritorious litigation, of course, is discouraged both because it is unfair and costly (to the defendant, to the court system and society itself by discouraging faith in the legal system); ultimately, such litigation distorts the purposes of the legal system. Of course, there is a difference between plaintiffs merely not winning a case and bringing frivolous litigation; not prevailing does not necessarily signify frivolousness.

In any event, the legal system is designed to be a civilized mechanism to deal with conflict in society based on the rule of law rather than based on violence or corruption.

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[2] See, e.g., Peter Leeson, "Trial by Battle,"
www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/LEO.Leeson.Trial_by_Battle.pdf
[3] See., e.g., United Sates Constitution, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments

III. Modern Litigation

A. The Rules of Court

In order to achieve its intended purposes, courts have created rules to be followed in pursuing claims and defenses. The federal system has developed the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (hereinafter "Fed. R. Civ. P.") a comprehensive set of directives for attorneys (and *pro se* litigants) to follow in the course of litigation. The rules follow a case from initial filing and response through the conclusion of litigation, and additional rules (*e.g, the* Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure) for appealing a decision to a higher court. Similarly, the states, in the scheme of federalism created by the United States Constitution, have a parallel system of rules for each state's court litigation (for those matters which may be pursued through the state courts, which may include some federal claims). State rules of court typically pattern themselves on the federal court system though there are differences.[4]

It is significant that the very first rule in federal court (and likewise in many state courts) articulates their purpose: the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of any [lawsuit]."[5] Although the public, and even many attorneys who have forgotten or not read this rule, might be shocked by the simple nobility of the rule, it is hard to imagine any attorney, judge, or litigant who believes that this rule has achieved its goals in the vast majority of cases filed each year. State courts fare no better.

Yet it is simple, and inexpensive to initiate a lawsuit: the current filing fee in federal or state court is typically about $400 (and free if a party can demonstrate financial inability to pay it, which is known as proceeding *in forma pauperis*).[6] Unlike those who face serious criminal charges, generally no attorney is constitutionally required to be provided for a defendant in civil litigation.[7] Recognizing the burdens on the parties, as well as the court system, of proceeding through a trial, the courts have established rules to resolve cases at early stages, allowing challenges to the complaint document itself (e.g., through the filing by a defendant of a

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[4] See, e.g., Florida Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter "Fla. R. Civ. P.")
[5] Fed. R. Civ. P. 1
[6] 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1913-1915 for federal court filings, and Fla. Stat. Sec. 28.241 (2013) for Florida state court filings
[7] See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981)

motion to dismiss the complaint),[8] or to summarily dispose of the case through the filing of a motion for summary judgment before trial. Summary judgment, in general, is deemed appropriate when no significant facts are in dispute and one party is entitled to prevail based on the law.[9] Thus, in appropriate cases the courts will grant such motions and eliminate the need for a trial at all, subject to appellate review.

The administration of justice (and the rules) is primarily the province of the judges along with the attorneys who are said to act as "officers of the court," and who are regulated by state bar associations. In the federal system, Fed, R, Civ. P, 11 (and comparable rules in the state courts)[10] outlines the responsibilities of the attorney signing any paper filed in the case to have sufficiently determined that the statements contained in the paper are factual and filed in good faith based on what the attorney knows about the facts and the law in the exercise of due diligence[11] Furthermore, judges have the inherent power to control litigation and oversee justice so that court proceedings are not used improperly.[12]

State bar associations maintain oversight over lawyers practicing in their states' courts. Each state maintains ethical rules which allow review of attorneys' actions or inactions.[13] Infractions can lead to discipline of attorneys, including suspensions, public or private reprimands, or even disbarment.[14] Each federal district (trial) court has a grievance committee to review conduct of allegedly errant attorneys practicing in their courts.[15] The American Bar Association, a national, voluntary bar association, has promulgated Model Rules of Professional Conduct which most states have adopted in some form.[16]

Lawyers are required under the ethical rules of the various bars to zealously represent a client's interests in the course of the representation but but must do so within the boundaries of the ethical rules. Those rules

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[8] Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)

[9] Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510

[10] E.g., Fla. Stat. Sec. 57.105 (2013)

[11] Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, Fla. Stat. Sec. 57.105, and Florida Rules of Judicial Administration 2.515.

[12] Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980)

[13] Florida Bar Rules of Professional Conduct, flabar.org/

[14] Florida Bar Rules of Professional Conduct, flabar.org/

[15] See, e.g., Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Rules Governing Attorney Discipline

[16] http://ambar.org/modelrulesprofcon

include an obligation to show candor and honesty in dealings with the court, their client, and opposing counsel and witnesses. Lawyers must operate within the bounds of the facts, as they know or should know them, as well as the law, though they are allowed to argue in good faith for the extension or overturning of law.[17] In summary, lawyers must act on behalf of client and their interests to the best of their ability but must do so within the bounds of the facts, law, and ethical rules.

As a result of modern trends toward inappropriate behavior by lawyers, sometimes referred to under the rubric of incivility, state bars such as in Florida have even amended their oath of admission to practice as a lawyer to include the swearing (or affirming) that they will not act in an uncivil way in the practice of law.[18]

B. Application of the Rules

Though all of these rules, whether of the courts or the state bar associations, purport to require lawyers to act with the highest of purposes in the legal system, the applications of these rules is spotty at best, and nonexistent at worst, in the case of potentially frivolous or abusive litigation. There are a number of reasons for this. The rules, though at least aspirational, are difficult to enforce in practice. Judges tend to be reluctant to impose, or even entertain sanctions. The allegations tend to be unpleasant or even nasty and not something a judge desires to address. Furthermore, the issues raised are ancillary to the main questions for the court to answer. Finally, questions of proof often are difficult to resolve, often involving credibility questions, so courts are reluctant to even attempt it.

Nonetheless, the externalities to the system of justice are significant. The costs to defend against frivolous or abusive litigation can be substantial. These costs include taking depositions, especially transcribing them, the need to secure and pay expert witnesses, whose fees are generally substantial, as well as investigators and other costs. Typically the largest expenditures in defending against such cases are attorney fees. Generally, those fees are based on an hourly basis which could range from several hundred dollars per hour to a thousand dollars per hour or more.

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[17] Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, Fla. Stat. Sec. 57.105, and Florida Rules of Judicial Administration 2.515
[18] See, e.g., Oath of Admission to the Florida Bar

Lastly, the intangible emotional toll of this sort of litigation can far exceed the out-of-pocket costs. As the late, renowned Judge Learned Hand eloquently stated in 1921, "After some dozen years of experience I must say as a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything short of sickness and death."[19] And he was referring to any kind of litigation, not just the frivolous or abusive type. And that was over 90 years ago.[20]

C. Countermeasures Against Abusive Litigation

Courts may, though rarely, act on their own against a frivolous lawsuit, dismissing the suit and sanctioning the plaintiff, his or her attorney, or both. In addition to the rules allowing this action by the court, cases have held that the judge has inherent power to control abuses of the courts.[21] More commonly, defendants may initially pursue sanctions against the plaintiff, his or her attorney, or both. In federal court, the request (motion) is made pursuant to Rule 11.[22] State courts have similar rules and statutes.[23]

In addition to requests that a court issue sanctions against an attorney, a plaintiff, or both in the form of dismissal of the lawsuit and monetary sanctions for pursuing frivolous or abusive litigation, defendants may pursue counterclaims against the offending party. One claim a defendant may bring is a claim for malicious prosecution.[24] The essence of such a claim is that the plaintiff (and his or her attorney) brought a claim without sufficient basis to believe that it was valid. In addition, a defendant could bring a claim for abuse of process.[25] This claim is premised on the improper use of the legal system, i.e., primarily to cause harm to the defendant rather than pursue a claim to obtain a result to which the

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[19] "The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter," 3 Legal Lectures on Legal Topics 1921-1922 89, 105 (Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1926) cited in Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), 1988, 125

[20] This insight was apparently ignored by a unanimous United States Supreme Court in de-ciding Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), the case in which the Court allowed a sexu-al harassment lawsuit to proceed against a sitting president.

[21] Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980)

[22] Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, Fla. Stat. Sec. 57.105, and Florida Rules of Judicial Administration 2.515

[23] E.g., Fla. Stat. Sec. 57.105 (2013)

[24] E.g., Lewton v. Hower, 35 Fla. 58 (1895) and Wolfe v. Foreman, 2013 WL 3724763 (Fla. 3d DCA July 12, 2013)

[25] E.g., Cline v. Flagler Sales Corp., 207 So.2d 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)

plaintiff is entitled. Both of these counterclaims are relatively rare primarily because they require that the litigation continue and the defendants need to prove their counterclaims so most defendants attempt to end the litigation, not prolong it.

D. Statutes Providing for Costs/Attorney Fees

Federal and state statutes and rules allow defendants in frivolous lawsuits to request at least some out-of-pocket expenses, and in some cases, not attorney fees.[26] Some states have enacted anti-SLAPP (i.e., anti-Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) statutes.[27] Such statutes allow for the dismissal of retaliatory lawsuits as well as costs and attorney fees for frivolous lawsuits intended to stifle public opposition to public matters. These statutes have been enacted in 31 states, though not yet by the federal government.[28]

IV. The Nature of Celebrity Today and How it Affects the Legal System

A. Introduction

The pop-artist Andy Warhol famously said that "in the day future everybody will be world-famous for fifteen minutes. (YBQ, 2006, 797) Daniel Boorstin, the late history professor and Librarian of Congress, wrote in 1961 that unlike heroes, who are famous for what they accomplish, celebrities are famous simply for being well-known. (Boorstin, 1987) Today, it appears that these two insights have coalesced and surpassed their initial essence: celebrities now are those who have been famous for 15 minutes, for whatever reason, and then try to extend their famousness as long as the public cares. Today's celebrities look for ways to remain "relevant," often by attacking those who they believe seek to marginalize them. Unfortunately, they sometimes may resort to dubious use of the legal system and the media to achieve their goals. The consequences of such tactics have far-ranging deleterious effects on the legal system and society at large.

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[26] See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1920, and Fla. Stat. Sec. 57.105 (2013)
[27] See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Sec. 768.295 (2013)
[28] See www.anti-slapp.org

B. Examples of Celebrities Who Sue

    1. Donald Trump

        a. Who he is

Donald Trump is a well-known American real-estate developer, entrepreneur and TV show host, who initially created "The Apprentice" and more recently "The Celebrity Apprentice." The show features various assignments for contestants who are serially eliminated by Trump ("You're fired!") so that only one remains. It is akin to one of the original "reality" show entitled "Survivor," in which contestants compete against each other in an exotic locale to win the final prize. Trump's initial exotic locale was the corporate boardroom. In any event, Trump has been in the limelight for years, including substantial gambling enterprises and glitzy projects around the world. His exploits have been discussed by himself in his own books, and those written by others. (Trump, 2004; O'Brien, 2005) He has been lauded, and derided by countless commentators and has professed to being very wealthy, which has been reported by sources such as *Fortune* magazine. (Forbes, 2016)

Trump has also injected himself into the political arena, including at the presidential level, most recently in Republican circles. For a time, public opinion polls of Republicans showed that he was the front-runner. (USNews, 2012) Trump has never formally declared himself to be a candidate for any office but has suggested publicly at times that he was considering becoming a presidential candidate. He has been a fierce opponent of Barack Obama, first when he was a candidate and later as president and a candidate for reelection. Trump flirted with the so-called "birther movement," i.e., those people, primarily Republicans, who have questioned Obama's citizenship based on his birth in 1961 to a Kenyan father and U.S. mother and therefore his eligibility to be president. (USNews, 2012)

Even after Obama presented his "long-form" birth certificate, Trump, during the 2012 presidential campaign continued to question the president's birth and therefore his qualification to be president. (Gentilviso, 2012)

        b. How he has used litigation

As a wealthy businessman Trump is of course familiar with the courts. The inquiry here, however, is how Trump may have used or threatened litigation to achieve results which do not always appear to be limited to

resolution of actual legal disputes. Trump has been described as media-savvy and fond of publicity. Either of these traits are in themselves not of interest for this paper except as they have been reflected in Trump's use of litigation apparently to promote, at least in part, his career image. (The Atlantic, 2013)

Man or Ape: the Bill Maher litigation

In furthering Trump's purported concern with President Obama's eligibility to be president, even after the President produced his full birth certificate from the state of Hawaii, Trump continued the questioning of it and offered to donate $5 million to the charities of the President's choice if he produced his college application and transcripts as well as his passport application and records. Not surprisingly, the President apparently never responded to Trump's media announcement of the offer.

Around the time of the 2012 election, Bill Maher, a comedian and political satirist who has a weekly show on HBO, "Real Time," appeared on "The Tonight Show" with Jay Leno and said,

[S]uppose that perhaps Donald Trump had been the spawn of his mother having sex with an orangutan.

Because -- well, I didn't just make this up -- the color of his hair and the color of an orange orangutan is the only two things in nature of the same color. I'm not saying it's true, I hope it's not true, but unless he comes up with proof, I'm willing to -- I'm willing to offer five million dollars to Donald Trump if he will come -- that he can donate to charity of his choice, Hair Club for Men, the Institute for Incorrigible Douchebaggery. Whatever charity -- (Volokh, 2013)

Several days later Trump announced through the media that he had his attorney send a letter to Maher, accepting what he asserted was an offer and enclosing Trump's birth certificate reflecting that Trump's father was a human, Fred Trump, demanding that Maher make available $5 million for charities of Trump's choice. (Volokh, 2013) When the letter was ignored, Trump filed suit against Maher on February 4, 2013, in state court in California demanding the $5 million for breach of contract.[29]

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[29] Trump v. Maher, Case No. BC499537 (Superior Ct. Cal. County of L.A.) (Feb. 4, 2013).

Commenting on the suit, well-known UCLA constitutional law professor Eugene Volokh noted that Trump's suit likely met the California standard for frivolous, and sanctionable pleadings since Maher's comments clearly fell in the category of a joke (and commentary on Trump's birther position) and would not fall in the category of a legally enforceable contract. (The Atlantic, 2013) Maher, in his commentary about the suit on his HBO cable TV show also noted the scientific impossibility of such an interspecies mating result. (YouTube, 2013)

Volokh refers to Trump's suit as a joke and suggested Trump was "just having fun with the complaint, and doesn't expect it to actually win." (The Atlantic, 2013) Because of the abusiveness of the suit, it seems to be more than that: namely, deleterious to the legal system and lawyers' reputations. Trump's lawyers moved to dismiss their own complaint. (TMZ, 2013) According to Trump's special counsel, "the lawsuit was temporarily withdrawn to be amended and refiled at a later date." (TMZ, 2013) In addition to the fact that lawsuits are not "temporarily withdrawn" (they're either withdrawn or not}, to date no new suit has been refiled and there appears no commentator who has credibly suggested it ever will be.

Why the Trump litigation and threats?

1.

One lawsuit and threat has been briefly examined to explore the topic of how the courts may have been used for dubious litigation. The question is why this suit and threat were instituted. It seems that extrajudicial considerations played a role, at least in part. In effect, Trump was able to garner publicity and remain in the news for a business model that depends at least in part on those goals. It also may have been intended to deter criticism by someone opposed to a Trump public position. Trump has amassed a large business empire that at least in part on his goal of being brash, bold, and looked to for public statements that generate notice, whether praised or denounced. His books seem to have been predicated, at least in part, on the notion that his name, and demands for opulence increase the value of a product, whether it is a real estate development, TV show, or clothing. (Boorstin, 1987)

This example of questionable litigation was not, of course, legally successful. But in bringing the suit or threat of dubious legal merit, the legal system itself (as abetted by the media) may have been affected and

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used, at least in part, for other than the purpose of resolving a real legal dispute.

2. Fox News/O'Reilly vs. Al Franken

In May 2003, Al Franken, then a comedian, political satirist and writer, and now a U.S. Senator from Minnesota, appeared at a book fair on a panel with Bill O'Reilly, a Fox News talk show host and writer. The two men engaged in a shouting match as they discussed their books. (BookTV, 2003) Franken's was entitled *Lies and the Lying Liars Who Tell Them: a Fair and Balanced Look at the Right.* (Franken, 2003) In August 2003, Fox News sued Franken and his publisher over the use of the phrase "fair and balanced" for which it claimed trademark protection and moved for a temporary restraining order in federal court. (SDNY, 2003) The federal judge found the case "wholly without merit, both factually and legally," even suggesting that the Fox News trademark could be invalid. (Saulny, 2003) Fox News dismissed the lawsuit three days later. (Collins, 2003)

It has been suggested that the lawsuit was filed by Fox News at O'Reilly's insistence. O'Reilly has one of the most popular talk show on cable TV, often the most popular cable show. (Mediabistro, 2013)

3. Lance Armstrong vs. Everyone

Lance Armstrong, the former champion professional cyclist who won the Tour de France seven times but was dogged by allegations of doping throughout his career. NYT (2012a) Armstrong had been totally dominant in the world of professional cycling but his reputation came crashing down with allegations by numerous sources of illegal use of performance-enhancing drugs and covering his, and his team's use of those illegal substances. NYT (2012a) For purposes of this paper, the focus will be on Armstrong's use of the courts and media to sue, or threaten friends, associates, newspapers and anyone else who accused him of illegal activities. His abuse of the legal system, now exposed for all to see, is monumental and has significant implications for the legal system, the media, and society.

In an article in the *American Bar Association Journal* in January 2013 entitled "Was Lance Armstrong a Lawsuit Bully?", (Weiss, 2013) Oprah Winfrey is quoted as asking "You're suing people and you know they're telling the truth? What is that?" Armstrong's reply was "It's a major

flaw." He went on to say "he was a control freak and needed to hide the truth." (Weiss, 2013)

This stunning admission raises numerous issues, of course, but for purposes of this paper the question is how he was able to abuse the courts, and media for so long. One of the lawsuits, in fact, was against the *SundayTimes* (*of London)* for defamation, which it settled for $500,000. The newspaper sued Armstrong to recover its money and reached a confidential settlement with him in August 2013. (The Guardian, 2012a)

Before the scandal came crashing down on Armstrong, he filed one last lawsuit against the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency to prevent it from pursuing doping allegations against him. ." (NYT, 2012b) The lawsuit was so patently an attempt by Armstrong to use the courts and media to raise at least some frivolous allegations that the federal judge hearing the request for relief by Armstrong's attorneys found that the 80-page complaint was filled with allegations "totally irrelevant" to Armstrong's claims and "solely included to increase media coverage of this case, and to incite public opinion against" the Anti-Doping Agency. "This court is not inclined to indulge Armstrong's desire for publicity, self-aggrandizement or vilification of Defendants..." (NYT, 2012b)

Armstrong famously dropped the lawsuit and said he was tired and would not contest the allegations against him. (The Guardian, 2012b) He later confessed on the Oprah Winfrey Show.(NYT, 2012a)

Other articles have discussed Armstrong's use of lawsuits and threats to protect his image and reputation, not to mention the money he had received. Ironically, Armstrong, whose net worth was estimated at $125 million, is now the subject of numerous lawsuits for fraud and breach of contract.(NYT, 2012b) Perhaps the most ironic lawsuit is pursuant to the federal False Claims Act, a post-Civil War statute that allows individuals and the Federal government to sue those who have defrauded the government. (Williams, 2013) Here the U.S. Postal Service, a major sponsor of Armstrong and his team, has joined a former Armstrong associate in suing to recover moneys the Postal Service paid out. (Williams, 2013) It has been suggested that the Postal Service may have difficulty proving damages because of the favorable publicity it had received when Armstrong and his team were winning championships, though now those titles are being stripped from the team. (Williams, 2013)

But it seems clear that tangible and intangible damage to the legal system and the media, among others caused by Armstrong's abuses has been incalculable.

4. Church of Scientology vs. IRS and other critics

   a. As alleged in many sources, most recently Lawrence Wright's best-selling book *Going Clear: Scientology, Hollywood, and the Prison of Belief*, the Church of Scientology has long been embroiled in litigation with its critics. (Wright, 2013, ch 7) Founded in the 1950's by a former science fiction writer, L. Ron Hubbard, Scientology has long been interested in attracting Hollywood celebrities, most notably Tom Cruise, to its cause as a means of recruitment and as spokespeople for it. Another founding principle, as reported by Wright, is the aggressive stance it has taken in regard to opponents and critic, particularly in regard to litigation and the threat of litigation.

   b. As described in an April 25, 2013 cover story in *The New York Review of Books*, "Lawsuits, in Wright's account, are Scientology's principal weapons against its outside critics, designed to 'harass and discourage rather than win.'" (Wright, 2013, p 50) For example, the story relates the allegations of one of the first exposes, in 1971 by Paulette Cooper that "she was subjected to death threats, nineteen lawsuits, wiretaps." (Collins, 2003)

As the article notes, "one of Wright's the most shocking accounts reveals how the IRS was intimidated into allowing Scientology the status of a religion." It notes that Wright found that after the IRS sent a $1 billion bill for back taxes, "Scientologists infiltrated it, IRS agents were threatened, their lives became a sea of legal and domestic torments." (Collins, 2003) Further, "The agency had to defend against more than two thousand legal actions. It eventually capitulated to the campaign of lawsuits and harassment, reduced the amount owed to $12.5 million... and acceded to its demands to be characterized a religion, which saves it untold sums of future taxes." (Collins, 2003)

If even some of these allegations are true, this presents a disturbing pattern which calls into question the ability of the legal system and the media to deal with such approaches to litigation.

C. What are the consequences of questionable celebrity litigation for the legal system and society?

When celebrities engage in litigation that may be frivolous and bullying, media coverage transforms behavior that is far too common in the non-celebrity, commonplace misuse of the courts into spectacles for all to see. In other words, it is not just the frivolous nature of the litigation that is critical but also the widespread public awareness of it. Public response can range from indifference since the celebrity angle suggests it does not matter to the average citizen, but more likely the public will focus on the celebrity aspect and extrapolate to society at large. Thus the response can be that the system is broken and lawyers should be even less trusted than they have become. Or the public can observe possible legal bullying and conclude that they too can obtain desired results though such tactics, if they have the financial resources and access to attorneys who will oblige.

The spotlight on such litigation may also highlight the difficulties of controlling such suits and the attendant media attention because of the seemingly insatiable demand for news about celebrities. The celebrity gossip website TMZ.com has specialized in this sort of coverage and it would seem fitting that its founder is a lawyer, Harvey Levin. But the inherent difficulties in preventing or even sanctioning attorneys for possibly frivolous litigation can lead to increasing cynicism on the part of the public about the legal system.

Finally, the escalating costs to defend even frivolous litigation illuminates for the public that the costs of litigation (most significantly attorney fees) can, and often do control the outcome of legal battles, not what is just. Again, cynicism, if not despair about the legal system and lawyers can be a consequence of these media and courtroom battles.

VII. Conclusion--what can and should be done?

In light of this paper's description of modern-day celebrity potential abuse of the legal system and the media, the question is how can these seemingly increasingly problematic tactics be addressed. There are several avenues that could be explored.

First, the media itself, which is often complicit in publicizing litigation because of the public's appetite for such coverage, to expose the possible abusiveness of such conduct. The media can highlight for their audiences that much of this litigation is, or may be without merit and thus highlight the improper purposes that may be at play.

Second, judges can be urged to deal more forcefully with possible abuses of the court system, in celebrity and non-celebrity cases. For example, several of the case mentioned in this paper, such as Fox News' lawsuit against Al Franken and Lance Armstrong's lawsuit against the Anti-Doping Agency, resulted in strong orders by the courts condemning publicly the lack of merit, and in the Lance Armstrong case, laying bare the shameless media strategy engaged in by the plaintiff Armstrong. If such court orders were more common, the improper behavior would more likely be deterred in all, not just in celebrity=brought potentially frivolous litigation.

Finally, the media, and the courts, can help the public recognize the importance of costs (financial and non-financial) in the outcome of cases and encourage alternatives and methods of controlling costs and errant attorney so that meritorious cases can be decided on the merits and not on successful bullying. In other words the media and courts should encourage the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of any legal dispute, as called for in the very first rule of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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SMOKING KILLS – BRAND COMMUNICATION RESTRICTIONS BETWEEN ADVERTISING STRATEGY, CONSUMERS' SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MASS MEDIA

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Abstract

This essay explains what drives the current discourse on consumer communication and advertising restrictions regarding tobacco products. It illustrates how recent developments in the field of consumer behavior research have influenced the current discourse and how different concepts of consumer sovereignty are used by both proponents and opponents of stricter regulations to influence the public discourse in a mass media society, and thereby the political outcomes. Based on public policy theories, the paper describes the fundamental mechanisms involved in the development of a mass media-driven social discourse.

1. Introduction

The planned Revised Tobacco Products Directive (RTPD) is a key piece of EU legislation which seeks to amend the existing TPD 2001/37/EC (European Parliament and Council, 2001) and will introduce new restrictions on product communication as well as measures of deterrence and education regarding the sale of tobacco products. After a first reading of the draft directive on October 8th, 2013, the European Parliament

amended the EU Commission's proposal, which means that negotiations on a compromise will take place among the Parliament, EU Member States and the Commission during the next few months. Nevertheless, the new TPD will in all likelihood include the following regulations:

- An obligation for combined picture and text health warnings to cover large parts of the front and the back of tobacco product packages.
- A ban of any misleading labeling (such as "natural" or "organic").
- The labeling or packaging of any tobacco product must not suggest that a particular product is less harmful than others or has positive health or lifestyle effects.
- Member States may introduce more stringent rules on additives or on packaging of tobacco products (such as plain packaging).
- No information on tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide should be included on packs.
- Prohibition of additives and flavors in cigarettes to make the product more attractive.

This paper wants to shed light on communication research's fundamental question of how effective those restrictions on product communication and education tools or measures of deterrence are as concerns products that entail health risks. To take this a step further, the paper takes a look at the broader impacts beyond the mere question of effectiveness: It will show how and why underlying theories of advertising effects are used in the media-driven political discourse on tobacco regulation, and it will take a look at the different consumer concepts behind the politicians' and producers' communication strategies and their inherent inconsistencies. Finally, it will explain how these different communication strategies are used by the tobacco industry and proponents of stricter regulations.

By no means should this paper be understood as an argument against tobacco regulations per se. The authors are well aware of the necessity to regulate potentially if not de facto harmful products. Hence, the paper's goal is to describe and analyze the sociopolitical discourse on tobacco regulation, the underlying motives by all parties involved, and how the tobacco industry tries to exploit inconsistencies in the communication strategies within the political discourse.

2. Research on the Effectiveness of Advertising Restrictions

2.1 Theoretical Framework

The proponents of advertising restrictions – especially political actors – rely on research when determining measures of regulation. Relevant studies try to prove the effectiveness of restrictive regulations to reduce tobacco consumption. All research is – explicitly or implicitly – based on models of consumer behavior. These models vary immensely. Research on consumer decision making goes back at least 300 years, led by economists like Nicholas Bernoulli (Richarme, 2005), John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944). The most influential early models (and some still today) are based on the Elmo St. Lewis AIDA model. Lavidge and Steiner's "Model for Predictive Measurement of Advertising" (1961), McGuire's "Information Processing Model" (1978), or even Kroeber-Riel's "Concept of Activation" (1979) can be traced back to St. Lewis. These hierarchy of response models all focus on the process of advertising itself, on a chronological sequence of steps that are necessary to persuade consumers, but neglect nearly all external influences in their buying behavior. Over the last decades, however, researchers have enhanced those models by considering the purchase situation, thereby introducing concepts of involvement, learning processes, and behavior (rational or emotive). The often revised models of Howard-Sheth (1969), Engel-Kollat-Blackwell – EKB (1968), Engel-Miniard-Blackwell (2006), or Bettman (1979) try to find a more holistic approach. With their work, the focus shifts towards the (not necessarily perfectly) informed consumer, his or her needs and environment. Today, research on advertising effects has developed even more differentiated approaches, for example the Elaboration Likelihood Model – ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), or Reactance Theory in consumer research (Brehm, 1966, 1972; Brehm et al., 1966; Mazis et al., 1973; Lessne, 1987).

Yet what appears to be a huge development within consumer research may at the same time be a drawback for – in our case – proponents of further regulation of potentially harmful products like tobacco. The undeniable complexity of consumer behavior has consequences: The more holistic the approach, the less clear are the results. Acting under the assumption that consumers are conscious human beings who actively seek product information and are able to process and interpret information, the more holistic models raise considerable doubt about how it is even possible to successfully protect consumers. On the other hand, theories

that are more concentrated on fewer factors influencing consumers provide clearer results. It comes as no surprise that different types of theories and models are applied by the different sides of the tobacco regulation discourse.

2.2 Two exemplary studies

As previously written, research on advertising effects has developed more differentiated approaches. Thus, more differentiated models lead to more complex results. The research findings on warning signs on cigarette packages are not clear by any means: When looking into different research studies, the impression prevails that the results depend heavily upon the initiator or sponsor of the respective study. Apart from the question on regulation's effectiveness, the question concerning scientific researchers' independence from business and political interests seems to be another dimension of the debate (Weingart, 2001).

However, while studies on behalf of the respective political actors do actually suggest a positive effect of communication restrictions on the motivation to smoke (Bühler et al., 2007; Drogenbeauftragte, 2011; Hanewinkel et al., 2010), studies carried out on behalf of the tobacco industry arrive at different results (Deloitte MCS Limited, 2011; Pailla & Watson, 2010). To pinpoint this divergence, we use two research studies initiated by different interest groups: Research number 1 (Deloitte MCS Limited, 2011) was initiated by British American Tobacco and conducted by the consulting firm Deloitte which in and of itself might ring alarm bells. However, it is research that holds up to all criteria of scientific research and is thus not by and in itself prone to scientifically legitimizing the current outlook of the tobacco industry. The second study was initiated by the German Ministry for Health and conducted by the Institute of Therapy Research (Bühler et al., 2007).

The two studies use different research methods: The second study's results are based on a synthesis of research papers. The Deloitte study uses − in addition to a research synthesis − an econometric analysis. The verdict of the two studies is predictably very different. Deloitte does not see the effectiveness of visual warnings on tobacco products:

> "The main finding of both these pieces of research is that PSA regulation (including increasing the size of health warnings) does not appear to have a direct impact on consumption." (Deloitte MCS Limited, 2011, p. 16)

Almost none of the sources used led to conclude that warning signs result in smokers giving up smoking. Even if the consumer becomes aware of the health risks that smoking entails, there is no such thing as automatic change of behavior. Thus, a statistically significant correlation between warning signs and changes in consumer behavior cannot be found. One might indeed conclude that larger warning signs increase attention for these; however, looking into aggregated smoking behavior, real consequences for smoking behavior cannot be derived. The introduction of visual warning signs in Australia in 2006 did not have a significant influence on the average total amount of cigarettes consumed between 1990 and 2010, while the total amount increased and declined steadily. Thus, Deloitte concluded:

> "Warnings have not had a discernable impact on smoking prevalence." (Deloitte MCS Limited, 2011, p. 17)

However, consequences were found regarding the image of the smokers/consumers themselves. Packages with less branding are seen to be less attractive; as a result, the consumers themselves are seen as less outgoing and fashionable. Implications for smoking behavior cannot be derived either from this fact.

The only variable that significantly impacts cigarette consumption – when one follows the Deloitte argument – is pricing, which is negatively correlated with consumption. Countries with lower cigarette prices can be said to have higher cigarette consumption. Furthermore, consumption in the year prior to the analysis, as well as the gross domestic product, i.e. wealth, are relevant.

The study initiated by the German government concludes the influence of warning signs to be higher: Visual, picture-based warnings supposedly have a strong effect on attention paid to and knowledge of health risks as a result of cigarette smoke's ingredients. Furthermore, effects could be measured as concerns the motivation to quit smoking. However, a direct effect on smoking behavior could not be found here either. The effects found, however, were stronger among women than among men; for non-smokers and ex-smokers, warning visuals helped to strengthen their attitudes and motivation to maintain their non-smoking behavior.

The above should in no way be understood as an evaluation or assessment of the validity or accuracy of the two studies mentioned, but should instead demonstrate how differently widely recognized research

approaches are used to influence the public and political discourse on tobacco regulations.

Regardless of the two studies mentioned above, increasing the complexity of an issue might help to put question marks on research findings. In general, when assessing what does or does not work in tobacco control, many factors have to be taken into consideration:

First, evaluations may be time sensitive. It takes time for measures to be implemented, time to exert their effects, and there may be some kind of erosion of the effects over time. Thus, outcomes may vary depending on the point in time. Different policies will have different time frames to show effects. Price changes for instance will show results faster than advertising bans. Second, assessments have to take into account competing influences which can be very subtle but nevertheless crucial. Such influences can be a misinformation campaign or some societal influence unrelated to smoking interventions. Third, before implementation there will normally be some kind of public debate, which in itself will change individual behavior. Fourth, policies are introduced as comprehensive packages, which makes it even harder to separate the influence of one single component. Finally, there is very often a need for better data which can be hard to retrieve, particularly in some regions of the world or even only for parts of a respective population, for example lower-income households (Slama et al., 2007, pp. 159–160).

All these factors can be and are utilized by the tobacco industry to somewhat water down unfavorable research results, thereby slowing down the process of implementing harsher tobacco regulation.

3. Underlying Consumer Concepts

Beyond the question for effectiveness of regulation, it is critical to look at the different concepts of the consumer which both politics and the advertising business/tobacco industry have devised.

In a democracy all citizens, whether they recognize and like it or not, are sovereigns. For citizens to stay sovereign there has to be the guaranteed access to open information channels. This is why the right of free speech is protected in free societies. Accordingly, for consumers to stay sovereign, no information must be censored. Advertising – no matter what product might be involved – provides information. It may be difficult to see how knowledge of the sort provided by tobacco producers

might help the sovereign consumer, but it might be argued that restricting commercial free speech is misinterpreting what it means to be sovereign.

> "True sovereignty implies the right for each of us to make up our own minds with regard to the value of any information flows which may reach us. Prohibitions of tobacco advertising, as in the case of all censorship, is thus a denigration of our sovereignty as citizens. It may seem sensible to some people to cut ourselves off from flows of commercially inspired information, but if these people, even a majority, are allowed to prohibit such free speech, they thereby denigrate the sovereignty of the rest of us." (Block, 1997, p. 226)

This concept, developed within the political realm, has transpired into economics. In a free market society consumers are supposed to be sovereign in their choice of products and services. German economist Ludwig von Mises introduced the concept of consumer sovereignty (Mises, 1996 [1949]). If producers in a free market society want to remain in business they have to satisfy consumer demands. The more consumers vote for a product by buying it, the more the producer is rewarded and more producers will furnish the product and vice versa.

> In Mises' terms:

> "Neither the entrepreneurs nor the farmers nor the capitalists determine what has to be produced. The consumers do that ... The consumers patronize those shops in which they can buy what they want at the cheapest price. Their buying and their abstention from buying decide who should own and run the plants and the farms. ... They determine precisely what should be produced, in what quality, and in what quantities ... The consumer is in a position to give free rein to his caprices and fancies. The entrepreneurs, capitalists, and farmers have their hands tied; they are bound to comply in their operations with the orders of the buying public." (1996[1949], pp. 270–271)

The sovereign consumer is necessary for a free market society to function. Mises was categorical about the economic importance of the consumer as he was the one to ultimately determine the course of economic affairs. This notion of consumer sovereignty returned to prominence in the late twentieth century when economic downturns and stagnation renewed the postulation for lesser state intervention and reinforcing free market principles.

However, concepts of consumer sovereignty are not found (as normative postulations) only in the realm of economics. Sociologist Gerhard Schulze positively describes the conditions of experience consumption in a fun-motivated society: Both actors, supplier and consumer, work together, thereby agreeing that suggestion is part of the service. Terms such as lie and truth do not apply where there is a consensus among all market participants that the primary goal is to provide desired psycho-physical processes for the end consumer (Schulze, 1993, p. 26). This means that the consumer is aware of what drives his or her consumer satisfaction and that no communication restrictions are necessary. Michel de Certeau (1988) even draws the picture of an immensely active consumer who cheats big corporations' marketing strategies by idiosyncratically dealing with goods and communication offers up to the point of détournement. The recently discussed concept of consumer responsibility (Heidbrink et al., 2011) is ultimately an approach that, too, implicitly questions the necessity of advertising regulations, since these do not match the idea of consumers as self-responsible and mature (Bundesregierung, 2013, p. 124).

This is the concept which proponents of a non-restricted consumer communication understandably and inevitably emphasize, and it is a concept widely agreed upon. In principle, politicians share this concept, too. In the coalition agreement of the last German Government (Bundesregierung, 2013, p. 124) the explicit guiding principle is the well-informed and self-responsible consumer who self-determines his or her actions. Politics serves to enable consumers, not to patronize them.

Nevertheless, the politicians' commitment to the concept of consumer sovereignty is all too often diluted or even contradicted by their actions. The concept they seem to agree upon is that of a (highly) limited consumer sovereignty. Measures of communication restrictions prove that the consumer is not to be seen as a self-responsible actor, but as a consumer who is over-burdened, short of time, short on competence, marginally interested, and not always disciplined (WBVE, 2010, p. 1). There is a potential demand for restricting consumer sovereignty whenever the outcome of humans acting under the umbrella of consumer sovereignty is or only has the potential to be harmful to either himself/herself or others. This argument can be and actually is taken even further: A good choice must be good for the community, for the planet and also bring happiness to the consumer. A sovereign consumer is such

only if he or she engages responsibly with his or her own well-being, that of the community and the planet (Sassatelli, 2012).

Thus, politics finds itself in a dilemma: committing to the concept of the sovereign consumer who has to be patronized. On behalf of consumer protection, the concept of consumers' sovereignty is contradicted, and at the same time the responsibility and ability of consumers as concerns political and economic issues is willingly being underestimated or even discredited – much to the delight of the tobacco industry, which uses this contradiction as an argument against further restrictions as we will show further on.

4. The Public Discourse on Tobacco Regulation

4.1 Strategies of Tobacco Regulation Proponents and the Role of Mass Media

There is a broad social consensus as concerns negative health consequences from active and passive smoking. Even representatives of tobacco manufacturers regularly admit the potentially harmful effects of their own products' use on consumers' health. Therefore, in many countries politics sees it as a core task to prevent people from starting to smoke and to proactively encourage people to stop smoking (BZgA, 2011, p. 6). The respective arguments in the debate for and against further strengthening tobacco regulations– at least in part – derive from the aforementioned differences regarding models of consumer behavior and consumer sovereignty.

The restrictions on cigarette marketing and packaging vary from one jurisdiction to another, but all use more or less deterrent strategies by visually and verbally enhancing fear. Whosoever prescribes warning signs and restricts or prohibits brand communication, however, presumes a certain concept of recipients and their being influenced by communication. Linear stimulus-response models are still the conceptual basis for this mode of advertising effects. Hereby, effects are just a question of the right dose, of the right medium or – in economic terms – the right price which stimulates the recipients. The aesthetic visualization on top of the chain of arguments reminds one very much of 19th century education discourses (such as the "Struwwelpeter" children's book). Given the aforementioned uncertainties within the research of advertising

restrictions, the question is raised why politicians tend to support them anyway. Why do so many politicians support that kind of legislation?

Public choice theory might provide us with an answer to the question why politicians fall for the "easy" way. Public Choice Theory seeks to understand the behavior of politicians based on the principle of rational choice. Political behavior is explained by self-interest and utility maximization, not by seeking common welfare (Downs, 1957; Olson, 1965). Politicians base their decisions on the expected costs and benefits of their actions. In any discourse, politicians strive for the highest benefits at the lowest costs. Benefits might be favorable voting behavior, high approval ratings, prestige, or just the realization that being elected means power and income (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). Costs might be time and money invested in keeping the voters and other stakeholders informed and convinced.

In our case, it is apparent that politicians like easy-to-communicate research results. The more complex results become, the higher the costs of informing the voter and, in the end, the higher the risk of being ousted or at least disempowered. In order to be recognized and rewarded, politicians must act. Inactivity might be interpreted as idleness. Any research result that justifies action is better than research that is inconclusive regarding political action or even advocates a hands-off approach. In particular, political discourses which draw wide public attention often increase politicians' willingness to act because of the potentially high rewards. Often politicians too easily yield to public pressure to act. A strong government that demonstrates its strength by not acting, not yielding to public pressure, appears not to be communicable. In the eyes of the general public, a functioning government seems to be the one that acts, not the one which admits lack of answers to questions that are not easily answered, that come with high uncertainty (Peters & Barker, 1993, p. 18). Treating symptoms – offering solutions even when they are inefficient and counterproductive – might be the rational decision in public discourses.

The concept of consumer sovereignty leaves room for individual failure, which is not an option within the political discourse. Politicians increasingly point out the social costs of individual behavior, therefore initiating the call for government action themselves. This goes along with calling for government's responsibility and showing political will to shape society. Therefore, coming back to our earlier statements on the paradoxes of consumer sovereignty in the political discourse, the call for

consumer sovereignty, for self-responsibility, is often interpreted as a radical libertarian, capitalist position in the war against the benevolent state. Politicians seem to be well aware of those inconsistencies and, regarding tobacco regulations, seem to have found a way to resolve them: The aforementioned paradox of the sovereign consumer who is still patronized by big government is to some extent solved by aiming regulation at children and adolescents. It is very easy – at least implicitly – to deny them the same amount of consumer sovereignty as everybody else. This is why "the Directive's focus [lies] on young people" (European Parliament, 2013).

In modern societies, where nearly all public discourses are media-driven, the mass media phenomenon amplifies those trends in political behavior. Whenever mass media cover an issue extensively, politicians are more active. In the case of smoking, mass media seem to be highly aware of the attractiveness of the issue for their consumers. Therefore, media coverage is high. In a media environment in which a tendency exists to oversimplify issues for the sake of consumers' attention (Henigan, 2009, p. 40), it makes sense for the rational politician to adapt to this approach and turn to research findings that offer simple solutions to an oversimplified problem and demonstrate the willingness to act. Adding the widely accepted understanding of the negative effects of smoking among the general public, it becomes clear why, on the other hand, it is difficult for the tobacco industry to influence the public discourse towards their own interests and thereby influence the political process. Thus, public choice theory explains why it is in the politicians' interest to resist (the tobacco industry's) special interest lobbying, and rather gives in to public pressure – bolstered by mass media – to avoid public opposition.

4.2 Tobacco Industry's Strategies

Even tobacco manufacturers are no longer denying the negative health effects of smoking. Therefore, new issue worlds are being opened up and included in the debate on impacts of communication restrictions. Opponents of new regulation on communication opportunities are left with two courses of action within the communicative realm: Not only do they try to avoid or at least water down new regulations, but they can utilize them proactively.

Understandably, tobacco manufacturers are mostly engaged in the first course of action. Resulting from the aforementioned problems regarding

consumer research, they are constantly pointing out the weaknesses that overly simplistic consumer behavior models' restrictions are based on: Restrictions like plain packaging, display bans, etc. have either no or insignificant effects on consumer behavior. The buying processes are based on far more complex models, denying new regulations the power to significantly influence smoking behavior. Therefore, existing regulations are considered sufficient in the eyes of the tobacco industry.

Another argument arises from the inconsistencies regarding consumer sovereignty within the mass media-driven political discourse as described above: Politicians propagate the enlightened, sovereign, self-responsible citizen and consumer on the one hand, while patronizing him/her on the other, acting like his/her legal guardian. Advertising restrictions might be the right choice for broad parts of the population; nevertheless they lead to a dead end as concerns the conceptual idea of an autonomous consumer that politics has to rely on in a more and more complex world. By defending the consumers' sovereignty the tobacco industry creates the impression of acting socially responsible.

Tobacco manufacturers also use restriction impact – in a broad sense – to arm their strategic public affairs. Thus, after Australia had passed their plain packaging regulations, the big tobacco companies started a communication campaign that pointed at the relationship – at least as it is assumed by the industry – between plain packaging, cigarette trafficking, and organized crime, including terrorism and prostitution. A direct logical link is being established between warning signs on cigarette packages and internal security.

On its corporate YouTube channel British American Tobacco (BAT) prominently features two spots. The first five-minute spot is titled "Illegal cigarettes: This is The Man" (WelcomeToBAT, 2011b). It tells the story of how politicians promote the production and distribution of illegal cigarettes and thereby make life easier for organized crime by introducing new regulations like plain packaging, display bans and restrictions on additives. It shows the connection between proposed new (or existing) rules regarding tobacco and international terrorism, prostitution, gun and drug crime. Even Deloitte (2011), in the study quoted above, propagates potential negative side effects of regulatory measures such as graphic warning signs and plain packaging. Negative effects on the potential to differentiate cigarette brands and on brand loyalty are to be feared, which in turn leads to decreasing prices and, thus, might lead to consumption increase. Negative impact on retail business is a further link in the chain

of arguments by restriction opponents: Easily-made fake products might have an impact on the cigarette trade and might cause difficulties for retailers distinguish almost identical packages.

The second seven-minute clip called "Illegal cigarettes: Who's in control?" (WelcomeToBAT, 2011a) follows the conversation of three fictitious government representatives talking about tobacco regulation. Each of their proposals (again plain packaging, display ban, etc.) is followed by a cut to a limousine carrying three criminals discussing their benefits from the government representatives' proposed policies, again illustrating the link between tobacco regulation and the promotion of organized crime.

This mirrors the bootleggers and Baptist theory of regulation invented by the economist Bruce Yandle (1983). He explains that Baptists and other church representatives lobby for the restriction of alcohol sales. Bootleggers, by selling alcohol illegally, get more business if legal sales are restricted. That is why both bootleggers and Baptists favor political activism. We find another aspect of Yandle's theory as well: The Baptists will be satisfied by the legal actions' results because they tend to only follow the probable decline in legal sales, not the probable increase in illegal sales of alcohol. The unlikely coalition between bootleggers and Baptists makes it easier for politicians to translate restrictive measures into national legislation, thereby being in perfect sync with the public choice theory implications mentioned above and the corresponding requirements of the communicative mass media environment.

Selling tobacco in and of itself denies tobacco manufacturers the opportunity to conduct social marketing concepts. But by pointing out the negative consequences of new communication restrictions on tobacco manufacturers, exactly this marketing strategy is opened up.

Another course of action tries to utilize existing and proposed rules and regulations. Consumers might not stand passively aside, but actually creatively use plain packaging or graphic warning labels on the cigarette boxes and turn tobacco products into aesthetic items of art. They might even start to collect graphic warning labels, turning them into some kind of "badge of honor," therefore demonstrating rebellious attitudes which in turn can be utilized in the tobacco industry's marketing efforts. At least some anecdotal evidence has already surfaced which seems to confirm those assumptions (Carrière, 2011; Death – Wikipedia, 2014).

Another example: For quite some time – anticipating the ban on additives – tobacco producers have abstained from using additives in some of their products to position them as pure and healthier as long as they are allowed to do so. They therefore use the strategy of a positive reinterpretation of expected regulation: refraining from the use of is communicated as a "feature, not a bug." The future effects of this campaign against the background of an expected ban by law are obviously not clear, but tobacco manufacturers are currently adopting a communication policy option unintentionally created by law makers in Brussels.

Tobacco manufacturers have done this in the past: The TPD 2001/37/EC of 2001 (European Parliament and Council, L 194/29) instructed the tobacco industry to inform consumers about tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide as a measure of deterrence. The tobacco industry used this obligation to differentiate their products into "lighter" (healthier) and "stronger" (unhealthier) products. Obviously, many consumers switched to products labeled "light." The EU, under the impression that light cigarettes are harmful as well, tackles this homemade problem by now prohibiting the information about tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide printed on the box.

5. Conclusion

The discourse on consumer communication restrictions as shown above is heavily influenced by different consumer behavior research results which depend on respective consumer behavior models, and by the different understanding of the concept of consumer sovereignty. In this paper, the fundamental question is not whether communication restrictions regarding tobacco products are successful or not (although it seems as if consumer behavior is not as easy to manipulate as proponents of further strengthening consumer communication restrictions might believe), or which understanding of consumer sovereignty should be followed. Instead, this paper tried to shed some light on what drives the political and public or, more precisely, the social discourse – propelled by mass media factors – on communication restrictions, and what socio-political consequences this discourse might have.

It should be clear that increasing regulations concern not only the tobacco industry. Providers of other products and services which are potentially or in fact harmful (e.g. alcoholic beverages, confectionary manufactures, the

gambling industry) have to implement more and more guidelines for consumers' product communication. In this context, the questions of appropriateness and effectiveness regarding restrictions on consumer communication and the question of consumer sovereignty might be important when trying to evaluate government measures, explain or – from a practitioner's side – strategically influence the public discourse.

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TERROR OF INCOGNITO: AMERICAN FOOTBALL, WORKPLACE BULLYING AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

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Introduction

Terra incognita, the Latin phrase meaning "unknown lands," was used on maps beginning in the fifteenth-century as explorers from Europe set out to find the "New World," today the Americas. Another kind of unchartered territory in the form of an improbably-named, massive American football player, Richie Incognito, burst into the public's consciousness in November 2013 due to an alleged reign of terror aimed at a giant-size teammate.

News media reported workplace bullying in an unlikely venue: a 312-pound, 6' 5" lineman for the Miami Dolphins professional football team, Jonathan Martin, who is mixed-race, had left the team after reports that he had been bullied, with racial and sexual overtones, by a comparably-sized Incognito, who is white. (The New York Times, 2013) Later, the Dolphins suspended Incognito indefinitely from the team. The allegations were explosive, and not just to football or sport fans. As the coverage grew to include lurid details including alleged sexual and racial slurs, and threats of violence against Martin, his mother and sister, the public glimpsed a never-before-seen reality show-like window into a professional sports team. Ironically, the Dolphins had recently been the subject of a reality-TV cable show on H.B.O., in what was billed as a behind-the-scenes look at a sports team that never revealed any details or allegations even close to which the public had now become privy.

Ultimately, an exhaustive investigative report (the Wells Report) prepared for the National Football League (NFL) found a pattern of workplace bullying in the Dolphins' organization over a significant period of time that went beyond the reported allegations, and included additional

perpetrators and victims. (CoNFL, 2014) The purpose of this paper is to examine the issue of workplace bullying, a burgeoning area of academic research around the world for the past twenty years. The literature on workplace bullying has presented the extent and potentially devastating impact on individuals and organizations. Although the issue will be viewed in the context of American football and other sports, more importantly, highlights the significance of the case and research in more traditional workplaces, and how such bullying is viewed in the employment law environment in the United States (and the world) now and in the future.

The Facts of the Martin/Incognito Case according to the Wells Report

Martin, a Stanford University graduate and star collegiate football player had played for the Dolphins for several years after graduating with a degree in literature and the classics. His parents are graduates of Harvard University. Though coming to the Dolphins with high hopes, it was believed Martin had to reach his potential. Incognito came to the Dolphins with a history of fighting and other negative behavior in both college and the NFL that made him a risky selection by the team. But the middling (or worse) performance in recent years by the Dolphins lead the team to take a chance with him in light of his perceived football-playing qualities.

The Dolphins have a storied history--they remain the only team in N.F.L. history to achieve a perfect season. In the 1972-73 season the team went 17-0 in winning the Super Bowl. But the team has fallen on difficult times. It has not made the playoffs in a number of years and season attendance has been falling.

Against this backdrop the Dolphins decided to make Incognito a lynchpin of its efforts to revive the team. He was an aggressive lineman (6'3", 319 pounds) and quickly assigned the responsibility by the team to be a team leader, especially of the other lineman. At least in part motivated by the role assigned to him by the team and his teammates, Incognito embarked on a mission to transform the team by imposing discipline on his teammates and engaging in "team-building" measures including rewards and punishments for certain behavior, much of which was off the field. These activities included golf outings, strip-club visits and trips to places like Las Vegas for patronizing casinos, among other things. For example,

newer players like Martin were required to pay various expenses of the veterans.

Incognito was asked by the Dolphins staff to take a special interest in Martin. Despite having played collegiate football for a very successful coach known for hardball tactics, Jim Harbaugh, Martin was perceived as different than the other players. His tastes ran more to reading than carousing and was viewed as "soft" by many of the players. New management at the Dolphins, and many of the players themselves, believed that Martin needed to be "toughened up" in order to reach his potential as an NFL player.

The information obtained by the news media, and the more conclusive evidence obtained for the Wells Report, included thousands of text-messages reflecting a complex relationship between Martin and Incognito, many of which would be deemed evidence of a friendship. Despite the ambiguity of the relationship, the ultimate conclusion of extensive and lengthy harassment of Martin is unmistakable. The texts between the players ranged from merely vulgar expression of shared interest and activities to vicious racial, and sexual expression which included threats of violence against Martin, his sister and mother. More chilling, the activities lead by Incognito included two other Dolphin players, both of whom were black.

Further, the relentless, often daily harassment by Incognito and two other players of an Japanese-American assistant trainer and another player paints a picture of a workplace run amok. The Wells Report concluded the abuse was either known or even directed by Dolphins management. The physical and verbal attacks documented lead to the inexorable conclusion that the Dolphins workplace was rife with racial, sexual and other bullying.

The Issue of Workplace Bullying

Workplace bullying has been studied extensively over the past twenty years, in the U. S. as well as Europe. (Samniani, A. – Singh, P., 2012) In the U. S., the issue of bullying in schools has been studied as well with an increasing emphasis on reducing the phenomenon which has been shown to be so devastating especially to younger students. The U. S. has shown an increasing sensitivity to the issue of teen suicide, especially as it relates to homophobia.

Although not as publicized as school bullying, workplace bullying research has explored the deleterious effects of bullying. Early research on workplace bullying focused on physical violence in the workplace so that many employers now have "workplace violence" policies. The earliest instances publicized in America dealt with U. S. postal workers who used guns to kill fellow workers or members of the public. The phrase "going postal" became code for workplace violence.

Recent research has moved from the physical violence arena to psychological damage caused to organizations and individuals. The organizational literature is often conducted by industrial psychologists, organizational structural theorists, and human resources professionals who are most interested in how workplace bullying affects employer interests in production and tangible and intangible costs associated with employee morale: higher turnover rates, days lost to work, or generally lower morale or productivity. (Samniani, A. – Singh, P., 2012)

Others interested in this area focus on the individual damage to employee victims of bullying. These professionals include clinical psychologists, counselors and therapists who address the day-to-day problems associated with bullying as well as long term issues such as psychological and physical consequences.

Finally, law professors and employment lawyers have increasingly become interested in issues of workplace bullying and violence because of the legal implications. As Tocqueville noted more than 150 years ago, most issues in American life eventually become legal issues. (Alexis de Tocqueville, 1994)

What is Workplace Bullying?

The precise definition of workplace bullying has vexed the academics, and employers who have studied this area. There have been a number of formulations but no uniform definition has been accepted. Most definitions include the notion of deliberate, and sustained actions in or associated with the workplace by one or more co-workers or supervisors, designed to, or which has negative psychological or physical consequences for one or more employees. This definition has an analogue in the area of school bullying which has been extensively studied.

What Are the Consequences of Workplace Bullying?

The extensive research over the past twenty years has lead to significant findings about the consequences of workplace bullying. This research, in both Europe and the U. S., has demonstrated the enormous costs, both to the organization as well as individuals of bullying in the workplace. But the definitional issue still looms large in the workplace because determining exactly what behavior is involved informs both prevention and identification of offending behavior.

Once the behavior is identified, measures can be taken to address particular situations and through training and communication employees can learn what behavior is prohibited and what to do about it if they perceive that that they are the targets of the behavior. The costs to the employer are significant of prohibiting the behavior, both in training and preventive measures as well as investigation and taking appropriate actions.

The costs to the individual in terms of productivity and tangible and intangible costs, is also substantial. Virtually all of the literature and practical understanding by management and employees point to the enormous and increasing toll on society of workplace bullying. The next section applies the definitional and practical considerations to an area of the workforce rarely studied: sports, a mega-industry in the U. S. and around the world. It also examines how a study of this area can inform the academic and policy implications for workplace bullying.

Sports and Workplace Bullying

In America, and the entire world, sports is big business. The billions of dollars spent on sports is staggering, most importantly sports on television, especially cable, satellite, and the Internet. Few industries have the world-wide impact as sports. In the U. S., college sports is a huge enterprise, affecting students, universities and the viewing public. Sports reaches the very young as participants and fans, collegians and children and adults of all ages.

While athletics has been an important part of human society earlier than the ancient Greeks and Romans, the big business of sports is a more recent phenomenon. Sports are covered in all forms of media. More recent trends have focused on the business aspects of sports, such as contracts, public stadia and the personal ives of athletes at all levels,

particularly collegiate and professional, which includes criminal behavior. These aspects of sport have not always received massive attention they do today.

It is against this backdrop that the recent bullying scandal should be viewed. Several factors inform the discussion. First, most people do not think of sports (or collegiate athletics) as a workplace environment. They are viewed as environments where very talented men (and increasingly women) engage in games where athletic prowess is exhibited leading to intense interest, and intense loyalty to particular teams, players and coaches. The fact that professional sports is a big business is now recognized by most members of the public but does not lead to most of them thinking about the workplace environment of sports teams.

Further, the notion of workplace bullying, while certainly more recognized now than in the past, is something unrecognized by most, particularly in such violent team sports as football or ice hockey. It is for that reason that the public appeared shocked by the revelations in the Dolphins' scandal. How is it possible for a 300 pounds plus, 6'5" foot professional athlete to be "bullied" by another player? While incidents of racial slurs by members of sports community has become more common (or at least more commonly reported), it has never before been reported that bullying was even possible of such players.

So when the news reports began to trickle out, followed by a thorough investigation concluding that in fact workplace bullying had occurred in an N.F.L. organization and involved more perpetrators and more victims, the public has been exposed to information that not only confirmed the existence of the behavior, but that is has been condemned by many in and outside the sports world. It is noteworthy, however, that condemnation has not been universal. When the revelations first appeared, many Dolphin teammates, especially African-Americans, came to the defense of Incognito and seemed to attack Martin.

Although the Dolphins management embraced much of the Wells Report, even urging legislation to deal with bullying in collegiate sports, a recent incident involved another Dolphin player using Twitter to verbally attack Michael Sam, the first openly gay NFL player (drafted by another team) is revealing. Although the Dolphins swiftly disciplined the player, and the incident was not an example of the bullying of a fellow Dolphins player, it is related enough to suggest that the team's "get tough" response has not been wholly successful. Incognito recently has been cleared to discuss

joining another N.F.L. team and does not appear to have been disciplined by the N.F.L. at all. (The New York Times, 2014)

The Context of American Employment Law

American employment law, unlike most other industrialized countries in Europe and around the world, has long been based on the notion that in the absence of an employment agreement for a term of years the employment relationship is "at-will." In other words, employers may hire, and terminate whomever they choose and treat them however they wish, and employees are free to accept or leave any job at any time. This body of law, which is based on the law of free market contracts, has been the default rule in the U. S. at least since the industrial revolution after the American Civil War. Generally speaking, the employment relationship has been a matter of each state's contract law, and at-will is generally the default rule in all but one state (Montana) (Timothy A. Glynn, et al., 2007)

Although at-will has been the default rule in the U. S., governing all aspects of the employment relationship (hiring, termination, and terms and conditions of employment), the doctrine has been eroding since the 1960's. Courts began to find novel ways to avoid the harshness of the doctrine and began to find contractual terms as well as new tort claims for outrageous behavior by employers. Most importantly, the American civil rights movement lead to new laws creating exceptions to the at-will doctrine when the employer acted on the basis of a discriminatory reason such as race, color, national origin, sex, age or disability, (CRA, 1964) Most importantly for the discussion of workplace bullying is the notion of the creation of a hostile work environment based on such factors as sex or race.

Sexual Harassment Law

In the 1980's the U. S. Supreme Court for the first time recognized a cause of action for sexual harassment, either of the *quid pro quo* variety (demanding sexual favors for employment benefits) or the creation of a hostile work environment based on sex. The latter is the most relevant to workplace bullying. In fact creation of a hostile work environment can be considered a subset of workplace bullying, although only if based on an illegal factor such as race or sex.

Much of the early literature on workplace bullying considered the issue in light of sexual harassment, in particular creation of a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment. As will be discussed later in this paper, the academic literature in this area, and the court decisions, provide perhaps the best guidance in addressing the general notion of workplace bullying.

In *Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson*, (477 U.S. 57. 1986) the Supreme Court accepted the doctrine of sexual harassment as a form of illegal sex discrimination. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited sex discrimination but the legislative history of the statute did not mention sexual harassment at all. In fact the statute had primarily aims at eliminating racial discrimination and the term "sex" as a basis for discrimination was only added by a Southern Congressman from Virginia who attempted to defeat the bill by showing how absurd it would be to try to prevent that basis of discrimination. Much to his amazement Congress added the category and passed the entire bill.

Although some lower courts had found that sexual harassment was covered by Title VII, it was not until *Meritor* in 1986 that it was definitively accepted. In that case and a series of cases in different settings, the Supreme Court has attempted to give guidance to trial courts, and now juries, to define sexual harassment. In a quest not much more definitive that its 1950's decision attempting to define "obscenity" (as one Justice put it, "I know it when I see it"), (Stewart, 1964) the Supreme Court has struggled with a definition. This struggle is not dissimilar to the search for a definition of workplace bullying.

The generally accepted definition is that to prove a claim of sexual harassment in a hostile work environment, the employee must demonstrate that the actions of employees are of a sexual nature and are so severe or pervasive as to create an abusive work environment interfering with an employee's ability to do his or her job. (477 U.S. 57, 1986) The actions of a sexual nature may be words, jokes, cartoons, touching, or other actions. The perceptions of the employee are judged both subjectively and objectively. In other words, the employee must sincerely believe that the situation is so severe or pervasive and a reasonable person would believe so as well.

The Supreme Court has concluded that the hostile work environment based on sex need not create severe psychological harm. (Harris, 1993) It has also determined that while sexual orientation is not currently a legal

basis for a sexual harassment claim (though Congress is now considering adding such a basis), but still the harassment must be based on sex in order to be actionable. (Oncal, 1998).

Most instructive for the discussion of workplace bullying is the Supreme Court's struggle with its definition. In Harris, Justice Scalia noted that the definition and explanation that had been given thus far by the Supreme Court is not very helpful in determining the often difficult determination of whether sexual harassment is present. Nonetheless, he notes that probably no better definition is possible.

Even more significantly, and even presciently, Justice Scalia reiterates the notion that Title VII and the other anti-discrimination laws (as exceptions to the at-will doctrine) were not intended to create what he called a "general civility code" for the workplace. Rather, the anti-discrimination laws are much narrower in scope: to prohibit less favorable treatment of individuals *because of* a prohibited classification. Most importantly, he goes on to emphasize the importance of context in analyzing cases pursuant to Title VII.

He gave as an example professional athletes' behavior in a locker room compared to employees in an office environment. In effect, he concluded that athletes, operating in their very specific milieu should not be held to the same standard as office employees, at least in considering the anti-discrimination laws. (Oncal, 1998) It is with precedent and guidance that the paper will consider how current employment law, including its anti-discrimination subset, informs the way forward in addressing workplace bullying.

How Does Current Employment Law Address Workplace Bullying?

As described in the prior section, at-will is the default rule for U. S. employment as modified by exceptions such as anti-discrimination law. Academic social science research and human resources professionals would likely agree with the majority public view that workplace bullying is wrong and creates many negative impacts in society. As noted earlier, the academic literature has concluded that workplace bullying is more prevalent than once thought and that the effects on individuals and institutions can be significant or even devastating.

At least in part due to the at-will approach to employment law, which is generally viewed favorable by employers because of the freedom to make

employment decisions without undue interference, tackling workplace bullying as a legal matter is a difficult task. It is true, however, that anti-discrimination and other erosions of the at-will doctrine have significantly affected the ability of businesses to act in an at-will way. The growing industry of training, advising and investigating complaints of discrimination is a testament to the already-modified ability of employers to simply do as they please in the employment arena.

In fact, most businesses consider it a positive to proactively deal with employment problems. The undeniable toll on individuals and employers form workplace bullying, legal or not, suggest that employers will and do want to address the issues raised by this problem. It is not merely the question of legal liability that drives decisions by employers, though that is certainly a factor. And the Supreme Court itself has addressed the issue of how employers can avoid liability in harassment and other discrimination actions by giving employers a defense, in certain circumstances. In particular, the Supreme Court has recognized defenses for employers when they create anti-harassment and discrimination policies, communicate them effectively to employees and supervisors, develop meaningful complaint avenues for employees, investigate complaints of discrimination promptly, and take action where appropriate based on those investigations. (Burlington, 1998)

Thus, the same types of mechanisms might be, and are used by employers to help minimize the ill effects of workplace bullying. Current employment law may apply in other ways. The common law torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress or invasion of privacy may apply in particular instances in most states. One of the problems with such approaches is that employers may or may not be liable in such situations even though individual perpetrators could be, thus minimizing the effectiveness of such tools.

Even more likely is the use of anti-discrimination laws, federal, state and local, pursuant to theories of hostile work environments as outlined above. One significant difficulty in pursuing legal liability in such situations is the requirement that the actions of the perpetrators was because of a prohibited classification, such as sex or race. But for the reasons discussed above in proving intent on the part of the perpetrators, and the ambiguity or even absence of such reasons the path to liability is fraught with difficulty.

Finally, one of the most vexing problems with proving liability is the definitional one. To paraphrase Justice Scalia, if such a law were enacted would it in fact be a "general civility code"? If so, exactly what behavior would be prohibited? As difficult as it has been to deal with the issue in the context of the anti-discrimination laws, that would pale in attempting to draft a law that would be understandable by the ordinary employee and employer.

Furthermore, even assuming those issues could be surmount, how would such a "civility code" be enforced? Exactly what behaviors would be covered and how would such prohibited behaviors be communicated to employees and supervisors? Just reviewing the academic literature, without an ability to even define th errant behavior gives an insight into the difficulties that would be involved.

For example, how long would the improper behavior need to continue in order to be viewed as improper? How many instances would be needed? Who would determine whether a supervisor's tone of voice was sufficiently threatening? What type of "horseplay" would be out-of-bounds? Naturally, not only violence or threats of violence would be required, but short of extreme behavior, how much is enough? And how would an employer decide? The next section attempts to address these vexing issues.

What Can Be Done Legally to Address Workplace Bullying?

Most agree that workplace bullying is an important issue in all of society, from the boardrooms to the playing fields of professional, and collegiate sports. There appears to be a consensus that the issue is important, growing, and should be addressed for the sake of individuals and businesses. The primary question, at least from a legal standpoint, is what, if anything should be illegal and thus impose liability on employers?

Perhaps the best guide is through adapting the legal developments of sexual harassment law to workplace bullying. Some would argue for other approaches. Advocates for employees might argument for the general diminution, or even abolition of the long-standing at-will doctrine. Such an approach would diminish or eliminate the ability of employers to take actions against employees without good cause. Employee advocates could suggest that the best way to increase productivity and minimize problems such as workplace bullying is to require such a good cause standard.

On the other end of the spectrum, employer advocates could argue that government regulation of the workplace has already gone too far so that further liability should be resisted or even rolled back. Such advocates would suggest that employers who tolerate or engage in workplace bullying would eventually be driven from the marketplace and replaced by more enlightened employers.

Since neither of these approaches seem likely in the global environment, if a consensus agree that workplace bullying should be outlawed, the most prudent approach likely would follow the lead of the development of sexual harassment law to the problem. The definition and defenses to a claim would follow the line of jurisprudence already developed.

Thus, courts would use the severe or pervasive standard for determining whether workplace bullying rose to a cause of action, including the requirement that the matter be viewed both subjectively and objectively. Perhaps in the place of requiring proof of illegal intent based upon a prohibited classification such as sex or race, the plaintiff would need to prove that the bully, or through some theory of liability the employer, had the intent to cause harm to the plaintiff.

In addition, defenses could be allowed as presently available pursuant to sexual harassment jurisprudence. This would encourage employers to prevent or minimize workplace bullying and not holding employers liable when certain instances are not brought to the employer's attention.

Of course, all of the problems currently associated with definitions of the wrong (here workplace bullying), along with the additional problem of imposing a "general civility code" would remain. But if society did want to impose legal liability to attempt eradicate or minimize workplace bullying, to paraphrase Justice Scalia again, there may be no better mechanism.

Conclusion: Incognito's Terror and Its Aftermath

Although the Dolphins bullying scandal shocked the country and the world, it brought to the fore a longstanding and burgeoning problem, albeit in an unlikely place and manner. It illustrated that no one is immune to workplace bullying and that the costs imposed on society and individuals is more widespread than believed.

The problem of workplace bullying has been studied for more than twenty years and the literature is clear that individuals, employers and society

pay an ever-increasing price for a phenomenon that most perceive as wrong. Although current employment law is not well-suited to address much workplace bullying, especially because of the at-will doctrine, except those instances which are demonstrably based on illegal characteristics as race or sex, the development of the harassment law of hostile work environments may guide the way if there is a will to have the law directly address the problem.

While many issues would arise in applying such principles, not the least of which is the definitional issue which has vexed the academic literature in the area of workplace bullying, it following the U. S. Supreme Court's approach to addressing sexual harassment in the workplace may suggest a way to approach this critical problem.

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SECTION V:

THE ROLE OF CONFLICT IN EDUCATIONAL, FAMILIAL, AND HEALTH CONTEXTS

COMMUNICATION DYNAMICS ADDRESSING CONFLICTS ENCOUNTERED BY RESEARCHERS WORKING IN GROUPS

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Abstract

This institutional research completed in 2011 sought to describe how conflicts between and among members of thesis groups affect the research process. It also looked into the ways by which conflicting and non-conflicting group members communicate with one another, as well as the ways through which they deal with worsening confict situations. Furthermore, it attempted to describe and illustrate the approaches and strategies that make up the communication dynamics which helped them manage and resolve conflicts while doing their research.

In this study, a qualitative research design was employed. Participants were selected purposively and focus group discussions were administered

to generate data. Six (6) thesis groups with three (3) or four (4) members served as participants while three (3) experts were interviewed as key informants.

The researchers found that conflicting situations inevitably arise in research undertakings which are done by a group of researchers. These conflicts are caused by several factors such as meager financial resouces, conflicting activites and schedules, and adviser's standards and expectations, among others. In the midst of these conflicts, thesis group members thought of and employed communication strategies through which conflicting situations that emerged could be addressed. The research team attempted to capture such strategies through this study.

The research is outlined as follows: a) the factors considered in choosing group members; b) the factors considered in choosing group members; c) the working environment; d) conflict situations in thesis groups; e) communication strategies and approaches to resolve conflict (at the onset of conflict situation, as conflict situation worsens); and f) major factors that contribute to the resolution of conflict.

Introduction

Defined by Conn (1995) as a "battle between individuals or groups with different standards, norms and goals," conflict, as we know it, is experienced in almost all human relationships. This could have been the reason Adler and his co-authors in the book Interplay wrote: "Regardless of what we may wish for or dream about, a conflict-free world just doesn't exist."

A thesis group composed of five to seven members with different standards, norms, goals, personalities, culture and psychological make up that agreed to work on just one common goal—to finish a research study—will most likely be confronted with a number of conflicting situations before, during and even after they finish working on their thesis.

Background

It is noteworthy to mention here that in our college, the PUP-College of Communication (COC), senior students, in collaboration with their advisors, may choose between two options through which they could

conduct their research work: pure academic research or institutional research.

Our group decided to choose the latter, and proposed to the college an institutional research which, when done, could guide future student-researchers in doing their thesis, especially those who would choose to work in groups.

The idea originated from our team's observation of the recurrence of relational conflicts between and among members of thesis groups in the college, specifically those enrolled in the Broadcast Communication Program.

We wondered why, despite the fact that all of us are in communication, broadcast researchers working in groups inevitably engage in conflicting situations during the time that they are working on their thesis—their supposed last year of stay in their college. This runs contrary to the thought that if there is any group that could best deal with conflict, it should be the group of senior communication students who must already have learned the craft of dealing with relational problems and conflicts.

Discussion

Overview

Based on what was generated and observed, student-researchers would normally avoid pressure and conflict and they would desire comfort and peace both in choosing their group members and the physical environment while doing their research. They are, however, invetabitably confronted with pressures that result in conflict and conflicting situations. But because most of them want to get the research done in order to graduate, they engage in communicative acts that result in certain dynamics to address these conflicts. Simply put:

Figure 1. Getting the research done in the midst of inevitable conflicting situations through communicative acts

I. Factors considered in choosing group members

There are two main factors considered in choosing group members: personal relationship and personal goals.

A. Members' close personal relationship

It is easy for those who have been friends for years to form their thesis group. As friends and *barkadas*, they know they can always rely and depend on each other when tasks need to be done. And because they are always together, they find ease and comfort in expressing their thoughts when working. In their words:

> *"Mas comfortable kung yung mismong barkada mo na yung magiging thesismate mo…"*

> *"Alam na namin kung sino yung maasahan talaga sa isat-isa …nagkakaamuyan na (kami)."*

> *"Kaibigan nalang namin, kung sino yung kasama namin, kasi mas kumportable kaming gagawa, magiging at ease kang gagawa kasi pwede mong sabihin yung mga nasa isip mo kapag friends mo…mas comfortable saka mas kilala nyo na yung isa't isa kasi alam nyo na kung paano sila ka-responsible or ka-irresponsible or alam mo nang gagawin nila yung task nila"*

B. Members' personal objectives

1. to avoid pressure considering the availability of members
2. to avoid conflict between and among members in anticipation of pressure

Others would rather choose not to be groupmates with their friends when doing research because of two personal reasons: avoiding pressure during scheduled thesis meet-ups considering their common affiliation with student organizations; and avoiding conflict in anticipation of such pressure.

Pressure resulting in conflict emanates from situations wherein most members are not able to make it to group meetings because they are preoccupied with the concerns of an organization with which they are commonly affiliated.

And because they already have heard about losing friends caused by thesis work, they would rather belong to different thesis groups and maintain their friendship than be thesismates and end up being enemies because of conflict caused by pressure. In their words:

> *"Ayoko talaga sumama sa kanila, kasi teatro kami, so kapag nawala si(ya) mawawala din ako, kawawa yung group, so humiwalay na lang ako."*

> *"Sa barkada namin, hindi talaga kami magsasama-sama kasi magkakaron ng conflict kapag nandun na… from the beginning meron na kaming, ine-expect na namin na magkakagulo once nag-thesis na, ayun… so alam namin magaaway… e kami ayaw namin na magkakagalit-galit kami. Nagkakayayaan lang kami na oh tara. Ganun ganun nung nagtethesis kami."*

> *"Ayokong maging ka-grupo yung mga kaibigan ko kasi ang sabi nila kapag ganito daw nasisira yung friendship, ganyan ganyan… so ang nangyari, humiwalay kami. Tapos sila, tutal wala silang kagrupo, kami na."*

II. The working environment

A. Physical

    1. Library

In any of the two physical environments of student-researchers, they would always seek comfort and peace to be able to concentrate on what they were doing. In the library, for instance, they themselves could not believe that they were able to extract ideas which they would not have extracted had they been in another place: *"Yun tipong kala mo hindi nanggaling sayo, lalabas at lalabas talaga sya"*

Staying in the library is also convenient and practical for those who rent small boarding space. They start and end their day staying and working in the library. They become productive too, because they feel conscious about the behavior of others who stay there—they keep silent because all others do; they keep on working because others are busy working, too. According to them:

> *"Sa library… naging magandang avenue s'ya sa paggawa ng thesis, kasi nakapagcompare kami ng maayos. Yung kailangan naming environment na peaceful… Saka syempre pagka tahimik, makakapagisip ka. Yun tipong kala mo hindi nanggaling sayo, lalabas at lalabas talaga sya"*

> *"Kasi lahat kami nagbo-board, ako sa Jasmin, si Joy naman, nagrerent lang sa kanila, si Makki nagbo-board din… wala kaming pwedeng tigilan, maghapon so umaga palang nasa library na kami, sa main library…nahihiya kong magsisigaw dun… parang pag nakikita ko yung iba may ginagawa, iisipin mo bakit ako walang nagagawa? Antagal-tagal ko na dito…"*

    2. House

Such kind of environment, however, does not necessarily make them productive at all times. In the second physical environment, which is the house of any of the group members, the student-researchers also find peace and comfort but these are the very same reasons why they become unproductive:

> *"Nakahiga sila dun sa kama. Nakakatulog pa sila actually…hindi pa kami tapos …manonood sila ng tv, lalo kaming tinatamad… Advantage din naman kasi nakakagamit*

kami ng computer, di na kami magrerent…mas comfortable kami kasi may pagkain…Disadvantage kasi lalo kaming tinatamad"

They find time to rest, sleep, chat, eat, bond, watch TV, log in to facebook; they also have easy access to computers, electrical power to charge their laptops, but so much peace and comfort make them lag behind. As they say:

"Syempre pagod kami sa byahe so ang mangyayari, pagdating sa bahay, matutulog kami so gigising kami madaling araw na, tapos ano, kwentuhan pa, so maliit na lang yung time para i-spent namin sa paggawa ng thesis, so most of the time, nara-rush ng gawa namin. Ang nangyayari, nagkakakwentuhan lang kami, kain, tas aantukin na… medyo hindi di sya nakatulong(laughs) pero dun din kasi kami nagkaroon ng bonding"

B. Non-Physical

Contrary to the peace and comfort brought by their physical environment, the non-pysical environment brings so much pressure and conflict which emanates from six major factors: finances, involvement in other activities, conflict in schedules, adviser's high expectations and busy schedule and group competition.

    1.   Pressure and conflict

Pressure and Conflict emanating from:

        1.1.   financial expenses

"Pressured din sa money kasi kailangan photocopied. Pag nagphoto copy, kunyari related don tapos mamaya photocopy pa rin, magastos siya…"

"Pressure…yung finance (kasi) hindi kami mayayaman…" .

"Yung financial ano na yon, a given na yon kase syempre ang laki ng gastos talaga tapos syempre wala pa naman kaming sariling pera noon"

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1.2. group members' involvement in other activities

"Yung mga personal na lakad namin, nung gumagawa kasi kami before, tulad ko na naglalaro ako dati sa intrams, sa events ng commsoc"

"Working student kasi ako…meron yung mga times na…kailangan ko ng umalis kahit gumagawa pa sila, so hindi natatapos yung trabaho kasi nga aalis ako, aalis na rin sila so ganun, hindi natatapos."

"Irreg na ko non, ang nagiging conflict ko lang may klase ako… tatlo yung subjects ko nun eh. Kasi sila regular sila, yung thesis lang tapos regular subjects tapos ako, yung subject namin nung 4th year last sem., tapos dalawa pang subjects na iba"

"(May) kanya-kanyang buhay, kanya-kanyang lakad, yung iba nag-o-ojt, may time na ojt nalang yung iniintindi nila, nakakalimutan na ang thesis…".

1.3. members' conflicting schedules and focus because of OJT

"Malaki yung naging conflict namin sa ojt kasi tatlo yung nag-ojt sa amin sa abs, so either yung sunday namin, kinuha so 24/7 talaga nasa ABS lang kami, yung dalawa lang yung nagwowork sa thesis."

"Napasabay din yung OJT tas yung mgs pakonti-konting production sa mga klase lalo na sa RC…"

1.4. adviser's high expectations and high standard

"Parang dala–dala mo na yong pangalan ni mam, parang nakakahiya naman kung bumagsak ka …"

"Pressure na kay Mam kasi hinandle namin sya ng maayos kasi can't afford na maging basura yung thesis namin ayaw din ni mam yun"

"Nakadagdag yun sa pressure kasi magaling siya, kaya kailangan lahat ng ibinibigay mo sa kanya pulido, palaging maayos kasi kung hindi maayos, its either itapon nya yun or iko-cross out nya ng malaki yun."

"Ang pressure samin dahil ang gusto namin ma-meet yung expectation samin ni mam kaya ang ginagawa namin,

ginagandahan talaga namin yung gawa namin, kapag alam namin pangit"

1.5.   adviser's busy schedule

"Si Ma'am busy sya… Palaging na momove yung consultation…may consultation kami ng umaga, magiging hapon na lang tapos minsan hindi na matutuloy, kinabukasan na lang"

"Si Mam kasi sobrang hectic nya bilang isang thesis adviser… kailangan mong habulin yung schedule nya…takbo ka papunta dun sa office nya tapos malalaman mo wala sya dun… maghihintay ka ng ilang oras hanggang ilang araw… minsan kasi may leave sya, umaabot kami hanggang ala-dyes para lang sa consultation…"

"Somehow, naka-contribute (sa pressure)… Nakakatulong sya pero minsan parang naaano ka sa schedule nya din kasi na busy… parang hindi pa kami tapos, pinapapasa na. ipapa-print na namin tapos pagdating mo dun wala si Mam, so balik ulit kami sa scratch parang revision ulit… dahil nga pressured kami, yung iba andito na, kasi natyetyempuhan nila si Mam…"

1.6.   group competition

"Halo-halo siguro kasi kapag nakikita mo yung mga classmate mo na natatapos na sila sa isang chapter or tapos yung deadline parang hindi mo ma-beat…"

"Kapag may nauuna, parang …sila tapos na… kami hindi pa. Lalo pa naming pinagbubutihan… pagdating sa study nagko-compete talaga kami …"

III. Conflict situations in thesis groups

This part of the study describes the intricacies of why and how conflicts arise within a group that has a goal—that of finishing the thesis—but has members who have varying characteristics, work attitudes and personal agendas.

A. Reasons why conflicts arise

1. Members' Differing Work Attitudes

"Actually nagsisimula lang talaga yon, pag makilala mo na talaga yung ugali nung isang tao pag yung ano, yung working attitude nya …pakikisama naman na nakikita mo dumudugo na yung utak namin, lumuluwa na ung mga mata namin sa computer. Siya nakikipagharutan lang sa iba.. Parang… hello?"

"Kung ayaw nyo, ako magpapa-consult mag-isa ko. Bakit kasi puro kayo ganyan, lagi kayong ganito… parang binu-burst out ko na nun… parang wala pa rin akong marinig, blanko… teka muna… ano ba naman to, nagkakagulo na kami dito, ganun pa rin yung reaksyon…"

"Ang nangyari kasi sobrang asar ako dahil parang sobrang relax ka… ganito lang lagi… sige lang, kaya yan… sige lang, kaya yan…ako kasi yung pakelamera sa ibang grupo na, Naku …andito na sila… chapter 5 na sila! Bakit tayo andidito palang"

2. A Member's Inability to Produce Acceptable Output for the Group

"Di namin alam kung iniisip mo ba yung pamilya mo o boyfriend mo o ano ba't hindi ka makagawa ng maayos na gawa…"

"Pwede mong utusan, ganyan… pag medyo kilos – kilos, ok yan… physically ok…kaso nga lang mejo tagilid sya sa grammar… nasubukan namin pagawin siya tapos at the end of the day, kami rin yung magrevise, kame rin gumagawa…ulitin from the top kasi wala, scratch talaga eh."

"Para siyang bata basta medyo parang hindi sya nakakapagsarili, parang ganun sya kaya kailangan i mo guguide mo sya tulungan mo talaga siya."

"Pinag-type ko kulang-kulang pa…"

3. Groups' Exposure to Various Pressures Creating Stress

"Sabi nga namin pag nagtithesis … para kaming nanay na naglalabor… kasi puyat, pagod – emotionally saka physically – depressed ka, halimbawa hindi naging maganda yung outcome, kulang pala akala mo ok na… pero after nun pag nanganak ka na at maganda ang anak mo, diba? Ang sarap sa feeling… para kang nakalutang."

"Mawiwindang ka talaga kasi halimbawa galing akong rehearsal tapos pupunta ako sa kanila parang gutom ka, puyat, tapos pagdating dun makikita mo nagfaface book, nakahiga.. Magmumura ka talaga.."

4. "Irregular" and "Outcast" Group Members' Unequal Participation in the Research Process

"Kasi all of a sudden bigla siyang nadagdag sa grupo hindi namin siya, hindi pa namin siya kilala, hindi namin alam kung pano siya magtrabaho, parang nadadalawang isip kami na ano ipapagawa ba natin to sa kanya? Pinipili lang talaga namin yung gusto namin ipagawa…"

"Kulang na kulang sa tulog kaya kapag thesis, magsasabi siya ng kung anong kailangan gawin, kami makikita kalagayan niya parang wag na lang di ba?"

5. OJT vs. Thesis

"Nagkasabay kami ng ojt …tapos patayan kami sa ojt, tapos last week revision before ng thesis, tapos lahat kami nun walang oras, kulang na lang wag na kaming umuwi para lang matapos yung ojt."

"Parang nagiging dependent din yung isat isa sa amin..timing din kasi sa thesis, yung ojt … so parang nag-chop yung mga work sa amin, so kayo muna magmeeting kasi may pasok ako…"

6. Group's Lack of Financial and Material Resources to Support their Study

"Ang totoo wala siyang pamasahe…Wala talaga siyang pera. yun yung problema"

"Pamasahe, ako hindi ko naiintindihan yon nung time na yon, gusto ko kapag nag set ako ng date dapat nandun kayong lahat, para sa akin kasi kung gusto may paraan"

"Equipment kasi yun nga dalawa lang yung may computer sa amin…may iba iba kaming work e… naging problema siya kasi yung iba…magne-net ako, magrerent ako para magtype lang… isinasama ko pa yun dun sa resibo na paghahatian ng grupo…yun yung naging problema."

"Yung sakin naman, ang mangyayari dahil nga financial, pag yun ang problema ko, hindi ako laging nakakapunta ng school, tuwing may pasok lang. pagbalik ko, naiba na yung pinupuntahan ng thesis"

7. Conflict in Group Tasks Resulting from Miscommunication

"Miscommunication, kasi minsan dapat gawin ng isa yung task nya tapos sasabihin, e diba naaano ko na kay ganito? Ayy, wala pa ba?"

8. Members' High Value on Close-Personal Relationships

"Yung pinagmumulan talaga ng mga away awayan namin is yung attitude namin sa isa't isa, dahil magkakaibigan kami, naging kampante sila sa lahat sa amen, gagawa sila, nagiging mediocre lang yung gawa nila, kasi gagawa lang sila tapos ibibigay nila saken tapos pagdating saken, ieedit ko pa, kaya yung relationship yung, pinaka-conflict. Kasi syempre, kailangan mong ilagay talaga sa pedestal yung pagiging magkakaibigan nyo para hindi masira."

B. Research process in the midst of the group conflict

The groups' research process may:

Progress

"Nagprogress siya nung during the conflict namin kasi tinulungan kami ni Mam. Siya yung pinaka-ugat kasi nung time na nagkakaproblema kami si Mam talaga yung hands on pa rin siya sa amin, kaya nagawa namin ng maayos yung thesis."

"Sobra siyang nagpo-progress kasi diba, nagkakaron ng conflict, kasi yung conflict para sakin, hindi ko siya tine-take as negative, lagi kong tine-take na positive siya kaya pag nagkaconflict kayo parang kinukuha ko na lang yung goodtime kesa sa bad."

9. Progress Slowly

"Nung wala sya kaya hindi kami nakapagpa-consult saka mali din yung nagawa nya yun din yung dahilan kung bakit bumagal yung study namin."

"Sobrang nagtatagal siya.. kung sabay-sabay kaming gumagawa ang bilis siguro namin…binigyan namin siya ng 2 days aabot siya ng 2 weeks, 1 month, sobrang nagtatagal siya."

10. Stagnate

"Totoo yung sinasabi nila na tengga yung thesis namin kasi mas exciting ang paggawa ng film… Parang feeling namin hindi kami umuusad… kahit parang everyday kaming magkakasama hindi umuusad yung ginagawa namin."

11. Retrogress

"Tapos isa pang naging problema nung nagumpisa kami sa scratch kasi dumating yung time na ano magma-mock defense na kami… namatay si Francis M (key informant of the study) yung iba malaki na agad yung progress nila … kami balik ulit sa chapter 1 kasi nawala yung study namin"

C. Relationship of members during conflict

1. Passive

"Hindi ko nalang iniisip e, pag kausap ko eto… hindi, ano… parang hindi mo nalang pinapansin, kumbaga, ise-set aside mo… kung meron ka mang hinanakit or sama ng loob, diba… kasi … pag maguusap kayo thesis lang…"

2. Aggressive

"Binabara talaga namin na hoy gumawa ka naman, parang wala ka naman silbi dito sa grupo ganyan nakakakuha ka ng grade na di mo naman deserve nakakahiya naman samin diba? Ginaganon talaga namin sya"

3. Hostile

"Sumisigaw na ko na, hindi ganito dapat, dapat nandito kayo, wala kayong ginagawa, anong ginagawa nyo sa bahay? Hindi na nga kayo umaatend wala pa kayong ginagawa sa bahay!"

"Halimbawa, boyfriend, tsismisan, tpos pag si irish na magsasalita… sa init ng ulo ko, "halikana mag thesis na tayo! Pag siya na magsasalita, thesis na ulit, ganun."

4. Avoiding

"Parang naguusap na hindi nagtitinginan…Pero nung lumalala na, walang communication, wala talaga…"

"May conflict kame so patunayan mo sa bawat isa na kaya mo tong gawin kahit may conflict kailangan may maipakita ka sa kanila … magagawa ko yung part ko."

5. Gossiping

"Bat ganitong leader to e… wag nyo nalang din sasabihin ha… pero sinabi ko na… kasi hindi maiwasan e…Pinaparating nya pa sa iba."

6. Nit Picking

"Never din kami nagkaroon ng confrontation sa amin, tapos may instance pa na sigawan sa dorm, nagta-transcribe lang kami, yung tipong magta-transcribe nalang pati sulat ng ano,

ung tipong pati, hindi ko maintindihan, sa sobrang inis mo sa tao, pati yung handwriting nung tao mapapansin mo."

"Mapride kasi kami, feeling kasi namin lahat magagaling kami, so yung pride namin,... kunwari siya hindi matapos, hindi nya natapos, yung isa magiisip na, na ay hindi nya natapos, parang ganun…"

D. Major factors that contribute to the resolution of conflict

1. Tolerance

"At first naman parang ok naman yun na hayaan… Tinolerate namin sya na ganun sya…Hinahayaan na lang namin kesa mamroblema tayo, magalit tayo, mabababoy pa yung gawa natin."

"Aalis, o iba na naman yung pupuntahan nya, e alam nya naman na may ganito dito.. makikita mo nagsa-sacrifice ka ng time mo pero yung isa hindi, ang dating parang di ka naman makapagsalita kasi wala na namang mangyayari kung magko-confront kayo tsaka what if nandun na, hindi din kayo makapag-trabaho ng maayos so its better na keep it to yourself nalang…"

2. Miscommunication among Members

"Nung nag-usap usap kami, bago kami maghiwa-hiwalay na ganito yan… pagdating ko iba na naman.. ano to?! Hirap na hirap akong magisip neto tapos iibahin nyo ng wala akong ano (consent)?"

3. Member's Dishonesty

"Ginagawa nya ring excuse, kami yung kasama. Most of the time daw kami yung kasama nyang gumagawa ng thesis. Nung nalaman kong lagi nyang excuse kami aside from dun sa dinadamay nya na tao na hindi naman kasali sa paggawa ng thesis."

4. Avoidance to Confront the Situation

"Iniiwasan naming magkasagutan kasi alam namin na mas walang patutunguhan…Hindi na namin sinosolusyonan yon, ang problema sa amin walang confrontation"

"Harap-harap tayo mag-usap… pero dahil may pride na sa bawat isa parang ang hirap, parang siguro nagkakahiyaan din na parang ayaw masabing madrama."

5. Members' Absence as a Result of Conflicting Schedules

Yung presence, sobrang mabibilang mo sa kamay ko kung kelan lang kami naging kumpleto kapag ginagawa namin yung thesis"

6. Research Process Retrogression

"Nagiging rush kami, so pag naging rush, yung nagiging quality wala na don, babalik, ulit na naman, recurring e. Parang masyado ng nakaka-consume ng time, effort, money."

7. Members' Lack of Focus and Priority

"May boyfriend kasi siya so kada mago-overnight kami, lagi yung kasama, naging problema siya sa amin,ang nangyayari dahil naghihintay yung boyfriend nya susunduin siya... minamadali nya yung trabaho imbes na natatapos namin kagad ng may quality yung work na ginagawa namin"

E. Consequences of conflict on the members' relationships and research output

1. Positive
   1.1. relationship between and among members

"Thesis can make or break friendship, parang nabreak nga kami ng thesis pero na-put together parin nya kami 'non, kasi dun lang lumalabas yung teamwork."

"Tumibay ang friendship natin…"

   1.2. preparation for future career

"Tsaka pag pinili mo yung mga taong makaka-trabaho mo, pano pa in the future diba?... hindi mo mapipili yung mga tao na yun. Dun ko natutunan kung pano mag-adjust sa mga attitudes na ganyan… sobrang helpful, right now… wala kong kaaway sa trabaho."

1.3. dealing with challenges

Minsan magkakaroon ng clash ng kunti sa inyo pero take it as a challenge, kailangan at the end of the day, buo pa rin group nyu hanggang matapos Kasi maganda nyan, fruit of labor, maganda kinakalabasan kahit nagkaroon kayo ng pagsubok sa grupo... convert yung conflict into better results...”

“Kung walang conflict, hindi nya malalaman kung ano ang dapat i-manage...di nyo matetest ang patience nyo, hindi matetest yung strength as a group, so kailangan may conflict para mas magimprove kayo,as a person na din”

1.4. members' resourcefulness

“...Oo, makakagawa ka talaga ng paraan dahil mag-iisip ka ng alternatives. Lalo na yung problema yung pamasahe. As in talagang gagawa ako ng paraan, lahat gagawin ako makapunta lang ako.”

“Kaya kelangan resourceful ka din pag nagtthesis ka kasi yung ano e, yung pinupuhunan mong pera”

2. Negative
   2.1. grudges between and among members

“Namansin sya, pero hindi sa amin. Sa ibang kasama namin na hindi naman nya kagrupo sa thesis...”

2.2. personal lives

“Halimbawa siyempre may personal life ka mas makakadagdag kasi yun sa ginagawa mo e, mahirap mag-isip kapag may dinadala ka...”

2.3. members' friendships after thesis

“Parang nalamatan yung pagkakaibigan na kahit hindi na gusto hindi mo ginusto nangyari... may mga bagay lang na syempre... hindi na kayang ibalik...”

2.4. unjust punishment to conflicting group members

“Hindi sya nakasabay sa min na grumaduate...”

IV. Communication strategies and approaches to address conflict

A. When conflict starts

It is evident that as soon as conflict arises, group members strategize and try to find ways through which they can resolve it—either through indirect or direct approaches. These strategies and approaches make up the dynamics that are observed when members try to address conflicting situations. Under the direct approach, they employ both positive and negative strategies—through negotiation, confrontation, and utterance of hurting/cursing words.

1. Negotiation/Setting of Rules

"Ako naman kasi pag ano, naga-argue kami. We see to it na pag nag-open kami, lahat, as in yung buong grupo. Hindi yung sasabihin ko pa sa ibang tao na may problema tayo. Usap tayo…Kailangan lahat naririnig… yung mga personal na hinanakit na namin inoopen naman namin, nagkakaron naman kami ng open forum"

"Ako na yung nagrereach out sayo tutulungan ka namin.Pero tulungan mo rin yung sarili mo di naman pwedeng tutulungan ka namin pero di mo tutulungan yung sarili mo kumilos."

"Sa boyfriend nya, binigyan namin siya ng limitation… naging part na yun ng rule namin na, walang boyfriends. Walang magtetext during gumagawa kami ng thesis.. naging open din naman siya sa ganun…"

"Set aside ang ibang activities… inopen narin namin sa lahat na yon, pagdating sa thesis, focus lang. Thesis lang iprioritize natin, kung may iba pang mga activities, ire-sked mo."

2. Confrontation

"Sa thesis na nga yun, nageeffort na kami sa time para magawa yung thesis, tapos nandududon na nga yung bf nya para sunduin siya agad or bantayan siya…kami yung nagsa-suffer though madali nya ngang natatapos kaso yung quality nga nung gawa, paulit-ulit lang. Kaya nung time na yun, dun nagstart na kinonfront namin siya."

"pinapagalitan ko rin siya pero wala akong magagawa, kailangan ko panindigan, kailangan mo talagang panindigan yung nakaatang samin

3. Utterance of "Malambing"/Hurting/Curing Words

"May two ways akong nakipagusap sa kanya, yung una, yung malambing pa ako eh, yung kaya ko pa, nakokontrol ko pa yung pasensya ko… tapos pangalawa, yung galit na ako…Kaya minsan siguro galit na saken kasi naging harsh ako,.."

"Kapag magtetext siya samin, mabait sila nikki kapag nagtetext, kasi ako kapag nagtetext, all caps na, puro exclamation point pa! (Sa kanya) Para kang nakikipag usap sa bata"

"Kailangan masaktan mo siya, para alam mo yung magising din siya sa katotohan na "hoy mali ka gumawa ka naman ng tama, mahiya ka naman sa amin… kailangan kasi, kung di mo isasampal sa mukha niya na kagrupo ka namin hello kailangan mo kumilos, kailangan talaga minsan maging mean ka sa tao kung alam mong ikabubuti nya,"

"mag-away man yan bukas tawanan na lang pero yung mga iba namin kaklase nagmumurahan…"

In the indirect approach, on the other hand, the following strategies are manifested: cracking of jokes, concealing one's feelings or anger by showing the opposite of what one really feels for the other, and gossiping.

1. Gossiping

"Si Carol hindi naman yan magbo-brought up ng pag andun si Joy, parang ang nangyayari, siguro silang dalawa ang madalas na nagkakausap, si Makki at si Joy tapos kaming dalawa neto, so ako yung absorber nya, tapos sya yung sakin, parang hindi talaga kami nagkompronta ng derecho, never."

2. Concealing One's Feelings or Anger by Showing the Opposite of What One Really Feels

"Wala… plastikan kami e…Meron yung instance na plastikan to the max na maguusap kayo, na parang ok, harap-harap kayong ganyan… parang meron syang masasabi na pabor na yung sagot nya na parang pabalang…tablahan talaga"

3. Cracking of Jokes

"Yung mga pahaging lang na ano, ano ayan… late na naman… Yung mga pahaging na ganun.. kahit pa joke o pabaklang sasabihin, totoo yun."

"...Parang wala ka na nga ng dalawang araw tapos pagdating mo ganyan ka pa…which is, hindi ko naman masabi ng derecho… pag kaming dalawa nalang yan, kaya ko yang sabihin, kahit takot… pero in a form of a joke…"

```
direct                          indirect
approach                        approach

negotiation                     gossiping

confrontation                   concealing one's
                                feelings/anger by
                                showing the opposite
                                of what one feels for
                                the other

utterance of                    cracking of jokes
hurting/cursing
words
```

Figure 2. Direct and indirect communication approaches which make up the dynamics in addressing conflicting situations at their early stage

B. When conflict worsens

If, at the start of a conflict, group members have three different strategies under both direct and indirect approaches of dealing with it, when it worsens, they employ the direct approach more than the indirect. The urgency of addressing the problem because of the extent of damage that the conflict has caused the group pushes the members to be more open with each other by employing the direct approaches.

For the direct approach, they resort to: bridging, taking sides, giving ultimatums, engaging in altercations, "ousting" members and seeking the advisor's mediation.

1. Bridging

"Hindi nga kami nag-uusap usap siya lang talaga yun naging way namin parang hindi verbally naguusap pero dahil sa kanya nagkakaron ng progress ganun…"

".. yung naging bridge… so kami sa respeto namin talagang sinusunod namin siya ayun…"

2. Taking Sides

"Divided kami so parang kaming dalawa yung natira parang yung leader sa kanila siya…"

"kampihan kami, tipong nasa library kami… ayokong umupo dyan kaharap ko si ano… naaasar ako …

"Ganyan din kaming dalawa… naglalabas na ng sama ng loob…

3. Giving Ultimatums

"Binigyan natin siya ng ultimatum… Within the week dapat wala kang absent. No other priority!"

"Anong paiiralin niyo? Awa o yung pagiging objective? Kung paiiralin niyo ang awa niyo, wala kayong karapatang magreklamo sakin."

4. Engaging in Altercations

"Dahil may conflict na, wala ng naglakas ng loob na, o bakit ganito? Kung baga walang nagapproach na malumanay… parating pasigaw…"

5. "Ousting" Members

"…nanlaglag kami ng isa namin groupmate…"

6. Seeking the Advisor's Mediation

"Si Mam yung ano, yung naging mediator…"

"Ilapit muna natin kay ma'am kung ano yung magiging decision niya kasi ang hirap kapag kami magdedesisyon kasi hindi naman kami yung nagbibigay ng grade sa kanya. Ayun nilapit namin kay ma'am.

They, on the other hand, resort to "silent war" when employing the indirect approach.

7. Silent War

"Pag magkakasama kami talagang may… silent war. Di kami nagko-communicate ng maayos… mas gusto namin yung toka-tokang trabaho. Kasi hindi talaga kami kumikilos as a group…"

"Oo, pero never mo iko-confront na, bakit anong ibig sabihin neto? Bakit mo sinabing ganon? Parang ramdam mo sa sarili mo na merong something pero never na-brought [sic] up."

Figure 3. Direct and indirect communication approaches which make up the dynamics that addresses conflicting situations as they worsen

V. Major contributors to the resolution of conflict

A. Adviser's and non-conflicting members' mediation

"Kinausap … ni Mam .., parang after non naging okay siya, nag improve siya na parang may effort na sya."

"Simula nung nilapit namin kay ma'am, ayun, nandun na siya palagi…"

"Kunyari nagtalo si Adeth or si abby, kumbaga shineshare din namin yung side nya at the same time wala naman kaming kinakampihan. Pagdating sa mga pago-open up ng mga nararamdaman nila. Hindi naman yung may kakampi dito, kakampi kami dito. Kumbaga both parties tinitingnan namin, binabalance namin yung situation."

B. "Professionalism"

"Kahit magkakaaway kami, ang gusto namin patunayan sa ibang grupo na kami mas magaling kami sa inyo. Ganun yung grupo naming…Pumasok yung professionalism kahit magkakaaway kami pagdating sa trabaho hindi kami pumapalya."

C. Members' passive communication towards co-members' aggressive communication

"Kapag dalawa kayong naiinis, walang patutunguhan, pagsinagot mo…walang matatapos."

"Never namin … nakita … na nape-pressure sya … sasabihin nya, ok lang yan, sige kaya lang yan… ok, bukas… ganyan-ganyan… yung tipong wala lang yung nararamdaman nya… wala ka man lang maririnig"

Figure 4. Major factors that contribute to the resolution of conflicts

VI. Conclusions

A. Whether close personal relationships or personal goals are the way of choosing their group mates, the ultimate goal of members is to achieve harmonious relationships to avoid pressure and conflict while working on their research.

B. While the researchers' physical environment brought comfort and peace, their non-physical environment inevitably brought pressure and conflict caused by different relational factors.

C. Researchers working in groups cannot really avoid conflicts because, aside from following the rigors of formal research is by nature stressful, groups are also composed of individuals with diverse personalities, attitude and abilities that may come in conflict with one another.

D. Communication dynamics is reflected in the group members' approaches and strategies to resolve existing conflicts between and among them. These communication strategies vary depending on the type of conflicts the groups encounter, the severity of the conflicts and their effect on the relationships of members and the research process.

VII. Recommendations

A. Official student organizations, in coordination with the college should, at the start of the semester, organize and sponsor a general orientation for incoming fourth year students who are enrolled in thesis writing class. Thesis advisers, as well as newlygrads may be invited to talk about the intricacies of doing research that are done in groups. Topics for discussion may be those which were generated in this study:

1. the factors considered in choosing group members
2. the working environments of a thesis group
3. the conflict situations between and among members based on:
   - 3.1 Reasons why conflicts arise
   - 3.2 The progress of study when there is conflict
   - 3.3 The members' relationship when conflicts arise
4. the communication strategies and approaches that may be used by the groups to resolve conflict

B. The college may produce and publish leaflets that contain the set of guidelines discussed during the general orientation for distribution after the event.

C. The set of guidelines

1. may be presented to the Vice President for Academic Affairs and Vice President for Student Services for the possibility of sharing it with other colleges and campuses
2. may form part of the research manual of each of the colleges

D. The study may be replicated in other colleges with the possibility of generating richer and varying data that may help enrich the generated knowledge offered in this study.

E. Results of the study may be presented in national and international conferences for greater possibility of broadening the varying areas of conflict and communication.

DOUBLE DOSE: HIGH FAMILY CONFLICT ENHANCES THE EFFECT OF MEDIA VIOLENCE EXPOSURE ON ADOLESCENTS' AGGRESSION

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Abstract

We investigated how exposure to media violence and family conflict affects adolescents' subsequent aggressive behavior. We expected a double dose effect, meaning that high media violence exposure would lead to higher levels of aggression for adolescents in high conflict families compared to low conflict families. A total of 499 adolescents (aged 10 to 14, 48% girls) participated in a two-wave longitudinal survey (4-month interval). Survey questions assessed their exposure to violence on television and in electronic games, family conflict, and aggressive behavior. Analyses revealed a significant interaction between media violence and family conflict. In families with higher conflict, higher media violence exposure was related to increased subsequent aggression. This study is the first to show a double dose effect of media violence and family

conflict on adolescents' aggression. These findings underscore the important role of the family in shaping the effects of adolescents' media use on their social development.

1. Introduction

Media violence exposure has been investigated as a risk factor for aggressive behavior for decades, with most studies demonstrating small to moderate effect sizes (Anderson et al., 2010; Bushman - Huesmann, 2006). Despite the current scientific debate about whether these effect sizes are theoretically and practically meaningful (Valkenburg - Peter, 2013), such relatively small effects are neither strange nor unexpected. Aggression is a complex behavior caused by multiple factors (Browne - Hamilton-Giachritsis, 2005; Ribeaud - Eisner, 2010) of which media violence is only one. Research investigating the effects of media violence in concert with other predictors of aggression is needed in order to better understand its relative contribution to aggressive behavior (Browne - Hamilton-Giachritsis, 2005; Bandura, 2009).

The debate about whether and how media violence leads to aggression has received renewed attention following the tragic event at Sandy Hook elementary school in December 2012, where 20 children and six teachers lost their lives. In the aftermath of this tragedy, President Obama called for additional funding for research designed to better understand the role that media violence may play in gun violence (White House, 2013). Public policy advocates such as Common Sense Media have indicated that "one of the most pressing needs" in both the public and scientific debate is research that investigates the effects of media violence within the context of the family environment (Common Sense Media, 2013). Indeed, family conflict (defined as openly expressed anger, hostility, and aggression in the home (Moos - Moos, 1994)) has been identified as a risk factor for aggressive behavior, particularly during childhood and early adolescence (Ribeaud - Eisner, 2010). Given that aggressive behavior is often conceptualized as the result of a socialization process in which both the family and the media play important roles (Bandura, 1986), investigating how media violence affects aggression within the context of family conflict is relevant (Ferguson, 2009). In this study, we respond to public and academic concerns by investigating the interactive effect of media violence and family conflict on adolescents' aggression.

1.1. Research into Media Violence and Family Conflict

Although media violence and family conflict have both been investigated as predictors of aggression (Tanaka et al., 2010; Vandewater - Lansford, 1998; Gentile et al., 2011; Krahé - Möller, 2010), this has largely taken place in separate disciplines (Vandewater et al., 2005). Media researchers have focused on the effects of media violence, while largely ignoring effects of family conflict, whereas the reverse is true for family researchers. Although a few studies have investigated the relative effect of media violence when controlling for family conflict (along with a number of other risk factors) (Ferguson et al., 2009; Huesmann et al., 2003), it has not yet been investigated whether media violence and family conflict have an interactive effect on aggressive behavior.

This lack of research attention for the joint effect of media violence and family conflict on aggression is surprising. Researchers have long argued that media research should incorporate social context as an integral part of research models rather than treat it as a control variable (Jordan, 2004; Slater et al., 2006). After all, media use does not occur in a social vacuum, but rather takes place within a broader social context that can shape and strengthen its effects (Jordan, 2004; Slater et al., 2006; Gerbner et al., 1980). Furthermore, investigating interaction effects between multiple predictors of aggression has been identified as an important goal for media research (Valkenburg - Peter, 2013). Doing so may show whether the relatively small effects of media violence exposure found on an aggregate level may be larger for a subgroup of children who are particularly vulnerable to the effects of media violence (Valkenburg - Peter, 2013). By ignoring relevant moderators such as family conflict, the effect of media violence on aggression may be 'diluted' across a study sample, potentially resulting in small effects (Valkenburg - Peter, 2013). To address this gap in the literature, we conducted a longitudinal survey among Dutch adolescents aged 10 to 14 to test whether there is an interactive effect of media violence and family conflict on adolescents' subsequent aggressive behavior.

1.2. Theoretical Background

Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) (Bandura, 1986) has been used to explain the effects of both media violence and family conflict on aggressive behavior (Jordan, 2004; Anderson - Bushman, 2002; Huesmann, 2007; Farver et al., 2005; Margolin - Gordis, 2000; McKelvey et al., 2011;Proctor, 2006). SCT states that children learn behaviors through their own experience and through observation of others. Seeing others enact a certain behavior and subsequently being punished or rewarded for this behavior teaches a child which behaviors are socially acceptable and which are not. Such social cognitions are seen as regulators of actual behavior (Huesmann - Guerra, 1997; Perry et al., 1986; Orue et al., 2011).

Within this social learning process, the family and the media represent two observable role models for children and early adolescents (Bandura, 1986). Parents, in particular, are the most important role models for youth (Anderson - Cavallaro, 2002; Bricheno - Thornton, 2007). Through their own actions, parents provide information about acceptable and unacceptable social behavior, which children can then replicate. In the case of aggression, several studies have shown that children who observe conflict within their family display more aggressive behavior themselves (Tanaka et al., 2010; Farver et al., 2005; Duncan et al., 2002; Formoso et al., 2000).

Given the high amount of time that adolescents spend using media (Rideout et al., 2011), characters and behaviors observed on TV and in games also form a vital part of adolescents' social learning process (Jordan, 2004; Huesmann, 2007). The way in which aggression is often portrayed in these media —glorified, rewarded, and performed by attractive characters (Konijn et al., 2007) —further increases the chance that adolescents will also display such behavior. Indeed, experimental research has shown that children and adolescents who are exposed to rewarded violence or who identify with aggressive characters subsequently demonstrate increased aggressive behavior (Konijn et al., 2007; Boyatzis et al., 1995).

Two theoretical models would predict that observing aggression both in the media and in the family can create a "double dose" effect (Gerbner et al., 1980). Cultivation theory includes the concept of resonance, which is the idea that people whose life experiences are congruent with what they see on television will be more affected by media messages (Gerbner et al., 1980). The Differential Susceptibility to Media Effects Model

(Valkenburg - Peter, 2013) stresses that media effects are often conditional, and that social context can reinforce the effects of exposure to media violence. Based on these theories, we expect that adolescents with high media violence exposure will become more aggressive in the context of high family conflict (double dose effect) than in the context of low family conflict. Thus, we hypothesize that family conflict strengthens the effect of media violence on aggression. Investigating this moderating role of family conflict can help us understand which adolescents are particularly susceptible to the effects of media violence exposure.

2. Method

2.1. Participants

After receiving approval from the sponsoring institution's Institutional Review Board, a large, private survey research institute in the Netherlands (TNS-NIPO) collected the data. Adolescents were recruited through TNS-NIPO's existing online panel (approximately 60,000 households) that is representative of the Netherlands. 673 Dutch adolescents between the ages of 10 and 14 years completed an online survey in January 2012. In May 2012, 499 of these adolescents agreed to participate in a second survey (*i.e.*, 74% recontact agreement). These 499 adolescents made up the sample used in this study (85.8% sibling pairs; 47.9% girls; age at Time 1: $M = 11.87$, $SD = 1.46$).

2.2. Measures

2.2.1. Media Violence Exposure

Media violence exposure was measured using direct estimates, a measure frequently used in media research (Vandewater - Lee, 2009; Lee et al., 2008; Schmitz et al., 2004). Exposure to violent content on TV and in electronic games was measured with two items each (four items in total): (1) How often do you watch television programs [play games] that contain violence? and (2) On the days that you watch television programs [play games] that contain violence, how much time do you spend on this per day? Participants were given the following definition of violence: 'All violence (for example, fighting and shooting) that living beings (for example, humans and monsters) do to each other.' Response categories for the first item ranged from 0 (never) to 7 (7 days per week). The

second item was an open-ended question, answered by filling in hours and minutes. Items were multiplied to calculate the number of hours per week of violent television and violent game exposure. These two variables were then summed to create one variable representing violent media exposure in hours per week.

2.2.2. Family Conflict

Family conflict was measured using five items from the conflict subscale of the Family Environment Scale (Moos - Moos, 1994; Jansma - Coole, 1996). Respondents were asked to indicate how often family members do the following things at home: (1) criticize each other, (2) hit each other, (3) argue, (4) curse, and (5) become so angry they start throwing things. Response categories were (1) never, (2) almost never, (3) sometimes, and (4) often. Scores were averaged to create scales ($\alpha = 0.75$), with higher scores indicating greater family conflict.

2.2.3. Aggression

Adolescents' direct aggression was measured with six items adapted from the Direct and Indirect Aggression Scale (Björkqvist et al., 1992). Adolescents were asked how often in the past six months they had done the following things to another adolescent: (1) call names, (2) push in a rough way, (3) kick or hit, (4) threaten to beat up, (5) fought with, and (6) tripped on purpose. Response categories were (1) never, (2) 1 time in the past 6 months, (3) 2–3 times in the past 6 months, (4) about 1 time per month, (5) about 1 time per week, and (6) about every day. Scores were averaged to create scales ($\alpha = .83/.85$ at Time 1/Time 2), with higher scores indicating greater aggressive behavior.

2.3. Analytic Approach

Because 86% of our sample (428 children) consisted of sibling pairs, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was inappropriate because the assumption of independent observations is violated. This can result in over- or underestimation of coefficients due to biased estimates of standard errors (Hayes, 2006; Desai - Begg, 2008). To address this clustering in the data, multilevel modeling was used in SPSS 20. Multilevel models take into account that some variables are clustered or nested within other variables (in our case, children were nested within

households). We accounted for the correlation among children within a household by allowing the mean aggression score (*i.e.*, the intercept of the regression equation) to vary freely across households. This results in appropriate estimates of the standard errors for the regression coefficients (Desai - Begg, 2008). Parameters in this multilevel model can be interpreted in the same way as OLS regression.

All models controlled for aggressive behavior at Time 1. In addition, we investigated whether gender would be a suitable covariate in our analyses. Because of the relatively short time lag between the data collection waves, as well as the considerable skewness introduced to our data when including gender, we had some concern that the gender-included model would result in incorrect estimates. Given that gender is often included in models investigating media violence and aggression (e.g., (Hopf et al., 2008; Krahé et al., 2012)), we opted to conduct two sets of analyses: one in which gender is omitted from the model, and one in which gender is treated as a covariate. Results from both analyses are reported in the text.

The two-way interaction was probed using the Johnson-Neyman technique (Preacher et al., 2006). This technique indicates where (*i.e.*, at which values of a continuous moderator) the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable is significant (at $p < 0.05$). In this particular study, the Johnson–Neyman technique allows us to identify at which values of family conflict the relationship between media violence and aggressive behavior achieves statistical significance. Although the values obtained for these regions of significance are slightly less stable in multilevel models than in fixed-effects regression, this technique provides valuable information for the interpretation of interaction effects (Bauer - Curran, 2005).

3. Results

3.1. Descriptives and Intercorrelations

Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all model variables. Adolescents in our sample scored relatively low on aggressive behavior, with a mean of 1.52 ($SD = 0.71$, scale range: 1 to 6). Family conflict was also relatively infrequent in the sample, with a reported mean of 2.10 ($SD = 0.55$, scale range: 1 to 4). On average, adolescents reported consuming 4.8 hours per week of media violence ($SD = 8.30$).

Gender correlated significantly with media violence exposure at Time 1 and aggressive behavior at Time 1 and 2. Boys were more aggressive on average than girls (boys: $M = 1.70$, $SD = 0.82$; girls: $M = 1.32$, $SD = 0.51$), and also reported about four times more media violence exposure (boys: $M = 7.60$ hours per week, $SD = 10.47$; girls: $M = 1.80$ hours per week, $SD = 2.71$).

Aggressive behavior was quite stable over time ($r = 0.55$, $p < 0.001$). Significant correlations were found between media violence and aggressive behavior, both cross-sectionally ($r = 0.27$, $p < 0.001$) and longitudinally ($r = 0.18$, $p < 0.001$). Family conflict was also significantly related to aggressive behavior (cross-sectional $r = 0.36$, $p < 0.001$, longitudinal $r = 0.30$, $p < 0.001$). The two predictors, family conflict and media violence, correlated at .11 ($p = 0.02$).

Table 1. Means (standard deviations) and correlations for model variables.

Variables	Means (SD)			Correlations				
	Full sample	Boys	Girls	1	2	3	4	5
1. Aggression T1	1.52 (0.71)	1.70 (0.82)	1.32 (0.51)	-				
2. Media violence T1	4.82 (8.30)	7.60 (10.47)	1.80 (2.71)	0.27^{***}	-			
3. Family conflict T1	2.10 (0.55)	2.13 (0.55)	2.07 (0.54)	0.36^{***}	0.11^{*}	-		
4. Aggression T2	1.46 (0.68)	1.61 (0.77)	1.29 (0.51)	0.55^{***}	0.18^{***}	0.30^{***}	-	
5. Gender [a]	-	-	-	0.27^{***}	0.35^{***}	0.06	0.24^{***}	-

[a] Girls = 0; boys = 1. * $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$.

3.2. Main Effects of Media Violence and Family Conflict

We first investigated the main effect of media violence exposure on aggressive behavior in two steps: first while only controlling for Time 1 aggression, second by adding family conflict to the model. The two predictors (Time 1 media violence exposure and family conflict) and the control variable (Time 1 aggression) were standardized in order to obtain standardized regression coefficients in the multilevel analysis. Standardized regression coefficients (b^*) are presented in the text; unstandardized coefficients are presented in Table 2. For the unstandardized coefficients (b), the predictor variables were centered at their sample mean values to reduce multicollinearity problems with their interaction terms.

Although Time 1 media violence exposure and Time 2 aggression correlated significantly (as shown in Table 1), media violence was not a significant predictor of aggressive behavior when controlling for Time 1 aggression ($b^* = 0.02$, $p = 0.47$). When family conflict was added to the model, the relationship between media violence and aggression was unchanged ($b^* = 0.02$, $p = 0.48$). Family conflict did predict subsequent aggression ($b^* = 0.08$, $p = 0.003$), with increased family conflict predicting increased aggression. These results did not change when we added gender to the model as covariate: media violence was not associated with subsequent aggression ($b^* = -0.00$, $p = 0.89$) whereas family conflict was ($b^* = 0.08$, $p = 0.002$).

Table 2. Unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals (CI) predicting Time 2 aggressive behavior.

| Parameters	Main effects			Two-way interaction		
	b	*SE*	95% CI	*b*	*SE*	95% CI
Regression coefficients (fixed effects)						
Intercept	1.46 ***	0.03	[1.40; 1.51]	1.45 ***	0.03	[1.40; 1.50]
Aggression Time 1	0.47 ***	0.04	[0.39; 0.55]	0.46 ***	0.04	[0.38; 0.54]
MVE	0.00	0.00	[−0.00; 0.01]	0.00	0.00	[−0.00; 0.01]
FC	0.15 **	0.05	[0.05; 0.25]	0.14 **	0.05	[0.04; 0.24]
MVE * FC	-	-	-	0.01 *	0.01	[0.00; 0.03]
Variance components (random effects)						
Random intercept	0.04 †	0.02	[0.01; 0.12]	0.04 †	0.02	[0.01; 0.12]

Note: MVE = Media Violence Exposure; FC = Family Conflict. For ease of readership, Table 2 reflects the analyses without gender. † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

3.3. Interaction between Media Violence and Family Conflict

Following main effects testing, we tested our hypothesis that media violence exposure leads to more aggression in the context of high family conflict (*i.e.*, double dose) than in the context of low family conflict. Results supported the double dose effect. There was a significant two-way interaction between media violence and family conflict ($b* = 0.06$, $p = 0.01$). The Johnson–Neyman technique indicated that the effect of media violence on aggression was significant only at higher values of family conflict, that is, for scores of 2.44 or higher on the four-point family conflict scale. As shown in Figure 1, high media violence exposure in combination with higher levels of family conflict led to increased aggression—providing evidence for a double-dose effect.

The double dose effect was also found when we included gender as covariate in the model. The interaction between media violence and family conflict remained significant ($b* = 0.06$, $p = 0.02$). The effect of media violence on aggression was again found for higher levels of family conflict (in this analysis, for scores of 2.95 and higher on the family conflict scale). The Johnson–Neyman technique also indicated a significant effect of media violence on aggression for low family conflict

(*i.e.*, scores of 1.37 and lower on a scale ranging from 1 to 4). For low conflict families, the pattern observed was the reverse: increased media violence was related to decreased aggression. However, we are cautious to interpret this result, as it may reflect an artifact of the data given (a) the conservative nature of the gender-controlled analyses, (b) the limited range of this effect (0.37 data points on the 4-point scale), and (c) the low number of adolescents with high media violence and low family conflict scores ($n = 4$).

Figure 1. High media violence exposure and high family conflict lead to increased aggression in adolescents (* = significant at $p < 0.05$). Note: low, mean, and high family conflict represent values of 1.76, 2.10, and 2.44 on the family conflict scale.

4. Discussion

This study investigated the interactive effect of media violence exposure and family conflict on adolescents' aggressive behavior. We found support for the hypothesized double dose effect: Adolescents' aggression increased when they were exposed to both high media violence and high family conflict. This finding provides three important implications for research and practice. First, the presence of a double dose effect is consistent with the idea that not all media consumers are affected by media violence in the same way (Valkenburg - Peter, 2013). Although many studies have shown main effects of media violence on aggression (e.g., (Gentile et al., 2011; Krahé - Möller, 2010; Huesmann et al., 2003)), our study shows that media violence exposure may have a stronger effect on adolescents from particular social contexts. By identifying and testing when media violence may have a stronger effect on aggression, rather than expecting equal effects for all media consumers, our study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the effects of media violence. Further research that seeks to investigate other potential moderators of the media violence-aggression relationship would be worthwhile.

Second, our findings highlight the importance of incorporating social context in media research. Adolescents living in higher conflict families showed increased aggressive behavior as a result of higher media violence exposure. One explanation for such a double dose effect is that more frequent experiences with aggression—both directly via family members and indirectly via the media—lead to more accessible aggression-related scripts in adolescents' memory (Huesmann, 2007; Farver et al., 2005). Having more readily accessible aggressive scripts increases the likelihood of using aggressive behavior in social interactions (Lösel et al., 2007). A second way in which frequent exposure to aggression in both the family and the media may lead to increased aggression is via adolescents' social norms. High media violence consumers in high conflict families can learn from two social contexts that aggression is acceptable social behavior (Orue et al., 2011). Such normative beliefs have been shown to predict increased aggression (Huesmann - Guerra, 1997; Perry et al., 1986; Henry et al., 2000). Finally, a double dose effect may be explained by maladaptive processing of social information. Research has shown that children living in family environments characterized by high levels of negative emotional expression are more likely to experience maladaptive processing styles and subsequent conduct problems (Schultz - Shaw,

2003). Maladaptive processing styles are operationalized as hostile attribution bias (*i.e.*, a tendency to view others' intentions as mean) and maladaptive response generation (*i.e.*, when presented with a negative situation, children generate aggressive response solutions as opposed to more prosocial response options). It may be that children growing up in households with high family conflict and high media violence exposure develop maladaptive processing styles and, as a result, demonstrate increased aggression. Currently, it is unknown which of these three mechanisms—aggressive scripts, normative beliefs, or maladaptive processing—may explain this double dose effect. Research which seeks to identify how a combination of real-life aggression and media aggression leads to increased aggressive behavior in adolescents would advance our understanding of this effect.

Third, our findings provide a starting point for practitioners who work on the prevention or reduction of adolescents' aggressive behavior. Given that family conflict not only predicted aggression individually, but also strengthened the effect of media violence on aggression, it seems reasonable that most ground can be gained by reducing aggression within the family. Family members' aggressive behavior may have a more pronounced influence on adolescents' aggression compared to media violence due to their proximity and emotional closeness to the adolescent (Ferguson, 2009). Helping family members in high conflict families to recognize and change their norms about acceptable and unacceptable social behavior would be a fruitful first step towards reducing adolescents' aggressive behavior. However, it is important to recognize that changing household norms and reducing family conflict may not always be easy to achieve, particularly in high conflict families. For these families, our results speak to the benefit of reducing media violence as an alternative way of decreasing adolescents' aggressive behavior.

Limitations

It is important to recognize that the effect sizes found in our study were relatively small. In fact, despite a significant bivariate correlation between media violence and aggression, this study did not find a main effect of media violence exposure on aggression—a finding inconsistent with previous research (e.g., (Gentile et al., 2011; Krahé - Möller, 2010; Huesmann et al., 2003)). Although small effects are not uncommon in media research (Valkenburg - Peter, 2013), three methodological choices should be taken into account when interpreting our results. First, our choice of media violence exposure measure may have resulted in underestimation of the effect sizes found. This measure asked adolescents to report how often and how long they consume violent TV shows and violent games during the week. Although such direct estimates have been validated for use among adolescents (Schmitz et al., 2004; Van der Voort - Vooijs, 1990), the estimation procedures involved in these measures can be difficult for adults and adolescents alike, potentially resulting in over- or underestimation of their actual exposure (Robinson - Godbey, 1999). Consequently, the small but significant effect sizes found in our study, as well as the absence of a significant main effect of media violence on aggressive behavior, may be partly due to our choice of media violence measure.

Second, the time lag between waves in our study was relatively short (four months). Since aggressive behavior was quite stable in our study (see the longitudinal correlation between Time 1 and Time 2 aggression in Table 1), this time lag may have been too short to show larger effects of media violence and family conflict on aggression. Third, our sample consisted of typically-developing adolescents who scored relatively low on media violence, family conflict, and aggressive behavior. Because of the restricted range of scores on these variables, the relationships between them may have been attenuated. Still, despite these caveats, we found a double dose effect of media violence and family conflict on adolescents' subsequent aggression, which speaks to the strength of this effect. Future studies may find this effect to be stronger when investigating it in a study with a longer time lag and an at-risk sample in which media violence, family conflict and aggressive behavior are more frequent. Furthermore, replication of our study using a measure of media violence exposure that relies less on adolescents' estimates of media use across longer periods (such as the Favorites measure by Anderson and Dill (Anderson - Dill, 2000)) would be an appropriate next step.

5. Conclusion

This study is the first to investigate the interactive effect of media violence and family conflict on adolescents' aggression. Results showed that media violence may be a stronger risk factor for adolescents in high conflict families compared to those in low conflict families. Our findings are a first step towards improving the public and scientific understanding of whether and how media violence leads to aggression in the context of other risk factors (Common Sense Media, 2013; Ferguson, 2009; Valkenburg - Peter, 2013). Practically speaking, these findings underscore the important role of the family in the development of early adolescents' social behavior. It is important for parents to realize that their home environment can strengthen the effect of media violence on their child's aggressive behavior. Fostering discussions about what constitutes acceptable social behavior, both in the media and in real life, can be a useful way for parents to mitigate potential negative effects of violent media exposure.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN COMMUNICATION COMPETENCE AND ALCOHOLISM RECOVERY

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There seems to be a strong negative relationship between alcoholism and competent communication. Extant literature suggests that the central features of addiction behaviors (i.e., alcoholism, drug usage) consist of the inability to effectively communicate a message, lack of decision-making skills, and poor use of conflict-management strategies (Bebbington, 1976; Buras, 2006; Zemore & Kaskutas, 2004). Currently, there is little research being conducted on alcoholism recovery within the field of Communication Studies. This may be because of the number of restrictions this area of work poses (e.g., IRB approval, finding an appropriate sample, teasing out such an intricate topic). However, this area of work was quite interesting and popular in the 1980s. At one time, approaches to alcoholism recovery progressed away from the traditional unitary models (e.g., solely Alcoholics Anonymous, solely rehabilitation center) and toward a more integrated biopsychosocial model (Abrams & Niaura, 1987; Monti et al., 1987; Zucker & Gomberg, 1986). This integrated approach included the development of treatment strategies based on information obtained from investigations of relapse precipitants in order to assist the alcoholic to cope effectively with the multiple precipitants of relapse.

Researchers were able to pinpoint situations that pose a high risk for relapse: interpersonal conflict (stemming from anger and frustration), social pressure, intrapersonal negative emotional states and stimulus-elicited craving (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985). While predisposing biological vulnerability and psychophysiological processes are likely to be involved or interact with alcohol relapse, their precise role and thus their implications for treatment are less clear. Nevertheless, the aforementioned research suggests that treatment strategies may need to focus on a variety of skills-training components, such as developing social skills to cope

with interpersonal conflict and stressors that serve as the catalyst for relapse.

Thus, the purpose of this inquiry is to revisit and examine the current two-pronged approach to alcoholism treatment and explore a third prong in this equation. Currently, the first prong in alcoholism recovery and treatment is the biophysiological component. Naturally, the physiological facet of recovery has to come first. In this portion of treatment, examination and medical treatment is provided to individuals who are physically dependent on alcohol. The current second prong of alcoholism recovery is generally not distinct from the first; often times, these components of recovery go hand-in-hand. The second prong is a cognitive and emotional reflection on what happened during an individual's alcoholic episodes. This prong also encourages alcoholics to set goals, both personal and interpersonal, that will stimulate progression and growth (Zemore & Kaskutas, 2004). Although the current approaches are useful and, in some cases, necessary, the current review seeks to uncover the importance of a third prong to alcoholism recovery and treatment: a communicative skills-training component. First, it is vital to examine and understand the intricacies of the first two prongs.

The first prong to alcoholism recovery: The biophysiological response

Generally, the first response to alcoholism recovery is the biological and/or physiological response to removing alcohol from the individual's system (D. Lynch, personal communication, March, 21, 2013). This typically occurs at acute, short-term facilities. In this time, physicians primarily focus on the detoxification process as well as achieving and maintaining patient stability when removing alcohol from the system (Byrd, 2012). In these facilities, a simultaneous focus is on an intensive patient interview process that allows physicians to develop a composite picture of the individual and his/her development. The interview process assesses individuals on a number of different levels; this process includes a physician interview, a medical interview, a nursing interview, and a therapeutic-clinical interview (D. Lynch, personal communication, March, 21, 2013). Together, the components of this interview process allow physicians to gather information about the patient in terms of chemical use, psychological history, profiles, personalities, medical history, treatment histories, and family history (Byrd, 2012). The goal of the interview process is to gather information that allows physicians to understand patient development as well as how s/he wound up in the

position that s/he is in. After initial detoxification and stability is achieved, physicians then consider a number of different treatment options depending on patient resources and patient desires. After the physiological component of recovery is assessed, physicians typically refer patients to longer treatment or intensive outpatient programs, individual therapy, and12-step resources in the community (i.e., Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous), and they set up medical appointments with their physician and any other medical appointments that are needed (D. Lynch, personal communication, March, 21, 2013).

Intensive outpatient programs are generally recommended after initial detoxification and stability is achieved. Intensive outpatient programs provide therapy, education, and medical treatment to drug- and/or alcohol-dependent individuals who wish to continue work during early recovery (Byrd, 2012). A relationship exists between the length of outpatient treatment and long-term sobriety. The largest percentage of individuals who relapse do so in the first 90 days of abstinence. Intensive outpatient programs are available to help during this critical period by presenting a forum for recovering individuals to learn and process new behaviors skills and to integrate them into daily living (Byrd, 2012). Generally, these programs consist of group therapy, family therapy, and medical groups that meet several times a week. These types of programs offer an opportunity to talk about pertinent issues during recovery, education on the recovery process, a change to educate family and friends on the nature of addiction and alcoholism, and a referral for necessary medical care (Byrd, 2012). It is evident that intensive outpatient programs offer vital mechanisms during the early stages in recovery. The next step in this process moves into the second prong of recovery: the cognitive and emotional reflective and longer-term portion of recovery. This generally takes place at community 12-step programs like Alcoholics Anonymous (AA; General Service Office of Alcoholics Anonymous, 2013).

The second prong to alcoholism recovery: The cognitive and emotion reflection

The second prong in the current approach to alcoholism recovery includes a reflective practice whereby alcoholics take time to emotionally consider and cognitively process the alcoholism and the personal and social ramifications attached. This is generally done during participation within a 12-step organization like AA. AA is an international organization

founded in 1935 that is dedicated to helping alcohol-addicted individuals stay sober (General Service Office Of Alchoholics Anonymous, 2013). Being a fellowship rather than a formal organization, there are no governing officers, no official spokesperson, and no formal rules or regulations. Financial support is obtained through member donations only; there are no fees or dues, and no outside support is solicited or accepted. Although there are difficulties determining the actual number of members due to the practice of not keeping any registration records, estimates are that approximately two million people now call themselves members of the fellowship (General Service Office Of Alchoholics Anonymous, 2013).

AA is not officially affiliated with any religious or political organizations. However, at the core of the rehabilitation program is a member's progression through 12 steps to recovery, a doctrine based upon the proposition that there exists a "power greater than oneself." Although this doctrine is not explicitly forced upon anyone, those who do subscribe to its precepts report that doing so manifests a positive spiritual transformation. With regard to other rehabilitation programs, AA has adopted the policy of "cooperation but not affiliation" (General Service Office Of Alchoholics Anonymous, 2013). Despite these policies, it is important to note that the majority of the 12 steps explicitly require interventions from God or religiosity (i.e., steps 2-7 and 11-12). However, affiliation with a particular religious group is not a requirement for membership in AA. In earlier years, AA was questioned with respect to the implications of its disease-oriented philosophy of alcoholism (Tournier, 1979), the overall effectiveness of its approach (Bebbington, 1976), and its relevance for certain subtypes of alcoholics (Ogborne & Glaser, 1981). It surmounted the curious connotations and continues to be regarded as a useful treatment resource. Longitudinal research supports the utility of AA in alcoholism treatment, with studies suggesting that regular AA attendance has a positive effect on abstention rates (Zemore & Kaskutas, 2004). The impact that AA has on alcoholic dependence may be related to its social support dimension. Among alcoholics, a strong social support network decreased the chance of relapse (Kaskutas, Bond, & Humphreys, 2002). While AA recognizes its social support role, specifically defining itself as a fellowship, it also sees itself as offering a program of recovery.

This program consists of a series of 12 steps designed to reinforce abstention through "growth along spiritual lines" (AA, 1976). The 12

steps are basically encompassed by five psychological tasks: (1) recognition and admission of powerlessness over alcohol, (2) acceptance of a higher power as a source of strength and guidance during recovery, (3) self-appraisal and self-disclosure in the service of personal change, (4) making amends for past wrongs, and (5) carrying the AA message to other alcoholics (AA, 1976). Even on its own, AA offers an interesting and effective set of guidelines that encourage the achievement, and maintenance, of sobriety. Paired with the first prong (i.e., the physiological assessment of alcoholism), however, creates a great way to treat alcoholism. The purpose of this literature review is to explore a third prong: the implications of a trained set of effective communication skills. It is important to note, that this investigation is not discounting, or taking away from, the current approach(es) to alcoholism treatment and recovery. On the contrary, the purpose of the current research is to explore another avenue and add to the existing approaches.

Exploring a third prong to alcoholism recovery: A set of skills for effective communication

Exploring the use of communicative skills training may be a useful component to the approach to alcoholism recovery and treatment. Skill training, as it pertains to alcoholism recovery, has been used in a few studies; this notion was mostly explored in relatively early studies. Chaney, O'Leary and Marlatt (1978) compared skills training to prepare alcoholics for relapse situations with standard treatment alone or with a discussion control. The researchers found that skills training decreased the length and severity of drinking episodes, suggesting that this is a heuristic strategy for designing treatments. Further, Eriksen, Björnstad, and Görtestam (1986) found social skills training to be more effective than a discussion control in increasing abstinent days and work days after treatment. Similarly, Oei and Jackson (1980) found that both individual and group social skills training resulted in significantly greater reduction in alcohol consumption than did traditional supportive therapy; the group format resulting in more rapid skills acquisition. In a more recent study, Monti et al. (2001) suggest that promising treatments for alcoholics include naltrexone (NTX), cue exposure combined with urge-specific coping skills training (CET), and communication skills training (CST). The researchers investigated the effects of these elements as treatment adjuncts. With respect to communication skills training – the focus of this review – the researchers found support for the promising effects of CST

as an adjunct to treatment programs for alcoholics by maintaining treatment gains for at least one year.

The current study is interested in investigating communication skills training as one of three primary treatment approaches, as opposed to an adjacent component of a more prominent treatment option, as Monti et al. (2001) assessed. Communication skills training as a third prong is an interesting avenue to explore because it is far-reaching and flexible. This approach may be useful in developing and applying training on self-disclosure, empathy, and social relaxation as these dimensions of competent communication have been shown to be problematic for alcoholics (Moeller, 2010). The current research, however, concerns itself with the implications of communication skills training in conflict management and the implications for sobriety. This study focuses on conflict management because much qualitative research on alcoholism indicates that conflict is often the catalyst for alcohol use and relapse. Moeller (2010) found that participants disclosed that interpersonal conflict was the catalyst for alcohol relapse for two reasons: (a) disagreement led to a hostile conflict environment and (b) participants were unable to effectively communicate conflict. Thus, conflict management provides a solid foundation to begin this third prong to alcoholism recovery. In order to develop a trainable set of communication skills, the first step is to examine the intricacies of conflict styles.

Styles of Handling Interpersonal Conflict

Rahim (1986) reinterpreted previous conceptualizations of conflict styles by differentiating the styles of handling interpersonal conflict on two basic dimensions: concern for self and concern for other. The first dimension explains the degree to which a person attempts to satisfy his or her own concerns. The second dimension explains the degree to which a person wants to satisfy the concerns of others (Rahim, 1986). The combination of these two dimensions results in five specific styles of handling interpersonal conflict: integrating, obliging, dominating, avoiding, and compromising. An integrating conflict style constitutes a high concern for self and for others. Typically, this conflict style involves openness, exchange of information, and examination of differences to reach an effective solution acceptable to both parties (Rahim & Magner, 1995). An obliging conflict style is comprised of a low concern for self and high concern for others. This style is associated with attempting to play down the differences and emphasize commonalities to satisfy the

concern of the other party (Gross & Guerrero, 2010). A dominating conflict style is marked by a high concern for self and low concern for others. This style has been identified with a win-lose orientation or with forcing behavior to win one's position (Rahim & Magner, 1995). An avoiding conflict style encompasses a low concern for self and others. This style has been associated with withdrawal and side-stepping situations (Rahim & Magner, 1995). Lastly, a comprising conflict style embraces an intermediate concern for self and others. This style involves sharing whereby both parties give up something to make a mutually acceptable decision (Gross & Guerrero, 2010).

Buras (2006) found that alcoholics reported that they were unable to (a) problem solve during disputes, (b) accommodate each other's feelings, and (c) create an equitable solution for one another. Thus, the current research anticipates that the training curriculum will cater to individuals displaying obliging, dominating, and avoiding conflict styles; and to a lesser extent integrating and compromising. The next step in this research is to collect data and identify the prominent conflict styles within. This will allow for the development of a communication skills-training curriculum. Ultimately, this research proposes an interesting three-prong approach to alcoholism recovery: physiobiologic, reflective, and communicative skills training. Introducing these three elements together may provide interesting and effective implications for the field of alcoholism treatment and recovery.

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SECTION VI:

VARIATIONS ON AGGRESSION: OSTRACISM, CYBER AGGRESSION, AND ONLINE EXPLOITATION

OSTRACISM: THE POWER OF THE SILENT BULLY

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Few episodes in life are more painful than learning that others want nothing to do with you. Considered as a "dramaturgical metaphor for separateness, meaningless, and even death (Williams, 2001, p. 71), ostracism can have such painful effects as to motivate individuals to commit acts of aggression (Williams & Warburton, 2003). Chances are, most people have experienced the pain of lesser forms of ostracism or have dished it out at least once in their lives. Ostracism can also be sanctioned by governments, cultures, religions, military institutions, tribes, and small groups as a response to individuals or groups that deviate from the norm (Williams, 2001), or as a mechanism to promote in-group cohesion (Gruters & Masters, 1986). Research has also revealed that social ostracism is an especially common occurrence among school peers (Asher & Parker, 1989). Despite the simplicity of the act (e.g., remaining silent), the effects of peer group ostracism can be astounding; in some cases, severe enough to lead victims to kill the source(s) and themselves (Leary, Kowalski, Smith, & Phillips, 2003). In an effort to understand how the mechanism of ostracism can create such potency, this paper examines some of the research that has examined ostracism, its effects, and how it can sometimes lead to a horrific end.

Ostracism is broadly defined as the act of ignoring or excluding an individual or group (Williams, 2001). Other names for this act are shunning, the cold shoulder, exile, excommunication, and the silent treatment. Ostracism is universally practiced across multiple cultures and species (Williams, 2001). It can be traced back to early human evolution, where the one that did not contribute to the survival of the group was banished from the group and left to fend for himself/herself (Gruter & Masters, 1986). Because the odds of survival were significantly decreased without the support of the group, any genetic material that made an individual insensitive to ostracism was left to rot or be eaten instead of passed on to offspring. Hence, human beings have evolved a deep, innate

motivation to form stable, lasting connections with other people and developed a natural mechanism that automatically triggers pain whenever one suspects (s)he has been ostracized (Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001).

Not all forms of ostracism are the same and produce the same results. Although ignoring and excluding the target are the common elements among all forms of ostracism, each form has different causes, purposes, consequences, and interpretations, depending on a variety of factors (Williams, 2001). For example, being ignored by a group of strangers during an elevator ride has different causes, purposes, and consequences than the same ride with friends or colleagues. These multiple forms and variables made any approach to ostracism complicated and any concerted effort among scholars nearly impossible. Therefore, in an attempt to bring structure, order, and consistency to the research and academic conversation regarding ostracism, Williams developed the model of ostracism (1997; 2001). This model is extremely valuable as a framework for describing each type of ostracism, its causes, and effects. To illuminate the structure of the framework, the following few paragraphs briefly summarize the model.

In general, Williams' (1997; 2001) model of ostracism describes each ostracizing event according to five broad concerns: (a) the degree to which a target perceives ostracism is occurring, (b) how the target constructs explanations for the ostracism, (c) the degree to which a target is naturally susceptible to ostracism, (d) how the target reacts, physiologically, emotionally, and behaviorally to the ostracism, and (e) how long the target has been the exposed to the ostracism. Although the model discusses a wide variety of factors pertaining to each of the above concerns, only the core and peripheral aspects of the model that pertain to peer rejection will be addressed in this paper. At that core is the concept of threatened needs.

The foundational principle of Williams' model of ostracism is the proposition that ostracism threatens the desired levels of four fundamental human needs: belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence (Williams, 2001). The need of belonging refers to the human drive to have frequent caring interactions with others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The need for self-esteem refers to the human drive to have positive thoughts and feelings regarding the self (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). The need for control refers to the human drive to have perceptions of control over the environment and relationships (Skinner,

1996). The need for meaningful existence refers to the human desire to feel that his or her life is in some way worthwhile (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). Although every individual has his or her own preferred level for each of these needs, all human beings require some level of each to live healthy, happy, and fulfilling lives (Willaims, 2001). If any of these needs fall below an individual's ideal level, actions are taken to either replenish the need or rationalize/cope with the lower level.

Each of these fundamental human needs is uniquely affected by ostracism in ways that differ from the effects of teasing, bullying, verbal aggression, or a verbal argument (Williams, 2001). For instance, in a verbal argument, there is not a threat to either individual's need for belongingness as each is included in the interaction for as long as the argument is taking place. Self-esteem is also less threatened in an argument. Although self-esteem may be threatened by verbally aggressive attacks during an argument, an outbreak of ostracism leaves it up to the target to determine what negative perceptions exist of himself/herself. Although there is likely to be only one, or at most, a few reasons for the ostracism, the target is likely to contemplate numerous possibilities in order to make sense of the act. Because these numerous reasons are not only more numerous than the true reason, but also derived from the target's own consciousness and cognitions, the ostracism is very likely to lead to a larger depletion of self-esteem than the verbal aggressive attacks during an argument. Control is also retained in an argument, as each participant is free to choose which strategy, tactics, and statements to use in order to make a point. When a person is ostracized, the target is denied any control to defend himself/herself and meets only frustration and further loss of control at every failed attempt to interact. Lastly, the human need for meaningful existence is not threatened in an argument. This is because the target, at the very least, perceives (s)he is deemed worthy enough to be included in the argument (Williams & Gerber, 2005). Some of these differences between arguments and ostracism offer an explanation for how it is possible for two people engaged in a seemingly dysfunctional, highly quarrelsome, and mutually destructive relationship are driven to stay together: self-esteem and the other fundamental needs are so depleted that engagement in an argument actually increases the levels of each for both participants. Despite intentions, individuals that are too wise, and perhaps too kind, to argue with and actively listen to such difficult individuals may actually be threatening the fundamental needs of the targets and hurting them more than if they engaged the target.

An individual's response to ostracism occurs in two, or in some extreme cases, three stages depending on the length of the ostracism (Williams, 2001). When responding to a single brief episode, the target is said to go through only the first two stages. The first stage is called the "immediate reaction phase," and is an indiscriminate, reflexive, and painful response that immediately occurs as a result of the instant depletion of the desired levels of fundamental needs (Williams, 2001). In this first stage, no cognitive activity takes place; rather, it is an automatic response that occurs whether the ostracizing person or group is an in-group, out-group (Williams, 2001), or even a despised group (Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007). This initial, instinctive shot of pain then activates the second stage, called the "coping phase," which initiates various coping mechanisms and cognitions aimed to restore the lost satisfaction levels (Williams, 2001). In some cases, especially for individuals that rarely experience ostracism or are ostracized by a desirable group, this second stage increases the target's motivation to try harder to please the group. In other cases, the ostracized individual either seeks acceptance to some other group or person, or withdraws to rationalize what caused the ostracism and what it means. For longer periods or repeated episodes of ostracism, a third stage occurs. When this extreme form of ostracism occurs, the individual essentially gives up, internalizes the meaning of what the needs loss represents, and surrenders to feelings of helplessness and depression (Williams, 2001). It is this third stage that is responsible for instilling the hatred and anger necessary to propel some to commit terrible acts of violence. Before addressing these dramatically severe and outlying effects of ostracism, a brief review of the research that has supported the model will be offered.

Prior research has yielded support for Williams' (1997; 2001) assumption that ostracism threatens a target's four fundamental human needs: belongingness, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence. Regarding effects to belongingness, Geller, Goodstein, Silver, and Sternberg (1974) found that when female participants were ignored by two female confederates they subsequently reported feeling more dull, anxious, alone, and withdrawn than the female participants who were not ignored. The hypothesis that ostracized individuals would try to regain feelings of belongingness by working harder to please desirable groups that have ostracized them was supported by William and Sommer (1997). In their study they found that those female participants who were not included in a ball-tossing activity worked harder on a group task than those participants who were included. In addition, Williams (1983) showed that

when participants were given a choice, those that were ostracized were less likely than included participants to want to continue working with the ostracizing group and were more likely to want to work with a different group. Self-esteem was also shown to be affected by ostracism when Craighead, Kimball, and Rehak (1979) had participants imagine being ostracized and found that they reported more negative thoughts about the self than those that imagined successful interactions. These findings are consistent with broader findings that suggest interpersonal rejection is not only painful and anxiety producing, but also lowers self-esteem (Leary et al., 1995; 1998).

Research has also supported the contention that the fundamental human needs of meaningful existence and control are affected by ostracism. Meaningful existence was shown to be affected when Williams, Shore, and Grahe (1998) asked participants to list specific behaviors that occur when they give or receive the silent treatment and to rate the degree to which meaningful existence was threatened. The results indicated that when receiving the silent treatment, 24% of respondents reported threats to meaningful existence, compared to only 10% of respondents reporting threats to meaningful existence when giving the silent treatment. Finally, social ostracism has been found to deprive a target of a sense of control. In a study by Warburton, Williams, and Cairns (2006), ostracized and included participants were exposed to a series of aversive noise blasts, the onset of which they had either control or no control over. With aggression measured by the amount of hot sauce added by the target to food the source was required to consume, the researchers found that the ostracized participants without control added four times as much hot sauce as any other group. Moreover, the ostracized participants that did have control over the onset of the aversive blasts were no more aggressive than either of the groups that were included. This clearly suggests that the effects of ostracism are moderated by the amount of control that is ultimately lost (Warburton et al., 2006).

The effects of ostracism have been related to acts of aggression in prior research. In a study by Twenge et al. (2001), ostracism was manipulated by telling participants that either they would be alone later in life or that other participants had rejected them based on phony feedback from a personality test. In four out of five experiments, the ostracized participants behaved more aggressively toward the supposed source of negative feedback by rating them more negatively on evaluations. Aggressive tendencies were also found to exist in ostracized children

when Waas (1987) used a sociometric rating procedure to classify 32 third grade boys and 32 fifth grade boys as peer-rejected and found that among the third graders, 69% were classified by teachers as aggressive. Although only 41% of the fifth graders were similarly classified, they were rated as more anxious than their aggressive counterparts.

Although school shootings in the US can be traced back to as early as 1760, the first incident to grab widespread media attention and start nationwide conversations regarding possible causes was the West Paducah High School shooting of 1997 that left three students dead and five wounded. Since this horrific act, nearly165 more students and teachers have been killed and several more injured in school shootings. This rising tide of school violence has increasingly alarmed students, teachers, parents, and school administrators and fueled evermore fervent discussions regarding the antecedents of such horrendous episodes and how to best safeguard against them. Some of the causes brought forward are lax gun control laws, society-wide moral decay, the negative influence of popular culture (e.g., song lyrics, "Goth" movement), violent video games, and even the lack of a religious presence in schools (e.g., failure to display the ten commandments; Leary et al., 2003). Although some of these factors may play a contributing role, the one variable that has been suggested to be prevalent in a majority of school shootings is the peer-rejected status of the perpetrator(s). Although empirical research examining this claim is scant, a study that was able to conclusively link ostracism to school shootings was conducted by Leary et al. (2003). To make the connection, case studies were conducted of 15 school shootings that occurred between 1995 and 2001. In all but two of the cases, acute or chronic patterns of ostracism, bullying, and/or romantic rejection were found to be involved. However, characterizations of the school shooters also included one of the three other risk factors: an interest in fire-arms and explosives, fascination with death and/or Satanism, or psychological problems. Clearly, understanding more about ostracism and how to mitigate the occurrences and effects offers a chance to stifle the tide of school violence; however, how that could be done is problematic and unclear.

The understanding of how ostracism can lead to aggression, and in some cases, violence, invites even more difficult questions. For one, ostracism is not something that is learned, but is innate; therefore, ostracism cannot be unlearned, especially with younger individuals. Even if ostracism could be unlearned or successfully discouraged, it would not always be

wise to do so because ostracism in some cases has been shown to decrease aggression and promote pro-social behavior (Williams, 1997; Williams & Sommer, 1997). Another difficult question arises when considering whether the aggressive behavior caused the ostracism or vice versa. This "chicken or the egg" dilemma is always there to invalidate any argument that the source(s) of ostracism are partially responsible for the results and are to be included in any preventative or corrective steps. Lastly, even if ostracism was hypothetically "proven" to be an antecedent to violence, it is difficult to imagine any measure, legislative or educational, that could drive individuals to mix with those they do not like. Another implication involves the potential of ostracism as an indicator of future aggression. This is also a double-edged sword as the profiling of children for aggressive tendencies is not only morally questionable, but also a practice that could serve to aggravate the condition. As ostracized individuals are singled-out even further than they already are for being ostracized, the risk of retaliation increases as well as the solidity and pervasiveness of peer-rejection. These problems are just a few that make any attempt to curb ostracism and mitigate the results extremely complex and problematic.

In light of these problems, the only salve with any promise exists in educating more parents and teachers that ostracism, or environments that allow for such, should not be left fertile for the phenomenon to sprout. This could be done by stressing the importance of inclusive language and promoting activities that include everyone. One thing that may be certain is that any child that appears to okay when left alone is most likely not happy and okay, but may be working on how to cope with ostracism. If left alone too many times or for too long, he or she may no longer be working on how to cope, but rather how to retaliate.

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PREDICTORS OF CYBER AGGRESSION

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Abstract

While verbal aggressiveness has been well studied, the diffusion of online communication has also brought our attention to aggressive behavior online, which is called cyber aggression. Researchers address cyber aggression as a new phenomenon in the technological age. Cyber aggression has been primarily studied among adolescents and online game players (e.g., Law, Shapka, Hymel, Olson, & Waterhouse, 2012; Williams & Skoric, 2005), yet aggressive behavior is also seen among adults in other online contexts. Past studies on verbal aggressiveness demonstrated that victims of verbal aggressors experience hurt feelings, anger, irritation, embarrassment, and discouragement (Infante & Wigley, 1986). In addition, a recent study reported that online victims experience a higher degree of uncertainty (Pure, 2010). Thus, online users may experience stronger mental damage when they become victims of cyber aggression. In order to protect potential victims, it is critical to understand why online users engage in aggressive behavior. Accordingly, this essay discusses predictors of cyber aggression, considering personality traits, as well as situational factors, and provides suggestions for future research in this emerging area.

Verbal aggressiveness is a well-known personality trait that predisposes persons to attack the self-concepts of other people instead of, or in addition to, their positions on topics of communication (Infante & Wigley, 1986). While verbal aggressiveness has been extensively studied, the diffusion of online communication has also brought our attention to aggressive behavior online, which is called cyber (or online) aggression. Cyber aggression has been primarily studied among adolescents and

online game players (e.g., Law, Shapka, Hymel, Olson, & Waterhouse, 2012; Williams & Skoric, 2005), yet aggressive behavior is also seen among adults in other online contexts including emails, social networking sites, text-messaging, chat rooms, and discussion boards. In short, despite the significance of this new phenomenon in the technological age, there has still been limited research in this emerging area.

Past studies on verbal aggressiveness demonstrated that victims of verbal aggressors experience hurt feelings, anger, irritation, embarrassment, and discouragement (Infante & Wigley, 1986). In addition, a recent study reported that victims of face-to-face (FtF) bullying also experience cyberbullying, yet compared to FtF, victims of cyber bullying experience a higher degree of uncertainty (Pure, 2010). This finding implies that online users may experience stronger mental damage when they become victims of cyber aggression than victims of traditional FtF aggression. In order to protect these victims, it is significant to understand why online users engage in aggressive behavior. Accordingly, the goal of this essay is to investigate predictors of cyber aggression, considering relevant personality traits and situational factors, to enhance understanding of aggressive communication online. It will also discuss future directions in this emerging research area.

Review of the Literature

Aggressive Communication

Aggressive communication in Face-to-Face (FtF) contexts typically refers to a combination of argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness (Infante, 1987). Past studies indicated that highly aggressive individuals attack the other's self-concepts instead of his/her position on an issue in communication (Infante & Wigley, 1986), and they perceive their use of aggressive messages as justified (Infante, Riddle, Horvath, & Tumlin, 1992). On the other hand, verbal aggressiveness is often seen to be due to the lack of argumentative skills (Infante, Trebing, Shephard, & Seeds, 1984).

Aggressive messages include character attacks, competence attacks, insults, maledictions, teasing, ridicules, profanity, and nonverbal emblems (Infante & Wigley, 1986). Such messages can be also delivered online today.

Cyber Aggression

Cyber aggression is defined as "intentional, harmful behavior that occurs through a variety of electronic and cyber-space media" (Sontag, Clemans, Graber, & Lyndonm 2011, p. 392). While some researchers use cyberbullying synonymously (e.g., Li, 2007), cyber aggression should be differentiated from cyberbullying. Specifically, cyber aggression focuses on intentional aggressive behavior that hurts the target online. On the other hand, cyberbullying refers to repeated aggressive behavior online over time (Dempsey, Sulkowski, Dempsey, & Storch, 2012; Smith 2010). Both cyber aggression and cyberbullying can occur due to an imbalance of power (Smith, 2012). Some researchers, however, point out that physical power differences are not available online (Law, Shapka, Domene, & Gagne, 2012). In fact, powerful or threatening adolescents in real life can also become the targets of cyber aggression (Vandenbosch & Van Cleemput, 2008).

Similar to verbal aggression, aggressive behavior in cyberspace is planned or unplanned, and such aggressive behavior is motivated by a proactive or reactive reason. Proactive aggression occurs to achieve aggressor's goals intentionally, and reactive aggression is to reiterate aggressor's perceived threats (Howard, 2011; Law et al., 2011; Runions, 2013).

Aggressive behavior online is typically seen in two distinct forms from verbal aggression. One is text-based, such as posting or sending aggressive messages. The other is visual-based, such as posting or sending embarrassing photos/videos (Law, Shapka, Hymel, Olson, & Waterhouse, 2012).

As stated earlier, cyber aggression is a relatively new research topic. Thus, this paper first investigates traditional verbal aggression and seeks the relationship between verbal and cyber aggression to explore the factors that would lead to aggressive behavior online.

Predictors of Aggressive Communication

Early research considered verbal aggressiveness from a cognitive perspective and indicated that the lack of argumentativeness leads to verbal aggression (Infante et al., 1984). Yet, the lack of argumentativeness is not the only factor, and past research identified more factors that lead to aggressive communication.

While some researchers view aggressive behavior as social learning (e.g., Schrodt & Carr, 2012), some personality traits have been identified as predictors of aggressive behavior. For instance, self-esteem (i.e., defensive self-enhancement, moral self-approval, lovability, social self-esteem, self-control, and identity integration) was a negative predictor of trait verbal aggressiveness (Rancer, Kosberg, & Silvestri, 1992).

Indeed, Eysenck's three personality dimensions have been well-studied relating to verbal aggression. For example, extraversion is identified as a negative predictor of verbal aggressiveness, and psychoticism (e.g., hostility) is a positive predictor of aggressive communication (Heisel, La France, & Beatty, 2003). In addition, competitiveness and dominance are also identified as predictors of verbal aggression (Archer & Webb, 2006).

Further, impulsivity is also well-documented as a predictor of verbal aggression (e.g., Chen, Coccaro, & Jacobson, 2012; Lee, 2013). Defined as a tendency to act on the spur of the moment or to respond quickly to a given stimulus, without deliberation and evaluation of consequences (Chen et al., 2012), impulsivity explains verbal aggression as automatic and thoughtless processes. So, are these personality types also related to aggressive communication online? In the next section, some factors that are associated with cyber aggression will be discussed considering the characteristics of online communication.

Characteristics of Online Communication

Despite increasing attention to cyber aggression today, online researchers initially suggested that the lack of nonverbal cues (e.g., facial expressions, tone of voice) inherent in the mediated contexts would lead to impersonal communication (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Short, Williams, & Christie, 1976), which, in turn, increases a likelihood for aggressive behavior (Spears & Lea, 1992). While these studies addressed how the lack of nonverbal cues inherent in online communication affects users' aggressive behavior, some researchers suggest that communicators still feel an imbalance of power without nonverbal cues online, which leads to their aggressive behavior (e.g., Schoffstall & Cohen, 2011). In fact, empirical support for the effects of the lack of nonverbal cues on aggressive behavior has been limited (e.g., Huang & Chou, 2010; Moore, Nakano, Enomoto, & Suda, 2012).

In a similar vein, anonymity in online communication has also gained researchers' attention (e.g., Wright & Li, 2013). Without having personal

identity, online users may behave differently from FtF interaction, and anonymity could lead to harmful or offensive communication (Lee, 1996). Yet empirical evidence for the effect of anonymity on users' aggressive behavior also varies. Law et al.'s (2010) study supported that anonymity is related to aggressive communication by demonstrating adolescents who disclose more information are less likely to be aggressive online. In contrast, Markman and Ishii's (2012) study did not show any significant relationship between anonymity (as defined as the degree of self-disclosure) and aggressive behavior on online discussion boards.

Further, online users can easily access a large number of people via networked technology at any time. Due to these characteristics of online communication, cyber aggression can spread very quickly at any time (Agatston, Kowalski, & Limber, 2007; Sontag et al., 2011).

FtF Aggression as a Predictor of Cyber Aggression

Due to the distinct characteristics of communication technology, online behavior was originally viewed differently from face-to-face (FtF) behavior. Yet, more recent literature suggests that those who are aggressive in FtF contexts are also aggressive online (e.g., Li, 2007; Wright & Li, 2013). One common factor in these contexts is moral disengagement (Pornari & Wood, 2010). It refers to a cognitive process in which an individual justifies his/her own aggressive behavior when loosening his/her inner self-regulatory mechanisms. Pornari and Wood's study demonstrated moral disengagement is a predictor of both verbal and cyber aggression. However, the level of the mechanisms appeared weaker in cyber aggression than in traditional aggression.

Despite these studies, empirical support for the association between FtF and cyber aggression has not been consistent. For example, a study by Schoffstall and Cohen (2011) indicated that FtF aggression is a predictor of cyber aggression among adolescents because cyber aggression among adolescents often occurs as a reiteration of FtF events in school. In contrast, Wright and Li (2013) viewed cyber aggression differently from verbal aggression based on the distinct characteristics of online communication including: (a) anonymity, (b) a larger number of victims, (c) invisibility of victim's reactions that may promote further aggressive behavior.

More researchers today view cyber aggression as different from FtF aggression. For instance, Runions, Shapka, Dooley, and Modecki (2012)

observed that online communicators use different types of social cues available online (e.g., emoticons) to express their emotion, which differentiates cyber aggression from FtF aggression. In fact, adolescents reported different experiences between cyber and FtF aggression (Law et al., 2012). However, some empirical studies exhibited no relationship between these two types of aggression (e.g., Schoffstall & Cohen, 2011). These studies indicated the relationship between FtF and cyber aggression is still ambiguous. In order to investigate these inconsistent results further, some personality traits and situational factors will be discussed in the following sections.

Personality Traits as Predictors of Cyber Aggression

Extending Howard's (2011) quadripartite violence typology to an online context, Runions (2013) discussed how impulsivity leads to cyber aggression. Howard argued in a FtF context two types of aggression influenced by impulsivity. One is impulsive appetitive aggression, and the other is impulsive repetitive aggression. According to Howard, these two types differ in terms of motives for aggressive behavior. Those who engage in impulsive appetitive aggression seek immediate affective rewards, whereas impulsive repetitive aggressors are experiencing distress, frustration, or threat, which motivates their aggressive behavior. While Runions acknowledges that impulsive appetitive aggressors are often seen in online gaming, he claims that these two types are difficult to differentiate from each other due to a potential confound in responses. Runions, however, states impulsivity certainly leads to unplanned cyber aggression.

As cyber aggression is an emerging area of research, little is known about the direct relationship between other personality traits and cyber aggression. Past studies, however, identified some personality traits that are associated with online communication. These studies help understand how other personality traits may be associated with cyber aggression.

The literature discusses that introverted or reticent people avoid FtF communication (e.g., McCroskey, Heisel, & Richmond, 2001) and select text-based online communication (Kelly, Keaten, & Finch, 2004). More recent studies showed that reticent people even prefer online short-message services (O'Connell, 2010). In addition, introverts are less likely to join online communities, whereas extraverted people are more likely to participate in online communities (Mullen, 2011). In short, extraverted

people use online communication to enhance their FtF relationships, whereas introverted individuals use online communication to substitute for FtF communication because online communication can reduce anxiety about FtF communication (Keaten & Kelly, 2000). Although there is no clear linkage between the introversion/extraversion trait and cyber aggression, extraversion is a negative predictor of verbal aggressiveness (Heisel et al., 2003). In addition, introverted people are high in verbal aggressiveness in FtF contexts (McCroskey et al., 2001). Drawing from these findings, low-extraverted or high-introverted people who are not able to express their aggression in FtF contexts are more likely to engage in aggressive behavior online.

Past research on verbal aggressiveness also identified those who are low in self-esteem tend to engage in aggressive behavior (Rancer et al., 1992). In addition, past studies showed a strong relationship between self-esteem and communication apprehension (e.g., McCroskey et al., 2001). Thus, those who are low in self-esteem avoid FtF interaction and select impersonal communication, such as text-based online communication. More recently, Mullen (2011) found introversion lowers self-esteem, which makes introverts turn to online communication. Linking these findings, those who are low in self-esteem are more likely to engage in cyber aggression.

There are more personality traits that lead to aggressive behavior in FtF contexts. For example, a recent study reported that self-efficacy is positively related to aggressive behavior toward a disliked peer in a FtF context (Peets, Hodges, & Salmivalli, 2011). Although there is no clear connection between self-efficacy and anonymity, self-efficacy may increase aggressive behavior even more toward disliked people, in particular, with a combination of anonymous online communication.

Similar to self-efficacy, psychoticism (e.g., hostility) is a positive predictor of aggression in FtF contexts (Heisel et al., 2003). While little is known how psychoticism is related to cyber aggression, a recent study showed that those who are high in psychoticism are active in online communication to develop new relationships, and they disclose their "true selves" online (Tosun & Lajunen, 2010). Thus, similar to FtF contexts, psychoticism may lead to straight-forward behavior online, which could be cyber aggression.

Further, drawing from past studies on verbal aggression, more personality traits such as competitiveness and dominance (Wigley, 1999) may also be

related to cyber aggression. It appears that these traits are less likely to be affected by communication channels.

In sum, similar to FtF contexts, impulsivity leads to unplanned cyber aggression. In addition, introversion lowers self-esteem. These people tend to avoid FtF communication and turn to online communication. Those who prefer online versus FtF communication are more likely to engage in aggressive behavior online under certain conditions. Other personality traits such as self-efficacy, psychoticism, and dominance may also lead to cyber aggression because these personality traits appear rather stable across various types of communication channels.

Situational Factors as Predictors of Cyber Aggression

In addition to personality traits, situational factors are related to cyber aggression. Indeed, such situational factors may be distinct from the causes of verbal aggression. For example, Law et al. (2010) found that adolescents who have a computer in their bedroom have a higher degree of cyber aggression. Their finding can be interpreted that privacy affects adolescents' aggressive behavior. In addition, adolescents who have a computer in their bedroom may feel loneliness, which is also related to cyber aggression (Schoffstall & Cohen, 2011).

Hinduja and Patchin's (2008) study among adolescents showed that those who spend more time on the Internet and those who are high in computer proficiency are more likely to experience aggressive behavior both as offenders and victims. Their findings are consistent with the ones from online game studies that revealed that game addiction is related to cyber aggression because those who spend more time and get more involved in online gaming are more likely to be aggressive during the game (Kim, Ku, Kim, & Joo, 2008; Mehroof & Griffiths, 2010).

Similar to verbal aggression, cyber aggression is significantly related to negative social competence among adolescents (Schoffstall & Cohen, 2011). Such competence includes self-perception for children, peer relations, number of mutual friendships, social acceptability, and popularity in FtF contexts. Likewise, Williams and Guerra (2007) found in their study among adolescents that their perception toward peer support and negative school climate are related to aggressive behavior online. Interestingly, however, Williams and Guerra's longitudinal study indicated no gender differences.

The characteristics of online communication also stimulate cyber aggression. For example, anonymity as well as invisibility of victim's reactions, may promote further aggressive behavior online (Wright & Li, 2013). In addition, such situations can unfortunately create a larger number of victims in a public cyberspace.

To summarize, situational factors can lead to cyber aggression. A higher exposure to online communication itself provides more opportunities to experience cyber aggression. The lack of social competence, including the lack of peer support, perceived social acceptability, and popularity in FtF contexts, can also lead to cyber aggression. In addition, privacy and loneliness as a result of private environment may be related to cyber aggression, particularly among adolescents. Further, some characteristics inherent in online communication, such as anonymity and invisibility of victims, lead to aggressive behavior in a public cyberspace, which could unfortunately increase the number of victims.

Future Directions in Cyber Aggression Research

Thus far, some personality traits and situational factors relating to cyber aggression have been discussed. However, as noted earlier, empirical studies are still limited in this emerging area. In particular, while some researchers acknowledge that cyber aggression is planned or unplanned, and such aggressive behavior is caused by proactive or reactive reasons (e.g., Howard, 2011; Law et al., 2011; Runions, 2013), it is not clear how these factors are associated with each type. Impulsivity was addressed for unplanned cyber aggression from both proactive and reactive motives (Runions, 2013). However, other personality traits have not been discussed. Most traits including introversion, self-efficacy, self-esteem, psychoticism, and dominance could lead to both planned and unplanned behavior for both proactive and reactive reasons.

Likewise, situational factors can also involve both planned and unplanned behaviors as well as both proactive and reactive reasons. For example, Pornari and Wood (2010) discussed that children may see cyber aggression as a game without realizing its influence on the victims. Likewise, Runions (2013) observed some online game players seek excitement or thrills via aggressive behavior, and he categorized their behavior as unplanned cyber aggression. However, it could also be planned. For example, those who are more experienced with online gaming may make a plan ahead to satisfy their excitement needs.

Some characteristics inherent in online communication also encompass all types of cyber aggression. For example, anonymity and easy access to a public audience in cyberspace can certainly increase aggressive behavior to satisfy the offender's proactive and reactive needs with and without plans. Thus, identification of other factors that clearly contribute to the typology of cyber aggression will enhance understanding of cyber aggression. Alternatively, the existing typology may be revisited.

Conclusion

Online communication is part of a daily life today. This significant alteration in our communication has also created inappropriate and harmful online behaviors. Cyber aggression is one such behavior. Unlike verbal aggression, research evidence for cyber aggression is still limited. Thus, this essay started discussing the relationship between verbal and cyber aggression to attempt to identify some important factors that are associated with cyber aggression. While verbal aggression can be a predictor of cyber aggression, there are also some personality traits as well as distinct situational factors that are related to cyber aggression, which may be able to explain the predictive relationship between verbal and cyber aggression in a more concrete way. Although cyber aggression has been categorized into four types based on the offender's motives, most personality traits and situational factors seem to involve all types of aggressive behavior. Empirical studies will certainly clarify the issues. This preliminary work sheds light on this emergent yet significant research area to understand the reasons why people engage in aggressive behavior online. As stated earlier, victims of cyber aggression can be total strangers, and a large number of strangers can be the victims. Those victims experience a higher degree of uncertainty (Pure, 2010), which could cause severe mental damage for them. Thus, it is critical to protect potential victims by understanding the predictors of cyber aggression. Finally, future research on victims' consequences will also contribute to reduce the amount of cyber aggression.

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
Figure 1. Predictors of Cyber Aggression

EXPLORATIONS AND REDEFINITIONS OF HUMAN SEXUALITY AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE ERA OF NEW MEDIA TECHNOLOGY: THE INVIGORATION OF EXPLOITATIONS OF FILIPINO MEN AND WOMEN

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Abstract

The advent of the new media technology introduces many ways to cultivate sexual connections between and among individuals across boundaries and geographical territories. Various forms of relationships, which several decades ago would not have been possible, have been cultivated. These apparent changes in sexuality and/or relationships brought implications and ramifications to modern social lives. Aggression and exploitation among men and women of various nationalities, including Filipinos, have been observed by scholars and academics in the past 10 years. To explore this situation, this research paper had the following objectives: 1. Describe the phenomenology of virtual

relationships through the testimonies of Filipino women and men who are indulging themselves in this kind of relationships; 2. Explore the motivations and drives of Filipino men and women in indulging in virtual relationships; 3. Describe and classify sexual deviations and sexual neurosis that may likely develop from virtual relationships; and 4. Explain the possible exploitations of Filipino men and women that may be caused by these sexual interactions through the digital and internet technology.

Introduction

Generally, there are about 33 million internet users in the Philippines or more than 30% of its entire population (Asia Marketing Research, 2013). These users are engaged in various internet-based activities including videochatting, social networking, research, and education. The latest 2012 data published by Social Media Monitor Semiocast, a company based in Paris, France, showed that there are less than 10 million users of twitter.com from the Philippines. The country ranked 10th in number of users on this social networking site. It trailed behind Spain (9th), but it overtook Turkey, which ranked 11th (Twitter reaches, 2012). The Philippines also ranked 8th among countries with the most users of facebook.com. Almost 28 million Filipino users are recorded. This means that the penetration rate of facebook in the Philippines is 27.75%. There are approximately five Filipinos who open their facebook accounts every minute (Five Filipinos, 2012).

These above data may be surprising to few, considering that only about 30% of the Philippines has internet access as compared to its neighboring countries like Singapore and South Korea. Likewise, the Philippines' internet access remains slow and expensive (Malig, 2012). It also trails behind South East Asian countries in terms of internet speed and broadband adoption (Tuazon, 2013).

With this reality, Philippines is exposed to both the negative and positive impacts of the new media technology. As Filipinos benefit from the useful information and knowledge that technology provides and facilitates, a huge number of Filipinos also become greatly vulnerable to various threats and risks that the internet technology poses, such as cyber exploitation, cybercrimes, etc. This paper primarily studied one of these risks, most particularly the invigorated sexual exploitations that occur in cyberspace. Though the paper focused on the phenomenology of virtual

relationships through the testimonies of Filipino participants, it tried to approximate and inconclusively redefine human relations and sexuality.

Literature Review

Virtual Reality and Cyberspace: Impact on Society

The simple definition of virtual reality is near-reality. It comes both from *virtual*, which means near, and *reality*, which refers to the phenomenon that human beings experience. It is a type of reality emulation. In the world of computers, virtual reality is a three dimensional, computer generated environment which can be explored and interacted with by a person (*What is virtual,* n.d).

For French sociologist Jean Baudrillard, virtual reality is synonymous with his postmodern concept of hyperreality (Baudrillard, 1995). He defines it as the generation by models of a real world without origin or reality. It is a representation, a sign, without an original referent. This means that for Baudrillard, hyperreality is a virtual world entirely remote from the real.

Although virtual realities and activities do not happen in a tangible environment and happen only on cyberspace, Michael Heim (1998) observed that social dynamics and personal interaction in the real world are inherently changed and affected. The same observation was also offered by Carmella Kedem (1999). The social dynamics of education, communication, business and personal relationships and interactions are greatly impacted.

In the field of education, the effect is great. For example, the proliferation of various online universities and online academic programs that facilitate learning for a vast number of students around the world, without the necessity of face-to-face interaction between teachers and learners, is a thing that was never imagined possible several decades ago. Interactions between learners and teachers have become more and more inessential. Knowledge and information have become so accessible that anybody could easily access almost all information in various fields of study in no time.

Like education, social, as well as individual, communication is also greatly affected by the new technology. Communication has become so fast that what happens in one geographical point is instantaneously known

by an individual from a distant point. Two individuals who are miles apart can now communicate with each other as if there is no distance at all between them. This scenario was never before possible, even after the invention of the telegraph and subsequently, the telephone.

Almost all information that anybody needs could easily be accessed anywhere and anytime. Business industries have become more and more dependent on this technology to stay afloat in the steep competition.

Personal relationships and interactions have also been greatly affected by cyberspace. Concepts like virtual friendships, virtual partnerships and online relationships have started to surface.

Virtual Friendships, Virtual Partnerships, Online Relationships: Distinguished

With the rapid development and movement of internet technology since its early beginning in the 1990s, social landscapes have certainly changed along with it. As pointed out, the technology has affected almost all spheres of human life. The internet has great impacts on education, communication, business, governance, morality and religion, and most importantly --human relationships.

Human relationships have taken on different characteristics because of the new technology. For example, concepts like *virtual friends/friendship*, *virtual partners/partnership*, and *online relationships*, which several decades back were not even part of our vocabulary, emerged. Steve Summers (2009) collapsed all these three concepts into one, which he generally calls "friendships in virtual communities." On the contrary, the researchers of this paper believed that there should be distinctions. The distinctions could be based on the purpose of the connection.

Virtual friendship is purposely forged to build a business/professional network and for other non-sexual purposes of connections. Virtual friends are friends that an individual collects through social networking sites like facebook, twitter, etc. In this kind of friendship, the individuals who are so much exposed to social networks tend to open their private lives to their virtual friends, who also reciprocate by opening their lives to them. Most of the time, in virtual friendships, friends do not even meet in person. They just know each other online and/or in cyberspace.

A *virtual partnership* is purposely forged to strengthen a particular advocacy or stance on an issue. It can also cultivate a particular interest

which all the partners consider valuable. Virtual partnership is, thus, simply an aggrupation. Most of the time, the virtual partnership is only in cyberspace. The partnership is formed, cultivated, and sometimes ended in cyberspace.

A virtual partnership is entirely different from an online relationship. An *online relationship* assumes a sexual characteristic. It could either be developed between two individuals of opposite sex (heterosexual) or two individuals of the same sex (homosexual). In this kind of cyber relationship, sex--both as a gender and an activity, is always a consideration. The relationship is not for any advocacy or for any stance. The relationship is for sexual gratification, and sometimes for love and mutual affection.

Virtual friendships, virtual partnerships, and online relationships are new phenomena, but they have certainly become part of the adolescent culture (Wolak, et al., 2003). These concepts, though new, radically changed what human beings normally consider usual and normal socio-psycho phenomenon.

Relationships in Cyberspace

Relationships formed over cyberspace are nowadays common and at times considered conventional. Like any relationship, internet relationships are forged for various reasons, such as battling loneliness, seeking intimacy, gratification of sexual desires, and even curiosity. The internet is only used as a vehicle for two people to meet, interact and form these relationships.

There have been numerous researches and studies that have been undertaken to explore the dynamics of internet relationships: how these relationships are established and how these relationships affect existing normal/physical relationships.

According to Underwood and Findlay (2004), online partners start to form relationships when they find and discover similarities and commonalities especially in the way they think (intellect), their emotional make-up, and their perspective (world view). The respondents of Underwood and Findlay also noted that the internet allows them to greatly reduce their social anxiety (which is common in personal/physical relationships), thus, allowing them to disclose themselves freely. It was

also observed by these researchers that most online relationships are between persons from distant geographical points.

Mckenna, Green and Gleason (2002) showed that individuals who are more comfortable in divulging their true selves and inner selves online to others than face-to-face are most likely to form virtual relationships and that they probably bring these virtual relationships to the real world. If they don't bring these relationships to the real world, these relationships would just disappear.

Though the internet is conducive to friendships because it permits disclosure at will, voluntary connection, mutual consent, and concealment of defects, internet relationships are not sustainable over the long term on their own terms.

Wolak, Mitchell and Fingelhor (2003) claimed that youthful individuals who are having troubled relationships with their parents and family would have greater possibility of forming online relationships. In their study, which used data from the United States of America, they pointed out that online relationships are established, especially by young people, to escape from their poor relationships with their family and parents and to avoid living their troubled lives.

In a relatively similar study, Wysocki (1998) speculated that sexual gratification may be another powerful reason for the formation of online relationships. This speculation was drawn from the reports of his respondents who mostly admitted that their online communications are always related to sex.

Some online relationships are also forged for the purpose of prostitution. Sarah Earle and Keith Sharp (2007) observed that prostitution in cyberspace also forged relationships between a man who pays for sex and a prostitute who sells sex.

Sexuality and Exploitation on Cyberspace

Donna Hughes (2002) observed that the sexual exploitation of women and children is prevalent in new communication and information technologies. This was two years before the popular social network Facebook was founded and four years before Twitter started. Sexual exploitations in cyberspace have more and more become distinguishable from real-physical sexual exploitation.

In a virtual context, sexual exploitations do have some dynamics that may be different from real (not virtual) experiences. For example, online enticement could not easily be classified as either acquaintance-abduction or stranger-abduction. This is because online sexual exploitation has the dynamics of both (Berson, 2003). When an online relationship is built with someone, an individual who is involved no longer perceives another individual as an outsider. This is when a complete stranger is perceived as a peer and so defenses against strangers are not triggered anymore. Although both adults and children could be easily victimized by predators, children are more vulnerable because of their young and innocent dispositions.

In Hughes' research, she pointed out that sexual exploitations in cyberspace, as perpetrated particularly over chat rooms, were alarming. During this time, chatrooms had been very popular; there were around 100,000 chat rooms available to users worldwide. As there are a high number of chatrooms, numerous cases of sexual exploitation and assault were noted, especially in the US and the UK (Hughes, 2002). Both children and female adults have become vulnerable to cyber predators who most often inflict emotional and physical abuses online and offline.

Hughes (2002) noted that the use of new communication and information technologies for the sexual exploitation of women and children is creating a crisis for women and children's status, rights and dignity all over the world. She stressed that exploitations in cyberspace continue to grow with the increased number of users on the net.

Ilene Berson (2003) reaffirmed Hughes stance. Berson claimed that chatrooms, where young people initiate exchanges and conversations online, have become so dangerous that the safety and well-being of the users are threatened. Often, predators perform chameleon-like behaviors and attitudes so sophisticated that they easily prey on young adults and children. Users in chatrooms at times assume different identities and characters to either lure, fool or deceive other users. Berson labeled this as Cyber Grooming.

Briggs, Simon and Simonsen (2011) explored how chatrooms create a new typology of sexual offenders. They characterized chatroom sexual offenders to be either contact- driven or fantasy-driven. The contact-driven group is motivated to engage in offline sexual behavior with an adolescent, whereas, the fantasy-driven group is motivated to engage an adolescent in online cybersex without express intent to meet offline.

These two groups remain dangerous and risky to both children and adult preys.

The behavioral description of online chat room sex offenders is "predatory" (Briggs et.al, 2011). They usually search chat rooms to look for vulnerable teenagers, both male and female. They start conversations with normal and neutral exchanges. They manipulate and control the interactions until the exchanges become so sexually charged. This process of manipulation paves the way to sexual exploitation.

Other than chat rooms, social networking sites are also utilized by predators in victimizing their prey (Katzin et al., 2011). There have been several US cases involving sexual exploitations in cyberspace since 2006. For instance, in June 2012, Joseph Anthony Kallash was sentenced to 15 years in prison after sexually abusing a minor in Owing Mills, Maryland, USA. Kallash met the minor victim over the social networking site facebook.com. On January 8, 2013, Middletown Press reported that Richard Henricks, a former East Hampton Middle School teacher, was sentenced to 121 months in prison. Forensic evaluations revealed that Henricks used his computer to receive numerous images and videos of pornography, including images of children under the age of 12, and images portraying sadistic or masochistic conduct and other depictions of sexual violence (Ex-Teacher, 2013). The saddest part of this case was that most of the files of Hendricks primarily originated from the Philippines.

Method

The participants were carefully selected according to the general notion or idea of the dominant research theme: cyberspace relationships and sexual exploitation. Consistent with this general notion, the researchers identified five participants who would likely supply important ideas about the research theme based on their lived experiences as having engaged in online relationships and exchanges. The researchers sought out the help of colleagues and students in the University who could possibly refer them to Filipino male or female internet users who probably experienced online relationships and/or sexual exploitation in cyberspace. With these referrals, about 20 candidates had been shortlisted. After initial visits and interviews were conducted, the researchers finally trimmed down the number to five participants. However, two of the five shortlisted participants backed out before their turn for interview. Thus, the researchers had only three participants for this study.

Having in mind representativeness and generalizability of this qualitative research, the researchers conveniently selected the participants according to the following gender, sexual orientation, age, marital status, and economic conditions. According to gender, there are two biologically female participants and one male participant. As to sexual orientation, the researchers decided to have at least one participant who comes from the LGBT community. As to age, the participants are within the age range of 24-43. As to marital status, two participants are single and one is married. One participant earns a stable income from his profession as a government employee. The other two participants live below the poverty line.

The researchers employed personal or face-to-face interviews in the conduct of the research. To avoid leading the participants towards a particular biased end result, the researchers did not employ a structured interview guide. The researchers decided to just ask two general questions after orienting the participants about the research topic and theme. The two questions were: First, can you describe as detailed as possible in which you experience "Online Relationship and Sexual Exploitation"? Second, can you describe a situation about "Online Relationship and Sexual Exploitation" in which you remembered something emotional? The second question is meant to generate psychological and emotional memories from the participants. Other questions were also asked in relation to their general responses to focus their responses one the phenomenon of online relationships and sexual exploitation.

Prior to the formal face-to-face interview proper, the researchers conducted pre-interviews at least one week before the formal and scheduled interview with the participants. These preliminary meetings and initial interviews allowed the participants to develop trust in the researchers. It was also meant to establish rapport and it initially acquainted the participants with the objectives and the research theme. These pre-interviews were also intended to give the participants more time to ponder and remember vividly the experience.

The Narratives of the Participants

Electra: A Filipina Yearning for Love

Electra obtained her Mass Communication degree from a private university in Metro Manila. She is 43 years old and single. She is about 5"2' in height. Despite her weighty built, she is very fashionable and neat looking. With her fair complexion, Electra, though not a stunner, is pleasant looking. She is graceful and careful in her manners, like a typical middle-class professional.

Electra has worked in a government agency for over 20 years. With her stable job, she lives a very comfortable life. Since her parents have already passed away, Electra lives by herself and no one depends on her for sustenance. Her siblings also do not need any financial support from her because most of them are well-placed and well-off.

She lives alone in a condominium unit just a stone's throw away from her office. During the day, Electra's life is not uncommon. She goes to work at 8 am and leaves at 5pm. She walks straight home and prepares her dinner. Before she retires for the day to sleep, Electra would spend four to five hours video-chatting with her American boyfriend named Spencer, whom she never met in person.

Spencer is not Electra's first online relationship. He is the fifth. The first online boyfriend she had was Edward from Wales, United Kingdom in 2004, followed by three others, Robert from the Middle East, Sane from the USA, and Brye from South Africa. According to Electra, she was introduced to chatting online in the early quarter of 2004. It was her batch mate in college that introduced the medium to her. From then on, Electra by herself explored the technology until she met Edward in one of the chatrooms.

In 2004, Electra was feeling so desperate. She was sad and remembered that since she broke off from her college boyfriend in the 1990s (he married and eventually left for the USA and immigrated), she had not had any serious sexual relationships. She admitted during the interview that her college boyfriend was the first man with whom she had sexual intercourse. She had not had any physical sexual intercourse since.

When she met Edward online, she was fascinated by the technology and she was even more amazed by the sexual gratifications she got from all her online conversations and chattings with Edward. Early on in the

relationship, there were only sexual innuendos and undertones in the conversations. These undertones made her addicted to the connection even more. After five months of constant chatting, sexual undertones become so sexually manipulative, instructive and direct. Edward would make her so aroused through his carefully calculated chats that she would do almost all the sexual instructions given her. Almost every encounter, Electra would end up masturbating to gratify her sexual desires. Likewise, Electra would also satisfy Edward with her sexual chats that were meant to gratify him. This went on for one and a half years without any physical connection. They never met even once. The relationship stopped when suddenly Edward was no longer in the same chatroom and not even in other chatrooms. His account was no longer active. Electra was left wondering the reasons why the relationship stopped. Was it her fault? Was it anything she said or did while online? She had never gotten any answers to all her questions.

After almost a month of waiting for Edward, Electra was finally convinced that what she had with the British, if indeed he was British, was a case of sexual exploitation she would never forget. There was no genuine feeling and all was about online sex. Though she was never violated physically, she felt that she was used and overly abused by what happened. All the emotional investments she poured came to naught. She thought that everything was real. She even stayed faithful and loving throughout the relationship. She considered the relationship as if it was a conventional relationship.

In the second quarter of 2007, Electra again found herself in another online relationship. This time it was with Robert. Robert was an American living and working in Saudi Arabia in an Arab-American oil company. He was 33. By this time, Electra demanded a lot of personal information from Robert: his age, address, work, real and passport name, and other facts. Robert seemed so real that he obliged all Electra's requests. Electra verified and counter-checked all the information given to her. To her satisfaction, all the information was truthful. Though they started their exchanges in the same chatroom where she met Edward, their relationship also employed other online media such as email, video chat, picture–sharing sites, etc. This was deliberate on the part of Electra to avoid the incident with Edward from happening again.

With the use of other online media, Electra's relationship with Robert was more intense and serious in that she started to show her naked body online by using a small camera through video chatting. Robert would likewise

show Electra his naked body while masturbating and toying with his sex organ. He likewise taught Electra to use devices such as battery-operated vibrators in her masturbation. This went on for a year. Robert seemed so kind, patient, gentle, loving and caring all throughout their togetherness and exchanges online.

In early 2008, Robert was asked by his company to go to Malaysia for an observation and inspection for a possible business partnership. Robert obliged Electra to meet him there. At the expense of Robert, Electra flew in to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia nervous, uncomfortable but excited. She admitted that during her three hours of air travel she was thinking and fantasizing about the physical sexual intercourse that would eventually happen the moment she met Robert in his hotel. She was so sure to give herself to Robert. Robert picked her up from the airport. Then they proceeded to the hotel where he stayed. Immediately upon closing the room-door, Robert and Electra passionately kissed each other so torridly, indicating their bursting lust for each other. They had sex all day and night. Electra had never been so happy.

But her happiness was short lived. During the third day of her stay with Robert in Malaysia, things became so different. Robert became violent and temperamental. The slightest error on her part would cause him to yell at her and shout at the top of his lungs. Robert also slapped her face twice when she had accidentally broken his belt buckle. She was so afraid. She realized that Robert was completely different from the way he projected himself online. During the fourth day, while Robert was asleep, Electra left for Manila and never contacted Robert again.

It was difficult for her to accept what happened. But she was intelligent enough to avoid more pain and abuses. When she arrived in Manila, she immediately deleted all her old accounts on the internet like email, chatrooms, video chats, etc. in order not to be traced and stalked and reached by Robert. She also decided then to change her residence. This was the time when she bought the condo unit where she now lives.

A few months thereafter, Electra registered first on Friendster and later, on facebook. It was through these social networking sites that she developed short-term online relationships with Sane and Brye. Her relationship with Sane was not so memorable that it never left an imprint in her memory. Sane and Electra just suddenly stopped contacting each other without any known reasons at all. Then she saw some pictures posted by Sane with his wife and his newly born baby boy.

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Her relationship with Brye was a virtual friendship. Brye would just share stories with her. He would ask her for pieces of advice and suggestions. There was no sexual relationship that happened between them. They remained friends until she met Spencer on facebook.

Her story with Spencer is still an open story. So far, she is happy with Spencer. They had already experienced online sex or cybersex and Electra felt that she has to oblige herself to engage in such sexual activities to keep her man.

Cez: A Born Performer Online

Cez is biologically male and is a homosexual. He is gay since his childhood. Cez is from a dysfunctional family. His father left for Mindanao (Southern Philippines) and never came back. His mother is a peddler of cigarettes and candies in one of the major thoroughfares in Tondo, Manila. Most of his siblings are either jobless or drug addicts.

Cez was a very diligent and active college student. He was on scholarship. He was very active in a student theatre organization in his university. He was known for his talent in singing and acting. His comedic antics during school programs would always stand out. He was a born performer and crowd pleaser.

One year before graduation, Cez decided to stop schooling. Thinking that the family needed him for support, he decided to work as a part-time stand-up comedian in one of the bars in Quezon City, also in the Metropolitan Manila area. He earns $10 per night of performance. This amount is a big help to his starving family. He only has three shows in a week. He thought that the income he got from his part-time work was not enough to feed his family and to sustain some of his personal whims, so he decided to look for another source of income, especially during his vacant time. A colleague in the bar, who is also gay, introduced to him online cybersex performance where he could possibly earn around $100 to $200 in a week.

At first, Cez could not imagine performing sexual acts in front of the camera. He said that this violates his long-held values and religious orientation. But his hesitation was not long. He still decided and was forced by circumstance to try the job.

In 2007, his comedian friend brought him to a house located in the slums of Sampaloc, Manila. Upon reaching the place, Cez immediately noticed several individuals who were performing various sexual acts in front of

cameras hooked to the internet. Just on the ground floor alone, there were 12 performers and 5 performers on the second floor. The operation is 24/7. Performers work on a shift-to-shift basis.

The house is a two-story house. Computers and booths are arranged so that performers cannot see each other. Performers are varied. The house is owned by a certain Malou, a grocery owner in the locality. Malou is the operator of the cyber prostitution den.

Cez was enticed to join the packs of cyber performers on a part-time basis, performing only during Friday nights. For every hour of performance online, Cez earns around $80, while the operator earns $20, on average. During his first night of performance, Cez was shocked to learn the trade.

Malou, the operator, co-owns (with a Chinese national) the pornographic website which advertises the services of online sex performers. The website has around 1,500 registered users from around the world. On the website, pictures of naked Filipino women and gays are posted with various screen names. The users would have to click the picture to directly access the account of the performer. Once the users accessed the performer, they would be asked to enter their credit card information in order for the performance to commence. The minimum payment that the users have to pay is $10 per 5 minutes and $120 for an hour. The money is directly siphoned to the account of the Chinese operator who in turn transfers the money to the Philippines. Cez and the other performers just get their money from Malou.

For one year, Cez performed various sexual acts before hundreds of users. When Cez was asked to detail the performance, he obliged. According to him, in almost every performance unusual and exotic sexual acts were performed. He would use battery operated vibrators, softdrink bottles, toothpaste tubes, wooden baton, and other objects as may be requested by the client/user. Cez was most often requested by the client/users to insert any desired object into his rectum and his oral orifice. He would dance naked. Sing naked. Act out famous characters with pornographic twists. And the most demeaning according to Cez was when the client/user would request him, for a much higher rate, to perform sexual intercourse with another gay performer, female prostitute, Filipino young/minor boys, and the most unforgettable would be intercourse with an animal (cat).

Cez got used to this set of activities that his perception about its ethical dimension began to be blurred. He would always justify it by the hefty

income the activities generated which continuously sustained his family. When asked about the relationship he forged with his clients through his job, Cez told the researchers that he just considered the clients/users simply as a source of income. He would always make sure that no personal attachment would develop.

In January 2008, Cez had an addicted Irish client. After three weeks of continuous connection, the Irish client offered a steady connection. He gave Cez 2,000 British pounds demanding he resign from his cybersex job. Cez could not refuse such an offer. What he did was to accede to the Irish man's request. He resigned immediately from Malou's cybersex den.

Cez used the money to make repairs and improve their shabby and dilapidated shanty, which made his family happy. With whatever was left, Cez bought three sets of desktop computers and hooked the PCs to the internet. One PC became his constant vehicle to get in touch with the Irish national and the other two PCs where used by Cez to start his own cybersex den operation without the knowledge of his Irish boyfriend. Cez did not use any website to advertise his business. He just asked his performers to befriend any nationality over the social networking site facebook. Cez calls it "operation hunting." They hunt for possible client over facebook.

Other than the bulk money that was transferred to the account of Cez, the Irish boyfriend regularly sent an average of 200 UK pounds per month to him. Cez felt comfortable with the setup. He also earns around 100 to 150 USD per month from the other two PCs.

In April of 2008, the Irishman decided to visit Cez. The Irishman, about 34 years of age, reserved a cozy hotel a few miles from the airport. He requested Cez accompany him in the hotel for five days. Cez obliged. They made love almost every day. Despite the insistence of Cez, the Irishman, who left for Thailand for another 10 days, did not meet Cez's family and friends. The Irishman also did not give Cez any money during their Manila meeting.

After two days, Cez received a message from his Irish boyfriend. The message said: "I WENT TO THAILAND TO MEET ANOTHER HOMOSEXUAL. PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT ME ANYMORE. HOPE THAT YOU ARE COMPENSATED WELL WITH ALL YOUR SERVICES. THANK YOU. I AM NOT EVIL AFTERALL."

Cez was devastated upon receiving this message. Not because he learned to love the Irishman but because he was thinking that the allowance and all the money he was getting from the Irishman would suddenly stop. He was devastated because of the thought that he would be forced to go back to his old ways and lifestyle. He would be compelled to go back to Malou's ward. He realized that the small cybersex business he put up certainly could not measure up with the resources of Malou. Cez went back to Malou.

Sweet: Married and Wanting to Escape

Sweet is a 35 year-old accounting assistant based in Pasay City (Metro Manila). She is married and has a 13 year old daughter. She was compelled to marry at the very young age of 22 to her boyfriend when she unexpectedly got pregnant despite all her precautions and measures not to bear a child. Hesitant though she was, Sweet was civilly married to Ben, her boyfriend, whom she loved less. She would always tell her friends that she was not sure about her feelings towards Ben and that she was not ready to commit herself to a lifelong relationship.

Since the start of their relationship, Ben and Sweet quarreled over anything. They just did not fit with one another. Jealousy, finances, and trust issues caused the relationship to crumble. When the couple's daughter turned nine years old, they decided to part ways. Sweet, together with her daughter, went and stayed with a relative, and Ben remained in the conjugal home.

Sweet was not so fond of computers and the internet. She would say *"Walang appeal sa akin ang pa-facebook facebook na yan* (Facebook did not have any appeal for me), I only used computers to type documents and make powerpoint presentation for my company." She seldom opened her email account. She had only five friends in her facebook account. She rarely visited and updated her facebook page. Until sometime in 2012 a friend request from Patrick Buckley popped up in account, she immediately accepted the request. Patrick Buckley introduced himself as a real state professional from Central London, United Kingdom.

After three straight weeks of getting connected, they began to develop an intimate relationship. They began to use other media as well, such as chatting, mobile phones, and emails. Sweet fell so madly in love with Patrick. She started to entertain thoughts of getting a formal annulment of her marriage to Ben. She started to entertain thoughts of immigrating to United Kingdom with her daughter and cohabitate with Patrick. Patrick,

according to Sweet's assessment, could be a great stepfather for her daughter and a greater lover for her.

Despite the disagreement of some friends and relatives, Sweet remained steadfast and stubborn about her relationship with Patrick. The couple would always be burning their lines and talk over the phone almost every day. Sweet would always receive thoughtful and loving messages from Patrick.

Sweet spent so much time on her cellular phone and laptop talking with Patrick. She was always on her phone giggling, laughing, and whispering sweet notes to Patrick. "*Minsan napapabayaan ko na nga yung mga basic needs ng anak ko at hindi na rin kami masyadong naguusap.*" (Sometimes I tend to forget the basic needs of my daughter and it comes to a point where I seldom communicate with my daughter.)

"Dumating sa punto na sa tindi ng pagmamahal ko sa kanya, inaaway ko na lahat ng tao na nakapaligid sa akin. Pinaglaban ko talaga sya at aming pagibig." (It came to a point where, because of my deepest love for him, I would be in conflict with some people around me. I fought for him and our love.)

"My dislike for my husband who kept on wooing me to go back to the conjugal home even intensified. I was so confident that life with Patrick would be far better. My daughter would have a great future with Patrick. Despite all the efforts that my husband exerted, I was already so convinced of separating from him permanently and the prospect of a life with Patrick excited me."

When Sweet's job, relationship with her relatives, relationship with her daughter were already affected in a bad way, her relatives, especially Ethel, decided to investigate the real identity of Patrick. This investigation of Ethel infuriated Sweet. She got mad at Ethel. Her aunties and other cousins were alarmed.

Sweet was so head over heels in love with Patrick that she was blinded, until an incident happened after 10 months of their relationship. Patrick called her up using a UK number. He was telling her about a nephew who was incarcerated in Malaysia for a drug crime while touring the Asian country. The Malaysian authorities, he claimed, were asking around USD 1500 as bribe money. He told sweet that he could not go to Malaysia immediately and that it was midnight in the UK. Banks were closed. Time was of the essence, he told Sweet. He requested Sweet deposit the amount

into the account of a certain Malaysian sounding name. He told Sweet that the name to whom the deposit was to be made belongs to a Malaysian police officer tasked to collect the money. Failure to deposit the money would mean death or life imprisonment for Patrick's nephew. Sweet was so shocked. She wanted to help Patrick but she could not do it because she had no money to send.

When she told Patrick of her inability to help and send money to Malaysia, Patrick broke up with her. Sweet was devastated. She thought that the love was real and genuine and that Patrick was a real lover. She felt so violated and abused. She had been scammed.

In her own investigation, she discovered that Patrick was a Malaysian national posing as British. He used a UK cellular number which made it appear that he was really calling and communicating from Britain. But the truth is that he was just placing calls from Malaysia. Sweet discovered that Patrick was able to do it by getting a UK number over the net the FREE UK NUMBER site. Patrick lured women from around the world, attacked their vulnerability and then when the women were already in love with him, he would demand money.

Today, Sweet is trying to fix her marriage with Ben. Though they are not yet perfectly fine, things look brighter for their relationship. Sweet preferred not to tell Ben about what happened with her and Patrick. She decided to just forget about the incident and erase all the bad memories.

She also decided to deactivate her facebook account at the moment. The experience really devastated her but she learned so much from it.

"It was really painful because I lost him. I felt very abused and that I wasted precious time, efforts and emotions. But the experience taught me something good—that I have to value the love and care of my family," she finally said.

Discussion

In past decades before cyber technology and all the elements that came with it, human relationships and sexual connections and activities were very simple or uncomplicated. In the Philippines, women are courted in the most traditional ways.

Men have to exert so much effort to impress the women they love. A suitor is required to visit the woman's house and he had to ask permission

from her parents. During the suitor's visits, he has to cultivate rapport with the entire family. He has to woo all the members of the family to show that he respects and values the host family After several visits, the suitor has to do '*paninilbihan*' or servitude.

The process of courting in the Philippines, in the traditional way, is a difficult process. The Filipina is expected to play hard-to-get as the norm dictates. Hence, no matter how the woman likes the suitor, she has to show disinterest and utmost restraint.

The case of Electra showed that Philippine courtship tradition is no longer as valued by women as before. Electra's series of online relationships did not show her playing hard-to-get, as the tradition demands. She was easily lured by the glibness of her online suitors. She also did not exercise caution in dealing with online users. She was so used and contented with her cyber love life that all her relationships after her college boyfriend were on cyberspace.

The sexual and even physical (courtesy of Edward) abuses that she experienced at the hands of her online partners should have deterred her from having other online relationships. But she continued to be hooked and addicted to search for some other online partners. The bleak experiences became circuitous and repetitive and yet she remained so used and immune.

There is likelihood that she was already disillusioned by the pleasure she was getting from the online sexual gratifications and the online connection that she forged. This disillusionment made her more distant from real life relationships, particularly normal heterosexual relationships. Perhaps, her being hooked on cyber relationships caused her to get older without any real physical partner or boyfriend in the traditional sense of the word.

In the case of Sweet, Patrick Buckley who groomed himself to be a very decent, wealthy and responsible British national wooed Sweet without even a single element of traditional Filipino courtship. The relationship blossomed as he deceitfully projected himself to be so in love with Sweet-who was then longing for a genuine love that she never experienced with her Filipino husband. A deceitful man, like Patrick, could never give the respect for women and family that the Filipino courtship norm demands.

Electra and Sweet were obviously abused and violated. They were both emotionally, psychologically and sexually abused by their cyber partners.

What they did online, though, truly satisfied and somehow gratified their sexual needs, turned out to be activities that shattered their perceptions. Electra's perception about sexual relationships became so much grounded in virtuality. Her sexual satisfaction become more and more anchored on activities such as masturbation, pornography and sex talks. Electra's continued search for online partners one after another is a testament to this.

The exploitation and deception that Sweet experienced altered her perceptions. Her perception about family was altered. She became so hooked to Patrick that she forgot her obligations to her daughter. She was at war and in conflict with almost all the closest people around her because of her boyfriend.

Clearly, Electra and Sweet share the same motivation for engaging in online relationships, which eventually caused them pain. Their motivation was LOVE. They were searching and looking for genuine love and love that also satisfies their sexual desires. This is where Cez, our second participant, differs from the two. Cez's principal drive was MONEY. He wanted to help his starving family. He wanted to provide them with a good life. Cez also nurtured online relationships but relationships between customer and performer.

Cez was abused not because of love and manipulations of a lover. Cez was abused online because of his customers or audience wanting to be entertained and wanting to satisfy their eccentric and exotic sexual desires. Cez never felt love during the course of his performance. He always considered the cyberporn site where he appears as a stage.

With the exposure of the three participants to the exploitation/abuses of cyber relationships, the following sexual deviations were observed to be either present or likely to be present in the psychological make-up of the participants:

1. *Masochism* is defined as gaining sexual pleasure from receipt of pain and humiliation (Thomson, 1959). Electra manifested slight symptoms of masochism. Despite constant pain and abuses that she got from her online relationships, she still remained hooked and addicted to the activity.
2. *Scoptophilia* is a deviation in which a person gains pleasure from seeing some undressed individuals with their genitals out, or from observing a couple in the act of coitus (Thomson, 1959). Both Electra and Sweet may be affected by this if they do not stop

indulging in online cybersex. Online cybersex facilitates scoptophilia.

3. *Exhibitionism* is a deviation in which the individual gains pleasure from exposing his/her genitals and his/her sexual activities (Thomson, 1959). Cez is likely afflicted by this deviation. Electra and Sweet also have the tendency to be afflicted by this sexual deviation.

Conclusion

The use of new communication and information technologies for the sexual exploitation of women and men is becoming more and more pronounced as social networking and internet penetration is becoming widespread. The testimonies of the participants manifested the gravity of the abuses and violence that are committed against them. Despite the variety of reasons that drove the participants to engage in online relationships, exploitations, though different in forms, certainly impacted the way the participants lived their lives.

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